Truman, MacArthur and the Korean War

Meanwhile, on June 30, armed with presidential authority, MacArthur ordered General William F. Dean’s 24th Infantry Division to South Korea. Its mission was to advance to the enemy’s position and “delay his advance.” Also, Dean would temporarily assume command of all U.S. ground troops in South Korea.² At the same time, Walker was preparing the Eighth Army’s other three infantry divisions—the 1st Cavalry, the 25th, and the 7th for transfer to South Korea.

While the 24th Division was preparing for the move to South Korea, MacArthur sent a 540-man task force, under Colonel Charles B. Smith, ahead to engage the enemy below Suwon. Called Task Force Smith, it included two infantry companies, a battery of artillery, two mortar platoons, a platoon of recoilless rifles, and six rocket-launcher teams.³ One-third of Smith’s troops were World War II veterans, but the rest lacked combat experience, were twenty years old or less, out of shape, and wrested from a comfortable garrison life in Japan, which did not help their mental attitude. They would go into combat, said Collins, “as is,” with no special combat training.⁴ “We just flew those poor devils over there,” said Rusk later, “and just sent them into combat.”⁵

On July 2, Smith’s troops arrived by motor convoy at Itazuke Airfield, where six C-54 transports were waiting to take them to Pusan, at the extreme southeastern end of South Korea. At the airfield, Dean told Smith, “when you get to Pusan, head north. We want to stop the North Koreans as far from Pusan as you can.” Dean added, “Good luck and God bless you and your men.”⁶

Later that day, Smith’s troops landed at Pusan’s airport, at the extreme southeastern end of the country, and boarded trucks for the seventeen-mile trip to the city’s railroad station. Cheering crowds lined the road along the way, waving flags, banners, and streamers, and bands gave them a noisy send-off for their four-day journey north to Osan.

On the night of July 4, Smith’s troops prepared positions at a point about three miles north of Osan and eight miles south of Suwon. Throughout the night, the troops test-fired their weapons, ate C rations, and waited. It was tragic,” said Ridgway later, “to picture this handful of poorly equipped men on some nameless Korean hillside, where there was neither cover nor concealment.” ⁷ To MacArthur, Task Force Smith was an important “display of strength,” which he hoped “would fool the enemy into thinking that a much larger force was at hand.“⁸

At dawn, about thirty-three enemy T-34 tanks appeared on the horizon, with a strong infantry force far behind them. Although Smith’s troops engaged the tanks they faced “overwhelming odds,” lacking sophisticated antitank weapons, combat support aviation, or reserves. The enemy tank crews did not stop to engage Smith’s forces. Eight tanks came through first, followed at short intervals by groups of four. It took an hour for all the tanks to get through Smith’s positions. Mainly with howitzers and bazookas, Smith’s troops destroyed four tanks and damaged three others. Tank fire killed or wounded twenty of Smith’s men.⁹

About an hour after the tank column had passed, Smith saw a long column of trucks and foot soldiers, estimated by him to be about six miles long. When the convoy of enemy trucks and infantry was about 1,000 yards away, Smith “threw the book at them.” His troops hit the trucks with mortar shells, and machine-gun bullets swept the column. As trucks blew up, NKPA soldiers sprang from their vehicles, and while some began setting up a base of fire, others fanned out to either side in a double enveloping movement.¹⁰

Despite the odds, Task Force Smith put up a good delaying fight of four to five hours. Facing annihilation, Smith ordered his units to begin “leapfrogging” off the road. Each unit, covered by protecting fire from the next unit ahead, kept its small arms and three clips of ammunition but abandoned all crew-served weapons, recoilless rifles, mortars, and machine guns, and left behind its dead and wounded. The men fell back into “unknown countryside,” suffering about 150 killed, wounded, or missing.¹¹

Surprised to encounter American troops, NKPA commanders assumed that more were in reserve. As a result, they ordered the advance halted in order to bring up heavy guns, and deployed their troops along a 150-mile front, which was exactly what MacArthur had hoped they would do. After ten days, they realized that the United States did not have massive forces in reserve and resumed the advance. By that time, MacArthur had commandeered every ship, plane, and train to get his forces to Korea. “No mobilization toward a battlefield ever equaled it in peed,” said Willoughby.¹² Smith’s troops, added Truman, “put up one of the finest rear-guard actions in military history.”¹³

