Truman, MacArthur and the Korean War

MacArthur’s reply on March 21 barely recognized that Truman was considering a political settlement of the war. Instead, he requested that Washington place “no further military restrictions on his command.”² According to Bradley, that Truman was considering a political settlement shattered MacArthur’s hope “of an all-out war with Red China,” and that realization “snapped his brittle mind.”³ But to MacArthur, war’s purpose was to beat the enemy or surrender, but never to accept a stalemate. The worst of all choices, he said, was “to go on indefinitely, neither to win or lose,” and to “sacrifice thousands of men while we are doing it.”⁴

On March 24, MacArthur released a statement of his own that undermined Washington’s planned peace move. In a sharp reversal of his former estimates of Red China’s power, he said that the enemy had shown “its complete inability to accomplish by force of arms the conquest of Korea.” Threatening direct military action against Red China, he said that a U.N. decision to depart from “its tolerant effort” to contain the war by expanding it to the enemy’s coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China’s forces in Korea “to the risk of imminent military collapse.” He stood ready, he said, to confer in the field with the enemy commander in chief “to find any military means whereby realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no nation may justly take exception, might be accomplished without further bloodshed.”⁵

MacArthur’s statement “deeply shocked” Washington. Acheson described it as “insubordination”; Bradley called it a direct challenge to Washington’s “limited war policy in Korea”; and Truman said it “challenged the traditional civilian supremacy over the military.”⁶ MacArthur’s “one man act,” said Democratic Senator Robert S. Kern of Oklahoma, was “wearing the patience of the rest of the team mighty thin.”⁷ According to newsman James Reston, MacArthur’s peace appeal “scoffed at the Chinese Reds, demanded their unconditional surrender and thus placed Red China in an unreceptive mood to negotiate.”⁸ And from the Allies, there arose an immediate outcry: “What was Washington’s policy?”⁹

Playing down his March 24 statement, MacArthur referred to it as a “routine communiqué.” After the Inchon victory and the capture of Pyongyang, he said, he had called upon the enemy to surrender, and Washington gave not “the slightest whisper of remonstrance.”¹⁰ Whitney added that MacArthur’s statement had not “disrupted some magic formula for peace.” No record existed of any such peace plan, he said, and “the complete lack of evidence can only mean that this claim was a fabrication.”¹¹ “No one in possession of the facts,” said Ridgway, “could have been so naïve as to imagine that MacArthur was either unaware of what effect his announcement might have or innocent of any desire openly to oppose the President.”¹²

After MacArthur’s March 24 statement, which “challenged the authority of the commander in chief,” Truman aid later he had made up his mind to fire him. “If I allowed him to defy the civil authorities in this manner,” said Truman, “I myself would be violating my oath to uphold and defend the Constitution.”¹³ But he did not bring up the question of dismissal with his cabinet, and he decided on only a mild reprimand. He ordered Acheson to send a priority message to MacArthur reminding him that the December 6, 1950, gag order required him to clear all public statements with Washington, and if the Chinese Communists requested an armistice in the field, he must report it to the Joint Chiefs and wait for instructions.¹⁴

Martin sent MacArthur a copy of his Lincoln Day speech and said that he would give it again in a radio hookup on March 21. He then asked MacArthur to share his views with him “either on a confidential basis or otherwise.”¹⁶

Without requesting confidentiality, MacArthur replied to Martin on March 20. “You have,” said MacArthur, “certainly lost none of your old time punch.” Regarding Red China’s entry into the war, he would follow “the conventional pattern of meeting force with maximum counter force.” Also, using Chiang’s troops was in conflict with “neither logic nor tradition.” If we lost the war to communism in Asia, he continued, the fall of Europe was inevitable. He concluded that “there was no substitute for victory.”¹⁷

On April 5, Martin read MacArthur’s letter on the House floor. Since he strongly favored using Chiang’s Nationalist troops against the mainland, said Martin, “Why in God’s name, then, are we not using them?” He added that the United States was “on the brink of World War III” and that the Truman administration was withholding information from Congress and the American people.¹⁸

