Truman, MacArthur and the Korean War

The Navy and Marine officers who had helped draft the Inchon plan had serious reservations about it. Although agreeing on an amphibious assault behind enemy lines, they considered the Inchon site too dangerous for it. Situated on the estuary of the Yom-ha River, Inchon possessed a protected, ice-free port with a tidal basin. With a range of thirty-three feet, its tides were among the greatest in the world and the worst in the Orient.² Because of the ebb and flow of the tides, the landing force would have only a certain amount of time to do its job. When the tide went out, all boats in the harbor would get stuck in the mudflats, becoming easy artillery targets.

Inchon presented other problems too. Narrow and twisting, Flying Fish Channel, the main channel, was extremely dangerous. While passing through it, the invasion fleet could not use navigation lights and faced the prospect of enemy gunfire and mines. Once through the channel, the fleet would free the islands of Wolmi-do and its satellite Sowolmi-do, both undoubtedly fortified. Before assaulting the city, X Corps would have to secure them, and in the process, it might eliminate the element of surprise so essential for success.³ Moreover, fronting Inchon’s harbor were seawalls ranging from twelve to fourteen feet high, which the Marines would have to scale with ladders. In addition, this area was in the heart of a large city. Thus there was excellent cover for enemy forces firing on the Marines once they came over the walls. ⁴ “We drew up a list of every conceivable and natural handicap,” said Naval Officer Arlie G. Capps, “and Inchon had ‘em all.”⁵ “At no time did I hear any Naval Officer tell MacArthur that Inchon was impossible,” said Admiral Joy, “but we were all anxious to point out the obvious dangers.”⁶

The Joint Chiefs shared the concerns of the Navy and Marine officers over the Inchon site. On August 19, they ordered Army Chief of Staff Collins, and Chief of Naval Operations Sherman to Tokyo, to obtain a more detailed briefing on the Inchon operation and to visit frontline troops to make a better estimate on the situation.

Informed that Collins and Sherman were flying to Tokyo, MacArthur was certain that their goal was to dissuade him from the Inchon plan, and he needed more time to prepare for rebuttals.⁷ When they landed on August 21, he informed them that he would confer with them on August 23. In the interim, they flew to Taegu for a briefing at Walker’s headquarters and a tour of the front.⁸

On the afternoon of August 22, General Oliver P. Smith, commander of the 1st Marine Division, landed at Tokyo’s Haneda Airfield. Admiral James H. Doyle drove him to the Mount McKinley, anchored in Tokyo harbor. Waiting for Smith on board was a Marine planning group. Its members briefed him on the Inchon plan, of which he had little knowledge until then. He learned of the September 15 invasion date, the ebb and flow of the tides, and the mudflats and seawalls. His troops would have little opportunity to consolidate their positions before nightfall, nor would they have time for training or rehearsals. What he heard “convinced him that the forthcoming assault would take a great deal of doing.”⁹

That evening, Smith reported to the Dai-Ichi Building for a conference with MacArthur. Waiting for Smith was General Almond, who at age fifty-eight had “a buoyant temperament and restless energy” that contrasted with the “reserved white haired” Marine general. MacArthur had not yet arrived. At that point, Smith, who had learned from Doyle of another possible landing site, told Almond that Pusong-Myon, about fifty miles south of Inchon and southwest of Osan, had better beach conditions than Inchon, and its location was within striking distance of the NKPA lines of communication south of Seoul.¹⁰ Rejecting it, except as a subsidiary landing in connection with Inchon, Almond said that his planning officers had studied it but it found that it lacked the necessary road networks to support heavy vehicles.¹¹

When MacArthur arrived, he saw Almond first, then summoned Smith into his office. Apparently, Almond had mentioned Smith’s reservations about the Inchon site. When he entered the office, MacArthur, leaning back in his chair and puffing reflectively on his corncob pipe, proceeded to reassure Smith. Granting that Inchon presented “difficulties and risks,” MacArthur said that the NKPA had committed most of its troops to the Pusan Perimeter, and that would leave little opposition at Inchon when the Marines came ashore to cut the enemy’s line of communications at Seoul. The war would be over in a month, said MacArthur, and “the 1st Marine Division would make September 15, 1950 a glorious date in American history.”¹²

