Background
After the two panzer groups of Kluge’s enlarged Fourth “Panzer” Army closed their pincers around the Smolensk region, the most important fighting in the sector of Bock’s Army Group Center during the second half of July took place when the infantry of Bock’s army group struggled to liquidate Soviet 16th, 19th, and 20th Armies encircled in the Smolensk pocket and when new armies assigned to Timoshenko’s Western Front fought to penetrate the outer encirclement line erected by the army group’s two panzer groups northeast, east, and southeast of Smolensk. In addition to these nasty fights, however, intense and complex fighting also developed along Army Group Center’s extreme northern and southern flanks. This fighting occurred because, from Bock’s perspective, it was absolutely vital for him to secure his flanks so his main effort toward Smolensk and, ultimately, Moscow would succeed. In Berlin, far to the rear, Adolf Hitler too was anxious that Bock’s forces clear Red Army forces from its flanks, primarily because this was the guidance he had given to his senior commanders when they planned Operation Barbarossa.
From Moscow’s perspective on the fighting, Stalin and his Stavka were convinced that, in addition to concentrating strong forces along the Moscow axis, it was equally crucial to maintain strong and active forces in threatening positions along Army Group Center’s flanks to erode the strength of its advance along the Smolensk and Moscow axis. Given this shared appreciation of the importance of Army Group Center’s flanks, the heavy combat in these regions surprised no-one.
As Schmidt’s XXXIX Motorized Corps of Third Panzer Group was driving deep toward Smolensk in mid-July, on the northern wing of Bock’s Army Group Center, L, XXXIII, and IV Army Corps of Strauss’s Ninth Army and Kuntzen’s LVII Motorized Corps of Hoth’s panzer group were still fencing with Ershakov’s 22nd Army in the Nevel’ region. This action was taking place along a front lagging almost 195 kilometers behind Bock’s spearheads along the Smolensk axis. Further to the north, while the main forces of Field Marshal Leeb’s Army Group North were well on their way northward to the region south of Leningrad, Sixteenth Army, on the army group’s right wing, which was also lagging behind, was engaging General Berzarin’s 27th Army of the Soviet Northwestern Front in the region northwest and north of Nevel’. Thus, by this time the two Soviet armies, Ershakov’s 22nd Army in the Nevel’ region and Berzarin’s 27th Army northwest and north of Nevel’, occupied a salient separating Army Group North’s right wing from Army Group Center’s left wing. Therefore, if permitted to do so, the forces on Bock’s northern wing, in conjunction with Army Group North’s Sixteenth Army, appeared to be ideally positioned to trap and eliminate the bulk of Ershakov’s army, which, with Berzarin’s army, still occupied a salient jutting westward between Bock’s and Leeb’s army groups.
A similar situation had developed on Bock’s southern wing, where Vietinghoff’s XXXXVI and Lemelsen’s XXXXVII Motorized Corps of Guderian’s Second Panzer Group had driven deeply eastward through the defenses of Timoshenko’s Western Front to the Smolensk and El’nia regions. This left Geyr’s XXIV Motorized Corps the task of driving the remnants of the Western Front’s 13th and 4th Armies back to the Sozh River and the infantry corps of Weichs’ Second Army to eliminate Soviet 13th Army’s forces encircled in Mogilev. Despite Guderian’s success, by mid-July Weichs’ and Geyr’s forces had to contend with near constant counterattacks and counterstrokes, delivered in ever-increasing strength by F. I. Kuznetsov’s 21st Army in the Rogachev region and Gorodovikov’s Cavalry Group in the region south of Bobruisk. Bock felt he had to eliminate this threat to ensure the safety of his advance on Smolensk.
In addition, as they sliced through Timoshenko’s armies, Hoth’s and Guderian’s panzer groups left half a dozen large pockets behind, each of which remained a threat until follow-on armies could eliminate them.1 Although none of these pockets seriously interfered with Bock’s advance in and of themselves, collectively, and in combination with the Stavka’s counteroffensive at Smolensk, they appreciably slowed Army Group Center’s forward progress, hindered his defense against Timoshenko’s counteroffensive, and caused considerable confusion and even uneasiness within the OKH and OKW. Since the situation on Army Group Center’s flanks and rear disrupted the Wehrmacht’s Barbarossa timetable, it also revived the great debate between Hitler and the OKH regarding the Wehrmacht’s future objectives in the entire campaign.
