As Rokossovsky described his subsequent defense, although “suffering considerable losses,” his forces succeeded in:

Organizing resistance to the enemy within a very short time and preventing him from advancing to the east. Then we began going over to the offense by delivering blows against the Germans, first in one sector and then in another, frequently scoring appreciable tactical successes, which helped strengthen discipline among the troops and strengthened the confidence of the officers and men, who saw that they could actually beat the enemy, which meant a lot at that time.

Our activity apparently also puzzled the enemy command, which encountered resistance where it was not expected; they saw that our troops not only fought back but also attacked (even if not always successfully). This tended to create an exaggerated idea of our forces in the sector, and the enemy failed to take advantage of his great superiority. The Fascist command “recognized” our existence, as it were. It fed more and more troops into the Iartsevo region, delivered massive air strikes against our crossings and battle formations, and intensified its artillery and mortar fire….

The heavy continuous fighting at Iartsevo kept the German troops from fanning out to the south. This was our contribution to the Western Front’s general effort, the aim of which was to check the enemy, inflict the greatest possible losses, and, at the same time, prevent him from surrounding the armies fighting at Smolensk.

Colonel A. I. Liziukov’s mixed detachment, which was defending the Dnepr crossings in the rear of 16th and 20th Armies, which had at first operated independently, was by the logic of the events eventually subordinated to our group.⁵³

Actually, the Western Front’s formation and deployment of Rokossovsky’s group created a real crisis for Funck’s 7th Panzer Division since, in addition to blocking the withdrawal of Soviet forces eastward along the Smolensk-Moscow highway from the Smolensk pocket, Funck’ forces now had to contend with Soviet forces attacking its positions at Iartsevo from the south and east. Complicating matters, Stumpff’s 20th Panzer Division was unable to assist Funck’s forces, since it was busy erecting its defensive screen northeast of Smolensk. As a result, 7th Panzer Division’s forces were condemned to fighting near-constant battles with Rokossovsky’s forces for the next five days, during which Rokossovsky’s troops often penetrated to the eastern and southern outskirts of Iartsevo.

All the while, entire formations [divisions], as well as numerous units [regimental size] and subunits [battalion-size], from 19th Army’s forces, which had been dispersed and often shattered in the fighting for Vitebsk region and the area north and northwest of Smolensk in previous days, continued escaping eastward to reinforce both 16th Army and Rokossovsky’s group. The most significant of these to reinforce Rokossovsky’s group included Colonel Domrachev’s 69th Motorized Division (from Trans-Baikal Military District, which was reorganized and renamed 107th Tank Division on 15 July), 64th and 108th Rifle Division of Iushkevich’s 44th Rifle Corps, although both were significantly undermanned, and the headquarters and two tank battalions from Vinogradov’s 7th Mechanized Corps. In addition, many company and battalion-size groups similarly reinforced 129th and 152nd Rifle Divisions of Lukin’s 16th Army at and northeast of Smolensk.

While Funck’s 7th Panzer Division was contending with Rokossovsky’s burgeoning forces for possession of Iartsevo and straining to reach the vital crossings over the Dnepr River further to the south, 12th Panzer and 20th Motorized Divisions of Schmidt’s XXXIX Motorized Corps continued compressing the northern half of the encirclement around 16th, 19th, and 20th Armies into an ever-narrower pocket extending from the Rudnia region eastward south of Demidov to the vicinity of the towns of Syro-Lipki and Spassk-Lipki, 28 and 36 kilometers southwest of Dukhovshchina, respectively, and 28 kilometers north of Smolensk. However, since the panzer and motorized divisions lacked sufficient motorized infantry to seal off the pocket from the west and north, Bock ordered Ninth Army to dispatch General Ruoff’s V Army Corps to Hoth’s support. Initially, 5th and 35th Infantry Divisions of General Ruoff’s corps marched southeastward from the Vitebsk region to relieve 12th Panzer and join the encirclement fight.

