Finally, to restore vigor to what was clearly a flagging counteroffensive, on 28 July Timoshenko issued a personal appeal to his commanders and soldiers, although couching his request within a more threatening context. Beginning with the premise that the enemy “seeks to disguise his unpreparedness for active operations with small attacks on various sectors of our front,” he demanded his commanders and soldiers conduct “the most decisive active operations” and lose “not a single hour” in the offensive.” Specifically, his group commanders were to “conduct the most decisive attacks, while denying enemy [the opportunity] to put his forces in order and collect himself after our attacks” and, while doing so, “do not overestimate the strength of the enemy and do not think that he is strong and that he does not suffer losses and, therefore, is steadfast and invincible,” because, “on the contrary, the enemy is suffering heavy losses and is holding on under our attacks with great difficulty.”²⁹

After these notes of encouragement, the front commander “categorically” demanded all commanders be “closer to their forces” on the field of battle, “observe the fighting personally, and immediately intervene” in operations when the troops displayed “insufficient energy [aktivnost’].” Timoshenko, after “categorically” demanding his commanders report on the situation every four hours, added a clear warning that “Those guilty of crimes will be punished right up to being handed over to the judgment of a military tribunal.”³⁰

Even before Timoshenko’s counteroffensive wound down, the Stavka moved quickly to shore up its defenses and, at the same time, reorganize its forces along the Moscow axis so that it could mount even stronger and more effective counteroffensive operations in the future. For example, after splitting the Western Front into the Western and Central Fronts on 23 July, two days later the Stavka divided Bogdanov’s Front of Reserve Armies into two “reserve” groups designed to back up Timoshenko’s Western Front and create a defense in depth to protect Moscow more effectively.³¹ Commanded by Bogdanov and headquartered at Bologoe, the first group consisted of Pronin’s new 34th Army and Rakutin’s 31st Army and was responsible for protecting the Rzhev axis north of Viaz’ma. The second reserve group, commanded by NKVD General Artem’ev and headquartered at Ugriumovo Station, 53 kilometers southeast of Viaz’ma, consisted of Kalinin’s 24th, and Kachalov’s 28th Armies, 4th and 6th DNO’s (People’s Militia Divisions) from Moscow, 108th Tank Division, and the forces defending the Mozhaisk Defense Line. This reserve group was responsible for defending the approaches to Viaz’ma and Moscow.³²

Then, as previously mentioned, on 30 July the Stavka reorganized the Front of Reserve Armies into a proper Reserve Front by unifying the two previous groups of reserve armies, less 28th Army, which it assigned to the Western Front, into a single entity under Zhukov’s direct command. Headquartered at Gzhatsk, Zhukov’s front consisted of 34th, 31st, 24th, and 43rd Armies deployed from northwest of Vyshnii Volochek southward to the Kirov region, backed up by 32nd and 33rd Armies in the Viaz’ma and Spas-Demensk regions. The new 43rd Army was formed around the nucleus of 33rd Rifle Corps.³³ In addition to exploiting Zhukov’s talents as an organizer, this measure unified the Stavka’s reserve armies into a more effective fighting force.

Despite all of these measures and the extremely intense fighting raging along the entire front, the Western Front’s counteroffensive continued to falter in the face of determined German resistance. Timoshenko and his chief of staff, Shaposhnikov, explained why this was the case in a message he sent to Stalin early on 27 July. Although he emphasized the complexity of the counteroffensive and accused some of his subordinate commanders of “treachery,” he once again assured Stalin of his unyielding resolve.

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix G, 16.

After admitting that, “The operation to destroy the enemy’s Iartsevo-Dukhovshchina grouping has developed at a slower than desired tempo during the last two days,” the front commander asserted this was the case because of “constant enemy reinforcements” and effective enemy air support, but also because the “insufficiently ready” units of Group Khomenko entered combat in piecemeal fashion.” Therefore, Timoshenko informed Stalin he was sending his deputy, Eremenko, to Group Khomenko to ensure it cooperated more effectively with Group Kalinin. The commander-in-chief then described the situation elsewhere along the front [emphasis added]:

