CHAPTER

Community Supervision

“A recent survey of state chief justices conducted by the National Center for State Courts found … that the most frequent complaints from state trial judges hearing felony cases included the high rates of recidivism among felony offenders, the ineffectiveness of traditional probation supervision in reducing recidivism.”

—Judge Roger Warren (2007: 4–5)

THERE ARE TWO PRIMARY TYPES of community supervision: probation, which is a sentence of conditional supervision in lieu of incarceration, and parole, which is conditional supervision after a period of incarceration. Probation and parole are both significantly underperforming in terms of adoption of best evidence-based practices and outcomes such as recidivism and revocation (unsuccessful completion of supervision). Approximately 40 percent of prison admissions are parole and probation revocations. I begin with a discussion of probation, and then turn to parole later in this chapter.

PROBATION TODAY

Probation is a postadjudication sentence of diversion from incarceration to conditional, supervised community release. The conditions of probation are imposed by the court and can be modified over time as circumstances warrant. Typical conditions, generally aimed at control over behavior while on community release, include: avoid the use of drugs and alcohol, avoid persons and places of disreputable or harmful character, commit no new offenses, attend all scheduled meeting with the probation officer (at the probation office or at home as directed), retain gainful employment and support any dependents, do not change residence without permission, do not leave the county without permission, submit urine and/or breath specimens as directed, pay all court and supervision fees, and keep proper identification on your person at all times. There are also a variety of special conditions that apply at the discretion of the court or the probation office, including electronic monitoring, GPS monitoring, ignition interlock devices, community service restitution, inpatient and outpatient treatment, and special classes for drug and alcohol problems, psychological/psychiatric problems, anger/aggression, intimate partner and family violence, parenting, relapse prevention, sex offender intervention, and so on.

Individuals serving a sentence of probation are subject to revocation upon discovery of violations of the conditions of supervision (a technical violation) or a new offense. The typical path to revocation is the filing of a motion to revoke probation, followed by a court hearing in which a determination is made to revoke to prison (for felony probationers) or jail (for misdemeanor probationers), or continue probation with modifications to the conditions, and/or imposition of a variety of intermediate, graduated sanctions.

Probation was originally designed as an opportunity to allow an offender to remain in the community, and remain employed and supporting his or her family while receiving intervention and treatment to help address the reasons for criminal involvement. Probation is, in theory, designed to accomplish public safety through the three primary functions of surveillance, treatment, and enforcement. These goals went to the wayside as probation populations escalated and caseloads exploded, without commensurate increases in probation budgets. The probation model that emerged from the realities of increasing caseloads was largely supervision and risk management.

While incarceration rates and prison populations are typically what observers point to as the defining characteristic of U.S. crime control policies, in terms of sheer numbers of offenders, the probation population exceeds the prison and jail population by a factor of nearly two. In 2012, there were 4.3 million individuals on probation (both felony and misdemeanor, including formal probation, community-based correctional supervision, and specialized court supervision programs), compared to 2,239,800 individuals in prison and jail. Between 1990 and 2012, the incarcerated population grew 100 percent; however, the probation population increased by a healthy 50 percent over that time period.

As a share of correctional budgets, probation and other forms of community supervision decidedly take a back seat. Between 1982 and 2010, inflation-adjusted total correctional spending increased by 223 percent, totaling $48.5 billion in 2010. Spending for noninstitutional corrections (community corrections, halfway houses, and so on) increased by 160 percent. Most telling is the share of corrections expenditures for community corrections. In 1982, community corrections expenditures constituted 25.3 percent of total correctional spending. By 2010, the share of corrections spending for community corrections had dropped to 20.4 percent (Kyckelhahn 2012). Clearly, expenditures for prison and jail capacity and operations have consumed the vast majority of corrections spending over time, and the share of total outlays for incarceration has increased over time. The conclusion reached by many observers is not just that incarceration expenditures far exceed community corrections, but also that community corrections is seriously underfunded (Petersilia 1998; Pew Center on the States 2009). That conclusion appears to be reasonable: at least in terms of funding, probation is the stepchild of the U.S. criminal justice system, which is ironic because it is responsible for the bulk of criminal offenders in the correctional system.

There have been three very significant changes to probation that have radically affected the ability of probation departments and probation officers to manage the risk of offenders. One trend has been the sheer increase in the probation population, which, when combined with relatively stagnant expenditures over time, has resulted in increasing caseloads for officers. Caseloads for regular probation supervision can be as high as 300 or more. Caseload size for intensive supervision of high-risk offenders can be over 100. Estimates based on incomplete data indicate average caseloads for regular supervision are around 95.

A second trend has been the hardening of the probation population. Historically, sentences of probation were reserved for low-risk offenders who posed little threat to public safety. However, over time, the composition of the probation population has shifted to a much greater proportion of higher-risk offenders. As Taxman, Shepardson, and Byrne (2004) note, the probation population increasingly resembles the prison population. This higher-risk population poses very significant challenges for probation departments and officers. Higher-risk offenders present with a greater number and intensity of criminogenic needs and deficits, requiring greater allocation of time and resources. The obvious problem is that probation funding has not kept up with changes in caseload size and composition.

A third factor complicating the probation picture has been the increasing number of supervision conditions imposed on probationers. Perhaps partly in response to changes in the risk composition of the probation population, and in part an effort to be more punitive and to enhance correctional control, the increase in conditions has had at least two significant consequences: increased workload for probation officers and increased violations of conditions. Increasing conditions can be a reasonable response to higher-risk offenders, but as several experts have noted, often these new conditions are legislatively mandated or imposed by judges with little reference to presentence investigation reports, clinical assessments, and evidence-based practices.

For a variety of reasons, the probation of today little resembles the original intent. It is a system of correctional control, driven by the get tough mantra of the 1980s and 1990s, focused largely on risk management, and operating with substantially limited resources. In essence, probation over the past thirty years or so has functioned as a sorting mechanism, in which offenders self-identify as failures or successes through their behavior with regard to violating the conditions of supervision and/or reoffending.

As discussed earlier in this book, the great U.S. experiment with punishment has been a failure, and probation as currently funded and operated has contributed to that failure and largely been a lost opportunity. The evidence is clear. Probation as currently implemented does not significantly impact recidivism (Aos, Miller, and Drake 2006a; Bonta et al. 2008; Green and Wink 2010; Solomon et al. 2005; Taxman 2002). As Green and Wink simply state: “probation does not alter the probability of recidivism.” This conclusion is echoed time and time again in the research and evaluation literature.

These conclusions, reinforced by research comparing the effectiveness (recidivism) of custodial sentences (prison) and noncustodial sentences (community supervision), further underscore the limitations of probation in meeting its intended goals—to enhance behavioral change and ensure accountability. The research indicates that while probation has lower recidivism compared to prison releasees, in part due to risk differences in the two populations, the differences were small and not statistically significant.

Revocation and recidivism statistics tell the story. Across the board, probationers have about a 40 percent failure rate, but that figure is in the 50 percent or higher range in some states and for certain categories of probationers, for example, high risk and substance abuse. This failure rate is a combination of unsuccessful probation termination, violations of conditions, and revocation. Approximately 16 percent of probationers are revoked to incarceration, an additional 11 percent are classified as having an unsatisfactory probation exit, and around 3 percent abscond (Glaze and Bonczar 2011). Studies that track the timing of probation failure indicate that the probability of rearrest and/or reconviction while on probation is frontloaded in the first twelve months. Essentially 50 percent of rearrests and reconvictions occur during the first year of supervision. A very similar pattern exists for probation violations. While there is variation across states and studies, the bottom line is that probation violations are also frontloaded. One report indicates that 50 percent of probation violators commit the first violation within the first twenty months of supervision (Van Pattan and Matney 2004). Another survival analysis shows 30 percent of violations occurring within the first 100 days of supervision (Gray, Fields, and Maxwell 2001). These results are consistent with dozens of other analyses on the timing of supervision failure.

All in all, probation failure rates are troubling. As Judge Warren concludes (2009a: 1):

Recidivism rates among these felony defendants are at unprecedented levels. Almost 60 percent have been previously convicted and more than 40 percent of those on probation fail to complete probation successfully. The high recidivism rate among felony probation pushes up state crime rates and is one of the principal contributors to our extraordinarily high incarceration rates.

Recidivism postsupervision is as high as 60 to 75 percent for those discharged from probation and followed for up to five years after discharge. One study of Illinois probationers reported that those who did not successfully complete substance abuse treatment while on probation had a 67 percent four-year recidivism rate after probation discharge, compared to 44 percent for nonsubstance-abusing probationers (Huebner 2006). And as Warren notes above, the majority of probationers have a prior criminal conviction, regardless of whether they had served a prior probation sentence.

Once again, while a successful discharge from probation is counted as a success, subsequent recidivism is a system failure. Obviously, postdischarge recidivism cannot be eliminated. However, through implementation of research-based practices, as well as the other strategies discussed in chapter 3, the evidence indicates that recidivism can be dramatically reduced. I now turn to an assessment of what it is about probation as currently operated that may account for the high supervision failure rate and the relative inability to alter the likelihood of recidivism and to enhance public safety.

There are a number of factors that contribute to the limitations of probation today. While caseloads have increased dramatically over time, one of the troubling consequences is the impact of increasing caseloads on officer workload. The demands on officer time have escalated along with caseloads, and additional requirements for reporting and paperwork have imposed additional constraints on officers’ abilities to effectively supervise. Probation officers also report concerns about lack of clarity of goals, limited funding and resources, and difficulties implementing evidence-based practices (DeMichele and Payne 2007; Paparozzi and DeMichele 2008).

