However, if Bock was perturbed, Timoshenko faced even more daunting problems, which an operational summary his Western Front issued at 2000 hours on 16 July See Volume 3 1941 described in exquisite detail:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix J, 1.

• General Situation – on 16 July, the Western Front’s forces fought fiercely to liquidate the enemy forces penetrating along the Nevel’, Vitebsk, Smolensk, Gorki, and Propoisk axes and attacked toward Bobruisk.
• 22nd Army – fought sustained battles with enemy units, especially along the Idritsa and Nevel’ and Dretun’ and Nevel’ axes.
♦ 51st RC
⋄ 179th RD – fought in the Zabel’e region, during which its headquarters was encircled and the majority of its staff commanders perished.
⋄ 170th RD – part of its forces attacked toward Nevel’, but there is no information about the results of the fighting.
⋄ 112th and 98th RDs – fought along the Lake Liva Gorbachevo and Dvorishche line.
♦ The detachment defending Nevel’ (part of the Nevel’ garrison and a MRR of 48th TD)--withdrew to Velikie Luki, with enemy motorized units in pursuit.
♦ Headquarters, 22nd Army – moved to the Nazimovo Station region at 2100 hours.
• 19th Army – regrouped during the day for an offensive to recapture the Vitebsk region and preparing antitank defenses along the Shalatoni and Lelekvinskaia Station line.
♦ 7th MC (14th and 18th TDs) – preparing antitank positions along the Shalatoni and Bolotinka line and preparing for an offensive, together with 34th RC, toward Vitebsk.
⋄ 158th RD (720th RR and one rifle battalion) – assembled in the Novoselki region by day’s end, but no news about the rest of the division.
⋄ 162nd RD (25th RC) – assembled in the Baksheevo region to prepare antitank positions at Motyki.
♦ 34th RC:
⋄ 129th RD – marching to jumping-off positions for the offensive by 2200 hours, with the head of its column at the intersection of the Moscow and Leningrad highway.
⋄ 38th RD – completed concentrating in the Iartsevo region.
⋄ 158th RD [sic] – moving from the Riabtsevo Station, Grinevo, Moksheevo, Sloboda, and Pan’skoe region to the Nikulino, Korovino, and Turovo region.
♦ There is no information about the army’s remaining units and the corps’ headquarters as of 16 July.
♦ Headquarters, 19th Army – Bol’shaia Ploskaia, and the woods at Kapustino (10 kilometers southeast of Rudnia) from 2400 hours on 16 July.
• 20th Army – in sustained fighting along the Orshitsa and Dnepr Rivers lines.
♦ 69th RC.
⋄ 73rd RD – fighting with enemy units in the Seletka and Orsha sector along the Orshitsa River, but no information about the corps’ other units.
⋄ 18th RD – occupied the Orsha, Oktiabr’ State Farm, and Prontsevka sector along the Dnepr River line, with its left wing regiment attacking the enemy in Kopys’ on the morning of 14 July, but soon forced to abandon Oktiabr’ State Farm by enemy artillery fire.
⋄ 144th RD – one battalion seized Liady from two companies of enemy infantry and 5-7 tanks.
⋄ 1st MRD – destroyed up to a battalion of motorized infantry of enemy 18th PzD in its rear area at 1800 hours on 15 July by attacking Chirino, and captured 150 prisoners, including 6 officers, 40 vehicles, a cash box, staff documents, and submachine guns.
⋄ The enemy reinforced his attacks in the Orsha region, and up to 50 tanks and up to 180 vehicles with infantry were identified moving from Orsha to Dubrovno.
♦ 5th MC – is in the region north of Krasnoe, where it was subjected to repeated fierce enemy bombing raids.
• 13th Army – fought against penetrating enemy tanks and motorized infantry, which reached the army’s rear, disrupting command and control, communications, and logistics on the second half of 16 July and forcing the army to withdraw its units to an intermediate defensive line along the Pronia River. The army’s units withdrew to the following positions by 1600-1800 hours on 16 July:
♦ 20th MC – the Orsha and Domany [27 kilometers northeast of Mogilev] front, with small groups of enemy on its front.