•	Group Khomenko – reached the Okolitsa, Sergeevka, and Petropol’e front [20 kilometers southwest to 25 kilometers south of Belyi], with the cavalry group fighting in the Chernyi Ruchei, Bulatovo, Volgino, Zaikovo, Efremovo and Dubovoe region [25-35 kilometers southwest of Belyi] and 107th TD and 166th RD in the Esennaia and Korytnitsa region [40-45 kilometers south of Belyi], and ordered to continue its attack on 27 July.
•	Group Kalinin – defending the Sediba and Shamovo sector [18-32 kilometers north of Iartsevo] on the Vop’ River’s eastern bank with 91st and 89th RDs and ordered to continue its attack on 27 July,
•	Group Iartsevo (Rokossovsky) – holding on to Iartsevo and the Vop’ River’s eastern bank north and south of the town, repelling enemy attempts to cut off its forces west of the Vop’ River and drive them back to the river’s eastern bank, and ordered to continue its attack on 27 July. 44th RC is being sent to Solov’evo on the Dnepr River to prevent a link up by the enemy’s Iartsevo and El’nia groupings.
•	16th Army (Lukin) – continuing to fight successfully in and around Smolensk by smashing the newly-arrived German 131st [actually 137th] ID.
•	20th Army (Kurochkin) – repulsed enemy attempts to envelop 16th and 20th Armies from the north, smashing five enemy infantry divisions, and now fighting with two approaching German panzer divisions. Since 16th and 20th Armies’ forces are fighting well but diminishing in strength, we must accelerate our attacks against the enemy Iartsevo-Dukhovshchina grouping.
•	Group Kachalov – facing stiffening resistance from Group Guderian south of Pochinok, since Guderian’s forces captured El’nia from 24th Army and sent reinforcements to Pochinok, and forced to halt its advance on Smolensk because Group Guderian sent a fresh enemy infantry division against its left flank west of Roslavl’. Therefore, the Germans must be driven from El’nia.
•	13th Army – since 61st RC’s vigorous defense of Mogilev is tying down as many as 5 enemy infantry divisions, 13th Army was ordered to defend Mogilev at all cost, and 13th Army and the Central Front received orders to attack toward Mogilev and subsequently protect Group Kachalov’s left flank and reach the Dnepr River. However, when the commander of 13th Army failed to urge Bakunin, the commander of 61st RC, to stand fast, the latter “rudely violated his [previous] orders” and illegally abandoned Mogilev, this released enemy divisions to maneuver against 13th and 21st Armies. The Western Front immediately countermanded Bakunin’s order, replaced Bakunin with Colonel Voevodin, who steadfastly defended Mogilev, and turned Bakunin over to a military tribunal.
•	Cavalry Group Gorodovikov – although no news has been received, we know the Germans have been forced to escort their supply and personnel convoys with tanks.
•	22nd Army – defending Velikie Luki against fresh enemy forces, but the enemy is sending the bulk of his forces in this sector to reinforce his Iartsevo-Dukhovshchina grouping. The Germans intend to link up their Iartsevo-Dukhovshchina group with their El’nia group and, after encircling our 16th and 20th Armies, also threaten Viaz’ma.
•	Group Maslennikov – dispatching two rifle divisions to attack the enemy’s Iartsevo-Dukhovshchina grouping and to attack toward Il’ino [65 kilometers north of Demidov] and the south.

After describing the situation and providing his estimate of the situation, which was close to the truth, Timoshenko urged the Stavka to provide two additional cavalry divisions for use in a raid against Army Group Center’s rear in the Lepel’ and Vitebsk regions and personnel replacements and weapons with which to refit the Western Front’s 158th, 127th, and 38th Rifle Divisions and the Central Front’s many dilapidated divisions., especially those of 13th Army.³⁴

As the many orders and reports recorded above indicate, all of the Western Front’s attacking groups, including Group Kachalov, registered extremely limited gains against determined German resistance. Although Group Khomenko recorded some tactical successes in advances of 5-15 kilometers against the dug-in company-size kampfgruppen of 18th Motorized Division southwest and south of Belyi, Group Kalinin’s forces pushed forward only 2-5 kilometers against 20th Panzer Division’s hedge-hog defenses. In the Iartsevo region to the south, Group Rokossovsky achieved even less against 12th and 7th Panzer Divisions. Finally, Mel’nik’s cavalry group managed to begin its raid but penetrated only one third of its required distance before faltering in 18th Motorized Division’s rear area and then retreating as 19th Panzer Division moved into the region to reinforce XXXIX Motorized Corps’ defenses.

See Map 27. The situation, 2300, 27 July 1941.

Meanwhile, far to the south, although Group Kachalov finally reached the Stodolishche region, on the railroad line 28 kilometers south of Pochinok, before being brought to a halt by the forces of Guderian’s Second Panzer Group, this was small reward for so ambitious a counteroffensive. Repeating himself parrot-like for the third time, at 2030 hours on 27 July, Kachalov ordered his forces to resume their attacks on 28 July and assigned them new but familiar missions:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix G, 17.

•	Group Kachalov’s Mission – continue the attack on 28 July and fulfill all assigned missions.
•	Missions of Subordinates:

⋄	104th TD – reach the Egorovka and Starinki region [15-18 kilometers east-southeast of Pochinok] and capture crossings over the Khmara River, while protecting yourself from the east and northeast and reinforcing your rear area security with scouting armored cars and tanks.
⋄	149th RD – continue to fulfill your assigned missions by energetic attacks and, while preventing the enemy from digging in along intermediate lines, capture crossings over the Khmara River in the Ponizovka and railroad line sector and maintain close contact with 104th TD with your separate reconnaissance battalion.
⋄	145th RD – while protecting the Dumanichskie and Novyi Derebuzh line [7 kilometers west to 13 kilometers south-southwest of Stodolishche] with one battalion, attack decisively with your remaining forces to capture crossings over the Khmara River in the Tsyganovka Commune and Kiselevka sector [10 kilometers south on Pochinok], and return the motorized rifle company to the Stodolishche region after reconnoitering and protecting the Khislavichi region with the forces of the reconnaissance battalion and an allocated battalion.
⋄	Composite Regiment – after being relieved by 222nd RD, concentrate in the forest near Krapivinskii No. 1 by a night march.35