Siachen figured prominently in the last decade of my military career, more so when I was the ADGMO at the Army HQ and thereafter. As many people are not well acquainted with the genesis of the Siachen problem between India and Pakistan, I have endeavoured here to cover its essentials.
Dividing the northernmost crown of India and originating from the mighty Karakoram range is the Siachen, the second-longest glacier in the world. As one flies northwards from the base camp along the 76.4-kilometre-long glacier, one is dazed by the awesome beauty of the sea of ice and snow with moraines on both sides right up to the horizon. It is a surreal sight as the panoramic view of Sia Kangri, Indira Col and the other craggy and rocky peaks and pinnacles on both sides of the glacier slowly emerge from the white haze (Panorama 16.1). There is a famous saying attributed to the people of the region: ‘The land is so barren and the passes so high that only the best of friends and the fiercest of enemies come by.’ On the west of the Siachen is the rugged Saltoro range, which forms the watershed between Baltistan and Nubra valley of Ladakh region. Siachen in the Balti language means ‘the place which has abundance of roses’. It is the source of the Nubra river that goes on to join the Shyok river, which has its origin in the area of the Karakoram Pass. The Shyok drains into the Indus near Skardu.
At the end of hostilities in the Indo-Pak war of 1947–48, a ceasefire line in J&K was agreed to by both countries and was authenticated on the maps. This delineation was specific up to a point – NJ 9842 – and beyond that the agreement went on to say, ‘and thence north to the glaciers’. This position was maintained even after the Shimla agreement in 1972, although the ceasefire line (CFL) was renamed as the line of control (LoC). As no human presence on a permanent basis existed in these icy wastes, no thought was given to extending this line right up to the boundary of the princely state of J&K with China.
Panorama 16.1: The Siachen glacier and Karakoram range
(Courtesy: Shanta Serbjeet Singh).
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the historical ‘Great Game’ was played out by the British Empire and Czarist Russian Empire on the roof of the world. This was the famous region of the Pamir, Hindukush and the Karakoram ranges where the natural divide of Central and South Asia occurs. This game in a different avatar is being enacted by Pakistan and China against India since 1963, when they colluded and entered into an agreement wherein the Shaksgam valley, a part of India, was ‘ceded’ by Pakistan to China. This valley covers an area of about 5180 square kilometres and is on the north of the Karakoram range. When seen in the context of the sinister and illegal extension of the LoC from NJ 9842 eastwards to the Karakoram Pass by Pakistan, and the publication in some maps of this interpretation, the rationale of this ‘Sino-Pak game’ becomes crystal clear. The Shaksgam valley was part of the Dogra kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir, and since the state acceded to India in 1947, it lawfully became a part of our nation. (See Map 11.1 and Panorama 16.1.)
For China it would be more convenient to have the entire Karakoram range in Pakistan’s possession right upto the Karakoram Pass, as the ceding of the Shaksgam valley would get sanctified with a higher level of certitude, than if the eastern Karakoram range from Sia La to the famous Karakoram Pass was part of India, and under Indian control. In actual fact, after the decisive victory in the 1971 Indo-Pak war, India had every reason to insist on a settlement of the alignment of the LoC in a northward direction towards the glaciers from NJ 9842 as per the original Karachi agreement of 1949. However, we lost out on that opportunity during the 1972 Shimla talks. According to an engrossing account given by renowned adventurer Harish Kapadia, ‘A desperate Bhutto had pleaded with the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that he be trusted to do so (to agree to delineate the borders along the Saltoro range, but later), as he did not want to antagonize his generals at that point in time. Aap mujhpe bharosa kijiye (Trust me), he is reported to have said.’1
The Siachen issue gained prominence when cartographic aggression or errors were made in internationally published maps and atlases, which unilaterally decided to mark the extension of the LoC from NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass (see Map 11.1). Neither does this alignment go northwards nor are there any glaciers emanating from the Karakoram Pass. The issue was flagged with the US government by the ministry of external affairs at the behest of the army. However, there was no response from the Americans for quite some time. Eventually, after a lot of prodding, they replied that the ‘papers’ stating the reasons for this decision could not be traced! This was conveyed to me by Lieutenant General Hridya Kaul, who was the director general of military operations in the early 1980s. The foreign secretary during this period was Ram Sathe.