After listening quietly, Smith “made a move as if to depart,” but MacArthur motioned him back to his chair. He then brought the conversation to a close “by standing suddenly, grasping the Marine General’s hand, and bidding him a cordial good-bye.”¹³

Late in the afternoon of August 23, the meeting to discuss the Inchon plan took place in MacArthur’s conference room in the Dai-Ichi Building. Leisurely smoking his corncob pipe, MacArthur sat at the heads of the conference table. Besides Collins and Sherman, others in attendance included Generals Almond, Stratemeyer, Dole O. Hickey, Edwin K. Wright, and Lemuel C. Shepherd; Admirals Joy, Doyle, and Arthur D. Struble; and numerous senior military, naval, and air staffers.

General Wright, MacArthur’s operations chief, opened the meeting with a brief outline of the basic plan. After seizing Inchon, he said the 1st Marine Division would swing northwest to capture Kimpo Airport, then cross the Han River to seize Seoul and the high ground north of Suwon and west of Yonganni. In brief, on the Suwon-Yonganni-Seoul line, the X Corps would form the strategic anvil, and the Eighth Army, breaking out of the Pusan Perimeter, would deliver the hammer blows, destroying the bulk of the NKPA.¹⁴

For the next hour, Admiral Doyle’s Navy and Marine planners outlined the landing operation. In a “pessimistic tone,” they discussed the dangers and difficulties. Because the tides rose and fell rapidly, they estimated that the amphibious forces would have only two hours in the morning to secure the fortified islands of Wolmi-do and Sowolmi-do, and less than three hours in the afternoon to land troops and secure a beachhead for the night. The rest of the time the assault craft would be wallowing in the mud banks, easy targets for enemy shore batteries.¹⁵ Other problems included the narrow channel, enemy mines, and high seawalls offering excellent cover to defensive forces. Also, this was typhoon season, and a typhoon could scatter the fleet at any time. Summing up, Doyle said, “The best I can say is that Inchon is not impossible.”¹⁶

Collins spoke next. At Inchon, he said, the assault waves would land in the center of a fortified city with large population centers surrounding it, so the Marines would have “little maneuver flexibility.” Moreover, even if the Marines managed to gain a foothold at Inchon, he feared that the enemy would drive them back into the sea before Walker’s Eighth Army could break out of the Pusan Perimeter. He suggested landing instead at Kunsan, 100 miles south of Inchon. The beaches were favorable for an assault there, and it was closer to the Pusan Perimeter¹⁷

With the presentations over, everybody turned to MacArthur, who remained silent, smoking his pipe. Shifting in his chair, Almond appeared uncomfortable with his boss’s silence. While someone nervously drummed his fingertips on the conference table, cigarette and pipe smoke floated to the ceiling. As the tension rose in the room, said MacArthur later, he could almost hear his father telling him that “councils of war breed timidity and defeatism.” ¹⁸ MacArthur got up and began pacing back and forth. Speaking in a low voice, which rose in intensity, he admitted the difficulties involved in the Inchon landing, but he was confident that his commanders would overcome them. Smiling at Sherman, MacArthur said that the Navy and Marines had never let him down.¹⁹ Only by capturing the Seoul-Inchon area, he said, could his forces achieve a quick and decisive victory over the enemy. This was the vital spot in the enemy’s line of communications, and included almost all of the major rail lines and highways leading from North Korea to the NKPA in South Korea.²⁰

As for the Kunsan landing proposal, he said that it would not envelop, nor serve to destroy the enemy’s supply lines or distribution center. The X Corps would merely hook up with Walker’s troops on the left, and then “hang on” in defensive action.²¹ If the X Corps encountered an impenetrable defense at Inchon, concluded MacArthur, he would immediately order a retreat, and his reputation would remain the only loss. But, he said, “Inchon will not fail, will succeed and save 100,000 lives.”²²

