Truman, MacArthur and the Korean War

Since the enemy had placed its main forces above Seoul, Ridgway concentrated the bulk of his Eighth Army troops in the relatively flat central and western sectors. Under General Frank W. Milburn, I Corps held the Imjin River line with the 25th Infantry Division, the ROK 1st Division, the Turkish brigade, and the British 29th Brigade. General John B. Coulter’s IX Corps held the central sector with the 1st Cavalry Division, the 24th Infantry Division, the ROK 6th Division, the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade, and the recently arrived Greek and Philippine battalions.

In the eastern mountains, where Ridgway did not expect heavy attacks, he assigned the ROK II Corps and the newly committed, inexperienced ROK III Corps, which he soon reinforced with the ROK I Corps and the crack Capital Division. Meanwhile, he had the X Corps, in the process of reorganizing in Pusan, held in reserve.²

At daybreak on January 1, after a night of mortar and artillery bombardment, the Chinese Communists mounted their third-phase offensive. They directed their major effort against the U.S. I and IX corps, advancing steadily toward Seoul in the west and the rail and road center of Winju in the central sector.

The enemy’s strength was beyond the Eighth Army’s ability to withstand. As the Chinese Communists gained momentum, Ridgway ordered his forces to withdraw, hoping to delay the capture of Seoul. But the Chinese pressed forward much faster than during the November attack along the Chongchon River.³ Consequently, Ridgway ordered another withdrawal south to a line near the 37th parallel, which ran from Pyongtaek on the Seoul-Taejon highway east through Ansong, northeast to Winju, and on to the east coast town of Samchok.

But in contrast to November, the Eighth Army’s movement to the new line, beginning on January 3, was “no pell-mell race to the rear.” Ridgway directed his commanders to withdraw in a manner consistent with the Eighth Army’s mission: to achieve maximum punishment and maximum delay, and to maintain its units intact.⁴ He added that they were to remove the sick, wounded, and dead; leave no usable equipment behind nor abandon any units that were cut off; and “exercise ruthless control of any slight break which may undermine morale.”⁵

Ridgway’s strategy counted on the fact that the Chinese Communists’ logistical capabilities did not match their tactical abilities. He would use their distinctive combat pattern–initial charge, limited pursuit, followed by a lull during which they brought up men and supplies for a renewed attack–against them. Since they lacked motorized transport, relying on pack horses, ox carts, and human backs to bring up supplies, he would withdraw the Eighth Army to successive lines, forcing enemy troops to outrun their supply lines which would stall their advance. At this point, his troops would attack, inflict “maximum damage,” and then withdraw to yet another defensive line. By repeating this process, Ridgway hoped that the enemy would eventually exhaust himself.⁶

Air support played an important role in Ridgway’s strategy. The Fifth Air Force hurled its full strength against the CCF troops marching south toward Seoul along the highways from Kaesong and Yonchon. Its airmen estimated that air strikes had killed nearly 8,000 enemy soldiers, and had destroyed or damaged some 6,400 enemy-occupied buildings.⁷

By mid-January, the CCF offensive had lost its punch, and its commanders ordered their troops to withdraw to strong defensive positions close to the 38th parallel. But although air strikes and ground counterattacks had badly hurt them, they halted their offensive, as Ridgway had predicted, because of overstretched supply lines.⁸ In the face of a pursuing enemy, said Ridgway, his troops had fulfilled their mission by “achieving maximum delay and inflicting heavy casualties.”⁹ Similarly, MacArthur told reporters: “there has been a lot of loose talk about the Chinese driving us into the sea.”¹⁰

But whether Ridgway’s troops could hold up under yet another massive enemy attack worried Washington. To reporters, Truman said that the United States was not “formally at war,” nor did he anticipate asking the United Nations for “permission to bomb China.” As for the prospects of a wider war in the immediate future, he said only that he hoped not, since “that has been my fight for five years.”¹¹

MacArthur considered the January 12 Study a vindication of his desire to carry the war to Red China. The views of the Joint Chiefs and himself, said MacArthur later, “were practically identical,” and they were “unquestionably the result largely of the conferences which were going on constantly between my headquarters and Washington.”¹³

According to Whitney, MacArthur “was gratified” to learn that the Joint Chiefs had finally overcome their illusion that taking the war to Red China would “precipitate a global war.”¹⁴ And to James F. Schnabel, there was much justification for MacArthur’s contention “that the Joint Chiefs supported him in his demands for direct action against China.”¹⁵