The situation was further exacerbated when our army learnt that the Pakistani authorities surreptitiously began to give permission to foreign mountaineering expeditions to climb or trek in the Siachen glacier area, taking full advantage of that cartographic misrepresentation. The Pakistan Army conveniently began to assume that the triangle formed by NJ 9842–Karakoram Pass–Sia Kangri was Pakistani territory, knowing well that it was a falsehood. It is a historical fact that the Saltoro range has been a traditional boundary between the Balti people, who are predominantly Shia Muslims, and the Ladakhis.
We came to know of Pakistan’s intentions of setting up its military and civil presence in the Siachen area in 1982–83, even if that was partly for mountaineering or adventure activities. Therefore, the Indian Army sought the government’s approval and, in a pre-emptive action, occupied most of the important passes and dominating heights on the Saltoro range during April 1984. This ridge line follows a northward direction from NJ 9842, east of which is de jure Indian territory. The operation was named ‘Meghdoot’ (divine cloud messenger), and it commenced on 13 April 1984. In this joint heliborne operation, the Indian Army was ably supported by the Air Force. ‘Bilafond La and Sia La were the first to be occupied by infantrymen; two soldiers heli-lifted at a time in the Alouettes or their Indian versions, the Cheetahs, the only helicopters which could operate at altitudes above 18,000 feet. This was a stupendous feat that required about fifty sorties, just for the initial build-up of one platoon at each of these passes!’2 Thus India effectively pre-empted the Pakistani plans, and not only reclaimed its rightful territory but also restored the alignment of the LoC in a northward direction. Indian troops are deployed on all tactically important places on the Saltoro range. Pakistan responded by deploying its army on the lower heights and slopes on the western side, but they were not able to come close to the Siachen glacier. This is now referred to as the AGPL.
By firmly holding the Saltoro range, we physically denied them even a peep into the Siachen glacier. Pakistan has been falsely projecting to its people and to foreigners that its soldiers are fighting on the Siachen glacier. The reality is that the contest is for the control of the Saltoro range, which as of now is firmly in Indian hands.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Pakistan Army undertook many unsuccessful ventures to try and capture some of these important passes or heights. The first such attack by the Pakistani forces, comprising Northern Light Infantry and commandos from the Special Services Group (SSG) took place on 25 April 1984 but was repulsed and they suffered many casualties. On the other hand, 8 J&K LI, in a gallant action, captured the highest Pakistani observation post called Qaid in June 1987. For this mission Subedar Bana Singh won the Param Vir Chakra. In retaliation, Pakistan launched a major attack in September 1987 called Operation Qiadat,3 with one infantry battalion and two SSG companies with TOW missiles alongwith artillery and mortars in support. Because of the altitude and glaciated terrain, a large-sized operation is impossible. Therefore, a series of attacks were launched to capture some positions on the Bilafond La Pass from 23–25 September 1987. It is believed that Pakistani President General Zia-ul-Haq had entrusted this task to the then brigadier, Pervez Musharraf, who is said to have planned the attacks from the SSG base at Khapalu in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Reportedly, close to a hundred Pakistani officers and men died in this operation and more than that number were wounded. A chilling account of these foolhardy and ill-conceived operations, but with outstanding junior leadership and youthful bravado, is given in the book Fangs of Ice – Story of Siachen by Lieutenant Colonel Ishfaq Ali of the Pakistan Army.
Since then the Pakistan Army has been desperately trying to get a foothold on the Saltoro range, but we have managed to frustrate every design of theirs. Having taken a number of casualties each time, Pakistan finally gave up making any more serious attempts to attack our positions in the Siachen area. However, artillery duels continued with great intensity, till the ceasefire in 2003. Both sides suffered a number of casualties, more on account of the high altitude, avalanches, accidents and medical causes. Just to maintain the troops in those positions has been at a price. But the fact remains that Siachen is Indian territory and even if we withdraw from the positions on the Saltoro range, we would have to keep adequate number of soldiers fully acclimatized and ready to defend our territory in this region. These troops will perforce have to be kept in the base camp area, and we would have to bear that expense anyway. Therefore, the cost factor loses its relevance considerably. Further, the human cost in terms of casualties due to altitude and extreme cold conditions has also been brought down to fairly acceptable levels.