Despite MacArthur’s astute presentation, many of the participants remained skeptical. To Sherman and Collins, MacArthur had missed the essential point: the enemy’s strength and ability to draw his forces quickly into the Inchon area.²³ But without first consulting with their colleagues, they lacked the authority to make a decision on the Inchon plan, and MacArthur did not ask them to do so. On the morning of August 24, Admirals Sherman, Radford, Joy, and Doyle assembled with Marine Generals Shepherd and Oliver Smith in Joy’s office. They agreed that Pusong-Myon, about twenty miles south of Inchon, would be a better landing site, and selected Shepherd, as the commander of Fleet Marine Force Pacific, to make a personal plea to MacArthur for the Pusong-Myon area. That evening, Shepherd presented the Navy and Marine case to MacArthur, who assured him that the war would last only one month after the Inchon landing.²⁴

Upon returning to Washington, Collins and Sherman briefed Vandenberg and Bradley on the Inchon plan. Although in agreement that it was dangerous, they advocated only postponement, not actual termination of it, until they could be more certain that the Pusan Perimeter would hold. “A failure at Inchon,” said Bradley, “could very well so inspire the North Koreans that they would overrun the Pusan Perimeter.”²⁵ But Truman was more enthusiastic about Inchon than the Joint Chiefs were, and would not interfere with MacArthur’s schedule. “It was a daring strategic conception,” said Truman, and “I had the greatest confidence that it would succeed.”²⁶

On August 28, the Joint Chiefs sent MacArthur a message giving qualified approval for an amphibious landing at either Inchon or Kunsan, but its tone favored the latter. Also, they requested that he send them a copy of the Inchon plan. He replied that he would send it by officer-courier and that the Joint chiefs should receive it by September 11, only four days before the planned invasion, too late for them to influence the course of the operation.²⁷ Meanwhile, on August 30, MacArthur issued his U.N. Command operation order, which set in motion the actual preparation for the Inchon landing.

In early September, the news of heightened NKPA attacks along the Pusan Perimeter increased the Joint Chiefs’ anxieties about the “disastrous consequences” if the Inchon landing failed to produce a quick victory. On September 7, they relayed their concerns in a message to MacArthur on the dire results of failure.²⁸ Since his troops were in the final stages of embarkation, he replied that the Pusan Perimeter would hold and that the enveloping movement did not depend upon the immediate joining of the X Corps with the Eighth Army. Without exception, he added, his commanders were confident of the mission’s success.²⁹

On September 8, although still lacking a copy of MacArthur’s Inchon plan, the Joint Chiefs formally approved it. The Joint Chiefs, said Bradley, did not have enough facts “on which to base a disapproval,” and “it was really too late in the game.”³⁰ In a cable to MacArthur, they said, “We approve your plan, and the President has been so informed.”³¹ MacArthur interpreted it to mean that Truman had threatened “to interfere and overrule” his military advisers.³² Yet, as stated earlier, Truman was “enthusiastic” about Inchon. Collins said, “I have no recollection of Truman’s ever expressing any doubt about the success of Inchon or his seeking to override any action or decision of the Joint Chiefs in regard to it.”³³

Instead of appointing Almond to the position, MacArthur might have been better off with General Shepherd, who had contributed the material for making the operation possible and had acquired experience in amphibious warfare in World War II. Recognizing his expertise, MacArthur requested that Shepherd accompany him on the operation as his amphibious adviser.