The concern about lack of clarity of goals has its origin in the traditional dichotomy of the probation officer role of cop or social worker—enforcer/punisher versus fixer. Historically, probation officers were considered one or the other, without much room for a balance of the two. The problem appears to be a lack of organizational or administrative direction on priorities or not reaching a balance. Is probation basically a game of “gotcha,” or should it focus on behavior change through intervention and treatment? Should revocation be considered a success in that someone who is non-compliant is identified? Or should the bulk of the effort be on factors that enhance the success of offenders on probation (that is, addressing criminogenic needs)? Lack of clear direction, combined with limited funding and resources, further complicate agreement on the goals and objectives of the day-to-day business of probation. Lack of funding results in inadequate training for officers and a lack of proper equipment. It is also evident from survey responses that lack of funding renders evidence-based practices just another catchphrase in many departments. As DeMichele and Payne (2007: 6) conclude, “While agencies are interested in evidence-based practices, it appears that the lack of funding for fully implementing such changes fosters a half-hearted attempt.”

Taxman, Perdoni, and Harrison (2007) conducted a national survey (in 2005) of correctional agencies to determine the prevalence of various correctional and treatment services. Table 6.1 summarizes what Taxman and colleagues discovered in their survey of probation departments. The numbers in table 6.1, which are from Taxman, Perdoni, and Harrison (2007), refer to services provided by community supervision agencies and do not reflect programs and services that probationers are referred to in the community. What it shows is the limited availability of rehabilitative programming in probation departments across the country. As Taxman (2012: 369) notes, “on any given day, only about 9% of the offenders in a probation department can actually participate in programs.” These statistics only refer to whether the program/service is present. There is no indication from these survey results of the quality of this programming (for example, whether therapy/counseling is cognitive behavioral, whether the assessments are based on validated instruments, or whether there is any effort to target higher-risk offenders, prioritize criminogenic needs, and implement responsivity principles).

TABLE 6.1   Programs and Services Available at Community Corrections Agencies, 2005

PROGRAM/SERVICE	PERCENTAGE WITH PROGRAM/SERVICE
Drug/alcohol education	53
Substance abuse counseling (up to 4 hrs/week)	47
Substance abuse counseling (5–25 hrs/week)	21
Substance abuse counseling (>26 hrs/week)	2
Therapeutic community	7
Relapse prevention	34
Case management	7
Day reporting	13
ISP	42
Work release	7
Transitional housing	24
Sex offender therapy	57
Vocational training	23
Education	15
Physical health services	13
Mental health assessment	19
Co-occurring disorders assessment	20
Counseling for co-occurring disorders	18
Family therapy/counseling	13
Domestic violence intervention	19
Communication and social skill development	11
Life skills management	17
Anger/stress management	18
Cognitive skills development	17
Job placement and vocational counseling	19

The reality is that contemporary probation is seriously under-resourced in terms of screening and assessment and treatment and rehabilitation programming. In part, this reflects resource limitations. It also reflects the relative focus on control and surveillance versus behavioral change. The bottom line is that the availability (or lack thereof) of correctional and rehabilitative programming speaks much louder than any administrative declaration of the goals and objectives of the agency. Spending drives policy, not words or phrases. Probation departments may very well wish to have a more balanced approach to community supervision and implement evidence-based practices, an approach clearly supported by science. However, absent the necessary resources and a concerted cultural shift in how probation accomplishes public safety, the day-to-day activities of the officers on the ground will still be largely focused on enforcement, rather than behavior change.

Much like community policing was for local law enforcement in the 1990s, evidence-based practices (EBPs) appear to be an often-discussed focus for probation. EBPs have been demonstrated to significantly and substantially reduce recidivism. However, it is necessary to look closely at whether and how well EBPs are being implemented.

The day-to-day operations of probation departments, the large caseloads, the continued impact of crime control with a culture that supports surveillance and control, uncertain and limited funding, and the lack of in-house and local community-based treatment and rehabilitation resources all present barriers to institutional and cultural change. Research on California’s adult probation system with responsibility for supervising 350,000 probationers found that “many county probation departments are not operating according to the best practices identified by experts and are underperforming in key outcome measures (such as percentage of probationers successfully completing probation)” (LAO 2009). The data in table 6.2 represent the best national snapshot currently available on the implementation of EBPs in probation. The 2005 results of the survey of the National Criminal Justice Treatment Practices (Taxman et al. 2007) indicate limited implementation and wide variation in which practices are implemented. The limitations are that these results say nothing about how extensively and how well these practices are implemented.

TABLE 6.2   Use of EBPs in Community Corrections, 2005

EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES	PERCENTAGE OF AGENCIES IMPLEMENTING
Use of standardized, validated substance   abuse treatment	44
Use of standardized, validated risk assessment	34
Use of methods to increase treatment motivation	22
Use of evidence-based treatment modalities	12
Address multiple criminogenic needs	85
Address co-occurring mental health and   substance abuse with integrated models	25
Use of treatment programs that are a minimum   of 90 days	40
Continuing care	41
Use of graduated sanctions for negative behavior	37
Use of appropriate incentives for positive behavior	53

Average number of EBPs implemented: 5.0

The data in table 6.2, again from Taxman, Perdoni, and Harrison (2007), indicate a general lack of implementing evidence-based practices. Fewer than half used validated risk and needs assessments, so the extent to which they were accurately able to target higher-risk offenders and identify relevant criminogenic needs, let alone obtain clinical diagnoses, is questionable. Moreover, research shows that even when risk and needs are determined, probation officers are not utilizing that information in the supervision of offenders (Bonta et al. 2004; Lowenkamp, Latessa, and Holsinger 2006). It appears reasonable to conclude that there has not been much effort to assess treatment readiness or identify stages of change because less than 25 percent of the agencies report that they engage in any treatment motivation enhancement like motivational interviewing. The vast majority of agencies do not use evidence-based treatment modalities such as cognitive-behavioral, therapeutic communities, or behavioral modification treatment. Surprisingly, 85 percent of the agencies indicate that they address multiple criminogenic needs of offenders, although it is unclear how those needs are identified. Research indicates that substance abuse is widespread in the criminal justice population and that a very typical co-morbid diagnosis is mental illness and substance abuse. However, only 25 percent of the agencies in the sample indicated that they address this co-morbidity with an integrated treatment model. Treatment dosage is problematic in the majority of agencies because 40 percent use treatment programs that are at least ninety days in duration. Research also clearly indicates that treatment effects are usually quickly lost if the individual does not engage in ongoing aftercare. The minority of probation agencies (41 percent) offer continuing care. Roughly half use appropriate incentives to reinforce positive behavior. Only one-third have a graduated sanctions system. Finally, the agencies indicated that on average they have implemented five EBPs.

The survey results indicate some significant effort in the direction of implementing EBPs. Because the survey results are for 2005, it is reasonable to assume that implementation is greater today. However, we know very little about how extensive these practices are, how frequently they are used, for how many individuals, and how faithfully or well they have been implemented. As I discussed in chapter 3, reducing recidivism, crime, and victimization through engaging in meaningful behavioral change requires extraordinary commitment, not simply token efforts with limited capacity, inappropriate modalities and dosage, unreliable risk and needs assessments, and lack of aftercare, among others. Again, there is little systematic evidence that speaks to the fidelity of implementation.

Additional research has assessed the recidivism impact of implementing EBPs (without regard necessarily to fidelity, capacity, and so on). Andrews and Bonta (2010) focused on the risk, need, and responsivity (RNR) components of the effective principles of correctional intervention. The risk principle is accurately assessing risk with standardized, validated assessments and then targeting higher-risk offenders. The need principle also involves accurately and comprehensively assessing criminogenic needs with standardized and validated needs assessments and then targeting treatment resources on those needs. Responsivity refers to the use of cognitive-behavioral modalities, and tailoring the interventions to the motivation, learning style, abilities, and strengths of the participants. Adherence to these basic principles greatly reduces probation recidivism. When all three are implemented, the effect size from the meta-analysis is 0.26. When only two are implemented, the effect size is 0.18. When only one of the principles is implemented, it is 0.1. Implementation of none results in a modest increase in probation recidivism. Translated into a more meaningful metric, the implementation of all three principles results in a reduction of probation recidivism of roughly 16 to 18 percent.

A PATH FORWARD FOR PROBATION

Implementation of the evidence-based practices and policies for probation can result in recidivism reductions as high as 50 percent (Andrews and Bonta 2006; Aos, Miller, and Drake 2006a; Paparozzi and DeMichele 2008). However, as discussed in chapter 3, evidence-based practices are necessary, but not sufficient to maximize recidivism reduction. In this section, I first discuss those EBPs, or principles of effective correctional intervention, as they apply to probation. I then turn to what else should accompany these practices and principles.

One of the problems with probation as implemented in recent decades is that recidivism is a fact of life in which supervision failure is viewed as a public safety success—the surveillance/control system succeeded in detecting a violation or a new offense and took the appropriate action of revocation. In another important sense, probation violations are failures, largely because many are preventable if the probation system functioned with the primary goals of reintegration, behavioral change, and accountability; if it had appropriate, effective sanctions and rehabilitative interventions; and if it had sufficient funding and the proper cultural orientation. There needs to be an ultimate sanction like incarceration. However, revoking a probationer to prison does nothing to enhance behavioral change in a positive direction and further heightens the probability of recidivism upon release. The probation model going forward is one in which much more effort is focused on shared responsibility for success and failure, behavioral change, and reducing recidivism. In turn, failure on probation is a failure for which revocation is a last resort.

The Basics—Evidence-Based Practices for Probation

The research-based practices for effective probation have been articulated in a variety of relatively recent publications (Andrews and Bonta 2006; Aos, Miller, and Drake 2006a; Bonta et al. 2008 2010; Colorado Division of Probation Services 2010; Lutze et al. 2012; Solomon et al. 2008; Taxman et al. 2006; among many others). Here are the essential elements of these practices.

1. CLARIFY THAT THE GOALS OF PROBATION ARE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF SUPERVISION, REINTEGRATION INTO THE COMMUNITY, AND RECIDIVISM REDUCTION

Identify these outcomes as the primary performance measures, measure them, and hold probation staff accountable for achieving these goals. The traditional focus on measuring outputs such as office visits and field visits is not performance measurement. Clarify that the model going forward is a balance between risk management and accountability on the one hand, and behavioral change and successful reintegration on the other. Minimize the traditional dichotomy of law enforcement and social work and instill the risk management–behavioral change balance into the culture of probation agencies.