During this time, U.S. warplanes began bombing Korea. From Japanese airfields, General Emmett O’Donnell’s B-29 Superforts of the FEAF Bomber Command flew air strikes against enemy supply routes, communication hubs, and marshaling yards. On the west coast, the Navy’s Task force 77 bombed Pyongyang’s bridges railway yards, and along the eastern shoreline, American warships bombed enemy’s main supply route. Also, from Navy boats, commando parties landed behind enemy lines to mine and dynamite highways, railroads, and tunnels.¹⁴

MacArthur gave General Stratemeyer orders to devote a substantial amount of airpower to destroying North Korea’s Air Force. On July 18, his B29s destroyed enemy planes on runways at Kimpo, and pilots from Task Force 77’s aircraft carriers destroyed or damaged twenty-seven enemy planes at Pyongyang’s airfields.¹⁵ On the east coast, on July 19, carrier pilots strafed and destroyed fifteen enemy planes at Yonpo and three others at Sondol, and fifth Air Force pilots hit hard at a camouflaged enemy airfield north of the 38th parallel near Pyongyang, destroying or damaging twenty-one enemy planes. On the following day, B29s cratered the runways and dispersal areas at airfields in Pyongyang and Onjong-ni.¹⁶

By July 20, the FEAF had established air superiority over Korea. The air battle was “short and sweet,” said Stratemeyer. But if the enemy had possessed a modern air force, he added, the whole picture in Korea “would have been vastly different.”¹⁷

On the ground, the 24th Infantry Division’s 18,000 troops had completed their movement to Korea by July 6. At the same time, MacArthur had designated Walker to command all American ground forces in Korea. Walker, with headquarters at Taegu, had objectives that included delaying the enemy advance, securing the current defensive line, stabilizing the military situation, and building up for future operations. He deployed his troops along the south bank of the Kum River to a point just above Taejon.¹⁸ To help hinder the enemy advance, Stratemeyer sent all available B26s, F82s, and F80s to the area.¹⁹

On July 8, NKPA troops captured Chonan. If they would have continued their offensive, they might have destroyed Walker’s 24th Infantry Division, leaving the route to Taejon, Taegu, and Pusan bare of defenders. But FEAF fighters had hurt them badly, forcing them to pause and build up their strength.²⁰ Also, despite the NKPA’s numerical strength, the speed of its advance generated serious logistical problems that slowed it down.²¹

On July 10, General Dean’s “bitter, haggard, tattered, and exhausted” troops retreated to Taejon, fifteen miles below the Kum River, an important railroad center with a population of 37,000. Two days later, four military transport planes arrived in Japan from the United States, carrying the Army’s largest bazookas, the new 3.5mm rocket launchers, which could knock out an NKPA tank. Without delay, FEAF flew them to Taejon. Shortly thereafter, NKPA troops crossed the Kum River and drove toward Taejon from several directions.²² Despite air support and close-range antitank weapons, General Dean’s 24th Infantry Division was unable to hold the city, which fell on July 20.²³ Dean was captured, and his troops suffered 770 casualties.

Meanwhile, on July 9, the first units of the 25th Infantry Division, commanded by General William B. Kean, began arriving from Japan. Walker sent them to Hamchang, fifty miles northeast of Taejon, to block NKPA units advancing down an alternate road to Taegu. As other troops of the 25th disembarked, he dispatched them to an area north of Taegu, where another strong enemy column was advancing toward the city.²⁴ General Hobart K. Gay’s 1st Cavalry Division landed at Pohang, on the east coast, and relieved the battered 24th Infantry Division at Yongdong, northwest of Taegu.