The Northern Flank: Nevel’ and Velikie Luki
The so-called “Nevel’ diversion” was a case in note. When Hitler was developing his Barbarossa directive in December 1940, he altered the OKH’s original plan, which called for making the main attack toward Moscow, by adding advances into the Ukraine and the Donbas regions in the south and toward Leningrad in the north. Specifically, Hitler considered the destruction of Soviet forces in Belorussia by Army Group Center to be “a prerequisite for turning strong elements of the Armed Forces to the north” to destroy Soviet forces in the Baltic States opposite Army Group North and occupy the Leningrad-Kronshtadt region. Only “after the completion of this most essential mission,” could Army Group Center resume its offensive against Moscow, although Hitler admitted that any sudden collapse of Soviet resistance could justify the pursuit of both objectives at the same time.2
During a conference with Brauchitsch and Halder on 3 February 1941, Hitler had mused that the Soviets might adopt the same strategy they had pursued in 1812 by withdrawing their forces in the Baltic region and the Ukraine to resist farther to the east. If this was the case, Hitler recommended the Wehrmacht avoid a frontal attack in the center and instead first concentrate its effort along the northern axis to capture “the Baltic States and Leningrad” to provide Germany with a solid lodgment and favorable supply bases from which it could strike into the Soviet rear from both north and south to outmaneuver, encircle, and destroy the Russian forces in the center.3
By mid-July Hitler’s original strategic plan and the actual combat situation no longer coincided because, since the invasion had begun, the Wehrmacht had advanced far more successfully in the north and the center than it had in the south. Ironically, Bock’s success at Smolensk also undermined Hitler’s original intent to halt Army Group Center along the Western Dvina and Dnepr River line and shift Bock’s armor to assist Leeb in the north and Rundstedt in the south. This incongruent situation forced Hitler to adjust his military strategy in an agonizingly slow process that lagged behind the rapidly changing situation at the front until stronger Soviet resistance brought Bock’s army group to an abrupt halt in the Smolensk region during early August.4
Fueled by Bock’s success, Hitler’s indecision regarding where to focus the Wehrmacht’s main effort, toward Moscow or along the flanks, began as early as 4 July and remained unresolved until Bock’s forces finally reduced the Smolensk pocket on 5 August. By this time, Bock’s army group was far ahead of its neighbors, which, while also failing to advance as fast as Bock, had also failed to encircle and destroy most of the Soviet forces facing them. As a result, Army Group Center’s flanks in the Nevel’ region to the north and along the Sozh River to the south were now relatively open and far more vulnerable. Although Hitler himself contributed to the threat against Army Group Center’s southern flank by halting Army Group South’s advance toward Kiev on 10 July, the situation on Bock’s northern flank in the Nevel’ region was quite different because Hitler had already decided when and how to resolve the problem. Ultimately, his decision to eliminate the salient would significantly influence how Army Groups Center and North conducted their future operations.
Nevel’ fascinated Hitler for two reasons. First, situated 26 kilometers south of Leningrad and 116 kilometers north of Smolensk, the city was a key communications hub situated at the boundary of Army Groups North and Center and the junction of the Soviet’s Northwestern and Western Fronts. Second, the Nevel’ region was defended by the remnants of two Soviet armies, the Northwestern Front’s 27th Army and the Western Front’s 22nd Army, which were bunched together in the region and subject to quick encirclement and destruction. Elimination of the two armies would end the threat to Leeb’s right flank and Bock’s left flank and permit Leeb to advance more rapidly to Leningrad. However, to destroy the two armies, Hitler had to reinforce Strauss’s Ninth Army on his left wing with a portion of Hoth’s Third Panzer Group, which, in turn, would significantly weaken Hoth’s advance along the Smolensk axis.
Leeb supported Hitler’s decision to attack along the Nevel’ axis with part of Hoth’s panzer group because, if the operation was successful, Leeb could then concentrate his forces to mount an effective advance toward Leningrad. As a result, Nevel’ became a disproportionately important objective, a magnet attracting Hitler’s and the OKH’s attention, which required a portion of Hoth’s Third Panzer Group to resolve the problem. However, from Bock’s perspective, eliminating the Soviet force at Nevel’ was of only secondary importance since the important encirclement battle was already under way in the Smolensk region, and any diversion of Hoth’s armor further north would hinder his efforts at Smolensk.5 Thus, while Nevel’ was an enticing target, splitting up Hoth’s powerful panzer group by dispatching Kuntzen’s LVII Motorized Corps toward Nevel’ weakened and delayed Bock’s efforts to close the gap south of Iartsevo and eventually seriously diminished his success at Smolensk.6
Despite Hitler’s high hopes for what the battle around Nevel’ could achieve, the battle itself developed in relative isolation from the more important struggles taking place to the north and south and far differently than higher headquarters assumed. Furthermore, the difficult terrain and poor weather conditions in the Nevel’ region and the lack of wire communications, which prevented higher headquarters and the OKH from effectively monitoring and controlling the operation, prolonged the battle.7 According to German intelligence, on 15 July the Sovet 27th and 22nd Armies defended the region north and south of Nevel’ with a force of 17 divisions, including 13 rifle and 3 motorized divisions and 1 tank division. Beginning on 21 July, the Stavka reinforced these forces with four more rifle divisions from the Western Front’s 29th Army, which was deploying forward from Toropets, 112 kilometers east of Nevel’. German forces in the region included eight infantry divisions subordinate to X, XXVII, and II Army Corps of Army Group North’s Sixteenth Army operating north and west of Nevel’ and four infantry divisions from L and XXIII Army Corps of Army Group Center’s Ninth Army and 19th Panzer Division and one half of 14th Motorized Division from Third Panzer Group’s LVII Motorized Corps south of Nevel’.
