CHAPTER 1
How Much Coal Do We Have?
“It has been estimated that there are over 984 billion tonnes of proven coal reserves worldwide. ...This means that there is enough coal to last us over 190 years.”
— The Coal Resource, World Coal Institute, 2005
 
THE FIRST SCIENTIFIC FORECAST FOR FUTURE BRITISH COAL SUPPLIES, published by Edward Hull in 1864, promised a 900-year abundance.1 Subsequent estimates stayed above 500 years for about a century. By 1984, the official forecast for British coal was down to 90 years’ supply. As of 2008, Britain’s coal industry, once the world’s largest, is virtually gone.
The first scientific survey of US coal supplies, undertaken by the US Geological Survey in 1907, concluded that the nation had 5,000 years’ worth of coal. Today, the US Department of Energy says that the country has a 200-year supply.
Somehow Britons evidently misplaced about 750 years’ worth of coal, while Americans lost a staggering 4,700 years’ worth. What happened?
Future supplies of coal are often discussed in terms of the reserves-to-production (R/P) ratio — i.e., the resource base estimated to be recoverable at current prices and with current technology, expressed in terms of annual consumption. This ratio is frequently stated as if it were a forecast of supply over time, as in, “the world has 190 years’ worth of coal at current rates of consumption,” or “China has a 100-year supply.”
This sounds both reassuring and reasonable — simply a matter of common sense, easily illustrated with a homely metaphor to which we will return several times in the following paragraphs.
Imagine that you were in the habit of eating a can of soup for lunch every day and you looked in your cupboard and counted ten cans. You would correctly conclude that your daily reserves-to-consumption ratio for canned soup was 10/1, and that you have ten days’ worth of soup.
It makes perfect sense. Why shouldn’t the situation be similar for coal?
In fact, supply forecasts for nonrenewable natural resources based on R/P ratios are always wrong, and often dramatically so. This may seem like an unreasonably sweeping statement (surely such forecasts are correct at least once in a while?), but the evidence is clear: for practical purposes, real experience never conforms to forecasts based on R/P ratios.
There are three main reasons for this.
1. Rates of consumption for energy and materials are never constant. In most cases, as populations increase and economies expand, consumption continually grows. Let us say that demand for a given mineral is growing at 3.5 percent per year; in that case, a resource base that would have lasted 100 years at an initial, constant rate of consumption would be exhausted in only about half that time.
In our canned-soup example above, the initial ten-day supply forecast will be dashed if your soup-loving brother shows up to stay for a week, and will have to be scaled back even further when your sister from Florida drops by for a few days, with her hungry teenage son in tow.
2. It is physically impossible to maintain a constant or growing rate of extraction of any non-renewable resource until the moment when the resource is exhausted. In the real world, time-based extraction profiles for non-renewable resources tend to conform to a modified bell curve. Extraction starts slowly, increases as demand grows and exploration efforts expand, reaches a peak when the most easily-accessed portion of the resource has been depleted, and declines gradually thereafter as only the more remote and lower-quality deposits are able to be found and produced.
Again, back to our example: Suppose your soup cans aren’t stacked nicely in the cupboard, but have been randomly concealed around the house by a deranged former housekeeper, some in plain sight and others hidden in walls and under floor boards (this more closely resembles the actual situation with non-renewable natural resources, which must be located through prospecting efforts). You will find the cans that are in plain sight right away and exhaust them fairly quickly; after your brother has shown up and the two of you have polished off those first few, you may have to spend considerable time and effort taking the house apart, combing the wreckage for more. Perhaps many days or even weeks later, after your famished sister and nephew have joined in the search, will you discover the last can.
3. Reserves are not static, but can increase as a result of new discoveries, higher prices (which make lower-quality deposits more attractive), and new technologies that facilitate exploration and production. Our soup metaphor has so far assumed a fixed supply, but in reality you are unlikely to be confined solely to the food stocks you have in your house at any given time. Instead, you will periodically go to the supermarket to buy more. If you have a car or even a bicycle, you can get there more easily, and also carry home larger quantities.
Obviously, the first two mitigating factors work to make the initial R/P forecast too optimistic, while the third trends in the other direction. Which factor carries the most weight? In the practical experience of resource extraction industries, the answer is rarely simple. Much depends, for example, on how fast demand is growing, or on how much of the resource remains to be discovered. It is on this latter point that our canned-soup metaphor breaks down: when it comes to non-renewable resources, there is no supermarket with groaning shelves being regularly replenished from trucks, canneries, and farms; instead, there are finite quantities endowed by nature. As a result, one thing is certain — the third factor can only overcome the first two for a limited time; unless demand is rapidly declining, the resource will run out.