Apparently the Joint Chiefs had not recommended the proposals of the January 12 Study for immediate policy implementation, as MacArthur had advocated, but consideration at some future date. They were contingent, said Bradley, upon “a rather drastic change in the situation and were by no means being urged as a course of action then and there.”¹⁶

The Joint Chiefs, said Acheson, had put them forward for study in preparation for “military and diplomatic consultation,” and they had only “tentatively” approved them for this purpose.¹⁷ According to Marshall, Washington was dealing with the real probability that the Chinese Communists would force U.N. troops to evacuate Korea, and to allow that “without retaliation” was unacceptable.¹⁸

Unable to reach a consensus on the January 12 Study, the NSC’s members split on the question of whether Washington should implement its recommendations unilaterally or first obtain Allied approval.¹⁹ Thus, American leaders continued to discuss the study’s proposals, implementation of which was contingent on whether Ridgway could stabilize the military situation in South Korea.

Meanwhile, at the urging of his advisers, Truman sent a personal letter to MacArthur on January 13. It was not a directive but a frank statement of American policy in Korea. Truman set forth a number of reasons for American participation in Korea, including the need to stand up to aggression, deflating the Chinese Communists’ prestige, carrying out commitments of honor, and bringing the United Nations through its first great effort in collective security. Acting with prudence and not expanding the war, wrote Truman, was in America’s national interest, and the United States would leave Korea only if forced by “military necessity.” If withdrawal became necessary, he concluded, “we shall not accept the result politically or militarily until the aggression has been rectified.”²⁰

Under any conditions, America’s Western European allies did not want her to carry the war to Red China. They feared that she would then become bogged down in Asia, and without her support, Western European forces, few in number and poorly equipped, would remain incapable of resisting a potential Soviet invasion. Most important, they worried that MacArthur’s stature and influence would enable him to persuade Washington to ignore the United Nations and “plunge into war with Red China.”²¹ This attitude, admitted Sir Edwin Plowden, chief planning officer of the British government, was “not entirely rational,” but it expressed the feeling that “MacArthur wielded too much power” and “the feeling of hopelessness” that “anything could be done about him.”²²

During this time, Attlee sent a message to Truman expressing concern that the U.S. intention was to evacuate Korea, not attempt to hold on to it. If that was true, he wanted to know if the United States was exchanging its policy of localizing the conflict to Korea for one aimed at limited action against Red China. While holding Korea might become militarily impossible, he said, provoking Red China unnecessarily would not be wise. A better course, he suggested, was to build up U.N. forces “in order to meet Communist attacks wherever they may come.”²³

In reply, Truman said that the United States had not changed its policy of limiting the war to Korea. He added, however, that should the Chinese Communists extend the war by air attacks from their territory, the U.S. intention of keeping the war limited might become impossible.²⁴

Collins informed MacArthur that the letter clearly stated that it was not a directive and that the objective was to delay evacuation “as long as possible,” without endangering the Eighth Army or Japan’s security.²⁶ Brushing aside Collins’s objection, MacArthur said that his command could not simultaneously defend Japan and hold Korea without additional troops, and that he wanted the four recently mobilized National Guard divisions for use in Japan. Collins and Vandenberg replied that Washington had not called them up for the defense of Japan, and they refused to make any commitment on the possibility of sending them to the Far East.²⁷

Later that day, as Collins and Vandenberg arrived in Korea to assess the situation, Ridgway ordered a limited attack against enemy forces north of Osan and Suwon; known as Operation Wolfhound. Ridgway’s purpose was to kill as many enemy soldiers as possible and then to withdraw to main positions, leaving a covering force in the area. Although the attack would inflict numerous casualties on the enemy, it was most notable as a signal that the Eighth Army was no longer on the defensive and as an indicator of Ridgway’s attempt to develop an “offensive spirit” in his new command.²⁸

While Operation Wolfhound was in progress, Ridgway and Collins toured the front lines. After talking with numerous corps and division commanders, Collins became convinced that the United States could stay in Korea without “serious jeopardy” to either Japan or the Eighth Army. To newsmen at Taegu, he said that “as of now we are going to stay and fight.” Ridgway said that there was “no shadow of doubt in my mind that the Eighth Army can take care of itself in the current situation.”²⁹

Vandenberg, meanwhile, was inspecting Air Force installations. At one point, to better assess the ground situation, he helicoptered twelve miles in front of the main U.N. positions and joined a combat patrol. Although courageous, his action showed bad judgment. If the Chinese Communists could choose one person they would most like to capture, Vandenberg would probably be at the top of their list. That he risked capture was “certainly apparent.”³⁰