The V Corps’ 5th Infantry Division reached the town of Liozno, 40 kilometers southeast of Vitebsk and 75 kilometers northwest of Smolensk late on 18 July, and 35th Infantry Division closed into the village of Dobromysl’, 25 kilometers southwest of Liozno and on 5th Division’s right, overnight on 18-19 July. Ruoff’s infantry subsequently pushed southeastward another 20 kilometers to the Rudnia region, 65 kilometers northwest of Smolensk, by the evening of 20 July, driving back the forces of Kurochkin’s 20th Army and eliminating most of the western half of the pocket. Ruoff’s task was eased as Lukin’s 16th Army removed its forces from the western and southwestern part of the pocket to concentrate them on the effort to recapture Smolensk. This, in turn, permitted Schmidt’s XXXIX Motorized Corps to transfer part of Harpe’s 12th Panzer Division to reinforce Funck’s 7th Panzer Division at Iartsevo and redirect Zorn’s 20th Motorized Division to reinforce the advance on the pocket from the Demidov region, 50 kilometers north of Smolensk.

Throughout this prolonged and often fierce struggle for the shrinking Smolensk pocket, Kurochkin’s 20th and Lukin’s 16th Armies frequently shifted their forces within the pocket to counter the Germans’ blows. Specifically, 144th, 229th, and 233rd Rifle Divisions of 20th Army’s 69th Rifle Corps, together with the remnants of the army’s already shattered 153rd Rifle Division, defended the western and northwestern flanks of the pocket from the Borisov-Smolensk road northward to the Rudnia region, 46th Rifle Division of 16th Army’s 32nd Rifle Corps defended the Demidov sector, the remnants of 127th and 158th Rifle Divisions of Lukin’s 16th Army defended northeast of Smolensk, 38th and 158th Rifle Divisions of 19th Army’s 34th Rifle Corps defended the eastern and southeastern parts of the pocket, 20th Army’s 73rd Rifle Division and 5th Mechanized Corps, with the remnants of 18th Rifle Division, protected the southwestern portion of the pocket along the Dnepr River east and west of Krasnyi, 152nd Rifle Division and parts of 17th and 57th Tank Divisions defended the Dnepr River line west of Smolensk, and a special group formed from General Gorodniansky’s 129th Rifle Division struggled to retain a foothold in the northern outskirts of Smolensk. All the while, the Stavka and Timoshenko worked hard to plan for a concerted counterstroke to rescue their beleaguered armies and, if possible, recapture Smolensk.

As was the case with Hoth’s Third Panzer Group north of Smolensk, south of the city, Guderian’s Second Panzer Group also had to fight two simultaneous battles during the week following the capture of Smolensk by Boltenstern’s 29th Motorized Division, one distracting his attentions from the other. From Bock’s standpoint, the more important of the two battles was the fight at Smolensk, where, beginning on 15 July, 29th Motorized and 17th and 18th Panzer Divisions of Lemelsen’s XXXXVII Motorized Corps fought to contain Soviet forces along the southern face of the Smolensk pocket. At the same time, however, the battles of Geyr’s XXIV Motorized Corps at Mogilev and along the approaches to the Sozh River inevitably slowed the advance of Guderian’s third motorized corps, Vietinghoff’s XXXXVI, toward El’nia, ultimately preventing Vietinghoff’s forces from linking up with Funck’s 7th Panzer Division south of Iartsevo to seal off the Smolensk pocket.

The heavy fighting around the city of Smolensk proper, in the Krasnyi region 48 kilometers to the southwest, and around the periphery of the Smolensk pocket continued with unabated intensity from 16 through 23 July. After 29th Motorized Division seized the city’s center by its 15 July coup de main, Lukin, 16th Army’s commander whom Timoshenko had entrusted with responsible for the city’s defense, assigned the task of recapturing the city to a special group formed around the nucleus of Major General Avksentii Mikhailovich Gorodniansky’s relatively fresh 129th Rifle Division. Reinforced by numerous subunits formed from stragglers from the west, Gorodniansky’s group was nearly at full strength with about 10,000 men. Approaching the city at 0500 hours on 16 July from the north, Gorodniansky’s forces attempted to recapture it but were forced to withdraw from their gains in the half of the city north of the Dnepr River with heavy losses after hours of repeated assaults and near constant German counterattacks. When Lukin issued fresh attack orders to Gorodniansky in the afternoon, 129th Division regained a foothold in the city’s northern section in a night assault on 16-17 July only to be driven back by another strong counterattack by 29th Motorized Division during the afternoon of the next day. Reflecting the seesaw nature of the fighting, Western Front noted in its operational summary of 0800 on 17 July simply:

