By 1 August the dimensions of the encirclement pocket northeast and east of Smolensk had shrunken in size to 20 kilometers from east to west and 28 kilometers from north to south. The inner encirclement line around the pocket consisted of forces from German XXXIX Motorized Corps’ 20th Motorized Division and V and VII Army Corps’ 129th, 35th, 5th, 8th, and 28th Infantry Divisions deployed around the pocket’s eastern, northern, and western sides and XXXXVII Motorized Corps’ 29th Motorized and 17th Panzer Divisions along the southern and southeastern sides of the pocket. The pocket itself contained the remnants of 20th and 16th Army, all operating under the control of General Kurochkin, the 20th Army’s commander. Kurochkin’s force included his own army’s 73rd, 144th, 153rd, 229th, and 233rd Rifle Divisions, 1st Motorized Rifle Division, 57th Tank Division, and 5th Mechanized Corps, which were defending the northern half of the pocket, and 16th Army’s 127th, 129th, and 152nd Rifle Divisions and 34th Rifle Corps’ 46th and 158th Rifle Divisions, which were deployed in the southern half of the pocket. By this time, the strength of Soviet forces in the pocket had dwindled from over 220,000 men in mid-July to fewer than 100,000 men, and, more important, the defenders were running out of fuel and ammunition.

The intelligence summary the Western Front issued early on 1 August, together with reports and orders prepared by the forces within and outside the encirclement pocket, made it abundantly clear by day’s end on the 1st that Timoshenko’s counteroffensive had failed, and the encircled armies faced certain destruction if they remained in the pocket. Dispatched to the Western Front at 0800 hours, the intelligence summary began optimistically, by stating, “The enemy did not conduct active offensive operations during the day on 31 July 1941,” but then qualified this optimism by acknowledging that the Germans “brought up reserves along Velikie Luki, Iartsevo, and El’nia axes.” The summary then provided the supporting evidence:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix x L, 1.

• The Nevel’ axis:
♦ The enemy counterattacked unsuccessfully during the day and concentrated two-three fresh divisions with artillery in the Shcherginikha and Bandina regions [30-40 kilometers southeast of Velikie Luki].
♦ Reconnaissance identified up to a battalion of infantry and 50 cavalrymen with mortars and artillery in defensive positions 1.5 kilometers west of Ploskish’.
♦ Agent, documents, and POW interrogations indicated 110th, 206th, and 253rd IDs, 14th MotD, and 471st and 451st Security Regiments were trying to encircle our forces northwest of Nevel’.
♦ A German Abwehr agent captured on 30 July said about 200 aircraft conducting raids on Moscow are situated at the Borisov airfield.
♦ Instead of disbanding the collective farms in the regions they have occupied, the Germans are instead urging the collective farmers to harvest the grain and then seizing it by force.
• The Iartsevo axis:
♦ The enemy’s 19th and 20th PzDs, 106th ID, 20th MotD, and 7th and 12th PzDs are fighting defensively along the Chernyi Ruchei, Iakovtsevo, Shelepy, Karpovo, Vetlitsy, and Riadnyi line.
♦ We have no information about enemy units operating northeast and south of Iartsevo, although combat has identified at least two battalions of 20th PzD, with artillery and three batteries of mortars in the Ostrov region, forces of 106th ID’s 240th IR south of Markovo, and at least two battalions of infantry in the Krasnitsa region.
♦ A corporal in 74th IR captured on 30 July in the Chamintsevo region said 19th PzD, which is located in the Chernyi Ruchei region, is severely worn down and under-strength, and another POW said three infantry divisions from the Smolensk region will relieve 19th and 20th PzDs on 2-3 August.
♦ A POW reported that 240th IR, which is being transferred to the combat region from Smolensk on trucks, reached Smolensk on foot.
♦ 20th PzD suffered up to 600 men killed and wounded on 29 and 30 July, and our forces captured 10 tanks, 3 guns, automatic weapons, and other trophies.
♦ 12th PzD is relieving 19th PzD so that the latter can rest and refit in reserve, but 12th PzD must also go into reserve after 10 days of fighting because it has lost up to 75% of its personnel and a significant number of supporting tanks in many of its companies, and its remaining tanks are severely run down. Politically and in regard to morale, the soldiers are ignorant of the war aims, they fear Soviet weapons, and they are unwilling to fight and are generally weary of the war.
• The Smolensk axis – The enemy has advanced to the Shokino region [30 kilometers northeast of Smolensk and 20 kilometers southwest of Iartsevo], with its front facing toward the south and, possibly, also Pnevo, Pnevskaia Sloboda, and Zabor’e (west of the Vop’ River) [6-10 kilometers southwest of Solov’evo].
• El’nia – Information is pending about the situation along the El’nia axis.
• Conclusions – After concentrating two-three divisions in the Plaksino and Bandina region [20-30 kilometers south-southeast of Velikie Luki], the enemy apparently intends to attack northward toward Velikopol’e Station [15 kilometers east of Velikie Luki] to sever the communications of our Velikie Luki grouping.57

The daily report submitted by General Lukin, the commander of 16th Army, to Timoshenko at the Western Front at 1900 hours on 1 August underscored the increasingly desperate situation faced by both his army and Kurochkin’s 20th Army within the shrinking encirclement sack northeast of Smolensk.