Earlier, the Joint Chiefs had approved MacArthur’s request for a Marine regimental combat team (RCT), with supporting air, to be transferred to the Far East. On July 14, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, composed of the 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division, and Marine Air Group 33 of the 1st Marine Air Wing, embarked for Japan. Under General Edward Craig, a proven World War II veteran, it included 6,534 Marines.²⁵ “This Marine force,” said Admiral Radford, “was capable of specialized missions, including amphibious landing.”²⁶ To MacArthur, that was good news since it fit into his overall plans, which were still in the developmental stage.

During this time, MacArthur continually pressed the Joint Chiefs for more troops. On July 7, he asked for four and one-half more divisions. Two days later he raised his request to eight and one-half divisions. In an ambiguous statement, he said that the NKPA was assuming “the aspect of a combination of Soviet leadership with Chinese Communist ground elements.”²⁷ But the actual presence of Chinese Communists “had not been confirmed in any other reports,” and the Joint Chiefs remained noncommittal on sending such large reinforcements.²⁸

Meanwhile, on July 7, the U.N. Security Council had passed a resolution recommending that all U.N. members participating in the Korean crisis place their forces under U.S. command and that Truman designate a U.N. commander. In this way, he became the executive agent for the Security Council and, under no obligation to clear his decisions with it, he promptly named MacArthur as the U.N. force’s commander.²⁹ The American command structure, in fact, remained the same. “The controls over me,” said MacArthur, “were exactly the same as though the forces under me were all American, and all my communications were to the American high command.”³⁰

MacArthur may not have been the best man for the job. At age seventy, he was carrying a heavy burden as head of both Japan and the U.N. forces. Truman could have picked a younger man for the task, such as Collins or Ridgway, while still retaining MacArthur as head of Japan. Yet he was “the man on the spot” with a proven World War II record, and Truman was not eager to generate tension by passing over the Republicans’ favorite general.³¹

Although sixty countries belonged to the United Nations, the United States carried the major burden of the war. It furnished the bulk of the air units, naval forces, troops, and equipment. To avoid the appearance of unilateral American action, the Joint Chiefs cautioned MacArthur to emphasize that the United States was acting on behalf of the United Nations. This reminded him of General Fox Conner’s admonition in World War I: “If you have to go to war, for God’s sake, do it without allies!”³²

In the first week of July, MacArthur told his chief of staff, Edward Almond, to prepare a detailed plan for an amphibious landing of American troops at Inchon, Seoul’s port city, to cut the enemy’s supply lines and encircle its forces south of Seoul. He considered Inchon, only twenty miles from Seoul and an important communications and supply center for the NKPA forces in South Korea, an ideal site for an enveloping movement. An amphibious landing, he said, was “my style, my manner of doing things.”³³ It appealed to MacArthur’s “sense of grand tactics,” said Roy Appleman, and he never wavered from it.³⁴

Assigning the code name Operation Bluehearts to the plan, General Wright and his aides considered using the 1st Cavalry Division for an amphibious landing at Inchon. They described the port city as the anvil upon which it would land and hammer, as Walker’s forces advanced north to drive the NKPA back across the Han River. In that way, the two forces could trap and crush the NKPA in their vise.³⁵ But the swift NKPA advance convinced MacArthur to land the 1st Cavalry Division at Pohang on July 18 instead, to help stem the enemy offensive.

MacArthur soon found another way to obtain troops for the Inchon operation. On July 10, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, fleet Marine commander who was stationed in Honolulu, visited him in Tokyo. MacArthur hoped Shepherd would view the Inchon operation as a good opportunity for the Marine Corps, which had been losing ground since the end of World War II, to regain its former status.

After about two hours of general conversation, MacArthur, accompanying Shepherd to the door, suddenly grabbed his shirt and pulled him over to a map of Korea hanging on the wall. “Lem,” said MacArthur, pointing to Inchon, “if I had the 1st Marine Division under my command, I would land them at Inchon and seize Seoul.”³⁶ Shepherd said that he would do his best, and when he later convinced the Joint Chiefs to transfer the entire 1st Marine Division to the Far East Command, MacArthur was not surprised.³⁷