A low-hanging-fruit syndrome constrains both the discovery and production of most non-renewable resources. Deposits of minerals are continually being found; but, as exploration history lengthens, the tendency is to find only minor deposits that were missed the first time around. Meanwhile, production continues to grow, perhaps for decades, until (as we have already noted) the difficulties of recovering the remaining resource force a peak and subsequent decline in extraction rates. With energy resources, production ultimately must cease when the amount of energy required to produce the resource equals the energy content of the resource being produced.
Some of the resource will always be left in the ground — and this often amounts to a majority of what was originally in place.
Therefore the world’s coal reserves will not last 190 years. In fact, they will last much longer, as there will surely still be some recoverable coal left many centuries from now. But that truism actually tells us nothing useful. For economic planning purposes, what is far more useful to know is the timing of the point when it will no longer be possible to increase yearly production rates. The shape of the depletion profile is far more informative than the R/P ratio.
It may be helpful to consider a couple of examples in order to gain some understanding of just how misleading R/P forecasts can be.
During the 1970s, exploration geologists identified enormous oil deposits under British-controlled regions of the North Sea. As discoveries accumulated, reserves grew. With low initial production, the R/P ratio was high. As production ramped up, the largest fields that had been found early on gradually became depleted. By 1999, it was no longer possible to increase the aggregate rate of extraction, and British oil production began to falter. By 2008, total production from all fields combined had declined to about half its peak level. But paradoxically, because reserves figures have remained fairly constant (since some discoveries are still taking place in the North Sea while production is falling), R/P ratios have actually increased in recent years. If one were looking to the oil R/P ratio as the main index of the health of Britain’s petroleum economy, this could only be encouraging. Yet Britain has recently been forced to become a net oil importer for the first time in 30 years.
For the past 25 years, the R/P ratio for oil produced in the United States has been between 9 and 12 years. On one hand, this seems cause for worry, if it means that America could run out of oil in only a decade; on the other hand, the fact that the ratio hasn’t changed in a quarter-century is encouraging, because it implies that reserves are being constantly replenished. However, that appearance of replenishment is itself misleading, because it is mostly due to America’s extremely conservative oil reserves reporting rules. Meanwhile, US oil production has generally been declining since 1970, and the nation — which was formerly the world’s petroleum powerhouse — now imports two-thirds of its oil. In other words, there is little or no useful correspondence between what has been happening with oil reserves and R/P ratios for the United States and what has been happening with actual production.
Net Energy
Net energy is the amount of useful energy delivered to society from energy-harvesting efforts, after all energy expenditures associated with those efforts have been subtracted.2 This is sometimes expressed as the ratio of energy returned on energy invested (EROEI). Society depends upon maintenance of a positive net energy balance. However, energy harvesting from non-renewable sources is subject to the law of diminishing returns, such that EROEI tends to decline as the resource is depleted. Fossil fuels in place become useless as energy sources when the energy required to extract them equals or exceeds the energy that can be derived from burning them. This fact puts a physical limit to the portion of resources of coal (or oil or gas) that should be categorized as reserves.
The graph shows a theoretical depletable resource that follows the “best first” (or “low-hanging fruit”) policy of resource extraction. The vertical axis is quantity and the horizontal is time. The gross energy resource “X” is the entire area under the curve (“X” = “A”+ “B”+ “C”+ “D”). Direct energy costs are “D.” Indirect energy costs (like tractors and highways and medical insurance and such) are “C.” Environmental externalities (in energy terms) are “B.” “A” represents the total net energy of the resource after costs have been subtracted. At any given point in time the energy returned on energy invested (EROEI) can be calculated by taking a ratio of the total area divided by the costs (depending on the boundaries). As can be seen, net energy peaks and goes to zero long before the total gross energy is depleted.
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Fig. 2
From all of this it seems fair to conclude that, as a tool for forecasting future supplies of nonrenewable resources such as coal or oil, the R/P ratio is utterly worthless. We use it to try (always unsuccessfully!) to answer the wrong question — When will reserves be exhausted?, when what we really need to know is, When will the rate of production begin to decline despite continuing efforts to increase it? Nevertheless, official agencies such as the Energy Information Administration of the US Department of Energy still prominently list current world and national coal R/P ratios, while making no effort to forecast peaks of production.3
Part of the appeal of the R/P ratio is its simplicity. However, the real world is complicated. With regard to coal, part of that complexity has to do with the extremely variable nature and quality of the resource. So any serious attempt to grasp the future supply situation must begin with an effort to incorporate that variability.

