The intense seesaw action within the city of Smolensk and along the city’s northern outskirts forced Boltenstern’s 29th Motorized Division to withdraw most of its forces in the part of the city north of the Dnepr River southward and resulted in heavy losses on both sides.⁶⁴

Midst this surge of violence within the city, Timoshenko’s Western Front documented the action in an operational summary it issued at 0800 hours on 21 July. As context, it asserted its forces “continued to conduct sustained fighting with enemy units that have penetrated toward Nevel’, Velikie Luki, Demidov, Smolensk, and Krichev and engaged in combat with enemy tank units that have penetrated into the Iartsevo region”:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix F, 9.

•	19th Army – fighting in the Smolensk region on 20 July and overnight on 20-21 July:

▪	127th RD – attacked at 0400 hours on 20 July along the Roslavl’ road by enemy motorized infantry with 20 tanks and heavy artillery, which penetrated the division’s combat formation and destroyed a battery of 391st AR, but repulsed the attack, destroying 9 enemy tanks and many vehicles. Attacked for a second time at 0800 hours on 20 July by motorized infantry and 9 enemy tanks, but repelled these attacks, destroying 15 enemy tanks, and is now defending the Dresna and Brilevka line [5-7 kilometers south of Smolensk].
▪	158th RD – defending Shtalov [10 kilometers southeast of Smolensk] and to the south.
▪	38th RD – 29th RR, with part of 129th RD defending Sortirovochnaia Station, the railroad bridge over the Dnepr, and Pokrovskaia Gora [30-40 kilometers east of Smolensk] and the remaining units fighting in the northern outskirts of Smolensk.
▪	50th RD – preparing defenses at Buliany and Pridneprovskaia Station on the Dnepr’s eastern bank [30 kilometers east-southeast of Smolensk] at 0600 hours on 21 July, with its headquarters in the woods 3 kilometers east of Kardymovo [30 kilometers east-northeast of Smolensk].

•	20th Army – concentrating along a new defensive line and counterattacking toward Rudnia [65 kilometers northwest of Smolensk].

▪	144th RD – forced to abandon Rudnia at 2000 hours of 20 July by an enemy infantry division with artillery and tanks, with its right wing withdrawing to the Dvorishche and Bat’kovo line [20-25 kilometers northwest of Smolensk].
▪	153rd RD (800 men) – withdrew to 69th RC’s defensive region.
▪	The positions of the army’s remaining units are being confirmed.

•

16th Army – holding off enemy attacks from the Kholm and Donets region [20-35 kilometers north of Smolensk], withdrawing its right wing to the Opol’e region [30-35 kilometers north-northwest of Smolensk], and regrouping its forces to attack Smolensk from the north. Positions as of 2400 hours on 20 July:

▪	46th RD – in Opol’e and to the southwest, organizing a counterattack against an enemy motorized battalion with 30-40 tanks in the Kholm region.
▪	152nd RD – concentrated in the Luk region.
▪	129th RD – fighting in the northwestern outskirts of Smolensk.

•	Group Major General Rokossovsky – fighting and regrouping.

▪	101st TD – fought unsuccessfully against a strong enemy antitank defense southwest of Iartsevo.
▪	69th MD (107th TD to 17 July) – concentrating in the Belyi region at day’s end on 20 July under 30th Army’s control and preparing to attack toward Lake Shchuch’e and Dukhovshchina on 21 July.65

Although not immediately apparent from this summary, its most important contents in terms of the viability of Kurochkin’s forces in the Smolensk pocket were the comments regarding 19th Army’s 38th and 50th Rifle Divisions. Despite the army’s virtual demise, its 50th Rifle Division had managed to escape eastward and was now organizing defenses along the eastern bank of the Dnepr River on the right flank of Rokossovsky’s Group Iartsevo. Additionally, 38th Rifle Division, which was a late arrival to 19th Army, was establishing defenses further south along the river and in position to support Rokossovsky’s efforts to maintain communications with Kurochkin’s forces.

Also not covered in the summary were the more positive bits of information that 10th Panzer and SS “Das Reich” Motorized Divisions of Vietinghoff’s XXXXVI Motorized Corps had captured Pochinok and El’nia, 48 kilometers south and 73 kilometers southeast of Smolensk, respectively. This meant that the center of gravity of their operations, as well as Guderian’s Second Panzer Group, was toward El’nia and Viaz’ma beyond rather than a link up with XXXIX Motorized Corps 7th Panzer Division at Iartsevo. The assumption on Guderian’s part was that XXXXVII Motorized Corps’ 17th Panzer Division would effect that link up after it disengaged itself from the region south of Smolensk. Ultimately, however, vigorous Soviet action in the El’nia region would divert 17th Panzers’ attention, distracting it from the more elusive prize to the north.