For two days, July 13 and 14, Collins and Vandenberg assembled with MacArthur, his staff, Stratemeyer, Radford, and Walker, who had flown over from Korea. In his usual fashion, MacArthur paced back and forth, appearing “cool and poised.” Although his staff, said Collins, did not always give him objective battlefield assessments, MacArthur admitted that the situation looked grim. His troops, he said, were “outgunned, outnumbered, and without adequate defense against the enemy’s armor.”³⁹ Describing the enemy fighters as “tough and well-led,” he insisted that ultimate success depended upon how quickly Washington sent him equipment and additional troops.⁴⁰

The participants briefly discussed the Inchon plan. While reluctant to divulge details, MacArthur considered Inchon the best place to launch an amphibious landing and envelopment. Collins and Vandenberg agreed on the need to launch an amphibious counteroffensive, but they had serious concerns about the Inchon site. From their World War II experiences, they knew that an amphibious operation was difficult at best, and Inchon presented the special problems of tides, narrow channels, and lack of time to coordinate attack elements. Despite these difficulties, MacArthur’s planning staff assured them “it could be done.”⁴¹

In “vigorous and colorful language,” MacArthur argued that Washington should reject the concept of a gradual buildup and allow him “to grab every ship in the Pacific and pour the support into the Far East.” Less concerned about the general situation, he said that driving back the Communists in Korea “would check Communist expansion everywhere and thus obviate the necessity of our being fully prepared to meet aggression elsewhere.”⁴² Collins and Vandenberg agreed that MacArthur could have the 1st Marine Division, but otherwise he would have to get along with what he had. Happy to obtain the Marines, MacArthur softened, said Collins later, fully realizing “our problems at home and the necessity of not stripping regular forces there.”⁴³

When Collins and Vandenberg brought up Chiang’s offer of 33,000 troops for Korea, MacArthur agreed with Washington’s decision to reject it since they lacked artillery and logistic capability, and would soon become “an albatross around our necks.” He added that the transfer of Chiang’s troops to South Korea would leave a defensive gap in Formosa, inviting attack from Red China.⁴⁴

At one point, MacArthur brought up the use of the atomic bomb. If the Chinese Communists crossed into North Korea, asked Vandenberg, would MacArthur cut them off at the border or invade Manchuria? A “unique opportunity” existed, MacArthur replied, for using the atomic bomb to cripple the many tunnels and bridges that crossed into North Korea. Vandenberg, remaining silent on its use, promised more B29s to bomb the supply routes.⁴⁵

Late in the afternoon on July 13, Collins and Walker flew to Taegu, sixty miles north of Pusan, and assembled with the Eighth Army staff. Despite the desperate situation, everybody was “calm and confident.” Now that reinforcements were en route to Korea, said Walker, he could, “banning unforeseen circumstances,” hold an extensive bridgehead at Pusan.⁴⁶ Collins promised “continued support.”⁴⁷ Since their plane had to take off before dark, the visit lasted only an hour.

Shortly thereafter, MacArthur cabled Washington that he had decided on mid-September for an amphibious landing at Inchon, consisting of two divisions to envelop and destroy enemy forces in the rear in conjunction with the Eighth Army’s counterattack from the south. Since a frontal attack would result in a “protracted and expensive campaign,” he rejected it. Only by American forces’ landing behind the enemy’s front, he said, could they cut its lines of communication and “deliver a decisive and crushing blow.”⁴⁸ The Joint Chiefs, however, expressed deep concern over MacArthur’s Inchon plan. “It was the riskiest military proposal I had ever heard of,” said Bradley, and “imprudent” that he should concern his staff with a “blue sky scheme like Inchon rather than the immediate and grave threat at Pusan.”⁴⁹

During this time, while the Korean situation was in flux, Truman obtained congressional permission to shift the economy from a peacetime to a wartime basis. He received emergency military funds, which raised defense spending from $13 billion to $15 billion by year’s end. He expanded the draft, launched massive recruitment drives, raised taxes, restricted consumer credit, and called up four National Guard divisions. MacArthur regarded Truman’s moves “as the focal and turning point for this era’s struggle for civilization.”⁵⁰