It is also critical that supervision officers understand that the goals of successful completion of supervision, reintegration into the community, and recidivism reduction are not just the responsibility of the offender. This is not a situation of giving an offender a chance to prove he or she can make it, and if not, yanking him or her off probation. It is a situation of collective responsibility for accomplishing these goals. That needs to be ingrained in the culture of the agency. Evaluations also need to be conducted to determine outcomes, and the relationship between outcomes and supervision and program attributes.

2. ADHERE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF RESPONSIVITY

—Use cognitive-behavioral intervention modalities and tailor supervision conditions to the needs and risk of offenders. Conditions should be realistic, relevant, and based on research, not the typical laundry list of generic conditions that too often characterize the judicial imposition of conditions and can lead to inappropriate oversupervision. Conditions should focus on those that reduce the likelihood of violations and reoffending and enhance behavioral change. At the end of the day, this practice involves greater thought and consideration of the individual circumstances of the offenders and requires engaging in greater problem solving when imposing conditions of supervision.

3. ADHERE TO THE RISK PRINCIPLE

—Devote the bulk of supervision and intervention resources to higher-risk offenders. Research consistently shows that allocating resources to higher-risk offenders is much more productive in terms of positive longer-term outcomes than devoting resources to lower-risk offenders.

4. FRONTLOAD SUPERVISION RESOURCES

It is known from numerous survival analyses of probation failure patterns that the first six to twelve months of probation supervision are higher risk than subsequent time periods of supervision. This information is quite actionable and should lead to frontloading supervision and intervention resources. Clearly, this is not an across-the-board pattern, so thoughtful assessment of individual offenders should determine frontloading for whom.

5. PROBLEM SOLVING

Whether we like it or not, many probationers need case management, assistance, and problem solving. While part of the point of probation is accountability and accepting responsibility, some offenders are not as well prepared or equipped to effectively deal with compliance with supervision conditions. One of the key roles for probation officers is problem solving—working with probationers to overcome barriers or problems. Part of the process is to teach problem-solving skills so those who are not good at it can improve. It is unfortunate that this is the situation, but it just is. No one wins if we simply put someone on probation and then wait for them to violate.

6. IDENTIFY DYNAMIC CRIMINAL RISK AND CRIMINOGENIC NEEDS/DEFICITS, AND TARGET BEHAVIORAL CHANGE INTERVENTIONS AND TREATMENT TO ALL PRIORITY CRIMINOGENIC NEEDS/DEFICITS

All of the discussions of evidence-based practices or the principles of effective correctional intervention indicate that assessing risk and needs is the key starting point to the entire process. They also advocate the use of standardized, validated risk and needs assessments for determining the risk level posed by the offender and the criminogenic needs that may require intervention. Moreover, risk is dynamic, reflecting real-time events. Thus, risk prediction must be dynamic, utilizing changeable factors as well as static ones (Connolly 2003; VanBenschoten 2008). Risk is also a driver of level of intervention and dosage of treatment. One size does not fit all, not only because it is wasteful, but because it is ineffective and counterproductive. Intensity or dosage must be tied to level of risk, and intensity of needs and assessments must be able to accurately measure intensity. The variety of interventions must be tied to the variety of criminogenic needs. Correctional intervention cannot continue just focusing on the primary or most obvious criminogenic problem. I have emphasized throughout that many criminal offenders come to the justice system with multiple problems and deficits. Perhaps one compelling explanation for recidivism (surely not the only one) is that the interventions provided did not sufficiently address all of the key, priority criminogenic needs.

The success of any interventions, services, or rehabilitation efforts is dependent on, among other factors, what is identified for intervention. Standardized assessments are fine for what they are. They are designed to discover or identify a limited range of needs or deficits. They can identify what they are designed to identify. They miss a wide range of circumstances, conditions, and deficits that are relevant to the intervention process. For example, few if any are designed to identify trauma and its consequences. There is little discussion of assessing cognitive or learning deficits and neurocognitive impairments, which clearly have consequences for an individual’s ability to learn. Structured assessments are fine, but they preclude deviating from the structured topics of the assessments. Clinical judgments and diagnosis are appropriate when there is evidence of such impairments and deficits.

Taxman and colleagues (2006: 5) describe the assessment and intervention plan as follows:

Under the behavioral management model, this phase [assessment and case planning to engage the offender in the change process] consists of four chief tasks: 1) identify or assess offenders’ criminogenic traits and triggers; 2) diagnose the typology of offender (drug, alcohol, dissociated, violent, domestic violence, sexual predator, etc.); 3) develop a supervision plan for changing offenders’ behavior that the offender and supervision staff mutually consent; and 4) implement the agreed upon plan through a behavioral contract that facilitates change.

What is described is a structured process of classification typically engaged in by probation staff. Understandably having probation staff do this is more efficient and cost conserving. However, it is at the same time rather limiting in terms of obtaining a comprehensive picture of an individual’s circumstances and situation. One element that is often missing in the assessment process is a true clinical diagnosis conducted by experts in mental or behavioral health.

Consensus indicates the following are the eight primary factors that are correlated or related to the propensity to engage in crime: a history of antisocial behavior; antisocial personality; antisocial values and attitudes; criminal peers; substance abuse; dysfunctional family relations; school/work failure; and lack of prosocial recreational and leisure activities. This consensus is good news because it allows probation staff to focus resources on these primary factors. This consensus is bad news because it allows probation staff to focus resources on only these primary factors. The point is that while these eight factors appear often as correlates or precursors to criminal activity, they are not the only factors that may require focus and resources. The “big eight” create the propensity to classify offenders into one or more of these eight categories. The point is that these eight may blind practitioners from the bigger picture, and create the tendency to think of offenders as categories or types rather than individuals.

In some respects, the process depicted by these discussions of assessment and classification is similar to the processes physicians use for diagnoses. Research has shown that many physicians make their minds up about a diagnosis on fairly limited information. Unsurprisingly, physicians are trained to look for certain things, and if they are specialists, which most are, they look within a fairly narrow range. The more limited the perspective, the more likely the diagnosis will miss potentially important information.

6. SUPERVISION SHOULD OCCUR IN THE COMMUNITY

The traditional office-based supervision is inadequate for understanding an offender’s circumstances and risk of reoffending. Places are criminogenic and research indicates that probationers tend to be geographically concentrated, living in a relatively small number of resource-poor, higher-risk neighborhoods. Place-based supervision appreciates the importance of geography and puts supervision officers in communities where they can better observe, establish relationships with family and friends, and become familiar with community resources and high-risk areas and people. In turn, much like the community policing model, place-based supervision puts officers in a position to be better informed and connected with local communities.

7. ENGAGE INFORMAL SOCIAL CONTROL

Research consistently shows that informal social control is more effective than formal legal sanctioning in fostering behavioral change and reducing recidivism. One of the advantages of community- or place-based supervision is the ability to leverage family, employers, friends, and community residents in engaging informal social control.

8. EMPLOY INCENTIVES AND REWARDS

Traditional supervision has relied primarily on sanctions and punishments for controlling and attempting to change behavior. While sanctions are important, exclusive use of punishment is ineffective in reducing recidivism. Positive reinforcement is a very important element in the process of behavior change, and the evidence indicates that positive reinforcement has persistent effects, while the effect of punishment quickly erodes. Incentives and rewards motivate compliance and progress and encourage positive responses. For example, reduction in supervision fees and earned discharge can motivate and reinforce compliance and progress. Incentives and rewards should be delivered swiftly, consistently, predictably, and with certainty for maximum impact. Incentives and rewards that are delayed or arbitrary are generally less effective.

Key to the big picture of behavioral change and supervision compliance is a balance between rewards and incentives on the one hand, and punishment and sanctions on the other. I now turn to the use of sanctions.

9. RESPOND WITH SWIFT AND CERTAIN GRADUATED SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS OR INAPPROPRIATE BEHAVIORS

Recidivism reduction, not revocation, should be the goal of probation. Revocation should be a last resort, after appropriate graduated sanctions or intermediate sanctions (supervisory and administrative hearings) and behavioral change interventions have been exhausted.

Punishment or sanctioning is relevant in the context of correctional control, risk management, and behavioral change. However, it is swift, certain, proportional, and graduated sanctioning that has been shown to be effective in supervision compliance and behavioral change. Again, sanctioning is effective in the context of a balance of rewards and sanctions.

In 2004, Judge Steven Alm responded to the frustration of high levels of probation violations by drug offenders by developing a new, specialized sanction court called Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE). The principle was simple: enhance compliance and accountability by invoking the two dimensions of punishment that do deter negative behavior—swift and certain punishment. The model has caught on, with variations of the HOPE Court in several jurisdictions, including Anchorage, Alaska; Maricopa County, Arizona; Fort Worth, Texas; and Austin, Texas, as well as in states such as Oregon, Washington, Massachusetts, and Arkansas.

The HOPE model is based on swift, certain, predictable, consistent, and proportional sanctions, which typically take the form of graduated stays in jail. The procedure involves a warning hearing in which the expectations for performance and the consequences for noncompliance are made clear. The theory is that revocation to prison is overkill and ineffective in many instances of probation violation and does nothing to change behavior. Deferred and low-probability threats of more severe punishment are not terribly effective. Instead, swift, certain, modest, and proportional sanctions (immediate, high-probability threats) may motivate compliance and progress on probation, largely based on the idea that immediate, proportional punishment is a more realistic threat.

The evidence indicates that the theory is on target. Evaluations by Hawken and Kleiman (2009) show substantial increases in supervision compliance and reductions in revocations in the Hawaii HOPE Court. Positive drug test results dropped dramatically as did no-shows for probation appointments in the HOPE sample. HOPE probationers, compared to the control group of probation as usual probationers, were 55 percent less likely to be arrested for a new crime, 72 percent less likely to use drugs, 61 percent less likely to skip appointments, and 53 percent less likely to have probation revoked. These results were found across probation offices, officers, and judges. An assessment regarding whether or not the effects persist is currently underway. The recent results indicate that the longer-term recidivism impacts of the HOPE Court are maintained (personal communication with Angela Hawken). The research evidence also indicates that where there is some erosion of the recidivism impact, it is a result of a drift from implementation fidelity of the HOPE model.