Sixth. 16th Army. The army prepared an attack on the northern outskirts of Smolensk on 16 July 1941. 46th RD attacked toward Demidov from the Kholm and Motyki region at 1300 hours on 16 July 1941. The results of the fighting are being clarified. 152nd RD is in the Motyki region. It is quiet on the division’s front.⁵⁴

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix F, 2).

However, at 2300 on 17 July, the operational summary of Lukin’s 16th Army added significantly more details about its progress:

•	General Situation – 16th Army is continuing to hold on to the Zagor’e, Maloe Vozmishche, Buda, Kuprino, and Katyn’ Station line [from 30 kilometers northeast of Smolensk southward to 25 kilometers west of Smolensk], with separate detachments from 46th RD, and the withdrawing units of 129th RD are attacking to capture Demidov and Smolensk.
•	32nd RC – 46th RD is attacking the northern outskirts of Demidov with two rifle and two artillery battalions, with the results being confirmed, and its remaining battalions are supporting Major General Gorodniansky’s Detachment (129th RD) in its attack on Smolensk.
•	152nd RD (five rifle battalions) – reconnoitering along the Zagor’e, Maloe Vozmishche, Buda, Kuprino, and Katyn’ Station line [28 kilometers north-northwest to 25 kilometers west of Smolensk] with no enemy to its front, with 1st Bn, 626th RR, supporting 46th RD at Demidov, 1st Bn, 480th RR, supporting 17th TD along the Svinaia River and Litivlia line [50 kilometers west-southwest of Smolensk], 3rd Bn, 544th RR, defending with 57th TD in the woods north of Krasnyi [50 kilometers southwest of Smolensk], and 3rd Bn, 480th RR, withdrawing toward Smolensk (but location unknown). The reconnaissance platoon of 646th RR encountered 4 enemy tanks in Blonnaia.
•	Major General Gorodniansky’s Detachment (46th and 129th Rifle Divisions) – attacking the northern part of Smolensk, with one battalion, 334th RR at Karmachi [Karmanichi] and Sitniki [in the northwestern suburbs of Smolensk], 1st Bn, 314th RR at Korolevka and Marker 251 [the northeastern suburb of Smolensk], and 3rd Bn, 457th RR attacking on its left wing. The detachment attacked toward Smolensk at first light on 17 July, together with 34th RC’s units, which are attacking toward the southeastern outskirts of Smolensk. 34th RC’s headquarters is in the grove 2 kilometers west of Berezhany [22 kilometers north-northeast of Smolensk].55

Meanwhile, along the extreme western extremity of the Smolensk pocket northeast and southeast of Orsha, on 17 July the remnants of Kurochkin’s 20th Army began what ultimately evolved into a 10-day fight to contain numerically superior German forces west of Smolensk. Northeast of Orsha, Colonel Aleksandr Ivanovich Akimov’s 73rd Rifle Division and the remnants of Alekseenko’s 5th Mechanized Corps fought tenaciously in near encirclement against the armor of Harpe’s 12th Panzer Division and 35th Infantry Division’s infantry until ammunition shortages forced them to fall back in stages through the Liubovichi region, 70 kilometers west of Smolensk, and then 16th Army’s lines near Buda, Kuprino, and Katyn’ Station, 25-30 kilometers northwest and west of Smolensk. At the same time, Colonel Iakov Grigor’evich Kreizer’s 1st Motorized Rifle Division, the latter a reorganized version of 7th Mechanized Corps’ 1st Motorized Division, fought with armor from Weber’s 17th Panzer Division and 137th Infantry Division’s infantry southeast of Orsha before its remnants withdrew northeastward toward Krasnyi, 50 kilometers southwest of Smolensk. During this struggle, Kurochkin’s forces reportedly employed their new “Katiusha” multiple rocket launchers [Stalin organs] for the first time with good effect.