On July 26, with the enemy advance nearing Taegu, Walker phoned Almond, asking for permission to move his command post to Pusan. It would “damage the Army’s morale,” Almond replied, and “might trigger a debacle.”⁵³ Almond immediately informed MacArthur that the situation in Korea had reached a critical stage and required his personal observation.⁵⁴ The next day MacArthur and Almond flew to Walker’s headquarters, where he briefed them on a series of planned retreats. Upon hearing this, MacArthur’s expression changed from “attentiveness to surprise to amazement.” With a “withering” glance at the briefing officer, he said, “These plans will be scrapped at once.” He added, “The present line must be held at all costs.”⁵⁵

Two days later, Walker informed the officers of the 25th Infantry Division that the Eighth Army would “stand or die” along the present line. “If some of us must die,” he said, “we will die fighting together.”⁵⁶

Known as the Pusan Perimeter, Walker’s defensive line enclosed a rectangular area fifty miles in width, from the Naktong River to the Sea of Japan, and about 100 miles in depth. Between August 1 and 4, the Eighth Army and ROK Army units withdrew behind it, preparing for a last-ditch stand. While the ROK Army held the eastern half of the line, the Eighth Army positioned itself on the western and southern halves.⁵⁷ Moreover, Walker’s nine divisions–four American and five South Korean—were spread thin, holding frontages twelve to twenty miles long. Nor did he had much in reserve. “Sometimes,” he said “I had only a company in reserve, and you know that is an absurd situation for an American army, but that’s the way it was.”⁵⁸

The NKPA amassed 150,000 troops, thirteen rifle divisions, and a tank brigade and division, for a two-pronged drive across the Naktong line, one from the west and the other from the southwest. The campaign consisted of hundreds of small thrusts and a series of large attacks and counterattacks. U.N. forces clung tenaciously to their Naktong positions, and despite Walker’s limited reserves, he skillfully deployed them for quick movement to contain and bend back the enemy attacks.⁵⁹

Fighting along the Pusan Perimeter increased the morale of the U.N. forces. For the first time, the troops fought along a continuous line. Before this, both flanks were generally wide open, and supporting troops were seldom nearby. Because of the isolated nature of the soldier’s position, he would not stay “to fight a losing battle.” According to military historian Roy Appleman, “with no inspiring incentive to fight, self-preservation became the dominating factor.”⁶⁰

Fresh troops began arriving at Pusan in late July and August. These included the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade, noted for its kilted bagpipers ; the 2nd Infantry Division; and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, diverted, en route to Japan, to Pusan. MacArthur had hoped to use it for his Inchon landing, but the enemy pressure along the Naktong line forced him to order it to Pusan.

The Marine Brigade became the mainstay of Walker’s defense, constantly attacking and counterattacking throughout the southern sector. In its first operation, lasting six days, it made a twenty-mile advance, the first successful counterattack by American troops since the war began.⁶¹ Two more major operations would follow. At these points, said Lynne Montross and Nicholas Canzona, Marine units effectively stopped the enemy’s efforts, inflicted serious losses, and forced abandonment of attempts at decisive penetration.⁶²

Also, under the control and direction of frontline Marines, the Marine Brigade used the Navy-Marine system of close air support from aircraft carriers. Navy and Marine aircraft would deliver their bullets and bombs upon enemy troops, about 50 to 200 yards distant, as well as vehicles, supply dumps, bridges, and railroads.⁶³

Naval and air support was an important factor in holding the Pusan Perimeter. During August, FEAF airmen flew 7,397 sorties, pinning down enemy troops and preventing them from massing their strength for “a decisive attack.”⁶⁴ Similarly, naval forces were busy on both sides of the peninsula. While patrol planes covered the maritime flanks, gunnery units escorted shipping, bombarded enemy positions, and gave fire support to ROK troops trying to hold the east coast road.⁶⁵ “Without the Navy,” said Admiral Joy, “the Pusan Perimeter could never have been held.” He cited the Navy’s role of carrying troops and supplies to Korea, its support of the Eighth Army in bombardment and close air support missions, and the timely landing of the 1st Cavalry Division at Pohang.⁶⁶