By day’s end on 15 July, Knobelsdorff’s 19th Panzer Division had already shattered the defenses of Ershakov’s 22nd Army north of Polotsk, carving a narrow corridor 113 kilometers northward through those defenses to the southern outskirts of Nevel’. When Knobelsdorff’s panzers captured the city the next day, XXIII Army Corps’ 112th Infantry Division approached Nevel’ from the northwest, threatening to encircle 22nd Army from the north. Farther to the east, the divisions of Schmidt’s XXXIX Motorized Corps had already shattered the Soviets’ front in the Vitebsk region and were fanning out rapidly to the north and east. For example, on 14 July Stumpff’s 20th Panzer Division routed Soviet forces defending Velizh but failed in its attempt to advance on Belyi because retreating Soviet forces set fire to the town, delaying Stumpff’s advance. When Funck’s 7th Panzer Division encountered heavy resistance at Iartsevo on 15 July, Schmidt was forced to send Stumpff’s panzers southeastward to assist Funck and protect his division’s left flank.8 With 20th Panzer Division diverted to Iartsevo, Hoth dispatched Herrlein’s 18th Motorized Division and one half of Wosch’s 14th Motorized Division from Kuntzen’s LVII Motorized Corps northward to Usviaty, 58 kilometers north of Vitebsk, and part of Wosch’s division and 900th Motorized “Lehr” Brigade to Gorodok, 32 kilometers northwest of Vitebsk.
See Map 36. The situation in the Nevel’ region late on 15 July 1941.
As a result, operating along three separate axes almost 73 kilometers apart in conjunction with the infantry corps of Strauss’s Ninth and Busch’s Sixteenth Armies on his left, Kuntzen’s armor split 27th and 22nd Armies into four major groupings, the first between Velizh and Vitebsk, the second between Gorodok and Nevel’, the third west of Nevel’, and the fourth between Opochka and Novorzhev, northwest of Nevel’. Compounding Kuntzen’s problems, the region where his forces were operating abounded with lakes, swamps, and forests, and lacked passable roads. The few existing roads resembled narrow causeways through marshy terrain, which severely restricted all movement. While they had shattered the defenses of Ershakov’s 22nd Army, Kuntzen’s armored columns were relatively isolated in this difficult terrain and subject to attack on their flanks and rear. As a result, the only forces Kuntzen could employ to spearhead his advance to Nevel’ were Knobelsdorff’s 19th Panzer Division and roughly half of Wosch’s 14th Motorized Division.
Knobelsdorff’s advance toward Nevel’ was slow and tedious because the division’s tanks had to advance through the swamps and forests along a single, narrow logging trail not meant to bear heavy traffic. To hinder his advance, the Soviets also set fire to the town of Dretun’ [35 kilometers northeast of Polotsk and 60 kilometers southwest of Nevel’], and the fire soon spread to the adjacent forest, blocking the road to Nevel’ for about 24 hours. Nevertheless, after overcoming innumerable bogs, destroyed bridges, and sporadic Soviet resistance, Knobelsdorff’s forces captured Nevel’ late on 15 July and consolidated their hold on the city the next morning after a sharp fight with the 22nd Army’s 48th Tank and 170th Rifle Divisions. As Timoshenko reported that evening, “Part of 170th Rifle Division has attacked toward Nevel’, but the results are unknown. The detachment defending Nevel’ (units of the Nevel’ garrison and 48th Tank Division’s motorized rifle regiment) are withdrawing toward Velikie Luki [52 kilometers northeast of Nevel’] pursued by enemy motor-mechanized units.”9 The slow advance by Knobelsdorff’s panzers to Nevel’ permitted the forces of Ershakov’s 22nd Army, which were encircled in several pockets to the east, to escape northeastward out of the trap.