18 August – Memorandum of Zhukov, the front commander, accompanying Order No. 019:

1. 105th TD, despite my categorical warning about moving forward, has marked time in one place for 10 days and, without achieving any kind of results, has suffered losses.

In light of its inability to resolve independent combat missions, 105th TD is disbanded and will turn its personnel and equipment over to 102nd TD.

Demote the commander of the division, Regimental Commissar Biriukov, in rank because he could not cope with his duties.

2. Relieve the commander of 106th MD, Colonel Alekseev, who has been repeatedly warned about his unsatisfactory fulfillment of combat mission, from his assigned duties and appoint him, at reduced rank, to command 309th RD’s 955th RR.

3. Appoint Colonel Brynzov, the former commander of 158th RD, as commander of 106th MD.

4. Relieve Major Mita, the commander of 955th RR, from his duties because of the panicky conduct of the regiment and appoint him to the post of battalion commander in the regiment.

5. I am announcing a reprimand of Major General Petrov, the commander of 120th RD, for unsatisfactory and passive fulfillment of his combat missions and am warning him that, if he continues to fulfill assigned missions as poorly, he will be relieved from command and reduced in rank.

Zhukov¹²

After three more days of intense, costly, and often frenzied fighting, which achieved virtually nothing, at 0445 hours on 21 August, Zhukov finally “bit the bullet” by informing Stalin himself that further offensive action would be futile without a significant pause to rest, refit, reinforce, and train Rakutin’s dwindling forces;

See Map 103 and Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix P, 7.

0445 hours on 21 August 1941

The units of the Reserve Front’s 24th Army in the El’nia region have completely failed to encircle and destroy the German units by 20 August 1941.

In addition, on 19 August the enemy committed 137th Infantry Division, which was previously stretched out along 43rd Army’s front, in the Gur’evo and Sadki region [12 kilometers northwest to 12 kilometers north-northwest of El’nia].

The enemy has committed a new unit, whose number we have yet to determine, in the Klemiatino and Grichano region [28-30 kilometers northwest of El’nia].

During the 10 days of operations, I was in all of the divisions and personally familiarized myself with the combat conditions and how the units were conducting themselves.

The majority of the soldiers and commanders are conducting themselves well. They do not fear losses and are already learning the techniques and tactics for destroying the enemy, but all of the units are very under-strength and run down from offensive operations and enemy fire, which has not ceased even in the night over the last few days.

Given the essential numerical weakness of our units, it is not possible to encircle and destroy 4-5 German infantry divisions once and for all.

Further conduct of the battle in our present state will lead to the final loss of the combat effectiveness of the operating units.

It is now necessary to replenish the units to at least 60% in personnel, to bring up more ammunition, to allow the soldiers to rest, and to find weak places in the enemy carefully, and, after that, to attack impetuously.

I request your permission:

1) To cease the general offensive until 24 August;

2) To refill the units with replacements from 14 march-battalions arriving during that period;

3) To familiarize the replacements with the nature of conducting battle and prepare them for action; and

4) To begin the attack with the new forces on the morning of 25 August. If the situation does not become more difficult along other axes, to employ 303rd Rifle Division, which is situated in my reserve at Khoteevka, in the attack.

Before 25 August, the enemy will be destroyed by systematic artillery and mortar fire and air strikes, and prisoners will be seized.¹³

When Stalin approved Zhukov’s request later in the day, Zhukov ordered Rakutin to cease his attacks and begin preparing to conduct a stronger, better organized, and more thoroughly supported offensive later in the month. In effect, this temporarily ended 13 days of bloody combat that engulfed both Soviet and German forces in the El’nia region. Although indecisive, however, the fighting in and around the El’nia bridgehead exacted a terrible toll on attacker and defender alike.