Admiral Struble would command the 260-vessel invasion fleet, named Joint Task Force 7, which included transports, minesweepers, and cargo craft. Unlike most military men, who had expressed doubts about Inchon, he was enthusiastic over it. “It was the prize gem,” he said, and “I was convinced we could take it.”³⁵

Admirals Struble and Doyle and Marine General Oliver Smith would draft the detailed invasion plans. All three men had had extensive experience in World War II. Struble had been involved in twenty-two amphibious operations, working closely with MacArthur in the South Pacific campaign. Doyle’s experience included Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and the Solomon Islands campaign. Smith, considered one of the Marines’ top amphibious experts, had commanded a regiment at Cape Gloucester and participated in the Pelelieu and Okinawa operations.³⁶

On September 5, Admirals Struble and Joy asked Almond to restore the 5th Marines to the 1st Marine Division. Unless the Marine brigade was made available, said Joy, “Inchon would be impossible.”³⁷ Almond was sympathetic, but the issue came down to the need for an Eighth Army reserve unit. Struble suggested that Almond move a regiment of the 7th Infantry Division to Pusan to serve as a reserve unit. Almond agreed, and that evening the Marine brigade left the front lines and marched to Pusan. On September 11, they joined Joint Task Force 7.³⁸

By September 15, totaling 69,450 ground troops, X Corps would include the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division, as well as such major units as the 93rd and 96th Field Artillery battalions, the 73rd Tank Battalion, the 56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion, and the 2nd Engineer Battalion, and the 2nd Engineer Combat Group. In reserve were the 3rd Infantry Division and the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (RCT). But the 3rd Infantry Division would not sail for the Far East in time to take part in the Inchon-Seoul operation, and the 187th Airborne RCT, assigned to protect the left flank of the 1st Marine Division, was not due to land at Inchon until September 23.³⁹

Throughout the operation, cruisers, destroyers, and carrier planes would provide naval and air bombardment. At the request of Struble, Joint Task Force 7 would remain self-sufficient: no FEAF aircraft would operate in the area until D minus 3.⁴⁰ The Far East Command, moreover, did not consider North Korean air and naval elements a threat to the Inchon landing. On August 28, it estimated about nineteen obsolescent Soviet-manufactured aircraft were available to the North Korean Air Force.⁴¹ By this time, the U.S. Navy had bottled-up the five divisions of small patrol-type vessels of the North Korean Navy at Chinnampo, on the west coast, and at Wonsan, on the east coast.

After preliminary air and naval bombardments, the basic Inchon plan called for Murry’s 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, to assault Wolmi-do and its satellite Sowolmi-do. In the afternoon, after another bombardment of Inchon’s beaches, the 5th Marines’ remaining two battalions would land at Red Beach, a stretch of seawall in the heart of the city, and from Wolmi-do, the 3rd battalion would link up with them. Similarly, Puller’s 1st Marines would land at Blue Beach, a suburban industrial area, three miles to the southeast, and cut the highway to Seoul in the rear. Finally, after securing the city of Inchon, the two regiments would expand their holdings to include Kimpo Airfield and the banks of the Han River.⁴²

On August 28, X Corps’s G-2 intelligence section estimated enemy strength at 5,000 troops in Seoul, 1,000 in the city of Inchon, 500 at Kimpo Airfield, and between 1,800 and 2,500 at the landing area. According to G-2, the bulk of NKPA troops were in the Pusan Perimeter’s combat zone. Scattered throughout Korea were small rear-area garrisons, communications units, and newly trained groups, thus diminishing this enemy’s ability to quickly reinforce the Inchon-Seoul area.⁴³

Throughout August and September, FEAF photographic reconnaissance units flew RF-80 jets over the Inchon-Seoul area. They provided some of the basic information that the Navy needed to better orient its landing crews, but it needed someone on the ground to provide more detailed data.