What Kind of Coal?

Coal is a fossil fuel and therefore non-renewable. A combustible, sedimentary, organic rock composed mainly of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen, it was formed from vegetation consolidated between other rock strata and altered by the combined effects of pressure and heat over millions of years.
While oil and gas were formed primarily from enormous quantities of microscopic plants (algae) that fell to the bottoms of prehistoric seas, coal is the altered remains of ancient vegetation that accumulated in swamps and peat bogs (peat currently covers three percent of Earth’s surface; in previous geologic eras, that percentage was much higher). While oil and gas were formed during two relatively brief periods of intense global warming roughly 150 and 90 million years ago, coal formation started much earlier and occurred during much longer time spans, with the first primary formation period occurring during the late Carboniferous period (roughly 360 to 290 million years ago), another in the Jurassic-Cretaceous (200 to 65 million years ago), and a third in the Tertiary (65 to 2 million years ago).
All fossil fuels vary in quality. For example, oil from some geological sources is more viscous and may have more impurities as compared to oil from other sources. Natural gas likewise varies by chemical composition: its main ingredient, methane, may be accompanied by larger or smaller amounts of sulfur dioxide, hydrogen sulfide, carbon dioxide, or other impurities; if the latter are present in too great a degree the gas is considered uncommercial and is not extracted.
Coal’s variability is in some respects even greater than that of oil or gas: the range of energy density between and among hard and soft coals is wide, as is the range of impurities in coals from differing regions. (Much of this variability has to do with the degree of alteration undergone by the original plant material, a process known as coalification.) At the high end of the coal spectrum is anthracite — a hard, black coal that has more carbon, less moisture, and produces more energy per kilogram than other coals. At the low end are lignite and subbituminous coals, which are brown, friable, and have more moisture, less carbon, and a lower energy content. Again, coal that contains high amounts of mineral impurities (especially sulfur) may be unusable.
The qualities of coal determine its uses. Generally, only anthracites and some high-carbon bituminous coals are suitable for making coke for steel production, a process that requires high temperatures; these are therefore often referred to as “metallurgical coals” or “coking coals.” Since anthracite is much less abundant than other coals, it sells for higher prices; it also therefore tends to be mined preferentially. Other coals are used mainly for electricity generation and are therefore known as “steam coals,” but this category includes a wide variety of coal types, from bituminous to lignite. At the lowest end of the spectrum are coals that are barely distinguishable from peat.
Even a thick seam of high-quality coal may be unrecoverable if it happens to lie beneath a town, school, or cemetery. Accessibility is also an important factor: lack of nearby transport infrastructure can pose a serious economic hurdle, since the transportation of coal can account for over 70 percent of its delivered cost.4 The cheapest mode of transport for coal is by water; thus, coalfields nearest coastal areas are most likely to be tapped for the global export market. While the oil industry has learned to access offshore petroleum and gas, coal that is buried in marine environments is difficult to extract economically with current technology, although there are instances where this is done (undersea coal has been mined in Britain since the 18th century, and is currently mined also in Chile, Japan, China, and Canada).
The location of coal varies greatly in depth, from surface outcrops to seams buried thousands of feet down. In most instances, underground mining is practical only to a depth of about 3,000 feet (1,000 meters), although the world’s deepest coal mine, in England, reaches 5,000 feet (1,500 meters). Obviously, the costs of mining at great depth are much higher than those of working at the surface, and the danger to miners increases as well. Worldwide, 40 percent of produced coal is surface mined (in the United States, about 60 percent of produced coal is surface mined).
Coal seams also vary in thickness, from only a few inches to well over 100 feet. Unless they are very close to the surface, seams less than 28 inches in thickness are likely to be uneconomic to mine.
These variations in energy density, quality, location, depth, and thickness all must figure into calculations when geologists and energy analysts attempt to answer the question, “How much useful coal exists?” Cutoff points for whether coal is judged economical to produce tend to be vague and changeable. Two variables capable of affecting such decisions are price and technology. If the price of coal rises, producers may find it economical to dig deeper, to exploit thinner seams, or to mine lower-quality deposits. And with new machines for mining, coal that was uneconomic to extract in the past may become profitable.
Total world reserves (at end of 2002):
bituminous coal + anthracite479 billion tons
subbituminous coal272 billion tons
lignite158 billion tons
Each coal class has a different energy content:
anthracite30 MJ/kg
bituminous coal18.8-29.3 MJ/kg
subbitiminous coal8.3-25 MJ/kg
lignite5.5-14.3 MJ/kg
wood12 MJ/kg
coal14-32.5 Mj/kg
oil41.9 Mj/kg
natural gas53.6 MJ/kg
On one hand, as more coal is discovered, as the price goes up, or as new mining machines are developed, coal reserves expand. On the other hand, as we extract and use enormous amounts of coal each year, we draw down those reserves.
One might expect that overall reserves figures would change fairly slowly and in a predictable fashion. In fact, as we will see, reserves figures for several nations have collapsed in recent years; and, over the past few decades, centuries’ worth of coal has disappeared from global reserves. Given that the world’s economy depends so heavily on coal, this trend is hardly reassuring. If we wish to understand how and why such downward reserves revisions are happening, it is essential that we look more deeply into the rather specialized, technical process of estimating coal reserves.