10. COMMUNITY SUPERVISION SHOULD CONSIST OF A BALANCE OF SUPERVISION, SURVEILLANCE, AND RISK MANAGEMENT ON THE ONE HAND, AND BEHAVIORAL CHANGE TREATMENT AND INTERVENTION ON THE OTHER

Probation is part risk management and part recidivism reduction. Risk management involves elements of surveillance and officer-offender contact, efforts that are aimed at restraint and control. However, surveillance and control have limited impacts on recidivism. Longer-term recidivism reduction requires behavioral change, such as drug and alcohol treatment, cognitive restructuring, employment training, mental health treatment, education, and so on. It is also important to engage offenders in the development of treatment and supervision plans. Offender participation in the process and agreement to the plan increases commitment, compliance, and motivation.

11. ENGAGE COMMUNITY EXPERTISE AND RESOURCES

A report for the Crime and Justice Institute and the National Institute of Corrections (Scott 2008: ix) provides a very realistic picture of the challenges faced by corrections personnel:

Corrections professionals must manage and supervise offenders who present with high-risk behaviors and complex, overlapping problems, including addiction, chronic mental health challenges, domestic violence, and sex offending behaviors. The complexity of the multi-problem offender necessitates that, in order to be effective in their work and to reduce recidivism, corrections professionals must work collaboratively with professionals in other fields, particularly those who provide behavioral healthcare. Correctional treatment, as defined here, is multidisciplinary.

Criminal offenders often have multiple, complex criminogenic deficits, circumstances, and needs. Identifying, prioritizing, and addressing these needs is not a simple matter and requires a variety of resources and expertise that many probation agencies do not possess. Establishing relationships with local community agencies and organizations is critical for providing appropriate behavioral change interventions, treatment, and rehabilitation.

There is a tendency for the government bid process to favor the low-cost provider for treatment and rehabilitation services, with less consideration given to differences in qualifications and expertise. Common sense would suggest that we get what we pay for, and using inexpensive treatment providers may save money up front, but the longer-term costs due to recidivism (police, jail, prosecutor, court, corrections) quickly obliterate those cost savings many times over. If we are going to get serious about behavior change and recidivism reduction, we need to get serious about quality of services. A reasonable approach to achieving enhanced quality of services is performance-based contracting, whereby providers are required to engage evidence-based practices with fidelity and sufficient flexibility for implementing the most effective interventions science provides. Performance-based contracts should be tied to outcomes, not outputs. Typical outcomes are successful completion of treatment, evidence of changes in reassessed risk and needs, and reductions in recidivism.

There is evidence that the incentives for achieving these outcomes are greater in the private and nonprofit sector, compared to government providers. Enhanced use of private and nonprofit providers may increase competition and, in turn, the quality of services, level of innovation, and cost-effectiveness. This is the strategy followed in the United Kingdom. As the chief executive of the National Offender Management System describes the logic (Terry 2006: 13):

We want to get a wider range of partners involved in managing offenders and cutting re-offending. Therefore, we will legislate to open up probation to other providers, and will only award contracts to those who can prove they will deliver reductions in re-offending, and keep the public safe. We need to bring in expertise from the private and voluntary sectors to drive up the quality and performance of community punishments.

These are the basic evidence-based practices that experts recommend probation agencies should implement. We know from the Taxman and colleagues (2007) national survey that as of the mid-2000s, use of these practices does not appear to be the norm. Again, the survey results just report use (yes, no) and not how much or how well. There is considerable work to be done in getting probation agencies to embrace the use of EBPs, accurately and appropriately implementing them, and monitoring their use. There is a substantial difference between doing it and doing it well.

The implementation of EBPs requires a significant reengineering of probation, which involves changing probation structures, policies and practices, roles and responsibilities, the culture of the organization, and funding. As Bourgon and colleagues (2010b: 2) conclude: “Translating empirical knowledge into system-wide everyday practice has proven difficult.” Obviously, integrity of implementation is critical and barriers can range from top-level administration not understanding the big picture of EBPs, to inadequate funding for treatment and intervention, to a lingering culture of probation as mainly enforcement, surveillance, and control, to line officers who do not engage the basics of the risk-need-responsivity (RNR) principles.

Caseload Size

Research indicates that simply reducing caseload size does not reduce recidivism (Jalbert et al. 2011). However, reduced caseloads in combination with surveillance/control and EBP treatment and rehabilitation services can reduce recidivism. Determining the appropriate caseload size going forward should be driven by consideration of the new role of probation officers. As the roles and responsibilities of probation staff are expanded, caseload size should shift to accommodate that expansion. It would obviously be inappropriate and counterproductive to implement the changes discussed herein but require probation staff to maintain caseloads that prevent effective interaction with offenders and the optimal balance of supervision and behavioral change efforts. Lutze and colleagues (2012) suggest a caseload upper limit of fifty for probation staff who are implementing the expanded roles and responsibilities.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY SUPERVISION INTERVENTION

The implementation of evidence-based practices and reinvention of the role of the supervision officer are important and essential changes to community supervision. However, they are just the starting point. The time has come for community corrections agencies to reject the idea that failure is an acceptable outcome of supervision. Failure is largely avoidable and preventable. The task now is to outline factors in addition to EBPs that are essential to reducing supervision failure.

One of the primary considerations is creating a role for clinical assessment and clinical expertise in the process of identifying and diagnosing not only criminogenic needs, but also cognitive and behavioral impairments such as low intellectual functioning, as well as developmental, behavioral, and psychosocial problems. It is known from clinical research that such functional impairments affect an individual’s ability to effectively participate in treatment, as well as adhere to supervision requirements. As I noted earlier, these cognitive impairments are often important in predicting treatment retention and success, and should provide critical guidance for adhering to the responsivity principle of matching treatment/intervention programs and modalities to the abilities of the offender. We know that cognitive and behavioral impairments can affect understanding, comprehension, memory, intellectual functioning, inappropriate responses to stress, poor judgment and coping skills, among others.

An obvious question is: Why does the justice system, in this case community supervision, have to ramp up implementation of EBPs, as well as screening, assessment, diagnosis, treatment planning, and structuring of treatment, to a level that rivals the evidence-based practices of clinical psychology in the private sector? The answer is simple: if the justice system does not come to the table and engage what it takes to effectively sustain behavioral change, no one else will, and the taxpayers will continue to pay time and time again for these failures. Each time an offender recidivates, the cash register rings and someone is needlessly victimized, incurring physical, financial, psychological, or emotional harm.

Reinventing the Role of the Probation Officer

A 2008 review of fifteen studies of recidivism among probationers (Bonta et al. 2008) found only a two percentage point reduction in recidivism associated with offenders on community supervision compared to alternative criminal sanctions. There was no reduction in violent recidivism. Such results raise important questions, especially when compared to the research on offender rehabilitation, which routinely finds substantial recidivism reductions associated with implementation of the Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR) model (Bourgon, Gutierrez, and Ashton 2012). A concerted focus on offender–probation officer interactions has led researchers to a better understanding of how typical probation officers fall short in the implementation of the RNR model, in establishing a therapeutic relationship, in the extent to which the offender-officer interactions focus on behavioral change, and in the efficacy of officers in promoting offender change (Bourgon et al. 2009; Bourgon, Gutierrez, and Ashton 2012; Gleicher, Manchak, and Cullen 2013).

In response to the research findings that probation officers do not sufficiently or effectively promote behavioral change, Canadian researchers developed an officer training program that focuses on enhancing the quality of the offender-officer relationship, concrete RNR-based intervention skills, prosocial modeling, effective use of disapproval and reinforcement, collaborative problem solving, and building trust between the officer and the offender. The Strategic Training Initiative in Community Supervision (STICS) is a training program built on research-based core correctional principles (Bonta et al. 2010b; Bourgon et al. 2010a; Bourgon et al. 2010b). STICS is based on the premise that criminal behavior is learned just as any other behavior is learned, and is subject to the laws of social learning and operant conditioning. It is based on changing officer behavior, which can lead to behavior change in offenders when the skills officers have learned are applied in officer-offender interactions. The STICS training protocol includes a three-day training session, followed by monthly skill maintenance meetings in which officers discuss and practice the skills they have learned. STICS also includes ongoing clinical support and a one-year follow up refresher course consisting of a day-long training.

Evaluation results indicate that STICS is important. Random assignment to STICS training and a no-training control showed that STICS-trained officers substantially improved their interactions with offenders in terms of engaging RNR-based skills and techniques, and at a two-year follow-up, the probationers supervised by STICS-trained officers had a recidivism rate of 25 percent compared to 41 percent for the control group. The STICS initiative has encouraged others to develop similar training programs for community supervision officers, including Staff Training Aimed at Reducing Rearrest (STARR) (Robinson et al. 2012) and Effective Practices in Community Supervision Settings (EPICS) (Thompson and Lovins 2012; Smith et al. 2012).

STARR, similar to STICS and EPICS, is an RNR-based training program that includes skill enhancement in active listening, role clarification, effective use of authority, effective disapproval and reinforcement, problem solving, and application of the cognitive model. Evaluation of the impact of STARR indicates the training substantially improves the strategies used by supervision officers and in turn significantly lowers recidivism (Robinson et al. 2012). The EPICS training applies the RNR model to supervision, trains officers on the core correctional practices, and coaches officers to intervene and to be proactive in offender decision making. It is designed to teach supervision officers to increase the dosage for higher-risk offenders, target criminogenic needs, and to use cognitive-behavioral and social learning skills and approaches with offenders in the context of supervision meetings. Officers are trained to intervene in offender situations, as well as trained in thinking, feelings, actions, and consequences. Core skills include cognitive restructuring and problem solving, among others. Evaluation results indicate that EPICS-trained officers used core correctional practices more consistently and became more proficient in the use of these skills.