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix L, 2.

• General Situation
♦ The enemy attacked at 0600 hours on 1 August with at least an infantry division, reinforced by artillery and mortars and supported by large aircraft formations;
♦ After defeating 20th Army’s left wing and bypassing its 229th RD’s flank and rear, the enemy launched his main attack against 16th Army, exploited success at the boundary between 152nd RD and 34th RC, and is [now] reconnoitering toward Dukhovskaia [15 kilometers east of Smolensk].
♦ The withdrawal of 20th Army’s left wing immediately uncovered the [152nd] division’s flank and rear to a depth of 2-3 kilometers, and, while attracting the enemy’s main attack, the division fought fiercely and repeatedly launched counterattacks, but, after suffering heavy losses and lacking artillery and machine guns, it is conducting a fighting withdrawal to the east under the pressure of superior enemy forces. All the while, the division is holding on to the Mordvino line.
• Neighbors – none to the right.
• Situation of Subordinates:
♦ 129th RD – suffering heavy losses and in a difficult situation because of continuous enemy attacks on its flanks.
♦ 152nd RD – withdrawing eastward after two enemy regiments attacked its flanks and occupying the Dukhovshchina [should read Dukhovskaia] and Staroe Shishlovo line [15 kilometers east of Smolensk] at 1900 hours.
♦ 34th RC.
⋄ 158th RD – defending the Siniavino Station, Hill 215.2, and Mitino front [15-16 kilometers east-southeast of Smolensk] at 1700 hours after the enemy pushed the division’s right wing back and penetrated toward Dukhovskaia and Siniavino with two battalions.
⋄ 127th RD – defending the Mitino and Oblogino front [15 kilometers southeast of Smolensk], while the enemy is trying to penetrate at the boundary between 158th and 127th RDs, and detected enemy efforts to envelop the division’s left flank along the Dnepr River to the south.
♦ 46th RD – concentrated in the Zalesovo and Hill 228.5 region [20 kilometers east of Smolensk] by the morning of 1 August, with 646th Regiment in the Dukhovskaia region [18 kilometers east of Smolensk] to prevent the enemy from developing success eastward along the railroad and cutting 34th RC off from the army.
• Conclusions and Decisions
♦ The situation is “tense,” the army’s losses are heavy, there is no ammunition for the artillery, and the divisions lack most or all of their heavy machine guns.
♦ Our neighbor [20th Army] is providing no help; on the contrary, the “unrestrained withdrawal” of 20th Army’s left wing threatens us with envelopment and attacks on our rear.
♦ I am doing all in my power to hold on to the Mordvino, Dukhovskaia, Rogachev, and Kuznetsovo line [15-20 kilometers east to southeast of Smolensk].
♦ During the night I will move 46th RD to the Laptevo, Popovo and Tiushino line [24-27 kilometers east-southeast of Smolensk] and dispatch small groups southward to the Dnepr River.
♦ The enemy occupies the railroad crossing over the Dnepr River at Sobshino [30 kilometers east-southeast of Smolensk] with a company of infantry, a battery of artillery, and 10 tanks.

[Annotation] “Sent at 0145 hours on 2 August”58

Meanwhile, at the eastern end of the corridor separating the encircled 16th and 20th Armies from the Western Front’s main forces, Group Iartsevo made attempt after attempt to expand the corridor by driving 7th Panzer Division’s forces away from the Solov’evo crossing site. An order issued at 1900 hours on 1 August by General Rokossovsky, the group’s commander, indicated, first, that the group’s previous attempts to penetrate the German’s outer encirclement ring had failed and, second, that Rokossovsky was determined to succeed in the future. While admitting that his previous attack force, 38th Rifle Division, was “forced to withdraw because of its insecure flanks,” he also acknowledged that “the restoration of the lost positions [of 38th Rifle Division], once again with unsecured flanks, can also lead to failure and groundless losses in personnel.”59 Therefore, in characteristically cryptic but clear fashion, Rokossovsky ordered his forces “to attack at 2300 hours on 1 August” to reach the following positions and expel German forces from Iartsevo:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix L, 3.