How Are Coal Reserves Estimated?

The estimation of coal reserves has evolved through the decades, and it now constitutes a sophisticated process entailing the work of thousands of trained and experienced coal geologists around the world.
The first step is to identify prospective areas. This is accomplished by means of old-fashioned, painstaking geological fieldwork, carried out with map, compass, and pick. Geologists typically look for coal outcroppings in rock strata exposed by streambeds or by ancient earth movements. Once a prospective area has been identified, cores are drilled to determine the thickness and depth of coal seams, as well as the quality and characteristics of the coal itself. These cores are carefully analyzed and logged to yield a three-dimensional map of the region. Then, using such maps, field sizes are estimated. Finally, reserves for entire regions are estimated by totaling field-by-field estimates.
No matter how carefully this process is pursued, it inevitably incorporates many judgment calls. Remember: reserves are defined not as the total amount of coal present (that’s the resource); rather, they consist of the portion of the resource that can be expected to be extractable at a profit using existing technology. Not only are reserves limited by resource quality, seam thickness, depth, and location, but analysts must also take into account the fact that the mining process will inevitably leave some of the resource behind. This is especially true in the case of underground mining, where in some instances a majority of the coal originally in place is left behind.5 Historically, practical recovery percentages for underground mining average about 50 percent of the coal that meets all economic criteria for minability; for surface mining, it is 85 percent.6
In the ideal case, all of these variables will have been taken into account when a final reserves number for a region or a nation is produced and published. However, ideal cases are rare.
The task of reserves analysts is made difficult, for example, by the fact that private coal companies often keep their data proprietary. Thus, when a public agency sets out to compile national reserves statistics, it may find significant gaps in available data. Moreover, some nations simply don’t have the personnel or funding needed in order to properly compile and update records.
Additionally, there is no single internationally recognized, uniform method for assessing and reporting reserves as a fraction of resources. In the United States, coal geologists work with the following carefully defined categories:
original resources
remaining resources
identified resources
inferred resources
measured resources
reserve base
inferred reserves
indicated reserves
measured reserves
marginal reserves, and
sub-economic resources.7
But other countries have their own sets of categories, with varying definitions. Assembling national reserves figures into a composite global picture is therefore a task of enormous complexity. One might expect that this would be the work of teams of data analysts working for the International Energy Agency (IEA) or some well-funded, prestigious institute. Surprisingly, the task is actually carried out by a two-person team — Alan Clarke and Judy Trinnaman, whose company, Energy Data Associates, is headquartered in Dorset, England. Clarke and Trinnaman send a questionnaire every three years to every coal-producing nation in the world. According to Clarke, about two-thirds of nations reply, but only about 50 of these replies typically are useful. Some reported data must simply be disregarded as unrealistic. No effort is made to verify reported national reserves figures through independent geological surveys.8
The figures from Energy Data Associates are then taken up in the triennial report of the World Energy Council, and are subsequently republished by the IEA, US Geological Survey, BP, etc.
Clarke and Trinnaman no doubt do an excellent service with the information available to them, but given the nature of this data the results can hardly be regarded with a high level of confidence.