When Lukin’s 16th Army ordered Gorodniansky’s Detachment (129th Rifle Divisional Group) to resume its assaults on Smolensk on 18 July, this time Lukin took care to reinforce it with the remnants of 127th and 158th Rifle Divisions. Gorodniansky’s reinforced detachment launched its new assaults southward into Smolensk’s northern suburbs, while the cooperating 34th Rifle Corps’ under-strength 127th and 158th Rifle Divisions, just attached to Lukin’s army from Konev’s disbanded 19th Army, attacked Smolensk’s southeastern suburbs. However, these assaults scarcely dented 29th Motorized Division’s strongpoint defense in the city.

Meanwhile, at 0130 hours on 18 July, in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the Western Direction, Timoshenko took another step in response to Stalin’s 16 July rebuke by issuing new attack and defense orders to his six armies. Addressed specifically to “To the commanders of 22nd, 20th, 13th, 4th, 16th, and 21st Armies,” Timoshenko pointed out that “16th Army is repelling attacks and holding on to Smolensk” and “is attacking toward Demidov with its right wing.” Using Lukin’s 16th Army as an example, he then assigned specific offensive and defensive missions to his army commanders, holding them personally responsible for their fulfillment:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix F, 4.

•	22nd Army – while fulfilling previously assigned missions, exhaust enemy forces with the decisive actions of detachments day and night, prevent an enemy penetration to Velikie Luki with local garrisons, reinforcements, the civil population, and 126th RD’s rifle regiment dispatched on vehicles, and conduct flank attacks toward Vitebsk on the left wing to paralyze enemy operations along that axis. Under no circumstance surrender the city of Velikie Luki. I will hold the army commander and member of the Military Council personably responsible for fulfillment.
•	20th Army – while depending on 16th Army’s defenses along the Kholm and Sipochi Station front, hold on to your front, threaten the enemy’s Smolensk group with encirclement by attacks toward Gorki and Monastyrskie from the south and west, and tie down enemy forces in the Krasnyi region with attacks by 5th MC.
•	13th Army – while holding on to your front, liquidate the penetration between the army’s Mogilev and Bykhov groups by attacking toward Bykhov with 151st RD, attack decisively along the Bykhov-Bobruisk axis, and decisively fulfill previously assigned missions, which were “unnecessarily delayed.” 13th Army’s commander, Gerasimenko, will direct the forces of 4th and 13th Armies.
•	16th Army – continue to fulfill your assigned mission in accordance with Order No. 065 [prevent the enemy Velizh grouping from reaching the Smolensk-Iartsevo road and attack toward Gorki with concentrated divisions and 17th MC to destroy the enemy’s main mobile grouping], and prevent the enemy from seizing Smolensk.56

Timoshenko cryptically reported about the little he knew about this action in Western Front’s operational summary issued at 2000 hours on 18 July but without even mentioning any action in the sector of Rokossovsky’s Group Iartsevo. While the summary acknowledged that Konev’s 19th Army had essentially dissolved and dispersed to the winds after its defeats in the Vitebsk region, it did indicate the other armies in the Smolensk region were doing what they could to halt the German juggernaut:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix F, 5.

•	General Situation – on 18 July the Western Front’s forces continued fierce fighting with enemy units penetrating toward Nevel’, Demidov, Smolensk, and Propoisk and conducted an offensive toward Bobruisk.
•	19th Army – withdrawing in disorder, the army’s units are assembling in the Viaz’ma and Dorogobuzh region, with 25th RC’s headquarters assembling in Viaz’ma, 162nd RD withdrawing to the Nelidovo region (100 kilometers west of Rzhev), after the battles in the Surazh and Vitebsk region, where it is now subordinate to 30th Army. There is no other information about the location of the army’s headquarters and the army’s other units because of a lack of communications, and liaison officers sent out have still not returned.
•	20th Army – fighting intensely with enemy panzer and mechanized forces but running short of ammunition, fuel, and foodstuffs.