By the end of August, Walker’s troops had plugged holes, counterattacked, and established a firm hold throughout the line. To Collins, Walker did a “masterly job,” and Sebald called him “a thoroughly professional field commander.”⁶⁷ “That he held on at all,” said Ridgway, “was a measure of his own dogged tenacity and of the fierce bravery of his troops.”⁶⁸

But Truman viewed the bombing and mining of Red China by Chiang’s air force as too dangerous. Apparently, Truman was concerned that the Red Chinese might view as a prelude to an American-sponsored invasion.⁷⁰ In a compromise move, he agreed to give Chiang military aid, to send a fact finding mission to Formosa and to allow Chiang’s air force to fly reconnaissance missions over Red China.

In a cable to the Joint Chiefs on July 30, MacArthur informed them of his intention to visit Formosa on the following day to assess Chiang’s military capabilities. They replied that he should “feel free to go,” but they would rather he send a senior adviser instead. Puzzled by their contradictory reply, MacArthur countered that he needed to obtain “a clear picture,” and would proceed as planned.⁷¹ According to Margaret Truman, her father learned of MacArthur’s intention to visit Formosa from reading the newspapers and considered it an “unauthorized trip.”⁷² It was, said Ambassador Sebald, “on the basis of only a very general suggestion from Washington.”⁷³ As Far East commander, said Willoughby, “MacArthur had every right to visit Formosa to obtain firsthand military information.”⁷⁴

During the flight to Formosa, MacArthur informed Washington that he intended to transfer three squadrons of F80 fighters to Chiang. Although he was unclear when the transfer would take place, the American Embassy in Formosa conveyed the impression to Washington that it would occur in a few days. This move, however, would have violated Washington’s policy of not using American forces, other than the Seventh Fleet, for the defense of Formosa. Acheson “went through the ceiling.” He directed the Joint Chiefs to cable MacArthur that such a move had “strong political implications” and that he should not undertake it without Washington’s authorization.⁷⁵ MacArthur replied that he had no intention of moving the aircraft to Formosa “except in case of attack.”⁷⁶

When MacArthur arrived in Taipei on July 31, Chiang greeted him at the airport as a visiting head of state. Although the two men had never met, they admired one another. Chiang referred to MacArthur as his “old comrade in arms,” and MacArthur praised Chiang’s “indomitable determination to resist Communist domination.”⁷⁷

During the two-day visit, MacArthur and Chiang held two military briefings. While keeping the discussion mainly on military matters, MacArthur remained sensitive to diplomatic niceties. He thanked Chiang for offering troops to Korea but explained that such action at this time would jeopardize the defense of Formosa. He also apologized for the State Department’s failure to establish a relationship based upon “confidence and cordiality,” and he promised to prod Washington into sending Chiang’s army needed military equipment.⁷⁸

Afterward, MacArthur and Chiang held separate press conferences. In Tokyo, MacArthur announced that he had arranged for effective military coordination between American and Nationalist forces to counter any attack against Formosa, and in Taipei, Chiang said that “the foundation for Sino-American military cooperation has been laid for the final victory in our struggle against Communism.”⁷⁹ Washington feared the political implications of these statements. They gave the impression that the United States might arm Chiang for “a return to the mainland.”⁸⁰

MacArthur’s visit generated some furor. To Chinese Communists, it was evidence of American aggression, “which was part of the overall U.S. imperialist plot to surround and strangle the new China.”⁸¹ The British wondered if MacArthur’s visit meant a reversal of American policy to neutralize Formosa and to confine the fight to Korea. Calling it “needless provocation” toward Red China, London’s press said that the United States should not reject the West’s “well-thought-out Asian policy” for the sake of “keeping a paltry island in the discredited hands of General Chiang.”⁸² In contrast, America’s Korean action, added British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, “was in accordance with the Security Council Resolution” and “not concerned with Formosa.”⁸³

Expressing “astonishment” over the uproar, MacArthur aid that his visit to Formosa was merely to assess the military situation, and that it had been “maliciously misrepresented” to the public “by those who invariably in the past have propagandized a policy of defeatism and appeasement in the Pacific.”⁸⁴ But to the London Times, “On fundamental issues, MacArthur was not receptive to views which differed from his own.”⁸⁵

