The MLD’s wartime bases stretched over an immense area, from Singapore in the west to Java in the south, New Guinea in the east and Tarakan in the far north. From these bases, the Japanese drove the MLD back to Morokrembangan. Diagrams of MLD deployments can be found in the appendices of this book.
As part of prewar Anglo-Dutch agreements, the Dutch, British and Americans were allocated separate spheres of influence. In the Dutch area, MLD planes provided air reconnaissance in the northern East Indies. However since the British Royal Air Force was critically short of reconnaissance aircraft, the MLD was also asked to transfer two squadrons of Dorniers to Singapore’s Seletar Naval Air Station at the start of war. The British need for reconnaissance planes being acute, GVT.8 was placed under British operational control before hostilities started. The Dutch also promised the transfer of a second squadron of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft to Seletar that would be manned by RAF personnel.
All MLD reconnaissance squadrons had been deployed prior to the war, allowing them to immediately undertake extensive patrols. It was these squadrons that saw some of the first action of the war. Shortly after the shooting started, GVT.3 replaced GVT.8 on December 10. From Singapore, GVT.8 deployed to Kuantan, Malaya, while GVT.1 flew into Kuching, Borneo. From these bases, the two squadrons flew reconnaissance patrols along the Kuantan-Pulo Laut-Kuching line. A primitive seaplane base at Sedanau on Natoena Island served as an intermediate refueling point.
To the northeast, GVT.2 and GVT.5 patrolled the Talaud-Morotai-Sorong line. GVT.2 was based at Sorong, New Guinea, while GVT.5 deployed to Ternate. The converted GM patrol boat Reiger served as a tender for both squadrons at Sorong. A third squadron was also scheduled for deployment to Kalkas seaplane base if necessary. Reconnaissance over the western approaches to the Java Sea and Batavia area was provided by GVT.16 at Tandjoeng Priok. The squadron also served as a reserve for those operating out of Kuantan and Kuching.
Plans also called for GVT.7 to fly air patrols over the far northern reaches of the East Indies out of Tarakan. Army bombers flew the missions until the MLD was able to deploy a squadron to the area. Afterwards, Dutch seaplanes flew air reconnaissance and strike missions from the island until the Japanese occupied it in January 1942.
By the first week of December 1941, imminent signs of war were clear all across the Pacific. Although Japanese diplomatic efforts remained unchanged on the surface, a tense air lingered. Not only had regular airline flights from Japan to the western colonies stopped, but her merchant fleet had also vanished from Allied harbors. Then, American, British and Dutch reconnaissance planes reported large Japanese troop convoys moving south. Although Japan had made no formal declaration of war, there was little doubt among the Allied commanders that their final destinations were Allied territories throughout the Pacific.
On December 1, X-10 of GVT.2 encountered a Japanese fishing vessel near Sorong, New Guinea. Well aware that large numbers of Japanese spy ships disguised as fishing boats had long operated in the region, the Dutch pilot circled the ship several times at wave-top level as his crew carefully examined it. He then initiated a dangerous game that involved cutting off the Japanese ship every time it tried to change course. In the process, X-10 clipped the fishing vessel’s mast, bringing down its wireless antenna. In return the Dornier’s wing was badly damaged, forcing it to retire to Morokrembangan for repairs and being replaced by X-25 from the reserve pool.
MLD Operational Areas December 1941. Legend: Area 1: GVT.8 (X-16, X-17, X-18) based NAS Seletar; patrols over South China Sea and Gulf of Siam. Area 2: GVT.4 (X-13, X-14, X-21) based Sambas; patrols over South China Sea. Area 3: GVT.1 (X-15, X-35, X-36) based Sambas; patrols in area between Sambas, Kuching and Natoena Island. Area 4: GVT.16 (Y-51, Y-56, Y-57) based Tg. Priok; patrols over Indian Ocean, Java Sea, Karimata and Gaspar Straits. Area 5: GVT.6 (X-28, X-29, X-31) based MVK Morokrembangan; patrols over Java Sea and south coast of eastern Java. Area 6: GVT.11, GVT.12, GVT.13 and GVT.14 based MVK Morokrembangan; A/S patrols in area around Soerabaja. Area 7: GVT.7 (X-32, X-33, X-34) based Tarakan; patrols over Celebes Sea. Area 8: GVT.5 (X-26, X-27, X-28) based Ternate (Moluccas); patrols over Celebes Sea and sealanes south of the Philippines. Area 9: GVT.17 (Y-58, Y-59, Y-60) based MVK Halong; patrols over Molucca Sea and Halmahera Sea. Area 10: GVT.2 (X-11, X-12, X-25) based Sorong; patrols between bases at Morotai and Ambon.