The goal of all of these officer training programs (STICS, STARR, and EPICS) is to transition the role of the community supervision officer from case manager and law enforcement agent to a more balanced role of supervision officer and change agent. Bourgon, Gutierrez, and Ashton (2012: 6) describe it as follows:

It is the recent work of STICS … and other similar new training initiatives [that] suggests community supervision officers take on a more active and direct role in [order for] the change process to be more effective. A closer look at these training programs illustrates how community supervision officers are being encouraged to take on the “change agent” role. At the heart of these training courses are fundamental therapeutic concepts, cognitive-behavioural intervention techniques, and structuring skills. Officers are taught to take on a “change agent” role where the dominant task is to actively engage in the therapeutic change process with the client while traditional case management work is viewed as supplementary. This is a new demand on community supervision officers, challenging them to work with clients in a therapeutic manner and to employ skills and techniques that are firmly rooted in RNR principles so that they can directly facilitate personal, attitudinal, and behavioural change.

The point is simple and clear. Supervision as usual is not enough. Case management, while important, is insufficient in many cases for recidivism reduction. Accountability, compliance, and control are important but insufficient in many cases. It is time that community supervision recognizes that research and development have transformed the role of the community supervision officer in very important, research-based ways. There are significant challenges in making such transitions. For many, the new role of change agent requires substantially different ways of thinking, understanding new concepts, and applying them in day-to-day activities. This transition is not just a matter of training, although the training for STICS, STARR, or EPICS is obviously critical. It is a cultural shift, a repositioning toward a more balanced approach, which incorporates a substantial behavioral change role and responsibility for the officer in addition to case management, compliance, supervision, and accountability responsibilities.

However, it is important to caution that this new role for supervision officers does not and should not substitute for clinical therapy, counseling, and treatment. It is not the intent that the officer is the therapist/counselor and that clinical expertise is no longer needed. That may be sufficient in some cases, but it is a clinical decision whether an offender needs expert therapy or counseling.

The Question of Funding

It is important to be realistic with regard to funding—what is proposed herein for community supervision is not cheap. It will require more extensive screening and assessment; participation by clinical experts on a more consistent basis; substantially increased utilization of treatment and rehabilitation programming; higher standards for treatment and rehabilitation reflecting evidence-based practices of psychology, psychiatry, social work, and others; enhanced training for supervision officers; reduced caseloads, resulting in the need for more officers; and greater use of evaluation of effectiveness, among others.

At the same time that costs substantially increase, program retention and successful completion of supervision will increase, and violations, revocations, and recidivism, both short term and long term, will decline. There will be significantly reduced cycling of offenders in and out of the justice system and victimization will decline. Probation is an opportunity to keep offenders out of prison and jail, the outcomes for which are much grimmer. Probation is an opportunity to hold offenders accountable, supervise them, and require compliance with thoughtfully considered, individualized conditions of supervision. It is also an opportunity to address the reasons for criminal involvement in a setting that is much more conducive to behavior change. It is an opportunity to reverse past failures, both institutional and individual. Many criminal offenders are a product of failed public institutions, and many are a product of poor individual choices and self-imposed circumstances. So why should the justice system have to pick up the pieces and fix these failures and mistakes? Because no one else will. If the justice system does not engage in behavior change and recidivism reduction, the burden and the cost will continue to fall on the justice system, as the revolving door of the past forty years continues spinning.

Current funding models encourage probation as usual, a system whereby problem offenders are revoked off of probation caseloads and sent to prison. This approach is encouraged because probation is either funded primarily at the county level, or when funded by the state, the supervision budgets are separate from prison. Thus, there is a presumably unintended incentive to revoke probationers and pass the cost on to the state or to the state prison budget (LAO 2009 describes the revocation incentive as a primary problem with California probation). As funding for probation declined over the past several decades as funds were appropriated to prison construction and operation, those incentives likely increased. As the Justice Center, at the Council of State Governments (2011) notes:

Inadequate funding of community corrections agencies puts incredible strain on these organizations, which has significant, unintended consequences. There is little incentive for officers to keep individuals on caseloads instead of returning them to jail or prison at the first opportunity. In fact, helping people comply with conditions of release will result in an officer’s caseload remaining high or even swelling, even while reducing revocation rates. States and localities can re-align their fiscal relationship by sharing the savings from avoided prison costs with successful probation and parole agencies.

Going forward, the funding formula for probation must change. The performance incentive funding (PIF) or the performance-based funding model is advocated by a number of policy organizations, including the Council of State Governments, the Pew Center on the States, Public Safety Performance Project, and the Vera Institute. As of November 2012, eight states have implemented some form of performance-based community supervision funding. California was an early adopter of this model.

California has been operating a prison system at approximately 200 percent capacity, and nearly 40 percent of new prison admissions in 2009 were probation revocations. Moreover, California probationers had a successful completion rate about 10 percent lower than most other states. This led to the development in California of a performance-based funding model (SB 678, The Community Corrections Performance Incentives Act) that reduces the probation revocation incentive and provides enhanced funding for probation to implement best practices and engage behavior change strategies and recidivism reduction. The model is simple. A portion of the avoided incarceration costs due to the reduction of probation revocations (approximately 40 to 45 percent) are allocated to probation agencies in counties that reduced revocations; the funds are intended for implementation of enhanced probation services. For counties that already had low revocation rates, the California legislation provides for High Performance Grant awards that allocate funding for counties that were already reducing revocations. As probation improves and revocation and recidivism decline, prison costs are reduced, probation budgets increase, and public safety is enhanced. A 2011 assessment of SB 678 in California shows a 32 percent reduction in probation revocations in 2011 (two years after the legislation was in place), resulting in a savings of $278 million in prison costs. More than $136 million was distributed to local probation departments in 2012 and 2013. Moreover, forty-seven of California’s fifty-eight counties reduced their revocation rates, and fourteen counties qualified for High Performance Grants of $87.5 million in 2011. Use of revocation reduction funding and High Performance Grant funds is tied to implementation of evidence-based practices.

California’s 2013–2014 budget proposes a reduction of $139 million in performance incentive funding for local probation departments. The proposed total PIF funding is $35 million. This is based in part on the observation that California probation departments have successfully reduced revocation to prison. However, it is unclear how and if probation will be able to sustain these reductions in the face of funding cuts.

Other states that have some version of performance incentive funding for probation include Arkansas (2011), Illinois (2009), Kansas (2008), Kentucky (2011), Ohio (2011), South Carolina (2010), and Texas (2011). One lesson learned is to define multiple performance measures so that funding is not simply tied to revocation reductions. This will help enhance probation performance in a variety of areas such as assessment, rehabilitation and treatment services, training for supervision officers, and successful supervision completion. In turn, these performance improvements, tied to evidence-based practices, will enhance public safety.

Public Opinion About Probation

The public is clearly on board regarding diverting nonviolent offenders from incarceration to a more effective community supervision alternative (Pew Center on the States 2012). Nearly 85 percent of survey respondents believe that some of the money being spent on incarceration of low-risk, nonviolent offenders should be shifted to strengthening community corrections. Although respondents were not asked about California’s performance incentive funding, the opinion results indicate compelling public support for such initiatives.

PAROLE AND SUPERVISED RELEASE TODAY

Parole is conditional, supervised early release from prison (the terms parole, early release, supervised release, and conditional supervision are all used interchangeably in this section). Depending on the jurisdiction and therefore the laws that govern release from prison, an individual is eligible to be considered for discretionary early release after he or she has served the requisite percentage (25 percent, 33 percent, 50 percent, 85 percent, and so on, depending on the offense and the jurisdiction) of the sentence imposed. The requisite percentage of the sentence served is generally set by the state legislature. Discretionary parole was originally designed as a component of correctional rehabilitation, and was coupled with indeterminate sentencing, in which offenders were incarcerated for an indeterminate period of time. The point was that inmates progress or get better at different rates, therefore the decision regarding when they were ready for release was up to the parole board. The concept was in theory tailored to the circumstances and progress of individual offenders. Parole was designed as an incentive for good behavior and cooperation in whatever programming was required while incarcerated, and as a safety net, providing supervision and control over releasees to reduce the risk of reoffending. Parole was also designed as a way to assist or facilitate successful reintegration or reentry into the community. In the event that an individual violates the conditions of release, with probable cause, the parole authority may initiate a revocation process whereby the parole board will determine whether the individual shall be revoked back to prison, or allowed to remain on parole, perhaps with modified conditions.

Mandatory release is automatic (not discretionary), and is dictated by prevailing law in a particular jurisdiction. Mandatory release may or may not involve conditional supervision. For example, in Virginia, mandatory parole occurs when an inmate is six months from completing a sentence. In Texas, it is when the calendar time served plus any good conduct credits equal the sentence imposed.

The balance of prison releases that are discretionary parole decisions versus mandatory releases has shifted dramatically over the past forty years. In 1976, two-thirds of inmates released from prison were discretionary parole releases. In 2014, over three-quarters are mandatory releases. There is substantial variation across states regarding the use of discretionary release. For example, California, Illinois, New Mexico, Indiana, and New Hampshire have essentially abandoned discretionary parole and rely on mandatory release. On the other hand, Alabama, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, and Florida rely nearly exclusively on discretionary release decisions by parole boards or commissions.

A key element in the shift away from discretionary release is truth in sentencing and the impact it has had on early release and mandatory release laws. Truth in sentencing is the term that applies to the gap between sentence imposed and actual time served under traditional indeterminate sentencing schemes. The effects of truth in sentencing on parole and mandatory release vary by jurisdiction. The federal government eliminated parole all together. Several other states eliminated discretionary parole. The majority of states adopted the federal truth in sentencing standard of requiring inmates convicted of violent felonies (typically murder, attempted murder, rape, sexual assault, aggravated assault, robbery) to serve 85 percent of the sentence imposed before they are eligible for release.

