Soviet Offensive Planning, 14–16 August

As indicated in his 12 August assessment, Timoshenko concluded the Germans might already be weakening their forces opposite his Western Front east and northeast of Smolensk so that they could conduct a larger offensive from the Roslavl’ region against 24th and 43rd Armies of Zhukov’s Reserve Front at and south of El’nia. Therefore, he urged the Stavka to consider mounting a major offensive with his front’s 29th, 30th, 19th, and 20th Armies to recapture Dukhovshchina, 50 kilometers northeast of Smolensk, and then Smolensk itself. When that was done, he suggested his front could continue its offensive by recapturing Roslavl’ in conjunction with Zhukov’s 24th and 43rd Armies, attacking from the El’nia region on his left flank. At the time, the remaining armies of Zhukov’s Reserve Front, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, and 49th Armies, were still constructing, manning, and improving second echelon defenses north and south of Viaz’ma in the rear areas of both Timoshenko’s and Zhukov’s fronts. As for his second possible offensive variant, Timoshenko argued that his and Zhukov’s Reserve Fronts could conduct a joint offensive to recapture both Smolensk and Roslavl’.10 Of course, to conduct either variant, both Timoshenko’s and Zhukov’s fronts would have to be reinforced by most of Zhukov’s second echelon armies.

Acting on Timoshenko’s recommendations, the Stavka ordered his and Zhukov’s fronts, arrayed from north to south, to mount a coordinated offensive on 17 August, which, by the end of the month, would engulf the entire front from Toropets in the north to Briansk in the south. However, even though the Stavka insisted that the two front commanders plan and coordinate their offensives carefully, the chaotic combat situation forced Timoshenko to conduct his offensive in piecemeal fashion, and prevented him from coordinating his attacks with those by Zhukov’s armies to the south.

While Timoshenko and his staff worked on their final offensive plan, his subordinate armies continued mounting local attacks in an attempt to mask preparations for a general offensive. As an example of this maskirovka [deception], at 1100 hours on 15 August, General Rokossovsky ordered his 16th Army, which had been attacking incessantly for days along the Iartsevo axis, to mount yet another assault on the 16 August to distract German attention from the remainder of the front:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix O. 2.

• General Situation – the enemy is defending the western bank of the Vop’ River with four infantry divisions, whose forward edge takes the form of reinforced rifle company centers of resistance with full-profile foxholes along the Chistaia, Novosel’e, Khatyni, Pologi, Alferova, Bol’shie and Malye Gorki, and Zadnia line and with reserves in the Kokhanovo, Makeevo, and Krovopuskovo; Samuilova, Semukhino, and Soprykino; and Luk’ianovo, Chadovishchi, and Mamonovo regions
• Neighbors – on the right, 19th Army’s 89th RD is along the Dubrovka, Kuz’mino, and Kharina line, and on the left, 20th Army’s 144th RD is along the Korovniki and Osova line.
• 16th Army’s Missions – the army will regroup overnight on 15-16 August and concentrate its forces for an attack on its right wing.
• Missions of Subordinates:
♦ 64th RD – turn your sector over to 108th RD, concentrate in the Podylishche, Chizhiki, and Liada region overnight on 15-16 August, protect the crossing site over the Vop’ River near Prisel’e with a reinforced rifle battalion, and attack toward Miagchenki and Skachkovo with your entire force.
♦ 101st TD (with 18th MRR) – attack toward Novosel’e (eastern) and Kholm with your entire force.
♦ 44th RC (38th and 108th RDs) – occupy and firmly defend the Hill 207.2, Iartsevo, Skrushevskie, and Buianovo sector.
• Supply Station – Dorogobuzh Station.
• Timing – be ready to regroup at 2000 hours on 15 August 1941, and carry out the regrouping according to my additional instructions.
• Command and Control: Headquarters, 16th Army – the woods 1 kilometer southeast of Khotenova.11

Meanwhile, to compensate for the inexperience of the troops and junior officers in mounting attacks of any sort, the staff sections in the Western Front’s headquarters exploited past experiences to bombard its subordinate armies with special instructions regarding how best to conduct offensive operations. For example, one such order, probably prepared by the front’s Operations Department but signed by the front’s entire Military Council, provided an appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of German tactics and recommended all commanders exploit a perceived inability of the Germans to fight effectively at night. Beginning with the defiant declaration that, “The experiences of the 52-day struggle with the German Fascists, who have encroached on our holy land, vividly reveal the characteristics of the tactics of the German Army,” the order then catalogued the characteristics of German tactics, tinged with a bit of bravado to improve Red Army morale:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix O, 3.