Back in Tokyo on January 18, Collins and Vandenberg reported to Washington of their observations in Korea. The Eighth Army, said Collins, was “in good shape” and “prepared to punish severely any mass attack”; morale was high and improving daily under Ridgway’s leadership.³¹ Vandenberg said that he found no signs of “dissatisfaction or collapse” within the ROK units.³² This report, said Bradley, was “a tremendous relief to all.” For the first time, “we began to think that the Chinese could not throw us out of Korea.”³³

Before returning to Washington, Collins and Vandenberg met briefly with MacArthur, who had previously described the military position as “untenable,” but now agreed that the U.N. forces could hold a beachhead in Korea “indefinitely.”³⁴

On January 19, Collins and Vandenberg submitted an official report and formally briefed Truman and the cabinet. Both the report and briefing were thoroughly optimistic, contradicting MacArthur’s previous options of evacuation or annihilation unless Washington accepted his proposals. They gave credit to Ridgway, who “alone was responsible for this dramatic change.”³⁵ Thereafter, Washington would look “beyond MacArthur” to Ridgway for military assessments and guidance.³⁶ “I was reassured by this report,” said Truman later, “but the situation was still far from giving any feeling of relief.”³⁷

Before agreeing to the U.N. cease-fire resolution, the Chinese Communists insisted that the United Nations seat them, but it would not. To have accepted the resolution, then asked for a U.N. seat, might have placed them in a better political position to obtain it. The Western European allies, who questioned Washington’s “monolithic Communist” theory, were partial to giving it to them, and American leaders would have been in a less favorable position in arguing their case against it.

Shortly thereafter, the United States submitted her own U.N. resolution, which branded Red China an “aggression nation.” But not all of the Western allies agreed to it. They feared that it would only increase the scope of the fighting and widen the breach between Red China and the West.

Truman and Acheson urged passage. “For my part,” said Truman, “I believe in calling an aggressor an aggressor,” and Acheson said that unless the United Nations denounced “Chinese aggression,” a wave of isolationist feeling among the American people might result, and could “jeopardize the United States’ role in the defense of Western Europe.”³⁹ Without American commitment to Europe’s defense, said British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, in a plea for European unity, “we have to imagine what it would be like to live in a world with a hostile Communist bloc.”⁴⁰

On February 1, after two weeks of contentious debate on the American resolution, the U.N. General Assembly adopted it by a 44-7 vote. The Soviets, their satellite member nations, and India and Burma voted against it. Seven nations of the non-Communist world and Yugoslavia did not participate in the voting.⁴¹

Although the Eighth Army had successfully retreated south after Operation Wolfhound, Ridgway’s aim was not to wait passively for the CCF forces to renew the battle. Taking and holding ground was not important, said Ridgway; the main objective was to destroy the CCF armies.⁴² To this end, beginning on January 25, he mounted a series of offensives. By early March, “after hard and bloody fighting,” his troops had retaken Inchon and Seoul, and driven the enemy back across the 38th parallel. ⁴³ Under Ridgway’s “magnificent leadership,” Bradley said, the Eighth Army became “the equal of any army in World War II.” To Acheson, “There was to be no more talk of withdrawal from Korea.”⁴⁴

As Ridgway succeeded in pushing the enemy beyond the 38th parallel, MacArthur’s role in events diminished. To stay in the limelight although the planning and strategy originated with Ridgway and his staff, at the start of each offensive, MacArthur would take full credit for it.⁴⁵ In every field operation, said Ridgway, “MacArthur wanted to be the commander on the spot,” and “he wouldn’t let his subordinates have any credit whatever.”⁴⁶

Before an offensive began, MacArthur would often make premature announcements about it to the press, tipping off the enemy to an attack in the making. To avoid this, Ridgway sent MacArthur a message asking him to defer his visits until after an offensive began.⁴⁷ Here, said Ridgway, MacArthur showed another side of his “remarkable character”; he accepted the request with “quick understanding,” and “postponed his visits until after the offensive was well under way.”⁴⁸

Defying Truman’s December 5 gag order forbidding commanders to make unauthorized statements to the press, MacArthur began to make public statements critical of Washington’s limitations on the use of airpower against the enemy’s “privileged sanctuaries” in Manchuria. On February 7, March 7, and March 15, he said to newsmen that Washington’s continued “limitations” upon the U.N. forces’ “freedom of counter-offensive action” would result in a “military stalemate.”⁴⁹

Although MacArthur did not clear his press statements with the Joint Chiefs, as required by the gag order, for reasons that remained unclear, Washington did not confront him with these violations.

