The Western Front’s intelligence summary, also issued at 2000 hours on 23 July, added enemy context to the operational mosaic by asserted the enemy was “straining every nerve to concentrate his main efforts along the Vitebsk and Smolensk axes” and bringing “considerable forces forward with the aim of liquidating our Smolensk grouping” on 22 and 23 July. It then summarized the situation along the most important axes and added its conclusion as to what all of this meant:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix F, 12.

• General Situation – the enemy, while directing his main efforts along the Vitebsk and Smolensk axes, brought significant forces forward on 22 and 23 July with the aim of liquidating our Smolensk grouping. Along the Nevel’ axis, the enemy is trying to complete offensive action toward Nevel’ and Velikie Luki, while transferring part of his forces from the Nevel’ and Gorodok regions toward Il’ino and Toropets. Along the Mogilev axis, the enemy is going over to an active defense along the Sozh River and, simultaneously, continuing to encircle the Mogilev grouping. Along the Rogachev and Pinsk axes, the enemy is continuing to concentrate forces for a transition to a general offensive.
• The Smolensk axis – the enemy brought three divisions forward (5th ID, an SS Division, and an unknown division) to the Kasplia, Rudnia, and Komissarovo region [northwest and north of Smolensk] and up to one motorized and one panzer division to the Lenino and Krasnoe region [west of Smolensk], and attacked toward Smolensk from the northwest and west on 23 July, driving our forces southeastward and eastward. The enemy is defending the El’nia and Pochinok regions with 17th and 18th PzDs in order to protect the concentration of SS “Das Reich” Division for an attack toward Smolensk and Dorogobuzh.
• Conclusion – the enemy committed three-four fresh divisions along the entire front from 21-23 July, and, after regrouping his forces on the central axis, he concentrated his efforts on liquidating the Smolensk grouping (16th, 19th, and 20th Armies) by attacking with three divisions toward Smolensk from the west. Simultaneously, he tried to complete encircling our forces in the Iartsevo region, while protecting his main attacking force in the Kresty, Il’ino, and Solov’evo region against attacks by our forces [Group Rokossovsky] from the north.68

In the wake of Timoshenko’s rather optimistic operational summary and accurate description of Army Group Center’s strategic and operational intentions, early on 24 July, Lukin and his commissar Lobachev described 16th Army’s actions on 23 July in a report that clearly dampened Timoshenko’s previous optimism:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix F, 13.

• Enemy – stubbornly defending Smolensk, concentrating fresh forces in the Kasplia and Vydra regions, and captured Vydra with up two battalions.
• 16th Army – failed to fulfill its missions of completely cleaning out the northern part of the city, and 34th RC’s units and 46th RD are continuing to assemble their personnel and put them in order.
• 152nd RD – fighting within the city, cooperating with 129th RD’s attacks to seize the northeastern outskirts of Smolensk, and still missing the two battalions “loaned” to 20th Army.
• 129th RD – fighting on the approaches to the northern part of the city, with its right wing reaching the airfield’s hanger and its left wing, Tantsovka.
• 46th RD – assembling and reorganizing its forces and regrouping to Shchetkino and Nikeevshchina, [4-5 kilometers east of Smolensk] to relieve 129th RD’s units and assault Smolensk.
• 34th RC (127th and 158th RDs) (about 500 men) – assembling and reorganizing its units near Hill 315 and Lozyn’, but still missing the motorized regiment promised by Rokossovsky.
• Decisions:
♦ Seize the northern part of the city with 152nd, 129th, and 46th RDs on 24 July.
♦ Continue assembling and concentrating 9th and 3rd RCs on 24 July.
♦ Thereafter, prepare to force the Dnepr River and capture the southern part of Smolensk.
• Requests:
♦ Accelerate the arrival of the motorized regiment from Rokossovsky.
♦ Provide commanders and political workers for 20 companies and three battalions of 46th RD unloading and concentrating at Roslavl’.
♦ Return to 152nd RD the two battalions transferred to 20th Army.69

As the heated and often desperate fighting raged in and around the city of Smolensk and on the periphery of Kurochkin’s pocket to the north, Army Group Center tried hard to disengage the divisions of its two panzer groups from the fight. Bock felt compelled to do so for two reasons. First, since clear indicators were emerging that the Soviets were about to strike back against his army group’s main front east of Smolensk, he had to eliminate the pocket completely before he could provide vital infantry to support the overextended panzer and motorized divisions along the “eastern” front. Second and even more important, Bock hoped, just perhaps, to restore some degree of momentum to his advance on Moscow.

Therefore, as the pocket battle raged on, Guderian’s panzer group continued splitting its attentions between the pocket to the north, the road to Moscow through El’nia in the east, and the distracting fight along the Sozh River to the south. On Guderian’s left wing, 17th and 18th Panzer Divisions of Lemelsen’s XXXXVII Motorized Corps struggled to cordon off the southern perimeter of the Smolensk pocket by establishing defensive positions along the southern bank of the Dnepr River east and west of Krasnyi [45 kilometers west of Smolensk]. Without infantry support and suffering heavy losses, including the wounded Weber, the two panzer divisions engaged the remnants of 5th Mechanized Corps’ 13th and 17th Tank Divisions, Colonel Mishulin’s 57th Tank Division, and 73rd and 18th Rifle Divisions of Kurochkin’s 20th Army.