The fighting around the Germans’ El’nia bridgehead during the first three weeks of August yielded no significant results operational or tactically. In essence it was a draw. But it was a costly draw for both sides. As a virtual magnet for heavy combat, 24th Army’s persistent but poorly organized and conducted assaults decimated the forces conducting them. Although the Russians have yet to release casualty figures for the August fighting around El’nia, the Reserve Front as a whole lost 103,147 irreplaceable casualties, including 45,774 killed, captured or missing, and 57,373 wounded, from 30 July through 10 September. Since the front lost 31,853 men out of 103,200 committed to combat at El’nia from 30 August to 10 September, including 10,701 irreplaceable casualties, and another 20-25,000 men during the destruction of Group Kachalov from 1-7 August, this means that 24th Army, which did the bulk of the front’s fighting during August, lost upwards of 40-50,000 men during the fighting at El’nia from 8 through 24 August.

Making matters worse, if 24th Army’s attacking divisions did not know how to conduct effective offensive operations before 21 August, their horrendous losses in officers and men and the thousands of partially-trained men they received to replace these losses made it unlikely the army would fare any better in the future. For this reason alone, Zhukov requested four days of rest in the hope Rakutin’s army could operate more effectively after the pause. Understandably, it did not.

For the Germans, El’nia proved to be a killing field for an army that could not afford to suffer even a sizeable fraction of the casualties the Red Army suffered. As was the case in German Ninth Army, where its 161st Infantry Division lost more than three-quarters of its combat strength in one week of fighting along the Vop’ River, and other infantry divisions, such as the 5th, 8th, 26th, 28th, 35th, 106th, and 129th, also suffered unprecedented and unsustainable losses in this and other sectors, the same thing occurred at El’nia. For example, XXXXVI Motorized Corps had suffered 4,788 casualties from 22 June through 25 July 1941, including 1,182 dead, 3,445 wounded, and 161 missing in action. Yet, one of the two medical companies in SS “Das Reich” Division reported treating about 800 wounded and sick on 28 July alone.¹⁴ During just over a week of fighting from 8 though 15 August, XX Army Corps reported losing 2,254 men, including many line officers, most of them from the combat battalions of 15th, 268th, and 292nd Infantry Divisions. Other lamentable loss figures included 1,200 casualties in 263rd Infantry Division in seven days of fighting, 1,115 dead in two weeks in 78th Infantry Division (although most of these after 25 August), and about 2,000 casualties in 137th Infantry Division. In general, most of the German infantry divisions that fought at El’nia either in August or September, or in both months, lost between 20-30 percent of their combat strength in the fighting.¹⁵

It is no wonder that the bloodletting in the El’nia sector, like that in Ninth Army’s sector east and northeast of Smolensk, only increased Hitler’s reluctance to continue the likely costly advance on Moscow at a time when there were far softer and more lucrative prizes to be won to the north and south.

Altered Strategic Plans, 18–21 August

German Strategy

Despite Timoshenko’s clear discomfiture over the deteriorating situation on his front’s right wing, the success Konev’s 19th Army achieved in the center was having a clear impact on German decision-making, in particular, involving the question of whether or not German forces should immediately resume their advance on Moscow. The fact was that, while Bock, the commander of Army Group Center, ostensibly Halder and the OKH, and also many of Bock’s subordinate army commanders argued for an immediate advance on the Soviet capital, Hitler and his advisers in Berlin were now certain the advance must be delayed until after they dealt with the crises on the Army Group Center’s flanks.

The most important aspects of these crises were the Soviet counterstroke in the Staraia Russa region to the north, which, while unsuccessful, ultimately stalled the advance by Field Marshal Leeb’s Army Group North on Leningrad by at least a full week, and the obstinate resistance of Soviet 5th Army west of the Dnepr River, which had been delaying the advance of Field Marshal Rundstedt’s Army Group South on Kiev for well over a month. In Hitler’s view, the only feasible solutions to these problems were to divert a sizeable chunk of Army Group Center’s Third Panzer Group northward to assist Army Group North and unleash Guderian’s Second Panzer Group (with Weichs’ Second Army) on a drive southward to help Army Group South. Hitler declared as much in the supplement he issued to his Directive No. 34 on 12 August

It is also abundantly clear that the pummeling many German divisions were experiencing northeast and east of Smolensk and in the El’nia region, which by now confirmed that the Soviets were reinforcing and fortifying their defenses along the Moscow axis, contributed to Hitler’s decision to strike northward and southward rather than move directly eastward to Moscow.