On the question of “privileged sanctuaries,” American military leaders noted that both sides had them. The United States refrained from bombing Manchuria and Red China had not bombed American bases in Japan or U.S. lines of communication, airfields, ports, or troops in South Korea.⁵⁰ Similarly, in view of the FEAF’s global responsibilities, said General Vandenberg, it was operating on a “shoestring,” and if used in Manchuria, it would suffer “a dangerous attrition” by the enemy.⁵¹ According to Ridgway, the use of airpower alone to interdict the enemy’s supply lines had its limitations. Although airpower had destroyed large amounts of the enemy’s equipment and supplies, he said, their armies remained intact and they held vital ground.⁵²

Since September 8, 1950, the Joint Chiefs had placed Rashin, an important supply post on the east coast only seventeen miles from the Soviet Union, off-limits to bombing. Although MacArthur had supported their decision at that time, on February 15, in a switch from his previous stand, he asked for permission to bomb Rashin. “If he could destroy this last vital link in the enemy’s east coast transportation system, the enemy would have suffered a major loss.” Otherwise Rashin’s immunity from attack would remain a major threat to his forces.⁵³

But because of Rashin’s proximity to the Soviet Union, MacArthur’s pleas did not sway the Joint Chiefs from their decision not to bomb it. They feared an increased possibility that American planes might violate Soviet territory or accidentally sink Soviet vessels anchored in the harbor. Also, even if the FEAF bombed Rashin, the enemy could easily establish alternative depots in nearby Soviet and Manchurian territories.⁵⁴

In late December 1950, the Joint Chiefs had asked MacArthur’s advice on whether to bomb the hydroelectric plants on the Korean side of the Yalu and the power dams on the river itself. At that time, X Corps units had inspected the hydroelectric plants in northeast Korea and discovered that they were inactive. But U.N. forces had never made contact with the hydroelectric plants in northwest Korea. Nevertheless, their destruction, MacArthur said at the time, had no military significance, and therefore bombing them would be a political matter.⁵⁵

On February 26, however, MacArthur said Stratemeyer urgently requested that the Joint Chiefs give him permission to destroy the entire North Korean power complex, including the hydroelectric plants on the Yalu River. By so doing, Stratemeyer said, he could “slow down Communist support of their war effort, undermine the enemy’s morale, and cut down any surplus power going to Manchuria.”⁵⁶ Backing him up, MacArthur said that since the Chinese Communists admitted sending large forces into battle with the declared intention of driving U.N. forces from Korea, earlier political reasons were no longer relevant.⁵⁷

In reply, the Joint Chiefs, reiterating MacArthur’s statement that the destruction of the power installations was predominantly a political, not a military, matter, refused to give him the authority to bomb them.

MacArthur, meanwhile, had formulated a strategic plan that included using radioactive wastes, a by-product of atomic manufacture. After establishing a strong line on the 38th parallel, he would “sever Korea from Manchuria by laying a field of radioactive wastes all along the major lines of enemy supply.” Simultaneously, he would launch amphibious and airborne landings at the upper ends of both coasts of North Korea, closing the “gigantic trap.”⁵⁸ But since he never really pushed for implementation of this plan, he may not have seriously considered it or may have figured that Washington would never accept it.

As U.N. forces reached the 38th parallel in mid-March, the question of crossing it arose again. Along with Ridgway and MacArthur, the Joint Chiefs advocated it. They told Marshall that the September 27, 1950 directive, giving MacArthur the authority to cross it, remained in effect, and that the U.N. General Assembly had tacitly confirmed it on October 7. They further said that halting MacArthur at the 38th parallel would permit the enemy to build up larger concentrations of forces in North Korea, which would seriously jeopardize the safety of Ridgway’s Eighth Army.⁵⁹

Still, much opposition existed to crossing the 38th parallel. Virtually all of America’s allies opposed it. The British cabinet informed Washington that the decision to cross the 38th parallel “does not rest with the United States alone, but with the United Nations and, in particular, with those members who are contributing to the United Nations forces in Korea.”⁶⁰

By this time, in fact, Washington’s leaders agreed that stabilizing the 38th parallel was more in America’s national interest than was yet another costly push to the Yalu. Our war aims, said Acheson, “had not included the unification of Korea by armed force against all comers and Chinese intervention had now removed this as a practical possibility.”⁶¹ Instead, Washington began to seriously consider a negotiated settlement, withdrawing U.N. forces, and replacing them with a rearmed and competent South Korean Army.

Chinese Communist Third-Phase Offensive

The January 12 Study

Collins’ and Vandenberg’s Tokyo Trip

The Political-Military Situation