On September 1, a South Korean patrol vessel landed a naval officer, Eugene F. Clark, two interpreters, a radio, and small arms on the island of Yonghung-do, fifteen miles below Inchon. He sent the natives on several trips to Inchon to measure water depths, check on mudflats, and observe enemy strength and fortifications. He then transmitted their reports by radio to friendly vessels in the area.⁴⁴

Once Clark’s mission was done, he refused all offers to evacuate him. Instead, he restored the usefulness of the lighthouse on Palmi Island, an important entrance beacon for Inchon by way of Flying Fish channel, which the enemy had put out of commission, and it served him as a refuge after NKPA forces had discovered his presence on Yonghung-do. At midnight, September 14, he turned on the lighthouse beacon to help guide the amphibious vessels of Joint Task Force 7 through the most dangerous points of Flying Fish Channel.⁴⁵ Meanwhile, in Japan, during the final preparation and loading for the Inchon operation, Typhoon Jane, with winds up to 110 miles per hour, hit Kobe. For thirty-six hours, forty-foot-high waves crashed against the waterfront; breakers rolled two feet high across the piers where loose cargo lay; and seven American ships and a 200-ton crane broke loose from their moorings. ⁴⁶ Although the damage to ships and dock facilities was extensive, it was not enough to delay the operation.

On September 12, Generals MacArthur, Almond, Edwin Wright, Whitney, Shepherd, and Alonzo P. Fox flew from Tokyo to Itazuke Airfield and then went by car to Sasebo Harbor, where they boarded the flagship Mount McKinley to depart for the invasion area. But as it steamed out of the harbor, part of the Typhoon Jane hit it with a “sickening combination of pitch and roll,” continuing to buffet the ship throughout the night. As the seas smoothed the next day, MacArthur walked to the bow. “Listening to the rush of the sea,” he said later, “I alone was responsible for tomorrow, and if I failed, the dreadful results would rest on judgement day against my soul.”⁴⁷

In case the NKPA might prepare for an amphibious landing, Joint Task Force 7 tried to divert its attention away from Inchon. Naval vessels shelled areas on the east coast, including the rail center and port of Samchok, and a small force made a feint at Kunsan on the west coast, 100 air miles south of Inchon. But whether these diversions contributed to surprise at Inchon was unclear. In fact, on September 13, a intercepted NKPA radio message warned Pyongyang that U.N. vessels were heading toward Inchon.⁵⁰ By then, however, there was not enough time for the NKPA either to strengthen Inchon’s defensive positions or to mine its harbor.

In the early morning hours of September 15, a column of nineteen ships snaked through Flying Fish’s treacherous passage. Coasting in on the flooding tide navigators used radarscopes to navigate. About midway up the channel, they found welcome relief when Clark’s glimmering beacon on Palmi Island guided them past one of the channel’s most dangerous spots.⁵¹

As the column of ships eased into Inchon’s harbor, Wolmi-do, translated as Moon Tip Island, came into sight. Wolmi-do is a circular, rocky hill about 1,000 yards across and rising 335 feet above the water. From the northern corner, a 900-yard causeway led northeast to the Inchon shore, and from the western shore, another of roughly equal length ran south to the islet of Sowolmi-do.

Struble’s ships went to their assigned battle stations. Already, for five days, Marine air elements had dropped napalm on Wolmi-do, burning off its underbrush to reveal cave openings and gun positions. Now, in the predawn haze, naval cruisers, using six and eight-inch guns, began bombarding Inchon while the destroyers’ five-inch guns hammered Wolmi-do. At the same time, Marine planes smothered the island with tons of rockets and bombs until it was “a blasted piece of real estate.”⁵²

On the morning of September 15, Robert D. Traplett’s 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, landed at Wolmi-do. As they pushed inland, Marine planes sprayed their routes of advance with machine-gun bullets.⁵³ But resistance was light. Barely a half-hour after landing, a group of Marines, led by Sergeant Alvin E. Smith, raised the American flag on the island’s high ground, named Radio Hill, and another force crossed the island, sealing off the causeway leading to Inchon.⁵⁴

When MacArthur, who was watching the action through binoculars, saw the Marines raise the American flag over Radio Hill, he smiled, turning to his aides. “That’s it,” he said. He then penned a message to Admiral Struble: “The Navy and the Marines have never shone more brightly than this morning.”⁵⁵