There are fifty-two different state parole agencies in the United States, consisting of nearly 2,300 parole offices, and an estimated 14,000 full-time parole officers responsible for supervising active parolees. With around 850,000 parolees in the United States in 2012, the average caseload per officer is around seventy parolees, about twice the caseload that experts recommend (Baer et al. 2006). The majority of these parolees are on active supervision, meaning they must meet with their parole officer on a regular basis as a condition of their parole—generally at least once a month.

For the past two decades or so, approximately 600,000 to 700,000 inmates have been released from the nation’s prisons each year, and the vast majority (80 percent) have been on conditional, supervised release. There is some reason to suspect that this flood of prison releases beginning in the mid-1990s may not have been fully anticipated. Crime control has focused on maximizing punishment—lock ’em up and throw away the key. Despite our efforts to increase the length of sentences imposed and time served, the reality is that the vast majority do come home. The question is: What happens once they are released? How well do our community supervision systems manage this flood of inmates who are released from prisons, many of whom receive little or no programming or rehabilitative services, and for whom the prison experience is criminogenic? How well do we manage the public safety risk posed by these individuals? Are we able to effectively assist in successful reintegration into the community? Reentry into the community after a period of incarceration is often neither smooth nor successful. Two-thirds are rearrested and nearly 50 percent of offenders end up reincarcerated within three years following their release from prison (Pew Center on the States 2001; Visher and Travis 2011). The recidivism rate varies widely based on the individual policies and practices of each state, from a low of 24 percent in Oklahoma to a high of 66 percent in Utah. The notable variation in these rates can partially be accounted for by the unique parole revocation policies employed by each state. Despite overall decreases in crime across the United States, the recidivism rate among those released from prison has instead increased almost 12 percent between 1999 and 2004. Former prison inmates account for 15 to 20 percent of all adult arrests, so individuals we have punished and released account for substantial amounts of prison admissions, crimes, arrests, and victimizations. Parole revocations and new offenses by parolees account for 35 percent of prison admissions nationally.

The Urban Institute took the lead in the early 2000s in a nationwide assessment of prison release and reentry—a report card of sorts. The results are essentially consistent with what we already know about how well the justice system works: the prison release, parole, and supervised release picture is pretty bleak. This is a product of several collaborating factors: unmanageable supervision caseloads, inadequate programming and rehabilitation services in prison, inadequate programming and rehabilitation services while on supervision, a clear lack of funding for programs and services for supervision populations, a primary emphasis on risk management rather than successful reintegration, and lack of community-based resources, among others.

Research by Glaze and Bonczar (2011), Harlow (2003), James and Glaze (2006), MacLellan (2005), and the National Research Council (2007) provides a profile of the characteristics of individuals released from U.S. prisons. The vast majority are male (88 percent). Race and ethnicity are varied, with 42 percent categorized as white, 39 percent black, and 18 percent Hispanic. Drug offenses tend to be the most common crime for which releasees find themselves originally incarcerated (35 percent), followed by violent offenses (27 percent), property offenses (25 percent), and sex offenses (8 percent) (Glaze and Bonczar 2011). Forty percent of state prisoners have never completed high school or received a GED, and around half are functionally illiterate (Harlow 2003; MacLellan 2005). Mental and physical illnesses also tend to be widespread across this population. Over half of all state inmates suffer from a mental health problem (James and Glaze 2006). Inmates also exhibit higher rates of health problems than the general population, particularly chronic illnesses such as HIV and AIDS, hepatitis C, and tuberculosis (Roman and Travis 2004). Substance abuse issues are similarly prevalent. An estimated 60 to 80 percent of all prisoners are drug dependent or abusers and require extensive treatment and follow-up after release from prison (National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse 1998; National Research Council 2007).

The Returning Home research conducted by the Urban Institute (Baer et al. 2006) profiles the needs of returning inmates, the services and programming received while they were in prison, and the services and programming they receive while on supervised release in the community. The research also looks at the impacts on families, communities, and public safety. Here is what we know from this substantial undertaking:

Gainful employment is a tremendous challenge for releasees. The majority stated they needed assistance finding a job, but very few received any in-prison employment training. Twenty percent stated they had a job lined up upon release, while well under 50 percent worked at all eight months after release; 24 percent were employed full time. Transportation appeared as a significant barrier to employment.

Significant health and mental health problems are common. Thirty to forty percent have been diagnosed with a chronic physical or mental health condition; only a small fraction (10 to 15 percent) receives any in-prison treatment. Corrections agencies tend to lack discharge planning and referral provisions, dramatically impacting access to care. The vast majority of releases lack health insurance; incarceration disqualifies inmates from Medicaid, and it takes several months postrelease to reinstate it, denying access to care and medication.

Housing is a substantial problem; while a majority of releasees live with family or intimate partners upon release, for many it is temporary. Seventy percent of releasees report that they would need assistance securing housing upon return; there is little evidence they receive any help. There are obvious barriers to former prison inmates finding housing, including lack of affordable housing, legal barriers, and eligibility requirements. Estimates vary, but it appears that at least 10 to 15 percent of prison releasees are homeless soon after release for some period of time; the estimates of homelessness are dramatically higher for releasees who are mentally ill and/or have substance abuse problems (Roman and Travis 2004). Research shows that the likelihood of parole revocation is considerably higher for parolees who are homeless; it should be obvious that complying with supervision conditions is more difficult when someone is homeless.

Substance abuse (addiction, dependence, or abuse) is the most common criminogenic condition among prison inmates. Research indicates that from 60 to over 80 percent of state prison inmates have substance abuse problems, yet only 15 to 25 percent receive any treatment while incarcerated; in some states, it is considerably lower. For those who receive treatment, there is a critical discontinuity upon release because provisions for aftercare are essentially absent. There is an obvious heightened probability of recidivism and revocation for those with untreated or undertreated substance abuse problems.

Inmates released from prison tend to have extensive criminal histories and the majority are revoked or recidivate early in their release period. Research indicates that half of those arrested were on probation, parole, or pretrial release at the time of their arrest (Pew Center on the States 2011): 60 percent of all felony-level arrests in 2000 were committed by individuals on parole (Rainville and Reaves 2003). There is a clear pattern to parolee recidivism; the Returning Home findings, as well as research by Ekland-Olson and Kelly (1993) and the National Research Council (2007), among others, have documented the transition curve, which shows that the first nine to twelve months are the period of greatest risk of recidivism.

Surveys of inmates who were soon to be released reveal a variety of self-reported needs. These reflect potential criminogenic needs as well as factors that simply could enhance the likelihood of successful reintegration. These needs constitute areas in which the prison system, the parole agencies, and local community agencies could assist. The key services in which the percent of males state they need assistance include: education (94 percent), driver’s license (83 percent), job training (82 percent), employment (80 percent), transportation (72 percent), changing criminal attitudes (64 percent), a mentor (60 percent), access to clothing and food (60 percent), medical treatment (56 percent), and housing (49 percent). Females report greater need for services than males, including education (95 percent), employment (83 percent), a mentor (83 percent), a driver’s license (82 percent), access to food and clothing (76 percent), and mental health treatment (55 percent).

Research conducted by the Returning Home project indicates that only half of releasees report that their parole officer was helpful in the transition from prison to the community. The number of prison releasees has increased substantially in the past ten to fifteen years, caseloads have risen to unmanageable levels, resources are extremely limited, and the characteristics of inmates (criminogenic deficits or problems) are associated with a higher likelihood of recidivism or revocation. Taking all of this into consideration, I ask three broad questions. First, is parole supervision or supervised release effective in terms of enhancing public safety or improving reentry transitions? The research indicates that it is not. An Urban Institute study (Solomon, Kachnowski, and Bhati 2005) of fourteen states leads to the conclusion that parole supervision has little effect on rearrest rates. This conclusion is supported by research reported by the Washington State Institute of Public Policy, which indicates that parole supervision without treatment does not produce reductions in recidivism (Aos, Miller, and Drake 2006a). These are not surprising findings given the phenomenal challenges faced by both offenders and parole systems. Parole is largely focused on supervision, control, and risk management. Such tactics can control some offending, but at the end of the day, there is not much in place that serves to change behavior. In turn, there is not much in place to reduce recidivism. As Bogue and colleagues (2004:1) state, “the conventional approach to supervision in this country emphasizes individual accountability from offenders and their supervising officers without consistently providing either with the skills, tools and resources that science indicates are necessary to accomplish risk and recidivism reduction.”

The second question is: What do we expect? We release hundreds of thousands of prisoners each year who are generally worse off than when they went into prison. We have documented the criminogenic problems of offenders, the inability or unwillingness of prison systems to engage much behavioral change intervention or treatment, the difficulties releasees face in the community, the inability or unwillingness of parole agencies and officers to effectively assist in the transition from prison to community, and the restrictions the law places on what ex-offenders may and may not lawfully do in the free world, among many others. We continue to punish offenders well after they have “paid for their crimes.” For example, states impose a wide variety of restrictions on licensing for hundreds of occupations; there are significant restrictions on ex-felons obtaining government education grants and aid, on serving in the military, obtaining veterans’ benefits, food stamps, and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) benefits, and doing business with the government. Other benefits (such as Medicare and Medicaid) are curtailed while an individual is incarcerated and require reapplication upon release, a task that is often challenging for homeless, substance abusing, and/or mentally ill individuals, as well as those without those challenges. This is just a very brief sampling of the restrictions and limitations placed on offenders. Not that these restrictions are always necessarily wrong, but they make successful reentry and reintegration more difficult.

When viewed through this lens of circumstances, it becomes clear—the odds of an offender turning it around when released from prison are quite limited. The question is not what would we like to happen, but realistically, what do we expect offenders to do when released from prison? Prison (revocation) should not be the remedy for a failed prison and community supervision system.

I had a conversation about fifteen years ago with the head of the parole division of a state criminal justice agency. In the course of the discussion, this person stated that the purpose or function of parole is as a sorting mechanism: those who can make it do, and those who can’t, get revoked. This person further indicated that the success of parole is the effective identification of those who can’t make it—the revocation rate. That way of thinking speaks volumes.

