In essence, because their forces performed so poorly, Kachalov and his chief of staff had no choice but to try to teach basic combined-arms tactics to their subordinate commanders while combat was underway. But it was clearly too late, at least for this operation, because the fact was that no amount of supervision and guidance could overcome the basic defects in these newly-formed formations. As a result, Group Kachalov’s assaults on 24 July once again achieved only local success and no significant gains. This prompted an even angrier Kachalov to issue an even sterner warning to his forces at 2300 hours that evening.¹⁷ Acknowledging that “combat operations on 24 July achieved success, and the units advanced forward only in the sector of 145th RD (along one axis),” he castigated Major General Fedor Dmitrievich Zakharov, the commander of 149th Rifle Division, for failing “to organize for combat” and the supporting RGK, corps, and force artillery for “operating at maximum distances without cooperating with the infantry.” Consequently, he noted, “the units, having encountered organized resistance by an insignificant enemy force, not only did not advance forward but also withdrew, losing points they seized the day before.” Kachalov then threatened, “The Military Council takes notice of and demands that commanders, commissars, and political workers directly control the fighting, be in their companies and battalions, and, in particular, when necessary, compel their units to fulfill their assigned mission by personnel example,” and assigned new missions to his subordinate commanders for 25 July:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix G, 8.

•	All Commanders – fulfill your assigned missions, in particular, the commander of 149th RD, who allowed his units to withdraw from the positions they previously occupied, including:

♦	Seize prisoners and capture separate points in the enemy’s defense system during the night by decisive reconnaissance raids and reconnaissances-in-force;
♦	Send “hunters” [okhotniki] [reconnaissance] and separate well-armed groups into the rear of the enemy’s defenses; and
♦	Warn soldiers, commanders, and political workers that we will take severe measures up to and including execution for the loss or abandonment of weapons of the battlefield and deploy commands from the Supply, Food, and other departments forward to the battlefield to collect weapons and trophies [captured equipment] from the dead.

•	104th TD – provide 5 T-34 tanks under a decisive commander to 149th RD in the Lysovka region by 0500 hours, prepare remaining forces overnight for possible operations toward the north and northwest, and strengthen reconnaissance and combat security.
•	145th and 149th RDs – replace losses in companies with detained straggler and rear service personnel and give all serviceable weapons to rifle and machine gun companies.
•	The Chief of Artillery – personally and with your staff, be present in the combat formations of the divisions’ artillery units and prohibit firing on unobserved targets without forward observation posts in the infantry battalions.18

As his subordinate group commanders tried to correct deficiencies and reinvigorate their attacks, Timoshenko provided further clarification of his intentions and the course of the counteroffensive in a report he dispatched to Stalin and Zhukov on 24 July. In addition to describing the situation with characteristic optimism, the Western Direction commander also heaped special praise on the supposedly devastating effects of its new “Katiusha” multiple rocket launcher system.

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix G, 7.

•	16th Army (Lukin) – continuing to hold on to the northern, northwestern, and eastern parts of Smolensk in sustained fighting and attacking the southern and southwestern parts of the city, with 34th RC’s 127th and 158th RDs, which were attacking in the south, withdrawing across the Dnepr River at Korolevo and Lozheikovo [15-20 kilometers southeast of Smolensk] after suffering heavy losses. 17th MC (1,600 bayonets) is regrouping from Iartsevo to support 16th Army.
•	20th Army (Kurochkin) – while repulsing attacks by up to 7 enemy divisions, defeated two German divisions, including 5th ID attacking toward Rudnia with three volleys of “Katiushas,” causing heavy German losses and halting the German advance for a day. Began preparing 5th MC to strike the rear of the enemy’s Iartsevo grouping in cooperation with Group Khomenko
•	Group Iartsevo (Rokossovsky) – withdrew its forces west of the Vop’ River to the river’s eastern bank after three days of bloody and costly fighting and dug them in.
•	Groups Kalinin and Khomenko – attacked with 107th TD in the lead but encountered heavy German air strikes. Observed enemy forces concentrating in Velizh and west of Smolensk and preparing counterattacks against them.
•	The El’nia sector –observed enemy forces withdrawing from El’nia; however, Bogdanov’s front (of Reserve Armies) submitted no report because of poor communications. Recommended 19th RD, with tanks, pursue the enemy and then join Group Kachalov west of El’nia.
•	Group Kachalov – fighting in the region south of Pochinok.
•	13th Army (F. I. Kuznetsov) – planning to rescue the Mogilev corps, which is surrounded by 5 enemy infantry divisions, by attacking in cooperation with 21st and 4th Armies.
•	21st Army (Efremov) – facing three enemy corps, ordered to accelerate the concentration of Gorodovikov’s cavalry corps to operate in the enemy’s rear area “before it is too late.”
•	22nd Army (Ershakov) – recaptured Velikie Luki and occupying defensive positions along the Lovat’ River [north and south of Velikie Luki], but with the enemy trying to encircle 51st RC in the Nevel’ region.19

After Timoshenko asked the Stavka to send him two-three more “Katiusha” batteries, the Western Direction’s commander assured Stalin he was making every effort “to destroy the enemy north of Smolensk, straighten out the front to the south, and create routes to resupply the forces whose mission is to advance forward quickly to the Vitebsk, Orsha, and Mogilev line.”²⁰

As the intense fighting raged on in around the city of Smolensk and the shrinking encirclement pocket containing 20th and 16th Armies to the north and east, the Western Front described the action once again in an operational summary it dispatched to the Stavka at 0800 hours on 26 July:

See Map 25. The situation, 2300, 25 July 1941. See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix G, 13.