On August 4, Truman let MacArthur know who was in charge. He directed Secretary of Defense Johnson to send MacArthur a message reminding him that American policy in respect to the neutralization of Formosa remained in effect, and that only the President had the authority to authorize military action against the mainland.⁸⁶ Surprised by Johnson’s message, MacArthur quickly replied that he fully understood Washington’s policy on Formosa, and that Truman should have “no anxiety” that he would “in any way” exceed his authority as theater commander.⁸⁷ Shortly thereafter, Truman informed the press that MacArthur was doing a good job, and they were in perfect agreement and working well together.⁸⁸

On August 6, Truman sent Ambassador-at-Large Averell Harriman, accompanied by Generals Ridgway; Lauris Norstad, deputy chief of the Air Force; and Frank E. Lowe, special liaison to the president, to Tokyo for a two-day conference. Truman trusted Harriman. “He’d do what you asked him to do,” said Truman later, “and you could depend on him to tell you the complete truth about what had happened.”⁸⁹ Truman told Harriman to fully review Washington’s policy on Formosa with MacArthur and to leave Chiang alone. “I do not want to have him get me into a war with mainland China,” aid Truman.⁹⁰

When Harriman’s party arrived at Haneda Airport in Tokyo on August 6, MacArthur, who usually did not meet visiting dignitaries at the airport, was waiting for them on the ramp. Considering Harriman a friend “of long standing,” MacArthur had known him since the early 1920s. At that time, MacArthur was the superintendent of West Point, and the military academy bought its milk from Harriman’s nearby dairy farm. Harriman was one of the few people who addressed MacArthur as “Doug.”⁹¹

During the two-day conference, MacArthur admitted his differences with Truman on Formosa, equating neutralization with appeasement. If the Chinese Communists were “so foolish as to launch an assault on Formosa,” he said that he would deliver them “a crushing defeat,” and that he got down on his knees every night praying “that he will.”⁹² But MacArthur assured Harriman that he would “obey Truman’s orders.”⁹³ Impressed by this statement, Ridgway called MacArthur “a soldier ready to implement whatever decisions his superiors communicated to him.”⁹⁴ According to Harriman, however, MacArthur’s general attitude gave him the impression that “he was not fully a person to trust.”⁹⁵

MacArthur, in fact, resented Harriman’s visit, considering it an attempt to pressure him unduly into accepting Truman’s Formosa policy. “The interview was “distasteful to me,” said MacArthur, ”and Harriman probably recognized “my distrust.”⁹⁶ The visit also left MacArthur with a feeling of “concern and uneasiness” that Washington had no “fixed and comprehensive” Far Eastern policy.⁹⁷

Just before the conference ended, MacArthur gave a two-and-a-half-hour briefing on his Inchon plan. Referring to it as the anvil and hammer, he explained that it called for an amphibious landing of the X Corps at Inchon, then a prompt seizure of Seoul to cut the enemy’s line advance toward the south while the Eighth Army moved north to forge the pincers.⁹⁸ But whether his presentation, which Ridgway called “brilliant,” won over the participants was unclear.⁹⁹

Back in Washington on August 9, Harriman informed Truman that MacArthur had not overstepped military boundaries during his visit to Formosa. Still, “for reasons which are difficult to explain,” said Harriman, “I did not feel that we came to a full agreement on the way we believed things should be handled on Formosa.”¹⁰⁰ Despite Harriman’s doubts, Truman told reporters the next day that “MacArthur and I are in perfect agreement” and “I am satisfied with what he is doing.”¹⁰¹

On August 17, Clyde A. Lewis, commander of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), wrote MacArthur a letter asking him to send a message that he could read at the annual National VFW Encampment held in Chicago on August 28. Since MacArthur had sent messages to numerous other groups in the past, he regarded Lewis’s request as “a matter of routine.”¹⁰² In MacArthur’s message, sent to Lewis three days later, he called Formosa an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” and considered it crucial to America’s Far Eastern defense perimeter. He advocated using Formosa as an American base in future operations against the Asiatic mainland, and rejected the argument “by those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific that if we defend Formosa, we alienate continental Asia.”¹⁰³