Recent Studies of Coal Reserves and Future Supplies

As underscored in the Introduction, questions regarding future world coal supplies are not just academic. The global economy is more reliant on coal today than at any time in the past as total production is at the highest level in history. Meanwhile, the questions of how and whether the world continues its coal consumption are crucial to the fate of the global climate. Accurate coal reserves figures and supply forecasts are therefore more important than ever, as the world plans its energy strategy for the remainder of this century.
The common assumption that the world has plenty of coal has been the subject of several recent studies. Five of the most important of these will be summarized below, and we will return to them in the next four chapters as we examine the status of coal reserves and production in the world’s main coal countries. These studies do not all reach the same conclusions, but they represent the best, most recent data and analysis available.

1

“Coal: Resources and Future Production” (Energy Watch Group). The organization Energy Watch Group (EWG) was founded by German parliamentarian Hans-Josef Fell, and is supported by the Ludwig-Bölkow-Foundation. Its mission is to assess future supplies of fossil and atomic energy resources, and develop scenarios for renewable energy sources and strategies for a long-term secure energy supply at affordable prices. The EWG report, “Coal: Resources and Future Production,” was released in March 2007.9 Its central conclusions are that minable global coal reserves are much smaller than is commonly thought, and that a peak in world coal production is likely within only ten to 15 years.
The report’s authors — Werner Zittel (Ludwig-Bölkow-Systemtechnik GmbH, Ottobrunn) and Jörg Schindler (Managing Director, Ludwig-Bölkow-Systemtechnik GmbH) — state their opinion that “the data quality [for coal reserves] is very unreliable,” especially for China, South Asia, and the former Soviet Union countries. Some nations (such as Vietnam) have not updated their “proved reserves” for decades, in some instances not since the 1960s. China’s last update was in 1992; since then, 20 percent of its reserves have been consumed, though this is not revealed in official figures.
Even more striking is the fact that since 1986, all nations with significant coal resources (excepting India and Australia) that have made efforts to update their reserves estimates have reported substantial downward revisions. (In its 2007 survey, the World Energy Council noted that India reduced its reserves from 92Gt to 56Gt; this survey was published after the EWG report.) Some countries — including Botswana, Germany, and the United Kingdom — have downgraded their reserves by more than 90 percent. Poland’s reserves are now 50 percent smaller than was the case 20 years ago. Each new assessment (again, except in the cases of India and Australia) has followed the general trend. These downgrades cannot be explained by the volumes of coal produced in this period. The best explanation, according to EWG, is that nations now have better data from more thorough surveys. If that is the case, then future downward revisions are likely from countries that continue to rely on decades-old reserves estimates.
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Fig. 3
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Fig. 4
The report concludes: “present and past experience does not support the common argument that reserves are increasing over time as new areas are explored and prices rise.” This conclusion is supported by the fact that even the world’s in-situ resources of coal have dwindled from 10 trillion tons of hard coal equivalent (hce) in 1980 to 4.2 trillion tons in 2005 — a 60 percent downward revision in 25 years.
The EWG group performed a peaking analysis of world coal, and arrived at the conclusion that world production will reach a maximum level around 2025, decline slowly for about two decades, and then fall off more rapidly beginning around 2050.