In fact, on 21 August, four days after 19th Army’s impressive drive across the Vop’ River, three days after Bock reported 161st Infantry Division was “at the end of its tether,” and the very day Bock admitted 7th Panzer Division’s counterstroke was a bloody failure, Hitler released a new Führer Directive which read:

The army’s [OKH’s] proposal for the continuation of the operation in the east of 18 August does not correspond with my plans [intentions]. I am ordering the following:

1. The most important objective yet to be achieved before the onset of winter is not the capture of Moscow, but rather, in the South, the occupation of the Crimea and the industrial and coal region of the Donets, together with isolation of the Russian oil regions in the Caucasus, and, in the north, the encirclement of Leningrad and link-up with the Finns.

2. The operational solution, uniquely favorable to us, which was brought about by our reaching the line Gomel-Pochep, must at once be exploited for a concentric operation by the inner wings of Army Groups South and Center. The operation must be so conducted that the Soviet Fifth Army is not merely pushed behind the Dnieper by an attack of Sixth Army alone, but rather that this army is destroyed before he can break out to take shelter behind the line Desna River-Konotop-Sula River. This would make it safe for Army Group South to establish itself east of the middle Dneiper and to continue the operation in the direction of Rostov-Kharkov with its central portion and left wing.

3. Regardless of subsequent operations, Army Group Center must employ forces on a scale sufficient to achieve the objective of destroying the Russian Fifth Army, while retaining enough troops to be able to repel enemy attacks against the central sector of its front in a position that can be held with a minimum of losses. There is no change in the plan to advance the left wing of Army Group Center to the high ground around Toropets, where a linkup is to be effected with the right wing of Army Group North.

4. Capture of the Crimean peninsula is of paramount importance for safeguarding our oil supply from Romania. Therefore all available means – including armor – must be employed to cross the Dneiper quickly in the direction of the Crimea, before the enemy can bring up fresh forces.

5. Not until we have tightly encircled Leningrad, linked up with the Finns, and destroyed the Russian Fifth Army, shall we have set the stage and can we free the forces for attacking and beating the enemy Army Group Timoshenko with any prospect of success, as specified in the supplement to Directive 34 of 12 August.¹⁶

The same day, Halder, the chief of staff of the German Army and the driving force in the OKH, noted in his dairy that Hitler’s memorandum accompanying the Führer directive castigated the commander of the Army (ObdH), Field Marshal Walter Brauchitsch, for “failing to conduct operations on the lines desired by the Führer,” and for allowing the OKH “to be swayed by the special interests of the individual army commanders.” This prompted Halder to add the prescient notation, “It is decisive for the outcome of the campaign.”¹⁷ In a more lengthy critique of Hitler’s behavior, Halder caustically remarked:

I regard the situation created by the Führer’s interference unendurable for OKH. No other but the Führer himself is to blame for the zigzag course caused by his successive orders, nor can the present OKH, which is now in its fourth victorious campaign, tarnish its good name with those latest orders. Moreover, the way ObdH is being treated in absolutely outrageous. I have proposed to ObdH to request his relief together with mine. ObdH refuses on the grounds that the resignations would not be accepted, and so nothing would be changed.¹⁸

If Halder was angered by Hitler’s decision, Bock was even more irate. Although he avoided any comment in his diary the day he received the directive, the next day, 23 August, he discussed matters with Halder, who called Hitler’s proposal “a crime.” In response to the claim Hitler supposedly made in his memorandum that it “was necessary to smash the Russian Army,” Bock argued, “But the bulk of the Russian Army is standing opposite my eastern front and the opportunity to smash it is being taken away from me by the attack to the south!”¹⁹ Unwittingly, this comment by Bock simply confirmed the primary basis for Hitler’s judgment, specifically, that the Russians were indeed strongest along the Moscow axis. As if to add a “fillip” to this point, Bock ended his conversation with his diary on 23 August by adding, “”Further furious attacks against 9th Army’s front by the Russians.”²⁰ Furthermore, based in the harrowing experiences of 161st Infantry and 7th Panzer Divisions in mid-August, if not the overall erosion of the strength of Army Group Center’s divisions caused by the fighting in July and August, Hitler was convinced the immediate capture of Moscow was a risky “bridge too far.” He indeed wished to destroy the Russian Army, but piece by piece rather than in one fell swoop.