On the United Press news ticker later that afternoon, White House Press Secretary Joseph H. Short read the lead story outlining Martin’s speech on the House floor. Short gave it to his assistant, Roger Tubby, who rushed it to Truman. Unconcerned at first, Truman passed Martin’s speech off as “more politics.” Apparently, MacArthur’s letter had not registered in his mind. “Mr. President,” said Tubby, “MacArthur was both insolent and insubordinate.”⁷ Picking up the ticker sheet again, Truman read MacArthur’s letter more thoroughly. “By God, Roger, I think you’re right.”¹⁹ That night Truman wrote I his diary: “This looks like the last straw, rank insubordination.”²⁰

To those in Washington, MacArthur’s letter appeared to repudiate U.S. Korean War policy. In effect, said Truman, MacArthur was saying that Washington’s policy was “without logic and violated tradition.”²¹ This letter, said Collins, revealed the extent to which MacArthur’s frustration over fighting a limited war had gotten “the better of his judgement.”²² Instead of being dismayed at widening the war in Asia, said Acheson, MacArthur’s letter seemed to welcome it.²³ “Once again,” said Marshall, “the question was raised of whose voice spoke for the United States on foreign policy matters.”²⁴

Western Europeans disagreed with MacArthur’s letter, and British reaction to it was particularly intense. On April 6, a Labor Party member of the House of Commons submitted a motion proclaiming that Parliament no longer had confidence in MacArthur as U.N. commander.²⁵ Although unsuccessful, it received widespread media coverage. Minister of State Kenneth Younger criticized MacArthur for making “irresponsible statements” without the authority of the U.N.²⁶ Home Secretary Chester Ede complained publicly: “We cannot control MacArthur because we do not pay him.”²⁷ London’s Daily Telegraph aid that “MacArthur’s inability to identify a ‘definitive objective’ in the Korean War had created a situation which would be ludicrous if men’s lives were not involved.”²⁸

MacArthur called his letter to Martin merely “a routine communication.” He said that writing it had made “little impression” on him, and he attached “little importance” to it, describing it as “merely a polite response couched in such general terms as to convey only a normal patriotic desire for victory.”²⁹ He felt “duty-bound,” he said, “to reply to every Congressional inquiry into matters connected with my official responsibility.”³⁰ Still, he failed to explain why he neither asked Martin to keep the letter confidential nor cleared it with the Joint Chiefs.

Marshall and Acheson urged caution. If Truman dismissed MacArthur, said Marshall, getting military appropriations through Congress might become difficult.³² Acting impetuously, said Acheson, could cause “incalculable” harm, but Truman could surmount it if he carefully considered the advice and cultivated the support of his advisers.³³

But Harriman’s and Bradley’s views were less clear. Truman quoted Harriman as saying that the president should have fired MacArthur in 1949 for refusing a request to return to Washington to discuss occupation policy.³⁴ According to Harriman, he said, “Mr. President, this was a problem which you faced last August and which you decided you would not deal with until later.”³⁵ In Truman’s version, Bradley referred to MacArthur’s actions as “insubordination,” justifying dismissal.³⁶ On the contrary, said Bradley, “my advice was to go slow since MacArthur had not committed a clear-cut case of insubordination.” ³⁷

The meeting was inconclusive. Truman would meet with the Big Four again the next morning. Meanwhile, he asked them to meet without him later that day “to discuss every angle of the situation.”

That afternoon the Big Four assembled in Marshall’s office. For nearly two hours, they discussed a suggestion made by Marshall to call MacArthur home for consultation prior to making a final decision.³⁸ Calling this “a road to disaster,” Acheson said that to bring MacArthur back “in the full panoply of his commands” would not only impair the president’s freedom of decision but also “imperil his own future.”³⁹ Everybody agreed, including Marshall, who “saw the wisdom of Acheson’s point of view and withdrew his suggestion.”⁴⁰

The Big Four decided to suggest to Truman the next morning that he postpone making a decision until Monday, April 9, so that the Joint Chiefs, with whom Bradley arranged to meet on Sunday, would have had a chance to discuss the “MacArthur problem.”