• 101st TD (with 101st MRR) – Novosel’e (west) and Hill 217.9 [3-5 kilometers north of Iartsevo];
• 38th RD – Hill 209.2, the unnamed hill 1 kilometer north of Pervomaiskii and the crest of the hill 1 kilometer west of Pervomaiskii; and
• 64th RD – After occupying the Svishchevo region [6 kilometers south of Iartsevo] with 159th RR and reliably securing the crossing over the Vop’ River, capture Pologi and the unnamed hill 1 kilometer west of Pologi [5-6 kilometers southwest of Iartsevo] with 30th RR.60

Although these attacks failed to achieve their aims, smaller forces from Iushkevich’s 44th Rifle Corps managed to recapture the crossing at Ratchino, 11 kilometers south of Solov’evo, from detachments from German 20th Motorized Division late on 1 August. However, Iushkevich’s troops proved unable to recapture the crossing at Solov’evo to the north.

Given this situation, Timoshenko’s only recourse was to extract as many forces as he could from the shrinking Smolensk encirclement and deploy them to fight another day in the region east of Smolensk. Consequently, late on 1 August, the Stavka and Western Front tacitly authorized 16th and 20th Armies, assisted by supporting attacks by Rokossovsky’s Group Iartsevo toward the west, to break out of the pocket to the east. Although the withdrawal was initially couched in terms of an “attack” toward Dukhovshchina, in reality it was a fully sanctioned withdrawal. As a result, 16th and 20th Armies issued their forces the following withdrawal orders on 2 August 1941:

See Appendices L, 4 and 5.

16th Army at 0900 hours on 2 August

• General Situation – the enemy is attacking eastward, threatening the army’s right flank and the boundary between 152nd RD and 34th RC, and pressing our forces toward the east.
• Neighbors – on the right, 20th Army is defending the line of the railroad, with boundaries as before.
• 16th Army’s Mission – defend the Bol’shoi Vopets River, Tiushino, Vernebisovo, and Dnepr River line [25-30 kilometers east and southeast of Smolensk] stubbornly and prevent the enemy from penetrating toward the east and southeast.
• Missions of Subordinates:
♦ 129th RD – defend the Peresvetovo and Puzovo sector on the eastern bank of the Bol’shoi Vopets River, 28 kilometers east-northeast to 25 kilometers east of Smolensk, to prevent the enemy from penetrating toward Shchiurikovo and Liubkovo.
♦ 152nd RD – defend the Puzovo and Tiushino sector on the eastern bank of the Bol’shoi Vopets River, 25 kilometers east to 28 kilometers east-southeast of Smolensk to prevent the enemy from penetrating to Liubkovo and Zavrazh’e.
♦ 34th RC – defend the Tiushino, Popova, Zaluzh’e, and Vernebisovo sector [28 kilometers east-southeast to 32 kilometers southeast of Smolensk], with strong security detachments in the Sobshino and Malinovka sector on the western bank of the Dnepr River, 30 kilometers east to 35 kilometers east-southeast of Smolensk, to prevent the enemy from penetrating toward the east and northeast and reliably protect the crossings over the Dnepr River to prevent the enemy from penetrating from Sobshino into the army’s flank and rear.
♦ 46th RD – Concentrating near the barn 2 kilometers south of Golovino, force the Dnepr River, reach the Bereznia and Sel’tso region [18 kilometers south of Solov’evo and 40-45 kilometers east of Smolensk], protect the crossings over the Dnepr River from the east and southeast, and, subsequently, advance to Suborovka and Vishniaki [6 kilometers south-southwest and 5 kilometers south-southeast of Bereznia, respectively], while protecting yourself against attack from the northeast and preventing the enemy from cutting the army’s withdrawal routes from Dobromino and Vasil’evo [4 kilometers south of Suborovka and Vishniaki, respectively].
♦ The Chief of Artillery – reliably protect the Golovino and Malinovka front along the Dnepr River with antiaircraft artillery.
♦ The Chief of Engineers – immediately begin constructing three crossings over the Dnepr River and five fords along the Malinovka and Golovino front.61