If the intense fighting during the first three weeks of August was not proof enough that Hitler’s judgment was correct, the even more intense costly fighting in late August and early September would be proof positive.

Soviet Strategy

While Hitler agonized over his future strategic course and his senior marshals and generals fulminated in anger over his decision, Timoshenko, too, faced a dilemma founded on two realities. First, his front’s accomplishments during the third week of August, especially the unprecedented destruction of one German infantry division and the damage inflicted on many German panzer and infantry divisions impressed and encouraged Stalin and his Stavka. Despite the heavy casualties suffered by Timoshenko’s Western and Zhukov’s Reserve Fronts, both commanders were determined to destroy Army Group Center’s forces in the Smolensk region. Convinced that Bock’s forces, in particular, his infantry divisions along his army group’s forward defenses, were about to collapse, both Stalin and the Stavka were confident this could be done but only if Timoshenko expanded the scope and power of his offensive. Therefore, beginning on 21 August, the Stavka began releasing vital strategic reserves to Timoshenko and, on 25 August, issued new orders to Timoshenko to capture Velizh, Demidov, and Smolensk once and for all. Swept away by over-optimism, it also ordered the two forward armies of Zhukov’s Reserve Front to destroy the German forces in the El’nia bridgehead and advance westward to capture Roslavl’, and Eremenko’s newly-formed Briansk Front, reinforced by Efremov’s sagging Central Front, to block Guderian’s southward advance and protect the right flank of Kirponos’ Southwestern Front.

However, midst this air of unrequited optimism in Moscow and the grandiose plans this optimism engendered, a second more grim reality intervened. Three days before the Stavka issued orders for its culminating general counteroffensive, Hitler’s gamble suddenly materialized. On 22 August two German panzer divisions and seven cooperating infantry divisions subordinate to Ninth Army’s Group Stumme abruptly ended the week-long game of cat and mouse by striking a massive blow against the right flank of Timoshenko’s Western Front. Although it would take almost two full days before Timoshenko and Stalin fully recognized what was happening, when they did, both understood the climax of the battle for Smolensk was at hand. From this point forward, a new race materialized, specifically, a deadly race between three Red Army fronts trying to cripple Army Group Center and Army Group Center’s Group Stumme attempting to demolish the Western Front’s right wing. It was also clear to all parties that whoever won this contest would likely become the ultimate victor in the battle for Smolensk.

The Northern Flank: the Struggle for Velikie Luki, 21–24 August

Competing Plans

Although the capture of the city of Gomel’ by Weichs’ Second Army on 20 August and the simultaneous advance by Guderian’s panzers to Starodub resolved the problems on Army Group Center’s southern flank, the confusion on his army group’s northern flank continued to worry Bock and Hitler. This problem was particularly vexing because the infantry divisions of the Army Group Center’s V, VIII, IX, and XX Army Corps northeast, east, and southeast of Smolensk and at El’nia were under immense pressure. For Hitler, the Soviet strongholds at Velikie Luki and Toropets represented a red flag, since Soviet operations from these two regions still posed a threat to Strauss’ Ninth Army and Hoth’s Third Panzer Group.²¹ While Konev’s and Khomenko’s 19th and 30th Armies pounded the German defenses between the Western Dvina River and Iartsevo, and Rakutin’s 24th Army did the same at El’nia, Ershakov’s 22nd and Maslennikov’s 29th Armies threatened Ninth Army’s and Third Panzer Group’s left flank. As a result, Bock’s over-extended divisions lacked necessary reserves and were running short of ammunition. Since the defense of the El’nia bridgehead, in particular, was consuming an inordinate quantity of resources, Bock proposed he be allowed to withdraw XX Army Corps from the exposed bridgehead, a proposal Hitler categorically denied.