Under normal circumstances, the accident would have caused an international incident with dire consequences for the seaplane’s pilot. But fortunately for the sake of his career, war was just around the corner, and the attention of his superiors was fixed on other issues. It is interesting to note that the Japanese apparently never filed a protest, probably because doing so would have invited a Dutch demand for an explanation of what the ship was doing in the area in the first place. The fact that war was only a few days away also likely played a role.
Japan’s invasion of Malaya got under way on the morning of December 4, as 19 transports carrying more than 26,000 troops from the 5th Infantry Division and the 56th Infantry Regiment departed Hainan Island. The heavy cruiser Chokai and destroyer Sagiri with the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla and the destroyers of the 12th, 19th and 20th Destroyer Divisions support escorted them. The 7th Cruiser Squadron and 11th Destroyer Division departed at the same time with orders to provide the convoy with distant cover. The following day a second, smaller convoy departed Saigon escorted by the light cruiser Kashii and frigate Shimushu. This group comprised seven transports carrying units of the 143rd Infantry Regiment.
The commander of the main Japanese convoy, Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, had received orders to proceed southwest. He was to skirt the coast of Indochina and rendezvous with a second, smaller convoy some 100–150 miles off Cape Camao in the Gulf of Siam. If sighted before joining the second convoy, Ozawa was to maintain a course as if his destination were Bangkok and await further orders. Upon linking up, the Japanese convoys would turn south and make their final run across the Gulf of Siam for invasion points throughout Thailand and Northern Malaya.1
At 0130 Java Time2 on December 4, Dutch sources at Menado on the island of Celebes reported that a convoy of 8 transports, escorted by 20 warships, was set to depart from the Japanese naval base on Palau Island with the intention of landing troops somewhere in the Northern East Indies.3 This force actually consisted of 7 transports escorted by the light cruiser Nagara, 22nd Destroyer Division and the 11th Seaplane Carrier Division under the command of Rear-Admiral Kyuji Kubo. Kubo departed Palau on December 8 and landed a 2,500-man battalion at Legaspi on the Philippine island of Luzon on the night of December 11–12.
As the invasion forces moved on Malaya, they received air cover from aircraft of the Imperial Japanese Army’s 3rd Air Division. This formation consisted of the 3rd Flying Battalion (one fighter and two bomber regiments), 7th Flying Battalion (one fighter and three bomber regiments), 10th Flying Battalion (one fighter and one bomber regiment), 12th Flying Battalion (two fighter regiments), 15th Independent Air Regiment (two reconnaissance squadrons) and the 83rd Reconnaissance Regiment (three reconnaissance squadrons).4 These units totaled 465 aircraft, including 196 fighters, 203 bombers and light attack planes and 66 reconnaissance and utility aircraft.
They were supported by elements of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s 11th Air Fleet. The 21st, 22nd and 23rd Air Flotillas operated more than 430 fighters and bombers from air bases throughout Southern Indochina, Formosa and Palau. These flotillas consisted of elements of the Kanoya, Genzan and Mihoro air wings. In addition, Japan had 80 or so short-range reconnaissance seaplanes aboard surface ships operating in the South China Sea and Gulf of Siam, including the converted seaplane tenders Kamikawa Maru (14 aircraft), Sanyo Maru (8 aircraft) Sagara Maru (8 aircraft) and Sanuki Maru (8 aircraft). The purpose-built seaplane carriers Chitose (24 aircraft) and Mizuho (24 aircraft) added another 48 fighters.6
Table 4: IJA 3rd Air Division5
(Headquartered Southern Indochina)
3rd Flying Battalion
Operational Area: Southern Indochina, South China Sea, Western Borneo, Burma, Malaya, and Northern and Southern Sumatra and Western Java.
