a priori, vii–x, 3–14, 16–23, 27–34, 40–44, 56–57, 68–69, 75–96, 99–108, 115–18, 120, 123–32, 132–39, 139–44, 153–55, 161–76;
acquaintance–based vs. understanding–based, 18–19, 40–44, 77, 84–85, 87, 91, 94, 103, 108–9, 115–16, 120, 129, 136, 139, 143, 153–55, 171;
constitutive, vii, 6, 12, 19–22, 40–43, 63, 87, 94, 99, 103–8, 120, 123–32, 132–39, 139–44, 153–55, 161–74;
contingent, viii, 5, 73, 90–91, 96, 105, 126, 175;
synthetic, 12–14, 19, 23, 61, 90–92, 103, 164, 167–68, 173
absolutism, 100–2, 104, 128, 141, 153
analytic, vii–x, 4–6, 11–12, 20, 22, 30–33, 40–44, 55–63, 66–71, 72, 89–92, 94, 115, 120, 161–76
Aristotle, 14, 26, 51, 99, 154
Boghossian, Paul, x, 18, 30–32, 44, 66–70, 72–73, 93, 95, 101, 121, 133, 158, 176
Burge, Tyler, 22, 23, 44, 69, 83, 86, 88, 96, 119, 121, 151
Carnap, Rudolph, viii, 12, 20, 35, 101, 105–8, 123, 128–32, 136, 139, 141, 143, 157, 170, 175
Casullo, Albert, x, 22, 87, 95, 101, 175
Coffa, J.A., 12, 44, 59–60, 72–73, 101, 124, 129
competence, 21, 38, 62, 102–4, 109–15, 151–53
conceivability, 23, 28, 132, 172
conceptual evolution, 20, 41–43, 61, 87–88, 95, 100, 108, 128, 130, 139–44, 166, 172–73
convention, 23, 28–33, 61, 116–17, 122, 129
deference, 21, 112–19, 122, 144–53, 157–58, 166, 172
Descartes, Rene, vii, 4, 10, 18, 22, 75, 83–86, 95, 103, 167
empiricism, 3, 10, 12, 17–19, 76–77, 82–83, 100–2, 116–17, 133, 155
epistemology, viii, 3–14, 14–17, 23, 75–96, 100, 115, 141, 153–55, 161–75
essence, 51–53, 96, 117, 147, 157, 165–66, 175
extension, 21, 34–35, 39–40, 43, 63, 109–15, 116–17, 147, 172
externalism, 20–21, 24, 40, 99, 109–15, 116–21, 123, 145–54, 162, 170, 172, 176
Field, Hartery, 95, 101, 120, 143–44
framework, 20, 22, 43, 79, 87–88, 101–4, 104–8, 115–20, 123, 125, 128–32, 137–38, 139–48, 153–55, 161–75, 176
Frege, Gottlob, vii, 13, 21–22, 35, 38, 62–63, 66, 69, 72–73, 75, 77, 81, 86, 95–96, 100, 109, 114, 121, 149, 163
Friedman, Michael, viii, 94, 101, 105–8, 120, 130–32, 156
Hume, David, 4, 12–13, 17, 59, 65, 69, 73, 81, 117, 133, 154, 174
immunity to counterexample, 3–6, 6–12, 20, 31–32, 36–37, 40–44, 55–57, 62, 71, 75–83, 86–93, 99–109, 114–18, 124–30, 132–41, 143–44, 153–55, 158, 161–75
incomplete mastery, 21, 112–14, 144–53, 158
indefeasibility, 22, 87, 93, 95, 127
indexicality, vii, 5, 20–21, 33, 36–40, 44–45, 84, 167–70, 176
intuition, 6, 9–10, 16–19, 84, 114, 117, 120, 147, 153–55, 171, 173–74;
rational, 9–10, 17–19, 23, 43–44, 55, 76–79, 81–85, 90, 93, 103, 155, 171, 173–74;
semantic, 16–19, 43–44, 55, 63, 68, 77, 79, 85, 94, 103–4, 109, 115, 117, 120, 172, 173