♦ 110th RD – the Nichiporovichi and Nizhnyi Prudki [15 kilometers north to 24 kilometers north-northeast of Mogilev] front.
♦ 172nd RD – Trebukhi [14 kilometers north of Mogilev] and Vil’chitsy [5 kilometers south of Mogilev], while slowly withdrawing toward Kureni.
♦ 507th RR (148th RD) – the Dashkovka and Makhovo [24 kilometers south-southeast to 58 kilometers southeast of Mogilev] front.
♦ 137th RD – Smolka and Kopani [25-32 kilometers southeast of Mogilev].
♦ 132nd RD – Kopani and Usushek [32-40 kilometers southeast of Mogilev].
♦ The positions of the army’s other units are unknown.
♦ Headquarters, 13th Army – the forest 5-7 kilometers east of Krichev [105 kilometers southeast of Mogilev].
• 21st Army – continuing to attack toward Bobruisk, with small groups of enemy tanks withdrawing westward along the army’s front.
♦ 67th RC (102nd and 151st RD) – forced the Dnepr River and reached the Rogachev-Bykhov Station railroad, but no information received about the positions of the corps’ units. Headquarters, 67th RC – in the forest 5 kilometers east of Guta. Opposes small enemy tank and motorized infantry subunits, with an infantry concentration in the Falevichi region and columns of infantry moving along the road from Bobruisk to Rogachev detected at 0645 hours on 15 July.
♦ 63rd RC (167th and 154th RDs) – attacking westward but no other information received.
♦ 66th RC:
⋄ 232nd RD – no information received.
⋄ Colonel Kurmashev’s Detachment – reached the Drazhnia and Zapol’e front [30 kilometers south-southeast to 35 kilometers southwest of Bobruisk] at 1500 hours on 15 July and facing northwestward.
⋄ 24th RD (remnants) – combined into detachments and concentrated in the Kosarichi region [55 kilometers south of Bobruisk] and to the south.
⋄ 75th RD – withdrew to the Gulevichi and Vilcha front [130-150 kilometers southwest of Bobruisk] along the Sluch’ River and fighting with the enemy 40th ID.
♦ 25th MC – arrived in the Krichev region at 0015 hours on 16 July to fulfill missions in accordance with front order no. 065.
♦ Headquarters, 21st Army – Gomel’.
• 4th Army – conducted defensive work in the Zarech’e and Malyi Propoisk sector along the Pronia River line [45 kilometers south-southeast to 70 kilometers southeast of Mogilev] and started liquidating enemy tanks and motorized units that penetrated into the Propoisk region on the morning of 16 July.
♦ 28th RC:
⋄ 143rd RD – occupying the Zarech’e and Berezovka [45 east-southeast to 62 kilometers southeast of Mogilev] line.
⋄ 42nd RD – defending its previous positions along the Zakrupets [63 kilometers southeast of Mogilev] and mouth of the Pronia River line [just east of Propoisk], but 100 enemy tanks and motorized infantry penetrated at the boundary between 42nd and 55th RDs at 0300 hours on 15 July, seized Malyi Propoisk, and advanced along the highway to Krichev.
⋄ 55th RD – while defending the Propoisk and Kamenka Station [5 kilometers east of Propoisk] sector along the Sozh River, began liquidating penetrating enemy tanks and motorized infantry in cooperation with 6th RD and part of 4th AbnC.
⋄ 6th RD – after halting penetrating enemy tanks and motorized infantry along the Ozery and Aleksandrovka line [70 kilometers southeast of Mogilev and 10-23 kilometers northeast of Propoisk], began liquidating the penetration early on 16 July.
♦ No news has been received about the army’s remaining units.
♦ Headquarters, 4th Army – the forest 6-7 kilometers east of Krichev.
• 16th Army – No news received.
• VVS of the Front and Armies – destroyed enemy aircraft at their airfields, bombed the crossings over the Dnepr River, destroyed enemy tanks and motorized infantry, protected our most important objectives in the rear, and reconnoitered the enemy overnight of 14-15 July, during the day on 15 July, and overnight of 15-16 July.
♦ One enemy Me-109 aircraft was shot down. Our losses – one MIG did not return to its airfield.29