Apart from exercising our right to safeguard our territorial integrity, there are some important gains achieved by our deployment in Siachen. By holding the Saltoro range we are in a position to deny direct access to the Karakoram Pass to Pakistan, and also retain a capability to exert some influence on the Indian territory in the Shaksgam valley, which Pakistan has illegally ceded to China. However, in the agreement with Pakistan, the Chinese have taken abundant precaution of qualifying that the agreement would be subject to renegotiation with the side that has sovereignty over the area, once the issue of Kashmir is resolved.
Over the years, there have been a series of talks and meetings to find a way to resolve the Siachen issue. I participated in the seventh round of talks in 1998 in New Delhi as the ADGMO. During these talks, we made our position clear that we were prepared to disengage or withdraw from the freezing heights on the Saltoro range, provided the Pakistanis agreed to authenticate the existing ground positions on the maps. This was primarily due to the trust deficit between the two countries, which has been exacerbated by the Pakistani misadventure in Kargil in 1999. The Pakistani side did not agree to authenticate the present positions, and hence the talks ended on the first day itself. During my tenure as ADGMO, I also accompanied the then defence minister, George Fernandes, to Siachen in 1998. He was one of the few ministers who made a number of visits to these forbidding heights, and with his support, we were able to do a lot to improve the living conditions of soldiers serving there, specially the medical facilities.
Subsequently, on 23 November 2003, both sides agreed to extend the ceasefire along the AGPL in the Siachen area too. This truce has held since then.
As the army chief, I accompanied Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on his visit to the glacier on 12 June 2005. He was the first prime minister to visit the glacier. He called for a peaceful resolution of the problem and made an appeal to make it a ‘mountain of peace’. We discussed various dimensions of this issue during this visit. When asked for my views, I had no hesitation in stating that the army was ready for disengagement of forces to fall-back positions, in a phased manner. However, I strongly recommended that this step should only be taken once the Pakistanis agreed to authenticate the present positions. Without doing so, there was every possibility that they might renege from the agreement, grab some of our vacated positions, and then claim that they had always been there!
Further, it is my considered opinion that whenever an agreement is reached and a disengagement and redeployment of forces has to take place, it should be in phases and to positions from where neither side would have an unfair advantage of being able to occupy the area previously held by the other side. Any violation of the agreement by either side should allow the other side to take measures as considered necessary to have the status quo ante restored. In 1989, a proposed agreement for the two militaries to pull back forces and create a zone of disengagement never saw the light of the day. The main reason for this was that the Pakistani side did not want to disclose its actual positions on the ground. But in case it had done so and the agreement had gone through, it would have left the Indian forces in a rather disadvantageous position with respect to the scenario discussed above. In this regard, I find that some strategists and journalists have failed to comprehend the operational nuances of war-fighting in the Siachen glacier, and also the political compulsions that would have an overarching bearing while looking at options for conflict termination. As rightly brought out by Lieutenant General V.R. Raghavan, ‘… Indians and Pakistanis have attributed motives and pressures to the political and military leaders of the two countries. What was the reality? Certainly, from the Indian side no Prime Minister can accept a solution which would be seen as unequal by the public and the Parliament.’4
Fundamentally, there really is no logic to support the alignment claimed by Pakistan, a dotted line direct from NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass as erroneously shown in some maps, covering a distance of approximately 80 kilometres as the crow flies. Neither is this alignment going northwards nor is there any glacier emanating from the Karakoram Pass, thus making a mockery of the agreement between the two countries, which unambiguously states that from NJ 9842 … ‘thence north to the glaciers’. Therefore, India has been compelled to secure its territory and keep a permanent military presence on the Saltoro Range.
1 Harish Kapadia, Into the Untravelled Himalaya, Indus Publishing Company, New Delhi, p. 234.
2 V.R. Raghavan, Siachen – Conflict Without End, Penguin Books India, New Delhi, p. 54.
3 Description of the battle as seen from the Indian side.
4 V.R. Raghavan, Siachen – Conflict Without End, Penguin Books India (P) Ltd, New Delhi, p. 145.