Meanwhile, as the main battalion force was consolidating Wolmi-do, Traplett sent a squad of Marines and three tanks over the causeway to Sowolmi-do, where they quickly defeated a small enemy force holding a lighthouse station.⁵⁶ By noon, the Marines had secured both islands. They had killed 108 North Koreans, captured 136, and sealed another 100 in their caves. Marine casualties included seventeen wounded and none dead.⁵⁷ As the receding tide drove the amphibious task force back up the channel to the sea, the Marines watched, fully aware that they were on their own until the rising afternoon tide.⁵⁸

In the afternoon, after a “tremendously powerful” naval bombardment of the landing areas, the first of three waves of Murry’s 5th Marines hit Red Beach, for a thrust directly into the city of Inchon. Using scaling ladders, they climbed over the seawalls or went ashore through holes in the walls made by the bombardment. Just beyond, they encountered enemy troops in trenches and bunkers, rooting them out in less than an hour. By midnight, the Marines had taken Cemetery and Observatory hills, both commanding Red Beach, the site of their logistical buildup.⁵⁹

Meanwhile, Puller’s 1st Marines began landing at Blue Beach. They, too, had to climb high seawalls to move forward but the principal obstacle was “the blackness of the night,” which bred some confusion and disorder. By the morning of September 16, they had taken the high ground north of Blue Beach, commanded the main road to Seoul, and established contact with the 5th Marines, forming a solid line around Inchon to block enemy escape from the city.⁶⁰ In total, the invasion had cost the U.S. forces 174 casualties, including twenty-one dead, and one missing.⁶¹

While ROK Marine attachments mopped up bypassed centers of resistance in Inchon, the 1st and 5th Marines linked up along the Inchon-Seoul highway. While the 5th Marines moved along the northern side of the road and then veered west, toward Ascom City and Kimpo Airfield, the 1st Marines, south of the highway, moved toward Yongdong, an industrial suburb on the west bank of the Han River, directly across from downtown Seoul.⁶²

Although Almond had pressed Smith to take Seoul by September 26, the three-month anniversary of its seizure by the NKPA, Smith refused to hurry his Marines. They found that enemy resistance was increasing as they got closer to Seoul. By this time, Pyongyang had reacted to the surprise attack by quickly redeploying experienced NKPA troops to reinforce Seoul.⁶³

Before dawn on September 17, a few miles east of Ascom City, an advance platoon of 5th Marines encountered six T-34 tanks and about 200 enemy troops. In the dim morning light, they did not see the Marines. Quickly taking up defensive positions on both sides of the highway, the Marines let the head of the enemy column through before opening up with machine guns, rifles, bazookas, and recoilless rifles. Within five minutes they had destroyed all six tanks and killed most of the 200 enemy soldiers.⁶⁴

Shortly after the Marine ambush, a column of jeeps came slowly around the bend from the rear. In the lead jeep, MacArthur, who had come ashore that morning to inspect the battlefield, stopped to survey the carnage. Accompanying him were numerous high-ranking officers, newspaper correspondents, and photographers. As grimy Marines “gazed in wonder,” he viewed the still warm corpses beside the road and the burning heaps of T-34 tanks. General Smith, scanning the battlefield with apprehension, hoped that some hidden enemy soldier would not choose that moment to launch a mortar round at the distinguished visitor.⁶⁵

Not long after MacArthur’s procession moved back, the Marines, hearing “a suspicious noise,” flushed out seven armed NKPA soldiers from a culvert near where MacArthur’s driver had parked his jeep. They quickly surrendered, and were the only survivors of the enemy column.⁶⁶

That same day, the 5th Marines seized the southern part of Kimpo Airfield, sixteen miles northeast of Inchon. Throughout the night, the enemy initiated several company-size counterattacks, but the Marines repulsed them and secured the entire airfield by September 18. At the same time, Marine units advanced to the Han River beyond the airfield, and later in the day, elements of Marine Air Group 33 flew in from Japan.⁶⁷