The third question is: Where do we go from here? There are two versions of the answer, one for near- to medium-term supervised release and one for the longer term. The difference is one of scale and composition of the release population. In the near to medium term, supervised release will be at or near the current level of 500,000 to 600,000 releasees per year, with substantial demands on supervision agencies and officers. In the near term, incarceration will continue to be used as it has been for the past few decades and individuals will be released at current rates. During this period, the supervised release systems will need to balance supervision, accountability, and community-based intervention and treatment for numbers of releasees at or near current levels. Intermediate sanctions or graduated sanctions are effective strategies for holding offenders accountable, providing need-based interventions (such as substance abuse treatment), and reducing revocations to prison. The use of intermediate sanctions in a number of states (for example, Arkansas, Texas, Kentucky, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Kansas, and Pennsylvania, among others) has resulted in significant reductions in recidivism and revocations (Urban Institute 2013).

It is critical that supervised release transition into a system for providing the balance of risk management, accountability, and compliance on the one hand, and the resources for effective behavior change on the other. One of the keys to going forward is substantially reducing the flow of revoked parolees back to prison. The only evidence-based way of doing that is through effective behavioral change.

As justice systems transition to a substantially greater reliance on rehabilitative diversion through mechanisms such as problem-solving courts, probation, and deferred adjudication (combined with rehabilitation), and in turn as the prison population changes in size and composition, the volume of prison releases will decline. At the same time, we will see the composition of the prison population and the release population change to higher risk as more serious offenders are incarcerated for longer sentences and greater time served, and lower-risk property and drug offenders are diverted from incarceration. As those changes come about, by necessity, the roles and responsibilities of supervised release will change, focusing more on risk management, accountability, and supervision for the high-risk violent offender segment, the habitual offender segment, and the segment of offenders identified as untreatable. Supervised release will also have to focus on risk reduction through intervention and rehabilitation, although for a uniformly more challenging population than now is the case. The end game here is to transition the prison systems to nearly exclusively focusing on incapacitating a relatively smaller but high-risk offender population, balanced against an increasingly rehabilitation-focused diversion from prison for nonviolent, property, and drug offenders, who are not habitual offenders or untreatable.

EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR PAROLE AND SUPERVISED RELEASE

The near- to medium-term policies governing supervised release from prison must adopt research-based programs and strategies to reduce recidivism and victimization, and enhance successful reentry and reintegration. Because prisoner reentry has been a neglected policy area, there is not nearly as much research on best practices as in other criminal justice areas. Some research has been conducted on what is effective with parole, and there are several state-level initiatives that are instructive for developing a path forward. In addition, evidence-based practices used for probation supervision can apply well in the parole setting.

In 2004, the Bush administration announced its commitment to a multiyear federal reentry initiative. In April of 2008, the administration signed the Second Chance Act, legislation that supports the implementation of a variety of reentry efforts. The 2010 budget for the Second Chance Act was $100 million, followed by $83 million in 2011, $63 million in 2012, $64 million in 2013, and the Obama administration’s proposed $119 million for 2014. Federal leadership in this reentry initiative has dramatically focused attention on the issues and remedies and has provided funding to local jurisdictions for program implementation. Some experts mark the passage of the Second Chance Act as a “turning point in U.S. history in terms of justice policy” (Travis, Crayton, and Makamal 2010).

The current emphasis of the reauthorized Second Chance Act is in seven “purpose areas,” which are the priorities for funding:

1.  Educational, literacy, vocational, and job placement services.

2.  Substance abuse treatment and services, including programs that start in placement and continue through the community.

3.  Comprehensive supervision and services in the community, including programs that provide housing assistance and mental and physical health services.

4.  Family integration during and after placement for both offenders and their families.

5.  Mentoring programs that start in placement and continue into the community.

6.  Victim-appropriate services, including those that promote the timely payment of restitution by offenders and those that offer services (such as security or counseling) to victims when offenders are released.

7.  Protection of communities from dangerous offenders, including developing and implementing the use of risk assessment tools to determine when offenders should be released from prison.

The U.S. Justice Department launched a major initiative to implement and evaluate reentry services for prisoners and releasees, particularly high-risk, violent offenders. The Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative (SVORI) began in 2003. SVORI attempted to measure how five major elements of reentry—criminal justice outcomes, housing, education, health, and employment—were affected by the creation of prerelease treatment plans and accessible services postrelease for eligible offenders. Substance abuse treatment, cognitive-based programs, and, in particular, educational programming proved to have modest yet positive effects on housing, education, health, and employment outcomes. Interestingly, programs with a focus on “practical needs”—employment, drug use, life skills, and reentry preparation—did not prove beneficial to ex-offenders and even negatively affected nonrecidivism outcomes in some cases. Recidivism outcomes were modest at best. The mixed results from the SVORI initiative are likely due to less than full implementation of the interventions, insufficient program dosage (amount or intensity of the intervention provided), and the fact that interventions were most intense while offenders were incarcerated, and tailed off after release (Visher and Travis 2011).

A number of states have placed a priority on tackling the issues surrounding prisoner reentry in the community. Below are short summaries of the actions taken by a number of states. While tactics among the states differ, a number of trends shine through. First and foremost is acknowledging the interconnectedness of reentry with the entirety of the criminal justice system.

Successful reentry into the community is closely tied to correctional and sentencing policies. A number of states have recognized the importance of this relationship and made crucial, comprehensive reforms across their criminal justice systems. One such state is Oregon, which features the lowest recidivism rate in the United States, and places a large emphasis on implementing evidence-based practices in its criminal justice system. Oregon’s SB 267, passed in 2003, requires all corrections programs receiving money from the state to be evidence-based in both design and actual implementation, including regular evaluations. Additionally, in an effort to target the reentry process, prisoners in Oregon receive a risk and needs assessment at the time of intake into prison. These assessments serve as a basis for case management and the transition plan for the offender’s release from prison, beginning six months prior to his or her release. Once on parole, offenders face graduated sanctions for violations of community supervision, including short-term stays in jail. As a result, only 3.3 percent of Oregon’s offenders released from prison in 2004 returned to prison within three years due to a technical violation. Oregon’s overall recidivism rate among released prisoners is 22.8 percent—vastly better than the national average (Pew Center on the States 2011).

Michigan emphasized improving reentry outcomes among offenders through the Michigan Prisoner Reentry Initiative (MPRI). Born initially out of a budget crisis, the MPRI was expanded statewide in 2008 after positive results at a local level. Under MPRI, offenders receive a risk, needs, and strength assessment at prison intake, which is used to create a case management plan. Prior to release, inmates transfer to a facility specifically tailored to those about to reenter society, where a transition plan is created to address the necessities of postrelease life. This is done in close conjunction with community service providers. The results are impressive: offenders involved in MPRI are one-third less likely to return to prison than those who do not participate. Additionally, due to greater confidence in the ability of parole to reduce recidivism, parole boards are approving more offenders for parole, relieving some of the stress on Michigan’s prisons (Pew Center on the States 2011).

Missouri has addressed reentry issues at both the incarceration stage and the postrelease stage. While an offender is incarcerated, the Missouri Department of Corrections uses an assessment of the offender to create a Transition Accountability Plan, which is shared with the parole board and the parole agency responsible for the offender following his release from prison (Council of State Governments 2005). Missouri has also targeted its historically high levels of parole revocations due to technical violations. Recognizing the strain placed on its criminal justice system (and the inevitable costs that accompany such a heavy reliance on incarceration), Missouri created a comprehensive plan to reduce the number of technical violations. This approach took the form of an “inter-agency team that drafted a vision and set goals, continued through a pilot project and ultimately took flight through new policies and procedures, coupled with extensive parole and probation staff training, in 2006” (Pew Center on the States 2011: 23). Postprison supervision is now referred to as “e-driven supervision,” an evidence-based supervision using risk assessment tools and a variety of graduated sanctions that do not include prison time. Since implementing “e-driven supervision,” Missouri’s prison population has leveled out and the two-year recidivism rate among offenders dropped from 46 percent in 2004 to 36.4 percent in 2009 (Pew Center on the States 2011: 23).

The Urban Institute convened a wide variety of national practitioner and academic experts on parole supervision to identify strategies to enhance reentry outcomes. The experts identified thirteen strategies for which there was consensus (Solomon et al. n.d.). Two primary approaches were utilized: (a) research evidence on parole strategies; and (b) because of the relative scarcity of such research, “best thinking” or the combination of expert and practitioner experience, knowledge, and theory was also used. The thirteen strategies are as follows:

  1.  Define success as recidivism reduction and measure performance (focus on outcomes, such as recidivism reduction, rather that outputs, like contact standards).

  2.  Tailor conditions of supervision to the individual (responsivity).

  3.  Focus resources on moderate- and high-risk parolees.

  4.  Frontload supervision resources.

  5.  Implement earned discharge.

  6.  Implement place-based supervision based on GIS assessment of the location of parolees.

  7.  Engage partners to expand intervention capacities.

  8.  Assess criminogenic risk and need factors.

  9.  Develop and implement supervision case plans that balance surveillance and treatment.

10.  Involve parolees to enhance their engagement in assessment, case planning, and supervision.

11.  Engage informal social controls to facilitate community reintegration.

12.  Incorporate incentives and rewards into the supervision process.

13.  Employ graduated, problem-solving responses to violations of parole conditions in a swift and certain manner.

Moreover, Petersilia (2004) indicated that the evidence also supports beginning treatment in prison and providing continuity in the community by continuing treatment and/or aftercare, and providing intensive interventions for at least six months. These strategies are standard evidence-based practices that overlap nearly completely with what I discussed earlier in this chapter regarding probation. As I discussed there, these evidence-based practices, faithfully and fully implemented, are the starting point. Meta-analyses of particular reentry programs have used ratings of the quality of evaluations to determine which are more rigorous than others. The use of these methodological and statistical criteria allows readers to have added confidence regarding what has been demonstrated to be effective. Programs that have been shown to work in prisoner reentry include employment, in the form of vocational and work programs that improve job readiness; drug treatment, including intensive treatment in prison, followed by integrated aftercare after release; and transitional housing, often in the form of halfway houses. Research shows that participation improves employment, self-sufficiency, self-support, and participation in other improvement programming (James 2011; Seiter and Kadela 2003).