• The Strongest Aspects of German Tactics--mortars and antitank guns, operations by motorcyclists and deeply penetrating small groups of tanks, cooperating with aircraft, which create the “outward appearance” of encirclements and well-organized system of fires (interaction of fire and maneuver).
• The Weakest Aspects of German Tactics– cowardice in the face of our infantry and cavalry, reluctance to resort to bayonet attacks (instead, they “withdraw, lay low, and repel by fire”), and an inability of panzer and motorized units to repel surprise night attacks against tanks, armored vehicles, and motor transport bivouacking overnight in villages and along the roads. While in night lager [camps] in populated points, Germans usually post weak security at short distances, which attackers can destroy fairly easily by energetic actions, panzer and motorized divisions are already very exhausted and have suffered heavy losses, and, during surprise attacks at night, the Germans abandon their tanks, guns, vehicles, and machine guns.
• The Nature of Enemy Defenses – primarily company-size centers of resistance with large intervals in between them deployed across a broad front, and, in some sectors, separate mortar batteries defend without any infantry protection.
• Enemy Logistical Weaknesses – the enemy is operating in unfamiliar territory isolated from his bases, and his communications are vulnerable to partisan attacks.
• Conclusion – these factors create favorable conditions for raids and operations by separate small detachments under the cover of night,
• My Orders – immediately employ extensive night operations by night shock detachments in accordance with the attached brief instructions (“Short Instructions on the Organization of Night Shock Detachments, dated 15 August 1941) to exhaust the enemy and destroy his forces and weapons, which, in the final analysis, will create intolerable conditions for the enemy and prepare the ground for our decisive offensive operations.12

With these necessary preliminaries out of the way but before finalizing his offensive order, Timoshenko sent his basic concept of operations to Stalin for approval at about midday on 15 August. The concept began with Timoshenko’s intent “to prevent the enemy from restoring order in his units, and also to destroy the enemy grouping in the Dukhovshchina region” and followed with specific aspects of the offensive:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix O, 4.

• Overall Objective – to encircle and destroy the enemy’s 106th, 5th, and 28th IDs and 900th MotR by launching concentric attacks with two shock groups, the first from the Staroe Morokhovo and Markovo front [38-55 kilometers north of Iartsevo] and the second from the Potelitsa and Prisel’e front [12-24 kilometers north-northeast of Iartsevo].
• Attack Groupings:
• Northern – 30th Army’s 242nd, 251st, and 166th RDs, 107th TD, and 45th CD under the command of Khomenko;
♦ Southern – 19th Army’s 89th, 50th, and 64th RDs and 101st TD under the command of Konev; and
♦ Covering (Secondary) – 91st and 162nd RD along the Markovo and Potelitsa front [24-38 kilometers north of Iartsevo].
• Timing – begin the counteroffensive on 17 August, after regrouping and organizing on 15 and 16 August.
• Regrouping:
♦ Withdraw 101st and 64th RDs from 16th Army’s front and move 38th and 108th RDs into their sectors;
♦ Withdraw 45th CD from the Gzhatsk region, dispatch it along the Andreevskaia and Kaniutino march-route, and concentrate it in the forest in the Kaniutino region by day’s end on 17 August to operate in second echelon during the operation’s first stage.
• Exploiting Success – move a covering force of two rifle divisions toward Vorontsovo, Starina, and Teterino and send 45th CD and 107th TD from behind the Northern Group’s right flank into the enemy’s rear to envelop Dukhovshchina from the west.
• Deception – to conceal the intended operation, 30th and 19th Armies’ units will continue local attacks on 15 and 16 August to destroy individual enemy centers of resistance and occupy more favorable jumping-off positions for the offensive.
• Reinforcements – I request you reinforce me with two rifle divisions, one to Maslennikov [29th Army] to preclude the possibility of an enemy penetration toward the north and the second to reinforce Khomenko’s grouping [30th Army] and 100 tanks to equip a motorized rife division, consisting of one tank and two motorized regiments, for combat along Group Konev’s axis [19th Army].13

After Stalin approved his plan, presumably at about 1500 hours on 15 August, at about 1800 hours the same day, Timoshenko signed and issued the Western Front’s Combat Order No. 01, which read:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix O, 5.