On September 18, the 7th Infantry Division, with more than 8,000 Koreans attached to it, landed at Inchon and immediately moved south toward Suwon to block any NKPA troops moving up from the Naktong front. Three days later, Litzenberg’s orphan 7th Marine regiment arrived in Inchon. Now all the parts of the 1st Marine Division were in place. At Yongdong, separated from Seoul by two miles of sand and water, on the low ground at the confluence of the Kalchon and Han rivers, the NKPA decided to make its first real stand against the Marine advance. Assigning an entire regiment as a defense force, the NKPA commanders told their troops that if Yongdong was lost , “Seoul will fall.”⁶⁸

On September 20, as Marine air attacks set Yongdong on fire, the 1st Marines began advancing into it, and supporting arms on both sides exchanged heavy blows. While enemy mortars, tanks, and field pieces shot hundreds of rounds from positions in the city’s center and eastern outskirts, Marine planes and howitzers smothered NKPA concentrations and emplacements with thousands of bombs of all types.⁶⁹ Throughout the day and night of September 21, Marine attacks and NKPA counterattacks went back and forth. By the morning of September 22, the enemy’s will to continue broke, and its troops abandoned the city, falling back north of the Han.

As the 5th Marines advanced into Seoul from the northwest, only 5,000 yards from the Government Palace, the 1st Marines, from the southeast, crossed the Han River on September 24 and advanced directly into the city’s main business district. At the same time, the 7th Infantry Division’s 32nd Regiment and the ROK 17th Regiment attacked Seoul from the south, and the 7th Marines entered it from the north.⁷¹

But before the encirclement was complete, NKPA commanders had withdrawn most of their troops from the city, leaving behind small detachments. These detachments fortified themselves behind rice and earth barricades, eight feet high and five feet thick, stretching the whole width of the street. Behind them, troops manned antitank and machineguns and others hid in nearby buildings to fire from rooftops, window, and doors.

Sometimes referred to as the “Battle of the Barricades,” the fight for Seoul began on the morning of September 26. Leading the attack, the 1st Marines quickly developed a method of destroying the barricades. First, they called in Marine and Navy planes to rocket and strafe them. Next, the Marines used mortar and artillery fire to keep the enemy pinned down while engineers exploded antitank mines. Then medium tanks and M26 Pershings smashed the barricades, destroying enemy antitank and machine guns. Finally, with tank protection, the infantry followed breaching the remaining barricades and rooting out the snipers “Progress was agonizingly slow,” said Puller.⁷² Late in the afternoon of September 27, the 5th Marines raised the American flag on the Government Palace, the Korean capitol, and by evening of the next day, except for scattered snipers, the last pockets of enemy resistance had collapsed. Marine detachments had taken the hills dominating the road leading north to Uijongbu and secured Suwon Airfield south of Seoul.⁷³

During the period of September 15 to 28, casualties were high on all sides. X Corps suffered 3,500 casualties, and of these, 2,400 were from the 1st Maine Division. Casualties among NKPA troops numbered 14,000, and X Corps took 7,000 prisoners. The number of casualties among the 1.1 million civilians in Seoul was unclear, but it probably exceeded military casualties.⁷⁴

MacArthur landed at Kimpo Airfield on September 29. The formal ceremony to restore Rhee’s government, took place in Seoul’s National Assembly Hall. With the enemy only ten miles away, Marines from Puller’s 1st Marines surrounded the seated audience. Peering down the long corridors with binoculars, they kept close watch in all directions. Drifting smoke and ashes, and falling glass and rifle shots “punctuated the talks.”⁷⁵

Flanked by American and ROK flags, MacArthur, in a moving five-minute address, restored Rhee to the seat of Government. “How can I find words to describe my feelings and the feelings of all loyal Koreans?” said Rhee, clasping MacArthur’s hands. “Our prayers have been answered.”⁷⁶

