As 22nd Army’s offensive developed as planned, the Intelligence Department (RU) of Ershakov’s army informed him late on 21 August that the enemy forces to his front consisted of three to four tired German infantry divisions ripe for defeat. In essence, as indicated by a report 22nd Army’s Intelligence Department prepared retrospectively on 5 September, neither it nor the Western Front’s intelligence organs had any idea there were any German panzer divisions in the region:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix Q, 3.

On the basis of information from all types of reconnaissance, the enemy situation before the army’s front seems to be as follows:

1. At the time of the penetration of the army’s front on the night of 22 August 1941, the enemy opposite the army’s front had:

253rd ID (453rd, 463rd, and 464th IRs and 253rd AR) – operating on the army’s right wing and, according to the testimony of prisoners, has only 50-60% of its required personnel.

86th ID (184th, 216th, and 176th IRs and 86th AR) – operating on 253rd ID’s left [should read “right”], and severely worn down.

206th ID (301st, 312th, and 413th IRs and 206th AR) – fought continuously at Polotsk, Nevel’, and Velikie Luki, suffering heavy losses, supposedly relieved by 256th ID, and now refitting in reserve.

110th ID (262nd, 254th, and 255th IRs) – defending the Viazoviki region.

256th ID – concentrated in the vicinity of Lake Dvin’e.

Thus, up to four infantry divisions are located along the army’s front, and a new grouping of enemy was appearing in the region of Lake Dvin’e.²⁴

This report was clearly wanting because, according to German daily records, in addition to Group Stumme, with LVII and XXXX Motorized Corps and 19th and 20th Panzer Divisions, seven German infantry divisions were operating in the region (253rd, 251st, 86th, 206th, 110th, 102nd, and 256th) under the control of XXXX and LVII Motorized Corps and XXIII Army Corps. In fact, by 5 September, 22nd Army’s Intelligence Department had no choice but to admit:

On the morning of 22 August, the enemy penetrated the army’s front with mobile detachments and, during the second half of the day, captured Kun’ia Station [28 kilometers east of Velikie Luki], Velikopol’e [18 kilometers east of Velikie Luki], and Ushitsy State Farm [18 kilometers east-southeast of Velikie Luki]. From seized documents – maps and attack orders from 19th PzD – it has been determined that 57th PzC’s 19th and 20th PzDs, reinforced by 110th and 206th IDs, and 40th AC, penetrated 22nd Army’s front.²⁵

Thus, in mid-morning on 22 August, the divisions of 22nd Army’s main attack force were in for a surprise. No sooner had 62nd and 29th Rifle Corps’ lead divisions resumed their southward advance than they suddenly ran straight into multiple German panzer wedges attacking northward through their advancing combat formations, protected by screaming Stuka dive bombers blasting a path with their deadly bombs. The force they encountered was German Group Stumme, whose mission was to destroy 22nd Army and capture Velikie Luki.

Group Stumme’s Offensive and the Velikie Luki Encirclement, 22–24 August

22 August

Group Stumme, which was formed from the headquarters of newly-activated XXXX Motorized Corps and was commanded by General of Panzer Troops Georg Stumme, consisted of armored forces from 19th and 20th Panzer Divisions of Kuntzen’s LVII Motorized Corps and supporting infantry from 102nd, 110th, 206th, and 256th Infantry Divisions. Group Stumme’s plan was to strike due north in the 4-kilometer-wide sector east of the village of Dreki, 38 kilometers southeast of Velikie Luki, with 20th and 19th Panzer Divisions abreast, while 206th, 110th, 102nd and 256th Infantry Divisions followed and supported in the 18-kilometer-wide sector from Viazoviki, 35 kilometers southeast of Velikie Luki, eastward to the western bank of Lake Dvin’e, 45 kilometers southeast of Velikie Luki. While Group Stumme’s force thrust northward, on its left, 86th, 251st and 253rd Infantry Divisions of General Schubert’s XXIII Army Corps were poised to attack toward Velikie Luki from the south and west in concert with Stumme’s armor from the east.

See Map 105. Group Stumme’s counterstroke, 22 August 1941.

The German assault surprised, paralyzed, and shattered 22nd Army’s main shock groups in short order. The headlong northward assault by Knobelsdorff’s 19th Panzer Division struck 62nd Rifle Corps’ right wing and 29th Rifle Corps’ left flank, literally crushing and rolling over Major General Nikolai Ivanovich Biriukov’s 186th Rifle Division, which had just begun its southward advance. Tearing into and through the Soviets’ advancing units, Knobelsdorff’s panzers sped northward 24 kilometers in a single day, capturing Kun’ia Station, 28 kilometers east-southeast of Velikie Luki, and severing all communications between 22nd Army’s headquarters at Nazimovo Station, 32 kilometers east of Velikie Luki, and the army’s main forces operating 2035 kilometers southeast of the city.

Echeloned on 19th Panzer Division’s left, Stumpff’s 20th Panzer Division plunged through the defenses of 29th Rifle Corps’ 170th Rifle Division and raced northward 20 kilometers to cut the Velikie Luki-Toropets main road [shosse] near Vatolino, 18 kilometers east-southeast of Velikie Luki. Stumpff then wheeled his panzers westward toward the city. In the two panzer divisions’ wakes and along their flanks, 206th, 110th, 102nd, and 256th Infantry Divisions exploited the massive hole created by the advancing tank columns to march northward and spread out fanlike across the broad front from the village of Podol, 25 kilometers southeast of Velikie Luki, northeastward to the main highway and then eastward to the village of Vas’kovo, 40 kilometers east of Velikie Luki.

By nightfall, 22nd Army was in a state of utter shock. In addition to having its main shock group shattered by a powerful German offensive, the deep panzer strike disrupted communications between Ershakov’s main headquarters in Nazimovo Station and 22nd Army’s three rifle corps fighting in the Velikie Luki region. The day before, Ershakov had moved westward an operational group of his headquarters to a new field CP near Romanovo, a village 7 kilometers west-northwest of Kun’ia, from which he hoped to direct his army’s offensive. However, after being struck by German aircraft and threatened by advancing German tanks, he transferred his headquarters to that of 29th Rifle Corps near the town of Mikhal’ki, 11 kilometers east-southeast of Velikie Luki, on the night of 22-23 August. Since his command radios failed to reach his new command post, thereafter, Ershakov had no communications with the army’s main headquarters far to the east. In addition, since the German attack smashed Biriukov’s 186th Rifle Division, as well as most of 98th Rifle Division, which Ershakov had immediately sent southward to support Biriukov’s division, and forced 62nd Rifle Corps 174th Rifle Division to flee northeastward, Ershakov also had no communications with those forces.