When the Big Four reassembled at the White House the next morning, April 7, Truman was in an angry mood. He had just read MacArthur’s latest assertion in the magazine The Freeman, which was critical of Washington for not enlarging the ROK Army. He gave a misleading impression, since Washington had made the decision not to arm additional South Korean units on MacArthur’s recommendation.⁴¹

Bradley’s and Truman’s versions of this meeting differ. After reading the Joint Chiefs–MacArthur backfile messages, Marshall said, according to Truman, “You should have fired the son of a bitch two years ago.”⁴² But Bradley denied that Marshall had said this. “As planned,” said Bradley, “we merely advised the President to postpone any action until Monday.”⁴³ At this meeting, said Truman, the Big Four agreed on the necessity of relieving MacArthur.⁴⁴ However, that they would have agreed on a decision before the Joint Chiefs had met was doubtful. Bradley’s version of the meeting is probably the more accurate.

On Sunday afternoon, April 8, Bradley met with the Joint Chiefs in his Pentagon office for nearly two hours. At first, they discussed the idea of retaining MacArthur as supreme commander in Japan but relieving him of all other commands. They decided against it, however, because the conflict in Korea and the defense of Japan were “intimately tied,” and having two commanders in Japan was impractical.⁴⁵ Finally, after “deep thought and much discussion,” they agreed that Truman should relieve MacArthur, but that he should not charge him with insubordination, since that would bring about too many “legal complexities.”⁴⁶ Although he had “stretched” the Joint Chiefs’ directives, he had not legally violated them.

The Joint Chiefs gave several reasons for advocating MacArthur’s dismissal. First, his public comments were not in sympathy with Washington’s decision to limit the war in Korea; second, Washington needed a commander more responsive to its control; third, MacArthur had failed to comply with the president’s directive to clear statements with Washington before going public with them; and finally, he had taken independent action in proposing to negotiate directly with the enemy field commander for an armistice, although he knew the president had such a proposal under consideration.⁴⁷

Following their meeting, the Joint Chiefs, “a sad and sober group of men,” met with Marshall in his Pentagon office. Speaking for the group, Bradley said that if Truman decided to relieve MacArthur, the Joint Chiefs would agree to it.⁴⁸ Marshall then asked Bradley to present the Joint Chiefs’ view to the president in the scheduled meeting at the White House the following day.⁴⁹

During this time, Truman was discussing the “MacArthur problem” with Washington leaders. Vice President Barkley advocated dismissal and Chief Justice Fred Vinson, House Speaker Sam Rayburn, and Treasury Secretary John Snyder urged “caution.”⁵⁰ Remaining silent, Truman continued his policy of not disclosing “the trend of his thoughts” until he had heard all recommendations and was ready to act.⁵¹

On Monday morning, Truman reassembled with the Big Four. At this time, Bradley stated that the Joint Chiefs had agreed on the need to recall MacArthur, and had picked Ridgway as the logical choice to replace him. Also, to head the Eighth Army, they recommended General James A. Van Fleet. Agreeing with their suggestions, Truman revealed for the first time that he had decided to recall MacArthur after he had made his March 24 statement.⁵² Truman then directed Collins to draft MacArthur’s recall order and to write the replacement messages for Ridgway and Van Fleet.⁵³

Meanwhile, Bradley informed Truman that the editors of the Chicago Tribune had learned about the decision to dismiss MacArthur and that they were going to run it in the newspaper’s morning edition. Upon learning of it, said Bradley, MacArthur might decide to beat Washington to the punch and resign.⁵⁵ “The son of a bitch isn’t going to resign on me,” said Truman, “I want him fired.”⁵⁶ He ordered Short to prepare an immediate news release announcing MacArthur’s removal.

Short called a special news conference at 1 a.m., April 11. He gave reporters copies of Truman’s news release that MacArthur had been dismissed for failing to give his “wholehearted support” to Washington’s policies; the order of dismissal; and several background documents. These included the December 6 gag order, the March 20 Joint Chiefs cable regarding Washington’s impending peace move, MacArthur’s March 24 statement to the Chinese Communists, and his letter to House Speaker Martin. “As far as I was concerned,” said Truman later, “these papers stated the case.”⁵⁷

As the reporters ran to their phones to inform the world, Truman was asleep. “I slept well that night,” he said later. “If I’ve done the right thing, and I know I’ve done the right, I don’t worry about it.”⁵⁸

On the same day, while Whitney wrote to Truman’s military aide, Harry Vaughan, that MacArthur was “in the President’s corner one hundred percent,” MacArthur sensed that Truman might relieve him.⁵⁹ On April 9, Almond had just finished a four-day leave in Tokyo. Before returning to Korea, he met with MacArthur to say good-bye. “Ned,” said MacArthur, “I may be relieved.”