▪	144th RD – attacking part of 12th PzD near Rudnia [65 kilometers west of Smolensk], but totally out of fuel.
▪	69th RC (229th and 233rd RDs) – defending south and southeast of Dobromysl’ [25-30 kilometers southward of Rudnia] against a concentration of enemy motorized infantry with 2,000 vehicles, which have apparently run out of fuel, and elements of 17th PzD and 35th ID in the Bogushevskoe region.
▪	73rd RD – repulsing attacks by an enemy panzer division (probably the 18th) attempting to cross the Dnepr River at Dubrovno and Rossasna [20-35 kilometers east of Orsha].
▪	5th MC – facing up to two enemy divisions in the Liady and Syrokoren’e region [60 kilometers west of Smolensk] and conducting a fighting withdrawal to the crossing at Gusino [45 kilometers west of Smolensk].

•	16th Army – defending the Grinevo sector [10 kilometers south of Smolensk] with [34th RC’s] 158th and 127th RDs and assembling 7th MC in the Sosnovka region [22 kilometers northeast of Viaz’ma], but no other information available [about Detachment Gorodniansky’s attacks at Smolensk].57

The most revealing aspect of Western Front’s operational summary was the absence of anything but rumor about the situation in the critical Smolensk sector, which obviously demonstrated the chaotic communications in Timoshenko’s front. In fact, it would take more than 24 hours for Timoshenko to receive any credible reports from Lukin, a period of silence that only raised the level of anxiety if not outright anger in the Stavka. When the operational summary of Lukin’s 16th Army, which the army issued at 2000 hours on 19 July, finally reached Timoshenko, there was little in it that encouraged either the front commander or the Stavka:

See Map 18. Army Group Center’s situation late on 19 July 1941 and Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix F, 6).

•	16th Army – fought for Kholm and Demidov on 18 and 19 July, regrouped along the Zagor’e, Agafonovo, Borodenka, Kuprino, and Katyn’ Station line, attacked and occupied Smolensk’s northern suburbs in conjunction with 34th RC’s attack toward Smolensk from the southeast, and employed destroyer detachments to fight with enemy airborne landings in the Iartsevo and Terekhi region.
•	32nd RC – 46th RD is defending the Donets and Akatovo line [40-45 kilometers north of Smolensk] with three rifle and three artillery battalions and attacking toward Demidov. A rifle battalion of 527th RR contained an enemy attack from Kholm along the Donets and Akatovo line, but its right flank was enveloped by small enemy mobile groups, which penetrated from Bichno and Iushino. 3rd Bn, 314th RR and a battalion of 647th RR raided the headquarters of an enemy artillery regiment at Senino.
•	152nd RD – Regrouped its units, with 544th RR (less five rifle companies) along the Iavishche, Kasplia, and Bol’shoe Vozmishche line; 646th RR (less six rifle companies) along the Borodenka, Zyki, and Ermaki line; and 480th RR (less 5th RCo), along the Kuprino, Katyn’ Station, and to the Dnepr River line [from 30 kilometers northwest to 25 kilometers west of Smolensk], and with its reconnaissance groups in contact with the enemy, and observed the enemy preparing crossing sites over the Dnepr River in the Krasnyi Bor and Nizhnaia Iasennaia region on its left flank.
•	Major General Gorodniansky’s Detachment [129th RD] – fighting a seesaw battle in Smolensk, with 1st Bn, 340th RR, and one battalion of 720th RR on the western edge of Smolensk and the airfield; 3rd Bn, 457th RR, in the northern suburbs of Smolensk, and 343rd RR (less one rifle battalion) at the Marker 251 line. 32nd RC’s headquarters is in a grove 2 kilometers east of Senno.58