Only after Gomel’ fell and the situation east and northeast of Smolensk stabilized was Strauss’ Ninth Army able to assemble a large enough force to mount a concerted offensive operation to capture Velikie Luki. However, his decision to regroup 19th and 20th Panzer Divisions of Kuntzen’s LVII Motorized Corps from the region north of Smolensk to new assembly areas south of Velikie Luki provided the Stavka with yet another opportunity to strike at Bock’s weakened infantry divisions east and northeast of Smolensk. Hitler, however, accepted the risk, in part because the Velikie Luki offensive fulfilled the requirements of his cherished Directive No. 34.

Even as the Stavka was preparing fresh orders for Timoshenko’s, Zhukov’s, and Eremenko’s fronts to resume their offensives, on 20 August Bock began implementing Hitler’s addendum to Directive No. 34 by regrouping LVII Motorized Corps’ 19th and 20th Panzer Divisions from their rest areas on the left wing of Hoth’s panzer group west of Belyy northwestward into assembly areas north of Usviaty. There the two panzer divisions joined 206th, 110th, 102nd, and 256th Infantry Divisions to form a special composite group under XXXX Motorized Corps’ headquarters, commanded by General of Panzer Troops Georg Stumme. Protected on the left by 253rd, 251st, and 86th Infantry Divisions of Ninth Army’s XXIII Army Corps and spearheaded by LVII Motorized Corps’ two panzer divisions, Group Stumme was to penetrate the defenses of Ershakov’s 22nd Army, envelop Velikie Luki from the east, encircle and destroy Ershakov’s army, drive it and Maslennikov’s 29th Army eastward, and capture the Toropets region. If successful, in addition to clearing Soviet forces from Army Group Center’s left flank, the offensive would align the advance in the north with the front lines of Army Group Center’s forces struggling east of Smolensk.

Before the German storm broke over 22nd Army’s defenses on 22 August, neither 22nd Army and Timoshenko nor Stalin and his Stavka seemed to have any idea about what was about to happen to the Western Front’s right wing. In fact, only the day before, Ershakov’s 22nd Army had begun an offensive of its own and was already sending optimistic reports back to Moscow about its progress. Timoshenko had approved Ershakov’s proposed offensive plan on 18 August, telling him to begin the offensive on 21 August and “when the army’s shock group reaches the Lake Siverskoe region [42 kilometers south-southeast of Velikie Luki], subsequently exploit the offensive toward Usviat’e [33 kilometers northwest of Velizh],” and protect his main attack force against any threat from the west with two rifle divisions. Timoshenko cautioned Ershakov he would have to rely on his own forces for success because “at the present time, the front cannot reinforce the army with artillery and aircraft.”²²

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix Q, 1.

Ershakov issued a warning order about the offensive to his forces at 0345 hours on 19 August so that they could make necessary preparation and the full offensive order at 2145 hours that evening:

See Map 96 and Volume 3 (Documents)Appendices Q, 2 and 3.

•	Enemy Situation – on 22nd Army’s front, the forces of the enemy’s 253rd, 110th, 86th, and 206th IDs, totaling seven infantry regiments, have gone over to the defense.
•	Neighbors – on the right, 27th Army’s forces have the mission to capture the Kholm region, and, on the left, 29th Army’s forces are conducting an offensive to destroy the enemy in the Il’ino region.
•	22nd Army’s Mission – attack on 21 August to destroy opposing enemy forces and reach the Pozhari (on the Lovat’ River, 16 kilometers south of Velikie Luki), Lake Porech’e, Lake Odgast, Lake Siroto, Lake and Lake Ordosno [45 kilometers southeast of Velikie Luki] line and subsequently exploit the attack toward Usviat’e, while protecting the right flank.
•	Missions of Subordinates:

♦	51st RC (366th RR, 48th TD, and 214th RD, with artillery support) – protect the army’s right flank, defeat enemy forces with an active defense by 366th RR and 48th TD, prevent enemy detachments from infiltrating eastward north of Velikie Luki, attack on the left wing with at least two regiments of 214th RD, and reach the Rozhakovo, Lake Kupuiskoe, and Lake Sekui line [14 kilometers south of Velikie Luki], with a forward detachment in the sector along the Lovat’ River.
♦	29th RC – (126th RD, minus 366th RR, 179th, 170, and 98th RDs, minus one rifle regiment, with supporting artillery) – conduct a main attack with 179th, 170th, and 98th RDs from the Vas’kovo and Mokhoniki Farm region [20 kilometers southeast to 10 kilometers south-southeast of Velikie Luki] and a secondary attack with 126th RD from its present positions [6-8 kilometers south of Velikie Luki], destroy the enemy, and reach the Lake Sekui and Lake Psovo line and, subsequently, the Lake Sekui, Lake Porech’e, and Lake Odgast front [20 kilometers south-southwest to 25 kilometers south of Velikie Luki] with 126th RD and the Orekhovo and Vinogradovo line, and, subsequently, the Lake Odgast, Lake Orel’e, and Lake Siverskoe front [25 kilometers south to 42 kilometers south-southeast of Velikie Luki] with the main grouping by exploiting the attack southeastward and preventing the enemy from withdrawing south of the lakes.
♦	62nd RC (174th and 186th RDs, with artillery support) – while defending 174th RD’s right flank and 186th RD’s left flank, attack from the Gorki and Kurilovo line toward Savino (2 kilometers west of Lake Ordosno) with at least four regiments to prevent an enemy counterattack against the army’s shock group (29th RC) and its left flank, with the immediate mission to destroy enemy forces in the Vliazoviki, Slepnevo, and Luzhki region [38-42 kilometers southeast of Velikie Luki] and capture Nesterovo and Stolbtsy, with strong forward detachments in the Pasika and Bol’shoi and Malyi Potemki region, and, subsequently, exploit to the Lake Siverskoe, Lake Ordosno, and Alekseenki (7 kilometers east of Lake Ordosno) front [50-55 kilometers southeast of Velikie Luki] with the main grouping.
♦	Senior Lieutenant Pervushin’s Detachment – (a cavalry squadron of the cavalry division) – while conducting active operations in the lake region, prevent the enemy from penetrating between Lakes Dvin’e and Zhizhitskoe and into the isthmus between Lake Dvin’e and Lake Velinskoe [50 kilometers east-southeast of Velikie Luki].
♦	4th RR, 98th RD (the army reserve) – remain in the Ushitsy region [18 kilometers east-southeast of Velikie Luki] and be prepared to advance [southeastward or southward] along the Ushitsy State Farm, Mokriki, Chudino; Mulina and UshitsyState Farm, Annino, Bukatino, and Bolychi; and Annino, Akhromtseva, and Redkino lines.
♦	Separate CD (less one squadron) – after concentrating in 366th RR’s sector, move to the line of contact and advance toward Novo-Sokol’niki [25 kilometers west of Velikie Luki] to destroy individual enemy units, headquarters, and rear service installations to disrupt his command, control, and communications it the rear.23

Presuming his subordinate commanders could understand, much less carry out, such a complex order, Ershakov directed his army’s main shock group, the six divisions of 62nd and 29th Rifle Corps advancing southward from Velikie Luki, to keep pace and closely coordinate with Maslennikov’s 29th Army, which was attacking southward toward Il’ino roughly 50 kilometers to the east. Ershakov did so because Timoshenko wanted 22nd and 29th Armies, together, to maintain maximum pressure against the left wing of Army Group Center’s Ninth Army, which was anchored on the heavily forested and vast lake region north of the Western Dvina River and the town of Velizh. The 22nd Army’s offensive was also a risky venture because, even if there were no large German armored forces in the region, as its main forces advanced southward, the army planned to leave only the weak forces of its 51st Rifle Corps to protect its right wing north, west, and south of Velikie Luki. Consequently, if some large German force should magically appear on the army shock group’s front and shatter it, the Western Front’s entire right wing in the sector from Velikie Luki eastward to Toropets, deeper in the front’s rear, was essentially wide open and lightly defended.

See Map 104. The situation in the Velikie Luki region, 21 August 1941.