“You know,” said MacArthur, “the President has been angered by the exposure of my letter to Congressman Joe Martin, which was read in Congress. Truman claims that I have introduced politics into this, and so my use is at an end.”⁶⁰

At noon on April 11, MacArthur and his wife Jean were in the U.S. Embassy’s dining room, hosting two luncheon guests, Senator Warren Magnuson of Washington and William Stern, executive vice president of Northwest Airlines. At that moment, Colonel Sidney Huff heard over the radio a special bulletin announcing MacArthur’s recall. He got Mrs. MacArthur’s attention. She excused herself and left the dining room. With tears in his eyes, Huff informed her that Truman had relieved her husband. Back in the dining room, she stood behind MacArthur, touching his shoulder, then bent close and whispered the news. His face “froze,” and after a moment, he said, “Jeanie, we’re going home at last.”⁶¹

Shortly thereafter, MacArthur received Washington’s recall order, making his dismissal “effective at once.” He recounted his dismissal as coming “with suddenness and violence,” with no hearing, and with “no consideration of the past” or with the slightest hint that his service had become unsatisfactory.⁶² Describing it further as “callous disregard for ordinary decencies,” he did not even have the opportunity to bid farewell to his troops.⁶³

On the afternoon of April 11, Ridgway and Pace were touring the front when a reporter from the Baltimore Sun approached them. “I hear you are to be congratulated.” “For what?” asked Ridgway. “You mean you don’t know?” replied the reporter, turning and walking away. Puzzled, Ridgway looked at Pace, who was just as confused.⁶⁴

Later, at the frontline command tent, General Lev Allen informed Pace that Truman had fired MacArthur and designated Ridgway as his replacement. As a fierce storm raged, Pace found Ridgway still touring the front, live grenades strapped to his shoulders. “Matt,” said Pace, “take those damn grenades off because I don’t want one of them hit by a hail stone.” He then informed Ridgway that Washington had appointed him Far East commander. “I can’t believe it,” said Ridgway.

The following day, in the library of the American Embassy, MacArthur and Ridgway, who described him as “composed” and “friendly,” met for an hour. “Anything I can do to help you,” said MacArthur, “I’ll be glad to do.”⁶⁶ He seemed to show “no resentment,” said Ridgway, except in one remark. “A friend of mine,” said MacArthur, “very close to President Truman, tells me that he has a mental illness, and that he won’t live six months.”⁶⁷

Meanwhile, at the White House on April 11, Truman was preparing to give an 11 p.m. radio address to the nation. Either he was very confident or the events of the last few days had tired him, but thirty minutes before he was to give his speech, Truman went into an aide’s office, “moved some books from a sofa, curled up, and within a minute or two was sound asleep.” He awoke refreshed and went into the Oval Office to give his address to the nation.⁶⁸

Rather than focusing on the reasons for firing MacArthur, Truman concentrated his address on Washington’s Korean War policy, which was, he said, “to prevent a third world war.” The Soviet Communists were waging “a monstrous conspiracy to stamp out freedom all over the world.” In the 1930s, according to him, if the free countries had acted together, they could have crushed “the aggression of the dictators” and avoided World War II. The United States did not want to see the Korean War extended, he said, and the best way to prevent it was to continue to resist attack.

In remarks directed at MacArthur and his supporters, Truman said that the United States would not bomb Manchuria or help the Chinese Nationalists to land on the mainland of China because these actions would bring on a vast conflict on the Asian continent. “What would suit the ambitions of the Kremlin better than for our military forces to be committed to a full scale war with Red China?” To achieve real peace, he said, the fighting must stop and steps be taken to ensure that it would not break out again.

At the finish of his address, Truman said that “a number of events have made it evident that General MacArthur did not agree with Washington’s policy.” His relief, he said, was essential so that “there would be no doubt or confusion as to the real purpose and aim of our policy.” Although MacArthur was “one of our greatest commanders,” he concluded, “the cause of world peace is more important than any individual.”⁶⁹

Gag Order Violation

Joseph Martin’s Letter

The Decision to Dismiss MacArthur

MacArthur’s Dismissal