The Stavka Reacts: the Formation of the Briansk Front

Because the forces of Zhukov’s Reserve Front were still attacking El’nia, the OKH cancelled plans for any further advance eastward across the Desna River as counseled by Guderian and left it to Bock to decide whether or not to abandon the El’nia bridgehead, and when. The OKH did so because Vietinghoff’s SS “Das Reich” Division and “Grossdeutschland” Regiment were still in the line near El’nia and would remain there until 18 August, thus depriving Vietinghoff’s motorized corps, which had been in near constant combat since 22 June, of much needed time to rest and rehabilitate its forces.

Meanwhile, Stalin assigned Zhukov’s reinforced Reserve Front the multiple tasks of backing up the Western Front, eliminating Army Group Center’s bridgehead at El’nia, and continuing to fill in and defend the growing gap between the Western and Central Fronts southward from El’nia to the region northwest of Briansk.

From the Stavka’s perspective, the obliteration of the defenses of Golubev’s 13th Army along the Sozh River and the withdrawal of Gordov’s 21st Army toward Gomel’, both of which were now threatened with encirclement in the Gomel’ region, permitted a sizeable gap to form between the Western Front east of Smolensk and Southwestern Front defending Kiev. For the moment, however, the Stavka expected Zhukov’s Reserve Front and the remnants of Efremov’s Central Front to help fill this gap. Compounding the Stavka’s problems, on 11 August it received news that General V. I. Kuznetsov’s 3rd Army, which it had reestablished by 1 August and deployed on the western bank of the Dnepr River west of Gomel’ to protect the Central Front’s left flank, was withdrawing without authorization to do so.¹⁹ Reacting angrily, Shaposhnikov sent a scathing message to Timoshenko, the Main Western Direction commander:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix N, 1.

Despite the absence of overwhelming enemy superiority, Kuznetsov is continuing to withdraw without proper resistance, at the same time creating a serious situation for Potapov [5th Army on 21st Army’s left flank]. The front’s military council must compel Kuznetsov to fight as he should and not abandon his positions to the enemy without a fight. This situation cannot continue any longer.²⁰

When reinforcement of the Reserve Front and threats to the Central Front and 3rd Army proved inadequate to solve “the Guderian problem,” on 14 August the Stavka acted even more decisively to block Guderian’s southward advance by forming the new Briansk Front to plug the gap between the Reserve and Central Fronts and assigning the “fighter,” General Eremenko, as its commander. By doing so, it also kept its hopes alive for a new and more powerful offensive against Army Group Center. The Stavka’s directive read:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix N, 2.

1. For the sake of improving command and control, organize the Briansk Front, with it directly subordinate to the Supreme High Command. Appoint Lieutenant General Eremenko as commander of the Briansk Front, Major General Ermakov as deputy front commander, and Major General Zakharov as the front’s chief of staff.

Employ the command and control organs of 20th Rifle and 25th Mechanized Corps to form the front’s headquarters.

The front’s headquarters will be in the Briansk region.

The boundary lines of the Briansk Front will be:

– With the Reserve Front – Mtsensk, (incl.) Zhizdra, Pochinok, and (incl.) Smolensk; and

– With the Central Front – Novgorod-Severskii, (incl.) Gaishin, and Mogilev.

2. The composition of the Briansk Front will be:

a) 50th Army, with 217th, 279th, 258th, 260th, 290th, 278th, 269th, and 280th Rifle Divisions, 55th Cavalry Division, 2nd and 20th Rifle Corps’ corps artillery regiments, and 761st and 753rd Antitank Artillery Regiments.

Form the army’s headquarters on the base of 2nd Rifle Corps’ headquarters.

Appoint Major General Petrov as the army’s commander.

Headquarters – in the Vygonichi region.

The boundary line on the left – Trubchevsk, Severnaia Rassukha, Klimovichi, and (incl.) Moliatichi.

b) 13th Army, with 137th, 121st, 148th, 132nd, 6th, 155th, 307th, and 285th Rifle Divisions, 50th Tank Division, 52nd and 21st Cavalry Divisions, and an airborne corps.

c) Keep 229th, 287th, and 283rd Rifle Divisions and 4th Cavalry Division in the front’s reserve.

3. Confirm fulfillment.

The Supreme High Commander, I. Stalin

The Chief of the General Staff, B. Shaposhnikov²¹

See Map 66. Armeegruppe Guderian’s advance, 15 August 1941.

In addition to plugging the gap between the Western and Reserve Fronts operating along the Smolensk and El’nia axes and the Central Front along the Gomel’ axis, the Stavka ordered Eremenko’s Briansk Front to prevent the Germans from turning the Central Front’s right flank and protect the northern approaches to Kiev. Perhaps most important from Stalin’s perspective, the Briansk Front was also to join the Western Main Direction’s planned counteroffensive against Army Group Center. In addition to assigning Petrov’s new 50th Army to Eremenko’s new front, the Stavka also assigned it the remnants of Golubev’s 13th Army, which were in the process of making their way back to safety after their staggering defeat south of the Sozh River. In short, the Stavka now expected Eremenko to deal effectively enough with his illustrious namesake to justify his sobriquet, the “Russian Guderian.”

Armeegruppe Guderian’s Advance to Starodub and Second Army’s Capture of Gomel’, 15–21 August

Despite the Stavka’s careful precautions, over Guderian’s protests, on 15 August the OKH ordered Geyr’s XXIV Motorized Corps to continue its southward drive. At the time, Model’s 3rd and Langermann’s 4th Panzer Divisions were already in the Klimovichi and Kommunary regions, midway between Roslavl’ and Gomel’ and only 64 kilometers north of Unecha, a key railroad station on the main rail line from Roslavl’ to Novgorod-Severskii on the Desna River. Advancing on Geyr’s left (eastern) wing, 24 hours later, Model’s 3rd Panzer Division severed the railroad line at Mglin, 30 kilometers north of Unecha, although on Geyr’s right wing, Langermann’s 4th Panzer Division encountered stiff resistance from 13th Army’s withdrawing forces at the Besed’ River, 60 kilometers northwest of Unecha. After Geyr reinvigorated his offensive by committing Löper’s 10th Motorized Division at the junction between his two panzer divisions, Löper’s motorized infantry captured Surazh, 30 kilometers northwest of Unecha, late on 17 August, while Model’s panzers captured Unecha and bridgeheads over the nearby Guta River.