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR PAROLE AND SUPERVISED RELEASE

Several states have begun reducing their prison populations, as well as expanding probation caseloads. This is largely a response to tight budgets as a consequence of the recession that began in 2008. While reducing the prison population and increasing reliance on probation are moves in the right direction, absent many essential elements, these efforts may very well jeopardize public safety. Releasing inmates from prison without the resources in place to manage risk, reduce recidivism and enhance successful reentry is incautious.

As I discussed earlier, parole, like probation, must ramp up efforts to assess, diagnose, and treat a variety of criminogenic deficits, including the array of neurocognitive impairments that often are found among criminal offenders. We need to get better at assessing trauma and its effects. Substance abuse is a quite prevalent criminogenic factor, but efforts at intervention pale in comparison to the need. Absent housing, employment, and mental health, successful reentry is problematic. Supervised release needs to achieve a balance between risk management, control, and accountability on the one hand, and rehabilitation on the other. Individual offenders should be considered individuals, not categories. Furthermore, supervision agencies should not rely on prisons engaging in much more treatment or release preparation than they currently do. There needs to be the realistic presumption that the bulk of the assessment, planning, treatment, and aftercare will be the responsibility of community corrections.

Culture Change

The bigger picture is a cultural change in how we think about supervised release and recidivism, and how we think about, develop, and implement the tools, tactics, training, and funding needed to effectively reduce risk, recidivism, and victimization. Failure on parole (revocation) is not a success. It should not be a sorting device, driven by the strategy of “tail ’em, nail ’em, and jail ’em.” Failure is in many cases avoidable and preventable if we are willing to do what it takes, especially for the near- and medium-term timeline for supervised release. The challenges are substantial. This is a higher-risk population than probation and higher risk still due to the criminogenic effects of prison, as well as the barriers we continue to impose on releasees during the supervision period and after they are discharged from parole.

Caseloads

Caseload size, which translates into workload demand, must be reduced if we are serious about risk management and recidivism reduction. Parolees present complex constellations of problems, deficits, and circumstances, and they are high risk and reoffend quickly and often. Supervision is not enough, but if it was, current caseloads do not permit effective supervision, let alone accommodating what parole should look like going forward.

Role of the Supervision Officer

As is the case with probation, the role of the parole officer needs substantial revision. It is clear that the case manager and law enforcement role is insufficient for reducing recidivism. Once again, the goal is to strike a balance between supervision and control and change agent. This is a new perspective and requires a cultural change and training and retraining in approaches such as problem solving. The STICS, STARR, and EPICS programs are appropriate for training parole officers in this new role. The Center for Effective Public Policy, the Urban Institute, and the Carey Group have developed a series of coaching packets as part of the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s Prisoner Reentry Initiative (Domurad and Carey 2010). These provide technical assistance to local jurisdictions regarding strategic planning for reentry initiatives, implementing evidence-based practices, case management, behavioral change, and so on. Much of the material in these coaching packets is relevant to supervision staff and supervision officers as well as administrators.

A Promising Risk-Assessment Strategy

Risk assessment has improved significantly in the past ten years, but there is still considerable room for improvement. This is a critical issue because the efficacy of intervention efforts depends on our ability to identify for whom interventions are appropriate and potentially productive. Recent research on “signaling” provides an opportunity to incorporate and test the role of signals that inmates or parolees send regarding their willingness to engage in activities and programs that are prosocial. The example used in the research is employment training (Bushway and Apel 2012). The fact that an inmate participates in employment training or other voluntary activities while incarcerated, activities that require significant effort, may indicate they are a good candidate for intervention or successful reentry. Such signals may also be used postrelease to tap likelihood of reoffending and reentry outcomes. The fact that these kinds of measures are potentially fluid and can be assessed in real time makes them appealing. It is certainly worth investigating their relevance in the bigger picture of risk and recidivism reduction (Mears and Mestra 2012).

Collaboration with Key Stakeholders

The initiatives discussed here require more than establishing partnerships with local community-based resources. Clearly that is necessary as capacity for rehabilitative programming is extremely limited. In addition, however, the cooperation and collaboration of a variety of other justice agencies are required. These include law enforcement, prosecutors, judges, parole authorities, legislators, and the executive branch (Vera Institute of Justice 2013). But it is not just soliciting cooperation. Instead, this effort requires selling the benefits of these new initiatives to individuals who have been practicing in an environment of crime control and punishment. The rebalancing of risk management/control on the one hand, and rehabilitation and behavioral change on the other, is not a “no brainer” for all key players in the justice system.

Setting Appropriate Expectations

I am talking about an evolutionary process, one that requires many moving parts to act in concert. Changing minds, changing policy, changing procedure and practice, changing law, and changing funding will take time.

Leadership

Effective, visionary, bold leadership is essential to guide this process, motivate cooperation and compliance, and implement the necessary changes. It is not just a matter of having the language down. Being familiar with evidence-based practices is not the same as directing the faithful, full implementation of evidence-based practices. It requires that the leadership “gets it,” which places added pressure on making the right choices in the selection process, but it is absolutely essential.

Funding

What is proposed here, as in the case with probation, is a substantial ramping up of efforts and resources, and in turn funding. Current funding models will not support the level and scope of implementation required to reduce recidivism and enhance successful reentry. A reasonable approach for parole funding going forward is the performance incentive funding model developed and utilized in California, Illinois, and several other states (Vera Institute of Justice 2013)

In order for this performance incentive funding model to work, parole agencies will need to be tied to specific geographic areas. Probation agencies are typically at the county level. Parole may or may not be so geographically specific. That way, performance is assessed at a local level and funding is allocated to a local area.

Reentry Courts

The alternative, problem-solving court model has evolved into a variety of different types, including one of the more recent versions, the reentry court. The premise is quite similar to drug courts, mental health courts, or community courts. The model is based on therapeutic jurisprudence or judicial oversight to assure accountability and enhance public safety, and programming and services to facilitate behavioral change. The primary difference is that while the other versions are diversion courts, the reentry court deals with the population of offenders who have been released from prison. The key strategy is the adaptation of the principles of problem solving, community-based services, and judicial oversight to manage the transition from prison to community.

The rationale for reentry courts centers on several observations. First, prison releasees are high risk and high needs and therefore require a coordinated, powerful intervention or set of interventions to facilitate behavioral change. Moreover, because of their high risk and high needs, a highly structured environment is preferable to leaving a highly structured environment (prison) and moving to a much less structured environment. Third, the judge, as a significant authority figure, can serve as a powerful change agent who takes an interest in individuals’ welfare and progress, who hands out incentives and sanctions, and who problem solves and provides links with necessary social services (clearly with the assistance of expert court staff). Finally, the court can help hold collaborating local community agencies to a necessary standard of care and accountability, and can hold the offender and all other participants in the process to a high level of accountability and performance.

Today there are over twenty-five reentry courts across the nation. While they share a similar basic premise, they differ somewhat in design, implementation, and operation. Here is what is known about the key components of a reentry court, based on research conducted by the Center for Court Innovation and the Bureau of Justice Assistance (Hamilton 2010; Lindquist et al. 2013; Wolf 2011). They include psychosocial screening and assessment to determine criminogenic needs and services required; collaborative case planning involving the judge, case manager, parole officer, and clinical experts; active oversight by the judge, parole officer, and case manager, involving formal court appearances and supervision; management of support services involving court monitoring of social services; intensive case management as needed; accountability to the community by payment of fees and restitution; collaboration with victims’ groups; graduated and parsimonious sanctions in lieu of revocation; swift and certain sanctions in which revocation is a last resort; and rewards and incentives for success and progress, including public praise and other types of incentives.

A focus on procedural justice keeps the proceedings open and public, and enhances the perception of fairness, which in turn is important for offender participation and cooperation. It may be beneficial to incorporate the HOPE Court model of a warning hearing up front that clarifies roles, responsibilities, expectations, and consequences. As is the case in other problem-solving courts, judicial authority is collaborative (with the parole officer and clinical staff, among others) and the judge is involved with issues such as case planning, case management, and supervision, as well as incentives and sanctions. Ideally, it should be the same court that monitors the parolee in the reentry process as sentenced him or her originally. As Judge Jeffrey Tauber of Reentry Court Solutions notes:

This is perhaps the most promising reentry drug court hybrid developed to date. The court maintains jurisdiction and authority over the felon and a well-structured program beginning (optimally) at the time of plea or probation violation, provides a seamless process, with the same personnel working with the participant over the course of the program. Future programs may see the value of interim progress reports and the opportunity for negative incentives while in prison.

Reentry courts tend to frontload supervision, rehabilitative, and training resources during the first six months or so after release from prison. Caseloads for parole officers tend to be lower than the average of seventy for standard parole, typically around forty per officer. This permits closer supervision and more attention to social services and problem-solving activities.

The reentry court model is a preferable approach for a variety of reasons. First, the preliminary evaluation research shows that reentry courts reduce recidivism (rearrest and reconviction). There is some evidence that revocation increases in reentry courts, but this is at least in part a supervision effect, that is, lower caseloads lead to greater supervision, which can lead to more frequent discovery of violations. Moreover, parole, like probation, is local. Individuals released from prison are released to a local jurisdiction. It makes less sense to have administrative decisions like supervision standards, conditions of supervision, and disciplinary and revocation decisions made by some state or regional office. A reentry court judge is usually in a better position, in collaboration with the parole officer, clinical staff, and program providers, among others, to make decisions about treatment and rehabilitation, sanctions, and incentives. It is also quite likely that a re-entry court will have greater assessment, case management, planning, and rehabilitation resources compared to parole as usual.

This chapter was written in collaboration with Sarah Appleby, MA.