As a courtesy to journalists, MacArthur’s public relations office in Tokyo sent copies of his message to the press three days before the VFW Encampment. The State Department learned of it from the Associated Press ticker report and alerted the White House. Upon reading it, Truman broke into a “cold fury,” for it contradicted MacArthur’s pledge to Harriman to support the administration’s Formosa policy, as well as Washington’s attempts to assure U.N. allies that it had no designs, as the Soviets charged, to occupy Formosa and promote Chiang’s invasion of the mainland.¹⁰⁴

In his memoirs, Truman wrote that he gave “serious thought” to restricting MacArthur to Japan and placing Bradley in charge of Korea and Formosa.¹⁰⁵ But at a time when an increased possibility of losing the peninsula still existed, MacArthur’s relief might have weakened the Eighth Army’s already diminished muscle, and generated more political support for MacArthur and against Truman on the Formosa issue.

On the morning of August 26, Truman assembled with Acheson, Johnson, Harriman, Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder, and the Joint chiefs. Dispensing with the usual greetings, Truman, his lips “white and compressed,” read MacArthur’s message to Lewis. Turning to Johnson, Truman said, “I want that damn thing withdrawn immediately, and you tell MacArthur that’s a direct order from me and make sure he understands it.”¹⁰⁶

Johnson, an admirer of MacArthur, would not carry out Truman’s orders. Shortly thereafter, Acheson received a telephone call from Stephen Early, Johnson’s deputy assistant, who raised the question of MacArthur’s right to free speech. Acheson abruptly ended the conversation and called Harriman, who informed Truman of Johnson’s intransigence. ¹⁰⁷ Truman again ordered Johnson to send his message. Johnson did so, but by this time the news media had already published MacArthur’s VFW message.

MacArthur said later that his VFW message fully supported Truman’s position on Formosa and that he considered the reprimand part of a conspiracy against him. He wondered “how this person or persons could have so easily deceived the President” to construe his VFW message “to mean the opposite of what it had said.”¹⁰⁸ According to Courtney Whitney, MacArthur’s message may have run afoul “of plans being hatched in the State Department to succumb to British pressure and desert the Nationalist government on Formosa.” If that was true, added Whitney, “we shall no doubt never know,” because the participants would no admit it.¹⁰⁹

On September 2, Truman ordered Johnson to resign as secretary of defense, a post he had held for eighteen months. Truman had appointed him to the position after James V. Forrestal suffered a nervous breakdown in 1949. At first, Johnson seemed like a good appointment, said Truman, until he caught “Potomac Fever” and began to exhibit presidential ambitious.¹¹⁰ According to Harriman, Johnson was “secretly conniving with and encouraging” Truman’s congressional enemies.¹¹¹ The VFW episode, said Margaret Truman, was “close to the last straw in my father’s efforts to be patient with Louis Johnson.”¹¹²

Truman decided to replace Johnson with sixty-nine-year-old General George C. Marshall, who was living in retirement at Leesburg, Virginia. To Truman, Marshall, army chief of staff in World War II, was a genuine military hero. He was “the greatest of them all,” said Truman, “because nobody else had to handle so many men and so much equipment and nobody ever solved such vast problems of strategy.”¹¹³

In 1946, Truman had ordered Marshall to head a special mission to China to mediate the civil war between Chiang’s Nationalists and Mao’s Communists. When Marshall recommended that both sides form a coalition government, the China Lobby charged him with being “soft on Communism.” Despite the opposition, Truman appointed Marshall as secretary of state in 1947; he held the post until a kidney operation forced him to retire in 1949. Truman’s appointment of Marshall as secretary of defense was opposed by the China Lobby. Although the name calling was “brutal,” Congress confirmed him, and he became secretary of defense on September 21.¹¹⁴

The Seoul-Taejon Axis

Collins and Vandenberg’s Far Eastern Visit

Walker’s Perimeter Defense

Differences Over Formosa

MacArthur’s VFW Message