• General Situation – the enemy, after shifting his main forces against the Central Front, has gone over to the defense along the entire Western Front, with up to three infantry divisions and one panzer division defending opposite 30th and 19th Armies’ fronts and, presumably, up to one motorized division in reserve in the Zviakino region.
• Neighbors – on the right, 27th Army [Northwestern Front] is tasked with liquidating the enemy in the Kholm region with its left wing, and on the left, the Reserve Front conducting an offensive to liquidate the enemy’s El’nia grouping.
• The Western Front’s Mission – encircle and destroy the enemy’s Dukhovshchina grouping by conducting concentric attacks with 30th and 19th Armies toward Dukhovshchina and reach the Starina, Dukhovshchina, and Iartsevo line in its center.
• Missions of Subordinates:
♦ 22nd Army – fulfill its assigned missions and hold firmly to the positions it occupies.
♦ 29th Army – attack toward Il’ino and reach the Velizh and Il’ino line on 19 August, with Cavalry Group Dovator penetrating into the enemy’s rear at dawn on 16 August to destroy rear area objectives and supply bases in the Velizh, Demidov, and Dukhovshchina regions.
♦ 30th Army (250th, 242nd, 251st, and 162nd RDs, 107th TD, and 45th CD, reinforced by 46th MAD, 392nd and 542nd CARs, 30th M-13 Btry [Katiushas], 871st ATR, 263rd and 291st Sapper Bns, and 51st Pontoon-Bridge Bn) – while protecting your right flank toward Belyi, attack toward Dukhovshchina on the morning of 17 August, destroy the enemy by decisive operations, commit 45th CD and 107th TD into the enemy’s rear by the end of the day to exploit the attack by enveloping Dukhovshchina from the west, and reach the Velitsa River line with the main forces by 19 August. Subsequently, while protecting against attack from the west with two divisions along the Dubovitsa, Starina, and Verdino line, prepare to develop the attack northwestward of Dukhovshchina.
♦ 19th Army (166th, 91st, 50th, 64th, and 89th RDs and 101st TD, reinforced by 43rd MAD, 120th HAR, one battalion of 302nd HAR, 596th HAR, 311th GAR, 6th and 19th M-13 Btrys, 874th ATR, 321st Sep. Sapper Bn, and 42nd Eng. Bn) – leave reinforced 166th RD along the Markovo and Potelitsa front and attack from the Potelitsa and Prisel’e front toward Dukhovshchina with five divisions on the morning of 17 August to encircle and destroy the enemy in the region east of Dukhovshchina in cooperation with 30th Army, with your forward units along the Khmost’ River. Subsequently, while protecting your operations from the west, attack southward with your main forces.
♦ 16th Army (38th and 108th RDs) – firmly defend the positions you occupy, paying special attention to defending the Iartsevo and Dorogobuzh axes and, as 19th Army advances, deploy strong forward detachments to protect 19th Army’s left flank.
♦ 20th Army – continue fulfilling your previously assigned missions while preparing to exploit 19th Army’s attack to south of Dukhovshchina by attacking from the Zabor’e and Pridneprovskaia Station front [10-24 kilometers south of Solov’evo] toward Kardymovo Station [27 kilometers east-northeast of Smolensk] with a force of three divisions on the morning of 19 August.
♦ VVS of the Front. Missions:
⋄ Conduct air strikes in 30th and 19th Armies’ main attack sectors overnight on 15-16 August and 16-17 August.
⋄ Conduct strikes with all bomber aircraft against the forward edge of the enemy’s defenses along 30th and 19th Armies’ main attack axes from 07000715 hours on 17 August.
⋄ Prevent the approach of enemy forces from the Dukhovshchina region from the southwest and west.
⋄ Support 30th and 19th Armies’ forces in accordance with their commanders’ requests.
• Command and Control – operational CP of the front’s headquarters – Vadino14

Thus, Timoshenko’s plan for his front’s so-called “Dukhovshchina offensive” required his armies to regroup their forces for two days and then conduct their assault on 17 August with two shock groups, one in the south and the other in the north. The southern group, commanded by Konev and consisting of five rifle divisions (since 101st Tank Division had no tanks) of his 19th Army was to assault westward across the Vop’ River in the 9-kilometer-wide sector from Prisel’e northward to Potelitsa, 12-24 kilometers north of Iartsevo, penetrate the Germans’ defense in the center and on the left wing of VIII Army Corps’ 161st Infantry Division, and exploit due westward to cross the Tsarevich River and capture Dukhovshchina. One rifle division, the 166th, was to defend the 14-kilometer-wide sector from Potelitsa northward to Markovo on 19th Army’s right wing opposite German V Army Corps’ 5th and 35th Infantry Divisions and join the offensive if it proved successful.

See Map 72. Timoshenko’s offensive plan, 15 August 1941.