In addition to focusing his forces and attentions forward toward the vital crossing sites over the Tsarevich River, Konev also took special care to anticipate the German armored counterstroke he knew was inevitable. Based on his training and previous experience, Konev identified the northern flank of his army’s bridgehead west of the Vop’ River as the most likely focal point for the armored assault. Therefore, he ordered 50th, 91st, and 166th Rifle Divisions to concentrate their attacks in the 5-kilometer sector from Pochepova northward through Balasheva to Losevo on his army’s right wing. From this posture, Konev reasoned, the three divisions could wheel half of their forces to the right to defend against any German armored thrust from the north. To strengthen this sector further, he directed 202nd Tank Regiment, with the composite tank battalion attached, a total of roughly 50-60 tanks, to move into the 50th Rifle Division’s rear area, 5-6 kilometers south of the likely place from which the German panzer counterthrust would emanate. Once they reached their assigned area, the two tank units were to establish strongpoints with all-round defenses, dig some of their tanks into the ground, and organize tank ambushes with cooperating antitank artillery subunits and infantry. To complete his defenses, Konev ordered Colonel Tit Fedorovich Kolesnikov to regroup his 89th Rifle Division into reserve positions near Batyevo, 5 kilometers south of the expected point of German attack, and, as a fillip to his efforts, concentrated both artillery and aircraft strikes on the region.

Although 19th Army resumed its attacks at 0800 hours on 19 August, it did so without 50th Rifle Division, primarily because Kolesnikov’s forces failed to regroup in time to join the attack at its designated H-hour. Konev reported the problem to the Western Front‘s headquarters and two adjacent armies at noon, stating, “The army’s forces went over to the offensive to fulfill the mission set forth by Order No. 030 at 0800 hours on 19 August, except 50th RD, whose units did not succeed in regrouping and occupying their jumping-of positions during the night. They attacked at 1100 hours.”⁴⁶

See Map 84. 19th Army’s situation late on 19 August 1941 and Volume 3 (Documents, Appendix O, 37.

Despite this problem, as of 1200 hours, 50th and 64th Rifle Divisions drove forward another kilometer westward from the villages of Kazakov and Muzhilovo. To the south, two battalions of 101st Tank Division’s 101st Rifle Regiment reached the eastern bank of the Tsarevich River opposite Skachkova and Chistaia, and 89th Rifle Division cleaned up the battlefield to the rear, counting more than 200 enemy bodies and a great amount of captured German equipment (see the front’s daily summary below). The most valuable prizes seized were maps and orders belonging to 161st Infantry Division’s 336th Regiment and the reported 12 enemy tanks destroyed in the previous day’s fighting. Qualifying these successes, Konev also reported that Senior Lieutenant Korshunov, the commander of 202nd Tank Regiment’s 3rd Battalion, had “died a hero’s death” along with his crew when his command tank was destroyed. All the while, 19th Army reinforced the defenses on its right wing in anticipation of a German counterstroke.

Elsewhere across the front on 19 August, the northern shock group (30th Army) registered only modest gains. Although Khomenko’s 162nd Rifle and 107th Tank Divisions advanced roughly 2 kilometers to reach the eastern outskirts of Shelepy, the assaults by the army’s remaining divisions stalled against heavy German resistance primarily because the reinforcing 244th Rifle Division still failed to complete its regrouping in time to join the attack Likewise, the offensive by Maslennikov’s 29th Army also stalled south of the Western Dvina River north of Il’ino not only because of the stout German defense but also 246th Rifle Division’s failure to reach its concentration area and join the attack toward Il’ino. Other than on Konev’s front, the only other successes recorded in the Western Front sector occurred when Dovator’s Cavalry Group went into action in the gap between 29th and 30th Armies. By noon, Dovator reported his forces had “thrown the enemy back from the northern bank of the Mezha River to his main defensive line from Tukolovo to Vasil’evo, Ust’e, and Frolovo [25-55 kilometers west-southwest of Belyi],” in the process, “destroying 2,000 infantrymen and dispersed the headquarters of 4th IR (Ust’e) by night raids,” after which, the enemy reportedly “retreated in panic.”⁴⁷

See Map 85. 30th Army’s situation late on 19 August 1941.