2

“A Supply-Driven Forecast for the Future Global Coal Production” (Höök, Zittel, Schindler, Aleklett; Uppsala Hydrocarbon Depletion Study Group). Two of the authors of this 2008 report were also responsible for the EWG study, so it might be expected that the conclusions of both would be similar — and this is indeed the case. However, the newer report is also somewhat more thorough. Future global coal production is forecasted using a logistic growth model, as well as experience from historical reserve and resource assessments. The result is the same:
Global coal production will be able to increase over the next 10 to 15 years by about 30%, mainly driven by China, India, Australia and South Africa. A plateau will be reached around 2020 and the global production will go into decline after 2050.10
The authors again show that throughout the past century both reserves and resources have been constantly downgraded in most nations. Competition from other energy sources and the introduction of various political restrictions were involved in these downward reductions, but a main driver of the trend has been better geological understanding of actual available coal amounts.
It is pointed out that optimistic forecasts of future supply — see the BGR report, below — rely on the potential of new technology to turn resources (coal in the ground) into reserves (coal that we believe can be economically extracted). The authors note that, during the past century, the introduction of new technology for exploration and mining has had very little impact on the available coal reserves. They assume that this situation will continue:
[T]he world’s future coal supply likely is overestimated, as the entire concept of having resources upgraded to reserves needs to be reassessed, since it is something that has not happened throughout history on a significant scale. More careful studies of this need to be undertaken and all details in the mechanism of resource upgrading should be examined to find a suitable behaviour for future production forecasts.11
The authors note that, “Throughout history resources have not mattered much, and unless something causes a significant deviation in the historical trend, they will not matter much in the future.” They call for “better data and a more transparent and reliable system for reserve evaluations” in order “to form a solid basis for long-term decisions and forecasts regarding the energy system.”

3

“The Future of Coal.” This study, by B. Kavalov and S.D. Peteves of the Institute for Energy (IFE), prepared for the European Commission Joint Research Centre and published February 2007, questions future supply, but does not attempt a peaking analysis.
While Kavalov and Peteves discuss future supply in terms of the familiar but misleading reserves-to-production (R/P) ratio, nevertheless, the IFE’s conclusions broadly confirm those of EWG.
The three primary take-away conclusions from this study are as follows:12
• “World proven reserves (i.e., the reserves that are economically recoverable at current economic and operating conditions) of coal are decreasing fast ... .”
• “The bulk of coal production and exports is getting concentrated within a few countries and market players, which creates the risk of market imperfections.”
• “Coal production costs are steadily rising all over the world, due to the need to develop new fields, increasingly difficult geological conditions and additional infrastructure costs associated with the exploitation of new fields.”
Early in the paper the authors ask, “Will coal be a fuel of the future?” Their disturbing conclusion, many pages later, is that “coal might not be so abundant, widely available and reliable as an energy source in the future.” Along the way, they state “the world could run out of economically recoverable (at current economic and operating conditions) reserves of coal much earlier than widely anticipated.” The authors also highlight problems noted in the EWG study having to do with differing grades of coal and the likelihood of supply problems arising first with the highest-grade ores.
All of this translates to higher coal prices in coming years. The conclusion is repeated throughout the IFE report:13 “[I]t is true that historically coal has been cheaper than oil and gas on an energy content basis. This may change, however. ... The regional and country overview in the preceding chapter has revealed that coal recovery in most countries will incur higher production costs in [the] future. Since international coal prices are still linked to production costs ... an increase in the global price levels of coal can be expected.”
As prices for coal rise, “the relative gap between coal prices and oil and gas prices will most likely narrow,” with the result that “the future world oil, gas, and coal markets will most likely become increasingly inter-related and the energy market will tend to develop into a global market of hydrocarbons.”