20th Army at 1930 hours on 2 August

• General Situation – The enemy is pushing 16th and 20th Armies toward the Dnepr River, while trying to severe their communications, break up their front, and defeat them in detail. 20th and 16th Armies are defending the Il’ia Pustoi, Tveritsy, Kurdimova, Khmost’ River, and Bol’shoi Vopets line with part of their forces and withdrawing their remaining forces behind the Dnepr River.
• 16th Army’s Mission – firmly defend the Bol’shoi Vopets River with part of your forces, concentrate your main efforts on seizing and holding the crossings at Golovino and Voronitsy, and occupy and defend the Dnepr River in the same sector by 0500 hours on 4 August.
• Missions of Subordinates:
♦ 57th TD and 1st MRD – while defending the Il’ia Pustoi, Trisviat’e, and Kurdimova line [30 kilometers northeast to 19 kilometers east-northeast of Smolensk] and conducting a mobile defense along the Orleia and Los’mena line, penetrate to the crossings over the Vop’ River by attacking toward Mikhailovka and Pishchino [12 kilometers south of Iartsevo], occupy defenses along the Vop’ River from the forest to the mouth of the Vop’ River by 0500 hours on 4 August, and concentrate your rear services near the forest west of Prost’.
♦ 5th MC (with 229th and 233rd RDs) – concentrate your main efforts along the Usinino, Zadnia, Pnevo, and Makeevka axis beginning at 0400 hours on 3 August, cross the Dnepr River at Solov’evo and Makeevka, and, while protected by 233rd RD’s defenses along the Khmost’ River, Orleia, and the Vodva River line, occupy defenses behind the Dnepr River in the sector from the mouth of the Vop’ River to the mouth of the Ustrom River by 0500 hours on 4 August. Concentrate your rear services near the forest south of Podkholmitsa and in 229th RD’s rear in the Terenino region.
♦ 69th RC (144th and 153rd RDs) – firmly defend the Khmost’ River with part of your forces beginning at 0400 3 August and, while employing a mobile defense along the Nadva and Orleia Rivers, penetrate to crossings over the Dnepr River in the sector from Zabor’e to the mouth of the Ustrom River and occupy defenses along the Dnepr River in the same sector by 0500 hours on 4 August. Concentrate your rear services in the Novoselki, Borovka, Balakirevo, and Zaprud’e region.
♦ 73rd RD – withdraw from your positions at 2200 hours on 2 August, seize crossing over the Dnepr River in the Zabor’e and Sarai sector (13-17 kilometers south of Solov’evo] by 0400 hours on 3 August, and dispatch strong forward detachments to seize the Kolodezi and Mileevo region and protect the passage of the army’s forces along the roads to the east. Concentrate your rear services in the Pleshcheevo, Smorodinka, and Krasnyi Kholm region.
• Instructions for All Commanders and Commissars:
♦ You are personally responsible to the Motherland and government for taking all of your weapons with you during the withdrawal behind the Dnepr River.
♦ Organize the crossing using all of the crossing equipment available to troop formations, engineer units, and the local population, and pay special attention to constructing crossings that are concealed from enemy air observation, employed at night but dismantled during the day, constructed with their surfaces 15-20 centimeters under the water, to exploiting rafts, boats, ferries, and other local crossing means, to locating fords capable of crossing horse transports, cavalry units, and horse-drawn artillery, and to protecting the approach routes to the crossings in advance.
♦ Concentrate all of your antiaircraft weapons near the crossings.
♦ Defend the Khmost’ and Bol’shoi Vopets River lines at all costs through day’s end on 3 August and the Orleia and Nadva River lines until the end of the day on 4 August.
♦ During the crossings, give priority, first and foremost, to the wounded, to the artillery and tanks that lack ammunition and fuel, and to the army’s rear services, and, later, to the army’s troop formations and units.62

By exploiting the limited successes achieved by Rokossovsky’s Group Iartsevo, the forces of Kurochkin’s 20th and Lukin’s 16th Armies began their eastward withdrawal in earnest on the night of 2-3 August, engaging company-size strongpoints manned by the forces of 20th Motorized Division, which were deployed facing westward along the line of the Orleia River from the village of Sushcheva, 35 kilometers northeast of Smolensk, southeastward to the hamlet of Babeeva, 2 kilometers north of Ratchino and 35 kilometers east of Smolensk. Since 20th Motorized Division had failed to extend its lines southward to Ratchino, this meant that the withdrawing Soviet forces could exploit a roughly 10-kilometer gap between 20th Motorized Division’s extreme left flank at Babeeva and 17th Panzer Division’s extreme right flank south of the Dnepr River opposite Malinovka. Since this gap included several crossing sites over the Dnepr at and south of Ratchino, Kurochkin’s and Lukin’s forces naturally gravitated to this sector. Those that did not had no recourse but to take the riskier course of trying to penetrate or infiltrate eastward toward the crossing at and north of Solov’evo through 20th Motorized Division’s defensive cordon.

See Maps 53 and 54. The situation, 2300, 2 August 1941 and the Smolensk Pocket, 2 August 1941.