22nd Army’s Offensive, 21–22 August

Despite the risks, Ershakov’s army attacked as planned at 1300 hours on 21 August, after a brief artillery preparation. It conducted its main attack with six rifle divisions subordinate to Major General Ivan Petrovich Karmanov’s 62nd and Major General Aleksandr Georgievich Samokhin’s 29th Rifle Corps, which were deployed in situation in jumping-off positions across the roughly 42-kilometer front from Lake Dvin’e in the east westward to the eastern bank of the Lovat’ River south of Velikie Luki. The operational summary the Western Front issued at 2000 hours that evening recorded the attack’s progress on the first day of the offensive:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix N, 46.

•	22nd Army’s Situation – defending on its right wing, attacked in its center and on its left wing at 1300 hours on 21 August to destroy the opposing enemy.
♦	51st RC – defending the army’s right wing, attacking southward with two regiments, and raiding westward with cavalry.

◊	126th RD’s 366th RR – defending the Sidorovshchina, Veret’e 1, and Kudelino region [3 kilometers northwest to 14 kilometers north of Velikie Luki].
◊	48th TD – defending the Sergievskaia Sloboda, Eremeevo, Kikino, Mordovishche, and Kon’ region [3 kilometers west to 5 kilometers southwest of Velikie Luki].
◊	214th RD (one regiment) – defending the Kon’ and Pronino line [5 kilometers west to 10 kilometers south of Velikie Luki].
◊	214th RD (two regiments) – attacking southward from the Pronino and Strizhevo sector [10 kilometers south to 10 kilometers south-southeast of Velikie Luki] toward Kuznetsovo, wedging 2-3 kilometers into the enemy’s defenses.
◊	Sep. CD – raiding westward toward Novosokol’niki [25 kilometers west of Velikie Luki] and the enemy’s rear area.
◊	Corps headquarters – Vlaskovo [44 kilometers east of Velikie Luki].

♦	29th RC – attacking from the Strizhevo, Gusakovo, and Sopki line [10 kilometers south-southeast to 35 kilometers southeast of Velikie Luki] in the army’s center at 1300 hours on 21 August, and advancing 2-3 kilometers by 1500 hours, with its forces located at:

◊	126th RD – Leonovo [10 kilometers south of Velikie Luki].
◊	179th RD – Plaksino and Pirogovo [20-23 kilometers south-southeast of Velikie Luki].
◊	170th RD – Mulina and Pronino [23-25 kilometers south-southeast of Velikie Luki].
◊	98th RD – in army reserves, with two regiments in the Taraskino, Rudnitsa, and Leskovo region [20-25 kilometers east-southeast of Velikie Luki] and one regiment in the Ushitsa State Farm region [18 kilometers east-southeast of Velikie Luki].
◊	Corps headquarters – Vatolino [18 kilometers east-southeast of Velikie Luki].

♦	62nd RC – defending the army’s left wing with one regiment of 174th RD along the Shcherganikha and Berezniki line [40 kilometers southeast of Velikie Luki], and attacking on the right wing [35-45 kilometers southeast of Velikie Luki].

◊	174th RD (two regiments) – from the Bakutino and Matskova line [32-34 kilometers southeast of Velikie Luki] toward Nesterova, advancing 3 kilometers by 1500 hours.
◊	186th RD – defending the Kurilovo, Beliushina, and Karpova line [25-30 kilometers southeast of Velikie Luki] with one regiment and attacking with two regiments from the Matskova and Merino line [30-32 kilometers southeast of Velikie Luki] toward Luzhki, in cooperation with 174th RD’s shock group, but held up by very heavy enemy resistance.
◊	Corps headquarters – Annino [35 kilometers southeast of Velikie Luki].

♦	Boundary Protection

◊	With 27th Army – forward detachment from 98th RD in the Kniazhovo region (on the Kun’ia River 35 kilometers southwest of Kholm); and
◊	With 29th Army – an army detachment in the Iamishche, Krasnoe, and Sosny region [50 kilometers east-southeast of Velikie Luki].

♦	Headquarters, 22nd Army – Nazimovo Station [32 kilometers east of Velikie Luki].