justification, 3–4, 6, 17–20, 23, 43–44, 62, 75–83, 87, 94–96, 102–4, 107, 114–15, 118, 124, 129–30, 132–39, 143, 153–55, 158, 161–74
Kant, Immanuel, vii–viii, 4, 12–14, 20, 22–23, 61–62, 66, 75, 77, 81, 83, 86, 92, 94, 96, 100–101, 104, 117, 123, 130–32, 154, 163–64, 174
Kaplan, David, viii, x, 5, 23, 35, 37–39, 45, 73, 121, 167, 175
knowledge, 3–4, 7–10, 15–16, 17–18, 43–44, 75–83, 87, 95, 96, 116–17, 153–55, 161–74
Kripke, Saul, vii–x, 5, 17, 20, 21, 22–23, 30, 52, 71–73, 91–92, 96, 99, 109–15, 117, 121, 141, 149–54, 162–66, 170, 174–76
Maddy, Penelope, 18, 93–94, 121, 143–44, 157
meaning, 14–17, 21, 24, 28–33, 34–40, 43–45, 57–63, 66–71, 109–15, 121, 143, 147, 150, 155, 171
metaphysics, viii, 4–10, 14–17, 23, 40–44, 49–55, 64–66, 115, 124, 141, 154, 161–74
natural kinds, 21, 39–42, 54, 96, 110–15, 116–20, 122, 144–53, 165–66, 170–71, 176
naturalism, 10, 18, 23, 58, 93, 99, 106, 121
necessary, vii–viii, 4–14, 28, 30–33, 40–44, 49–55, 64–66, 89–92, 96, 115, 117, 129–30, 132, 155, 161–75;
a posterioriviii, 5, 90–91, 96, 117, 155, 164–66;
physical vs. metaphysical necessity, 28, 53–54, 175
Pap, Arthur, viii, 22, 49, 94, 101, 105–8, 128–30, 169
Peacocke, Christopher, x, 19, 22, 75, 93, 95, 101, 133, 143
Plato, vii, 4, 7–11, 19, 49, 75, 77, 80, 84, 95, 154, 161;
Plato’s problem, 8–12, 19, 59, 73, 77, 101–4, 108, 115, 120, 128, 139, 153–55, 161–74
Poincare, Henri, viii, 129–30, 133, 140, 156, 170
proper names, 39–40, 96, 110–15, 149, 175
proposition, 26–28, 35–40, 40–45, 56, 60, 72, 77–79, 124–25, 172
Quine, W.V., vii–x, 4, 10, 17, 18, 20, 22–23, 26, 32, 66–70, 73, 75, 93, 99–102, 115, 119–20, 130, 134, 141–43, 154, 162, 175
Railton, Peter, viii, 101, 105, 142, 157
rationalism, 9–12, 18–20, 23, 76–77, 116–17, 133, 155
reference, 21, 24, 40, 63, 110–15, 121, 144–53, 155;
Reichenbach, Hans, viii, 101, 128–30, 156, 170
revisability, ix, 19–23, 40–44, 63, 71, 86–88, 99–109, 115–20, 123, 129, 137–57, 162, 172
Russell, Bertrand, 10, 18, 38, 69, 81, 109, 114, 124–25, 149
Russell, Gillian, x, 22, 63, 66, 73, 151, 176
semantics, viii, 4–6, 11–12, 14–17, 23, 34–40, 40–44, 57–63, 100, 109–15, 141, 154, 163
skepticism, vii, 3, 10–12, 18, 57–58, 63–71, 92–95, 100–5, 120, 124, 134–35, 153
Stump, David, viii, 94, 101, 105–8, 120, 130–32, 156
transparency, 114, 117, 119, 121, 146–48, 151–53, 157–58
Williamson, Timothy, ix, 72, 121, 133–39, 151, 156, 158
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, viii, 12, 20, 23, 69, 101, 105–13, 121, 123–31, 133, 136, 141–42, 155–57, 170, 175