As the summary indicated, by this time, Bock’s army group had torn open Timoshenko’s defenses along the Western Dvina and Dnepr Rivers, captured Vitebsk, Polotsk, Orsha, most of Smolensk city, and Gorki, and exploited to the Nevel’, Velizh, Iartsevo, Mstislavl’ (95 kilometers east of Mogilev), and Propoisk regions. In the process the Germans had shattered 19th, 20th, 4th, and 13th Armies, seriously damaged 22nd Army in the north, and engaged 16th Army in Smolensk before it was fully assembled. In the process, Bock’s two panzer groups had almost encircled the bulk of Lukin’s 16th, Konev’s 19th, and Kurochkin’s 20th Armies in the region northwest and north of Smolensk.

In fact, despite Timoshenko’s vigorous efforts to mount a counteroffensive, only F.I. Kuznetsov’s 21st Army had succeeded in carrying out his offensive orders with any degree of success. Although promising, even 21st Army’s initial counterattacks at Rogachev, Zhlobin, and toward Bobruisk had failed to meet Timoshenko’s expectation. Actually, at this point, confusion and ignorance of the real situation clouded the full extent of the catastrophe Timoshenko’s Western Direction Command was facing. As if to emphasize how serious the situation was, on 22 July the Luftwaffe would conduct its first night bombing raids against Moscow.30

The Siege of Mogilev

On the positive side of the ledger, almost miraculously, the advancing Germans had not yet been able to close the trap shut around Smolensk, a corps from Gerasimenko’s 13th Army was holding out in Mogilev, the remainders of 13th and 4th Armies were erecting new defenses along the Sozh River, and, however futile, both armies were trying to carry out Timoshenko’s attack orders. Finally, spread out between the Rogachev and Gomel’s regions, F. I. Kuznetsov’s 21st Army still posed a considerable threat to Army Group South’s southern wing.

Both Bock and Timoshenko focused their attentions on the encircled city of Mogilev, but for altogether different reasons. From Bock’s perspective, the city was a thorn in his flesh because it disrupted his ambitious plans, particularly Guderian’s ability to march eastward to form the outer encirclement line around Smolensk. To Timoshenko, however, in addition to being the last sector his forces defended along the Dnepr River, Mogilev represented a serious obstacle to the Germans’ subsequent advance, and, if it could be relieved, it could become an important base for the counteroffensive plans both he and the Stavka were preparing. In short, if the garrison in Mogilev could hold out, or if 13th and 21st Armies could relieve it, its defense would prevent the Germans from concentrating their forces well enough to destroy the armies encircled in Smolensk and effectively resist the counteroffensive. Even if Mogilev fell, if its defenders held out long enough, their defense could provide time for 13th and 4th Armies to erect solid new defenses along the Sozh River from Krichev southward to its junction with the Dnepr.

After Guderian’s panzers struck eastward across the Dnepr River and reached the Sozh River at Propoisk (now Slavgorod), 70 kilometers southeast of Mogilev, on 16 July, the bulk of Gerasimenko’s 13th Army found itself confined within an oval-shaped encirclement extending from Mogilev 40 kilometers eastward to just north of Chausy. Although the encirclement initially included much of 13th Army’s 61st Rifle Corps (110th and 172nd Rifle Divisions), 20th Rifle Corps’ 132nd and 137th Rifle Divisions, and 20th Mechanized Corps’ 26th and 38th Tank and 210th Motorized Divisions, the army’s 45th Rifle Corps had managed to escape southward and join 21st Army, and the army’s remaining divisions had withdrawn northward and eastward, although in near complete disorder. That night, after reporting on his army’s scattered dispositions, Gerasimenko ordered its forces, less Bakunin’s 61st Rifle and A. G. Nikitin’s 20th Mechanized Corps, to withdraw eastward to the Sozh River. Ultimately, at dawn on 21 July, Gerasimenko once again reported on 13th Army’s current dispositions:

See Map 41. The Mogilev encirclement, 16-27 July 1941.