However, when the infantry divisions of General Geyer’s IX Army Corps began reaching the region on 18 July, Thoma pulled his 17th Panzer Division out of line and moved it eastward, first, to help repulse the Soviet attempts to recapture Smolensk by an assault from the southeast on 19 and 20 July and, later, to reinforce the 10th Panzer and SS “Das Reich” Divisions of Vietinghoff’s XXXXVI Motorized Corps when they finally reached the El’nia region, only to come under heavy Soviet attack on 21 and 22 July.

Thus, for about a week, the divisions of Lemelsen’s XXXXVI Motorized Corps faced the same dilemma as Schmidt’s XXXIX Motorized Corps to the north; they had to engage in close-in fighting with Soviet infantry and tanks to maintain the cordon south of Smolensk, all the while suffering heavy attrition. Only when the infantry arrived forward could they withdraw to obtain the rest and refitting period they so urgently needed. By early on 23 July, however, Schmidt and Lemelsen were finally able to withdraw their panzer and motorized divisions from the Smolensk encirclement ring, the former to reinforce his “eastern” front (outer ring) and the latter to reinforce the defenses of Vietinghoff’s motorized corps at and south of El’nia. It was not a moment too soon, since, instead of the rest they expected, they now faced attacks from new Soviet reserve armies.

While Schmidt’s XXXIX and Lemelsen’s XXXXVII Motorized Corps were investing the Smolensk pocket from the north and south, Guderian’s second motorized corps, Vietinghoff’s XXXXVI Motorized, was striving to reach its objective line north and south of El’nia to form the outer encirclement ring protecting the eastern and southeastern approaches to Smolensk, a task he ultimately failed to achieve. Vietinghoff’s vanguard, Schaal’s 10th Panzer Division, wheeled northeastward from Mstislavl’ early on 16 July and headed through Pochinok toward his objective at El’nia, with the SS “Das Reich” Motorized Division in his wake. By day’s end Schaal’s panzers reached halfway to Pochinok against increasing resistance from 17th Mechanized Corps and remnants of 13th Army’s divisions withdrawing eastward from Mogilev. The 10th Panzer Division finally reached the outskirts of El’nia late on 18 July and captured the town with its important bridges over the Desna and Striana Rivers on 20 July, after a day of heavy fighting. As Schaal’s forces dug in, the SS division attempted to move northward from El’nia to reach the Dnepr River, capture Dorogobuzh, and link up with 17th Panzer Division at Iartsevo. However, despite three days of heavy fighting, principally with the 50th and 107th Rifle Divisions, the division failed to accomplish its mission and was forced to fall back to defensive positions northwest of El’nia.

It was in the midst of this complex situation, with German attentions split between the “eastern” front north of Iartsevo, the city of Smolensk and the vexing pocket to the north, the forward bridgehead at El’nia to the east, and the fighting along the Sozh to the south, that Timoshenko chose to strike.

images

Army Group Center’s advance to Smolensk and encirclement of the Western Front’s 16th, 19th, and 20th Armies in the region northwest, north, and northeast of the city proved to be a textbook exercise in the conduct of an encirclement operations. First, Bock’s army group erected an outer encirclement line with the panzer and motorized divisions of Third Panzer Group’s LVII and XXXIX Motorized Corps northeast and east of the city and with the mobile divisions of Second Panzer Group’s XXXXVII Motorized Corps southeast of the city. Second, and simultaneously, Army Group Center formed an inner encirclement ring around the forces of 19th and 20th Armies, which were retreating to the Smolensk region, and 16th Army’s forces, already fighting in the Smolensk region, initially, with advancing armor and motorized infantry, and, as soon as they could reach the region, with the infantry of Ninth Army’s V Army Corps and Fourth “Panzer” Army’s IX Army Corps.

However, despite the “clockwork” nature of this maneuver, some potentially serious problems resulted. First, in the absence of infantry, which was still trundling forward from the Dnepr River line, the armored divisions had to both man the outer encirclement line and contain the Soviet forces encircled in the pocket. Even an awkward situation in peaceful circumstances, if Red Army forces counterattacked, this placed the armored divisions, with their paucity of motorized infantry, in a trying situation. Second, because they were overextended, the armored divisions manning both the inner and outer encirclement lines were too transfixed by constant fighting to seal the pocket completely, in particular, the pocket’s eastern end, where the swampy and marshy terrain along the Dnepr and Vop’ Rivers made the “sealing off” process particularly difficult. Third, rather than crumbling in utter disorder, the Red Army forces trapped in the pocket managed to maintain relatively contiguous lines and made the encircling Germans fight for every meter of ground. Here, Timoshenko’s decision to fold the remnants of Konev’s 19th Army into Lukin’s 16th Army and assign Kurochkin overall command of the encircled forces helped maintain cohesion among the pocket’s defenders. Within the pocket, Kurochkin’s rapid reorganization of his and Lukin’s armies galvanized Soviet resistance and transformed a short encirclement battle into a lengthy one. Fourth, the prolonged Soviet defense of the “pocket” prevented the encircling infantry from relieving the armored divisions positioned along the outer encirclement line. As the next chapter will demonstrate, this subjected those divisions, which represented the sharp steel tip of Blitzkrieg operations, to a fight that undermined their offensive power.

Thus, on 23 July Army Group Center was justifiably proud of what is had achieved in the course of one short week. The question was, could the army group digest the encircled forces without losing the high offensive momentum it had generated and maintained since 22 June? Much of this depended on the actions of the Stavka in Moscow and Timoshenko’s defeated and shattered but still not liquidated Western Front.