Kachalov, finally perceiving the deadly threat to his right wing, began regrouping his forces to meet the new challenge on the evening of 2 August. However, since he feared higher headquarters would judge him guilty of “passiveness” and “timidity,” if not outright “cowardice” in the face of the enemy, he stubbornly insisted his forces continue their advance toward the north:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix K, 3.

•	General Situation – the army’s forces are holding off an enemy offensive along the Ivanovka, Zimnitsy, Osinovka, Efremovka, Novyi Derebuzh, Pechkury, and Roslavl’ front. The enemy is trying to wedge between the fortified lines along the Desna River and the right flank of the army. Especially tense fighting is under way along the Novyi Derebuzh, Pechkury, and Roslavl’ axis from the direction of Khislavichi, Mstislavl’, and Krichev [the west and southwest].
•	Group Kachalov’s Mission – hold on to the Stomet’ River, 6 kilometers northeast and northwest of Stodolishche, and the Roslavl’ region and attack toward Egorovka, Khmara, and Pochinok [20 kilometers northeast to 28 kilometers north-northwest of Stodolishche] into the rear of the enemy’s El’nia grouping.
•	Missions of Subordinates:

♦	104th TD – protected by 31st MRR along the Novosel’e and Borisovka line, concentrate in Selibka, Chernavka, and Nedobraia [12-15 kilometers northeast of Stodolishche] overnight on 2-3 August, and prepare to attack northward under 149th RD’s control;
♦	149th RD (with 104th TD, 1st Bn, 488th CAR, and 3rd Bn, 320th GAR) – after relief by 145th RD, concentrate in the Postarok, Nikulino, and Voroshilovo region [7-10 kilometers north-northeast of Stodolishche], attack northward on 0500 hours on 3 August to capture crossings over the Khmara River at Egorovka and, subsequently, advance toward Pochinok while protecting the army’s right flank;
♦	145th RD (with 3rd Bn, 649th CAR, and 4th Bn, 320th GAR) – defend the Hill 212.6, Hill 192.1, Osinovka, Moshek, Shantilovo, and Dumanichskie line [6-7 kilometers west of Stodolishche] with two regiments, concentrate two regiments in the Stodolishche, Barsukovskie, and Borshchevka region [10 kilometers south of Stodolishche], and prepare to attack toward the west and south.
♦	31st MRR (with 1st Bn, 18th ATR, and 1st Bn, 320th GAR) – defend the Novyi Derebuzh region [13 kilometers south-southwest of Stodolishche];
♦	Composite Regiment (with 3rd Bn, 578th ATR) – defend the Pechkury, Bytenka, and Krapivinskii No. 1 region [12 kilometers south of Stodolishche];
♦	222nd RD (with 2nd and 3rd Bns, 18th ATR) – defend the Chepishchevo, Astakovskaia, and Slobodishche line, with your main center of resistance in Roslavl; and
♦	21st and 52nd CDs – concentrate: 21st CD in the Stodolishche, Kruglikovskaia Dacha, and Tereshok region [7 kilometers south from Stodolishche] and 52nd CD in Krapivinskii, Kubarki, and Morgunovka, and prepare to attack northwestward from behind 145th RD’s left wing.42

Thus, despite the danger of encirclement by the Germans, Kachalov tried to parry Guderian’s assaults by mounting a general assault toward the north, in a maneuver that was nothing short of suicidal. Meanwhile, his group’s 145th Rifle Division tried in vain to protect the army’s left flank and Roslavl’ in concert with the already routed 222nd Rifle Division and 21st and 52nd Cavalry Divisions, which were already recoiling southward in the face of Guderian’s advancing panzers.

From his vantage point at the Western Front’s headquarters, Timoshenko reported to the Stavka about Group Kachalov’s situation in an evening operational summary issued at 2300 hours on 3 August. However, since communications were intermittent at best, the report described the situation as of late on 2 August rather than 3 August, thereby failing to convey the full scope of the disaster the group was experiencing:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix L, 9)

•	Group Kachalov – conducting sustained fighting with the enemy forces enveloping the group’s flanks and penetrating toward Roslavl’.

♦	104th TD – withdrawing to Nikitina, Borisovochka, and Egorovka [5-10 kilometers northeast of Stodolishche] at 1300 hours after an enemy onslaught from the Ivanino region.
♦	149th RD – fighting along the Zimnitsy, Storino, and Smychkovo line [5 kilometers north to 5 kilometers northeast of Stodolishche] at 1330 hours.
♦	145th RD – defending the Smychkovo and Zhigalovo line [8-10 kilometers northeast of Stodolishche] with two regiments at 1330 hours and protecting the Dundukovka, Efremovka, Gorchilovka, and Dumanichskie front [6 kilometers northwest to 7 kilometers southwest of Stodolishche] from the west with the third regiment.
♦	31st MRR – withdrew to Novyi Derebuzh [10 kilometers southwest of Stodolishche], pursued by a reinforced enemy battalion with 15 tanks and 30 motorcycles.
♦	Composite Regiment – attacking toward Andreevskie and Pechkury from the Markers 175.3 and 185.9 line against a battalion of enemy infantry with armored personnel carriers and motorcycles.
♦	52nd and 21st CDs – (according to the Central Front) withdrew southward to Krasnopol’e, Pozhyr, and Fedorovka.
♦	222nd RD – withdraw from the Oster River line (15 kilometers west of Roslavl’) toward Roslavl’ at 1300 hours with two regiments and toward the northeast with one regiment (774th).43

Before Timoshenko and the Stavka could react to the deteriorating situation by dispatching reinforcements to Kachalov, Langermann’s 4th Panzer Division captured Roslavl’ on 3 August, blocking the Moscow shosse and encircling the bulk of Kachalov’s group north of the city. After spending the night with IX Corps, which he ordered to continue its assault overnight, Guderian personally remained with the forward elements of 292nd Infantry Division’s advancing infantry until they reached within eyesight of the Moscow shosse. There, as he performed the unusual feat of a panzer group commander closing an encirclement ring, he observed as 4th Panzer Division’s tanks deployed along the Roslavl’ road, in fact, those belonging to a tank company his son had recently commanded. Within minutes, the forward elements of XXIV Motorized Corps’ 4th Panzer Division and reconnaissance elements of IX Army Corps’ 292nd Infantry Division had linked up at a destroyed bridge over the Ostrik River, just east of the village of Kosaki and 17 kilometers northeast of Roslavl’. The German linkup slammed shut the door to the trap containing Kachalov’s forces.

See Map 48. Armeegruppe Guderian’s assault, 3 August 1941.