Blaming equipment shortages for the delay, Walker informed MacArthur’s headquarters that Almond had favored the X Corps over the Eighth Army. “We have been bastard children lately,” said Walker, “and as far as our engineering equipment is concerned, we are in pretty bad shape.”⁷⁷ Apparently not fully convinced by Walker’s complaint, MacArthur recalled an earlier warning by Eighth Army officers that its undertrained troops could not fight their way north, regardless of the success of the Inchon landing.⁷⁸ On September 16, Walker had counted on increased airpower to aid the Eighth Army’s attempts to break out of the perimeter, but bad weather prevented it. Finally, on September 18, cloud cover lifted and 42 B-29s carpet bombed enemy positions. The Fifth Air Force flew 286 close-support sorties that day and 361 on the following day. On the afternoon of September 19, the 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry divisions attacked across the perimeter and NKPA troops, becoming “bewildered and confused by the combined air attacks and ground advances,” began “milling around in the open,” falling prey to artillery, F-80 jet fighters, and B-26 light bombers.⁷⁹

The next day, September 20, Walker’s tank columns broke through the enemy defenses. By this time, NKPA troops had learned of the successful Inchon landing and had begun to feel its effects on their supply and communication networks. Soon they were in full retreat; whole divisions disintegrated; and their troops spread over the South Korean countryside in disorganized units, unable to travel or communicate with impunity. Some surrendered; a few organized into guerrilla bands; and others fled back across the 38th parallel.⁸⁰

The war soon came to a climax. On September 26, a “fast-rolling” battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division linked up with elements of the 7th Infantry Division at Osan. Four days later, MacArthur ordered FEAF to cease all air attacks, and with the capture of Uijongbu on October 3 by the 7th Marines, the war in South Korea was over.⁸¹

Military historians have described MacArthur’s Inchon campaign with words such as “fortunately,” “phenomenal,” “in spite of,” “unorthodox,” and “improvised.”⁸² For all practical purposes, said Roy Appleman, the NKPA “had been destroyed,” and “that was the real measure of the success of the Inchon landing.”⁸³ According to Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, “History records no more striking example of the effectiveness of an amphibious operation.”⁸⁴ Lynn Montross said that the “perfect teamwork” between the Navy and Marines made the Inchon landing successful.⁸⁵ But to Robert F. Futrell, General Stratemeyer’s FEAF, along with Navy and Marine fighters, provided the necessary component for Inchon’s overall success.⁸⁶ The Inchon landing, however, encountered substantial enemy resistance. If North Korea had introduced submarine, naval, and air opposition, heavily mined the harbor, or provided substantial troop reinforcements, the final result would have been more “difficult and costly.”⁸⁷

In Tokyo, MacArthur received congratulatory messages from Washington and London. Truman praised the Inchon operation as a “brilliant maneuver,” the Joint Chiefs referred to it as “magnificently planned, timed and executed,” and Britain’s top generals said it was “amongst the finest strategic achievements in military history.”⁸⁸ But Inchon had a downside. During the September 29 ceremony that restored Rhee’s government, MacArthur’s use of the American flag generated criticism from State and Defense departments that it gave the impression that the war was an American rather than a U.N. operation.⁸⁹ To Collins, however, the most important result was that the Joint Chiefs “hesitated thereafter” to question MacArthur’s decisions, and Ridgway said that Washington developed an almost superstitious regard for MacArthur’s “infallibility.”⁹⁰

The Chinese Communist and Soviet reactions to MacArthur’s successful Inchon operation and the resulting defeat of the NKPA in South Korea were unclear. However, a rapid shift in the strategic balance of the war had taken place, and if the U.N. forces attempted to reunify Korea under Rhee’s anticommunist government, the Communist Chinese would consider it a threat to their Northeastern Region, with its coal, steel, and waterpower.⁹¹ Similarly, in Northeast Asia, a reunified anticommunist Korea would shift the balance of power from the Soviet Union to the United States. But to save Kim II Sung’s regime, Stalin was not willing to bring on a direct military confrontation with the United States.⁹²

Operation Chromite

Assault in Readiness

Inchon

Fight for Seoul

Rollback

Analysis