4

Hubbert linearization and curve-fitting (studies by David Rutledge,14 Jean Laherrère,15 et al.). In the early 1980s, geophysicist M. King Hubbert (1900-1989) — who is generally credited with having pioneered the scientific study of oil depletion — developed a mathematical technique for forecasting ultimately recoverable figures for oil and the timing of production peaks using only production statistics. There are some who think that this technique can also be used to forecast future coal supplies.
Hubbert introduced the methodology, now known as “Hubbert linearization” (HL), in a paper titled “Techniques of Prediction as Applied to the Production of Oil and Gas,” published in 1982.16 It was later explained in some detail by Kenneth Deffeyes in his book Beyond Oil: The View from Hubbert’s Peak.17
The assumption inherent in HL is that the ability to produce a non-renewable resource depends entirely, and linearly, upon the unproduced fraction of the recoverable resource at any point in time. Simply put, this is a mathematical way of modeling the fact that we tend to find and produce the most accessible portion of the resource first, so that production requires more effort over time.
Cumulative production is logged on the horizontal axis of a chart, while the ratio of annual production to cumulative production is plotted on the vertical axis (P=production, Q=cumulative), using the equation P = 008where a is annual production expressed as a fraction of cumulative production. In early years, production is naturally low, but it is a high percentage of total cumulative production. As time goes on, the cumulative figure goes up, but each year’s production is a smaller percentage of the cumulative amount to that date. Thus an entire production history tends to assume a more-or-less straight, downward-trending line.
If production is constrained for part of that time, or, on the other hand, if it is temporarily stimulated, the line will diverge from its previous path. If the method is applied too early in production history, its results will be fairly useless because it takes some time for the linear trend to appear. Also, the technique works best when assessing a large region: in a small area, a single new discovery occurring late in the production cycle can skew the production trend considerably, rendering the earlier trend-line misleading.
Nevertheless, if the region is large and if enough time has passed to enable the data to show a clear trend, it is possible to project that trend-line to the bottom horizontal axis to forecast the ultimately recoverable amount of the resource.
The method has worked well in forecasting ultimately recoverable amounts of oil in many producing nations such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Mexico, and Oman. There is no obvious reason it should fail to apply also to other non-renewable resources such as coal.
David Rutledge, the Tomiyasu Professor of Electrical Engineering and Chair of the Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech), in a presentation at Caltech in October 2007, used the technique to estimate future global coal production, breaking the world up into eight regions — Australia, South Asia, East Asia, former Soviet Union, Africa, Europe, South America, and North America — and studying production statistics for each separately. Where no trend became apparent from the application of HL, Rutledge used reserves figures from the World Energy Council (WEC).
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Fig. 5: Hubbert linearization plot for US oil production from the lower 48 states, showing an ultimate recovery of 225 billion barrels.
Region Reserves (Gt) Trends
North America255135
East Asia19070
Australia and New Zealand7950
Europe5521
Africa3010
Former Soviet Union22318
South Asia111
Central and South America20
World (at 3.6 boe/ton)963 (3.5Tboe)435 (1.6Tboe)
boe = barrels of oil equivalent Tboe = trillion barrels of oil equivalent 18
Rutledge found about half the reserves officially accepted by the WEC are likely actually to be produced, assuming the HL method holds.
In subsequent communication I’ve had with Rutledge, he noted that he does not consider HL useful for estimating the timing of the global coal production peak. However, as noted above, the method is used routinely by others for forecasting peaking dates for oil production within individual countries and the world as a whole.
Once about half the reserves are gone, it becomes progressively more difficult to maintain the same or a growing rate of production. The straight-line HL graph can be converted into a logistic curve, with the quantity beneath the curve equal to the ultimately recoverable amount forecast by the first graph. All that is necessary is to take a reciprocal of both sides of the equation:
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Thus, in principle it is possible to obtain both an ultimately recoverable estimate and a peak production year forecast if there exists a sufficiently robust data set for production over time.
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Fig. 6
Veteran petroleum geologist Jean Laherrère, who served as deputy exploration manager for TOTAL and has written several reports for Petroconsultants and Petroleum Economist on the world’s oil and gas potential and future production, examined the data for world coal reserves and production and produced the HL graph of future coal production reproduced here, showing a peak before 2050.19
It is worth noting parenthetically that Laherrère prefers to use round numbers in his calculations. He argues that reserves estimates even to one decimal place give a false impression of accuracy, where in fact the numbers are fluid, arguable, and imprecise. This attitude strikes me as being refreshingly realistic.

5

“Lignite and Hard Coal: Energy Suppliers for World Needs until the Year 2100 — An Outlook.” It would be wrong to give the impression that all recent studies have yielded pessimistic results regarding world coal reserves.
Thomas Thielemann, Sandro Schmidt, and J. Peter Gerling of The German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) have published in the International Journal of Coal Geology a report that forecasts no foreseeable bottleneck in coal supplies and a large potential for coal-to-liquids (CTL). The article’s abstract states:
For three years, international hard coal prices have been at rather expensive levels. Some argue that these higher prices might indicate the threat of a physical scarcity of [coal] — similar to the situation with oil and gas. This is not true. The supply situations with lignite and hard coal appear to be largely not critical. Adjusted to the rise in global coal consumption, which is expected until 2100, nature by and large can meet the world’s coal demand. ...The only area of potential concern is Asia (especially China). But today’s and coming eager efforts in China to convert coal resources into reserves will most likely deliver the coal needed for the Chinese market.20
The conclusion of the report is unequivocal: “Up to the year 2100, and from a geoscientific point of view, there will be no bottleneck in coal supplies on this planet.”
The national coal reserves data used in this report are the same set used by the Energy Watch Group.
The BGR authors also assume a slowdown in world demand for coal, from the current six percent annual growth (largely resulting from consumption patterns in China) to two or three percent. They admit that their demand forecast looks “rather conservative,” and that stabilization of current high consumption growth is “uncertain.”
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Fig. 7

Conclusion

One cannot help but be struck by the dramatic difference in conclusions between the BGR paper on one hand, and the rest of the recent studies and reports on the other. BGR and EWG used the same data; how could they arrive at such divergent outcomes?
Essentially, BGR envisions the large-scale conversion of resources into reserves as a result of increasing investment and the development and deployment of new mining technologies. Most significantly, perhaps, the authors anticipate the conversion of several hundred billion tons of resources into reserves in China, forestalling supply problems there for several decades (EWG foresees significant coal supply problems for China well before mid-century).
The BGR authors do not discuss the historic trend in the opposite direction: in recent decades, and especially in nations with the best reserves-reporting practices, the conversion of reserves to resources has far outweighed the conversion of resources to reserves. Nor do they offer detailed discussion as to why or how this trend will be reversed in the future.
This is essentially the point on which Rutledge has focused his analysis: why have reserves historically been too high, requiring consistent adjustment downward? On the basis of Hubbert linearization analysis, he regards current reserves estimates as representing the upper limit of future production, while BGR treats them as the lower limit.
The weight of evidence tending toward the more pessimistic conclusions regarding future coal production can only be overcome with detailed data and argument. It is unfortunate in this regard that the BGR paper is relatively brief and does not address many of the questions raised by EWG and Rutledge.
013
We began this chapter with a quote from a booklet titled The Coal Resource, published by the World Coal Institute:
It has been estimated that there are over 984 billion tonnes of proven coal reserves worldwide. ...This means that there is enough coal to last us over 190 years.
On the basis of what we have seen so far, it seems fair to conclude that the entire statement may be misleading. It is clearly a mistake to use the reserves-to-production ratio in forecasting future supplies. Moreover, the reserves figure, “984 billion tonnes,” which sounds solid and authoritative, is in fact arguable.
Coal resources certainly exist in great quantities. But resources are of no use if they are inaccessible, are of exceedingly low quality, or are otherwise incapable of meeting the energy needs of modern industrial economies. Therefore we need better answers to the following four questions:
• How much of the resource should currently be counted as reserves?
• How much of the resource might be converted into reserves later as prices rise and new technologies develop?
• What portion of current reserves is likely to be reclassified as resources?>
• When will growth in coal production (for the world as a whole, and for significant producing regions) cease and a long decline begin?
Let us keep these questions in mind as we look at resources, reserves, and production in more detail, examining each of the world’s primary coal-producing regions.