59th Sentai (24 × Ki-43 “Oscar”)
27th Sentai (23 × Ki-43 “Oscar”)
75th Sentai (25 × Ki-48 “Lily”)
90th Sentai (30 × Ki-48 “Lily” and Ki-30 “Ann”)
7th Flying Battalion
Operational Area: Southern Indochina, South China Sea, Western Borneo, Burma, Malaya, Northern
and Southern Sumatra and Western Java.
64th Sentai (35 × Ki-43 “Oscar”
(6 × Ki-27 “Nate”)
12th Sentai (21 × Ki- 21 “Sally”)
60th Sentai (39 × Ki-21 “Sally”)
98th Sentai (42 × K-21 “Sally”)
10th Flying Battalion
Operational Area: Southern Indochina, South China Sea, Western Borneo, Burma, Malaya, Northern
and Southern Sumatra and Western Java.
77th Sentai (27 × Ki-27 “Nate”)
31st Sentai (24 × Ki-30 “Ann”)
62nd Sentai (22 × Ki-21 “Sally”)
70th Sentai (8 × Ki-15 “Babs”)
12th Flying Battalion
Operational Area: Southern Indochina, South China Sea, Western Borneo, Burma, Malaya, Northern
and Southern Sumatra and Western Java.
1st Sentai (42 × Ki-27 “Nate”)
11th Sentai (39 × Ki-27 “Nate”)
81st Sentai (9 × Ki-15 “Babs”)
(7 × Ki-46 “Dinah”)
15th Independent Flying Unit
Operational Area: Southern Indochina, South China Sea, Western Borneo, Burma, Malaya, Northern
and Southern Sumatra and Western Java.
50th Independent Squadron (5 × Ki-15 “Babs” / Ki-46 “Dinah”)
51st Independent Squadron (6 × Ki-15 “Babs” / Ki-46 “Dinah”)
83rd Independent Flying Unit
Operational Area: Southern Indochina, South China Sea, Western Borneo, Burma, Malaya, Northern
and Southern Sumatra and Western Java.
71st Independent Squadron (10 × Ki-51 “Sonia”)
73rd Independent Squadron (9 × Ki-51 “Sonia”)
89th Independent Squadron (12 × Ki-36 “Ida”
12th Transport Squadron (Kawasaki Ki-56 “Thalia”)
(Kawasaki-Lockheed Type LO Transport “Thelma”)
While on a routine reconnaissance patrol in the South China Sea on December 6, X-21 of GVT.4 sighted what it reported to be a camouflaged minelayer at 0915.8 The pilot reported the vessel to be making approximately 7 knots northeast of the Southern Natoena Islands at 3° 45' North, 110° 18' East with a SSW course. The Dutch crew also reported four deck guns covered by canvas tarps. Aside from a momentary glimpse of scattered crew on the bridge, not a soul was seen aboard the ship as X-21 leisurely circled at low altitude. Admiral Helfrich ordered the Dornier to maintain contact with the Japanese ship, which it did until oncoming darkness forced the Dutch plane to break off and return to base at 1630.
Although less well-armed than the JNAF “Zero,” the JAAF Nakajima Ki-43 “Oscar” was equally maneuverable (photograph courtesy of San Diego Aerospace Museum).
Although being phased out by the “Oscar,” the obsolescent Nakajima Ki-27 “Nate” was a formidable opponent for Allied flying boats (photograph courtesy of San Diego Aerospace Museum).
This ship was likely the Japanese auxiliary minelayer Tatsumiya Maru, which had been ordered to lay a secret minefield off the coast of Malaya and east of Tioman Island to coincide with the pending air strike on Pearl Harbor. The minefield would help screen Japanese landings in Northern Malaya and Thailand against expected counterattacks from British Royal Navy warships based at Singapore. However, after the departure of X-21, the minelayer’s captain became concerned about his ability to execute the mission after being sighted; with this in mind, he laid his mine barrage some 18 miles further north than originally ordered, putting the spread just north of Tioman, rather than to the east of the island.9
Table 5: IJN 11th Air Fleet, December 8, 19417
21st Air Flotilla
Operational Area: Eastern Netherlands East Indies, including Menado, Kendari, Ambon, Koepang and Java.
1st Group (headquartered at Takao, Formosa)
72 × fighters (18 detached to Indochina)
24 × fighters in reserve
6–9 × reconnaissance aircraft
Kanoya Air Group (headquartered at Taighu, Formosa)
54 × bombers (18 detached to Formosa)
18 × bombers in reserve
Toko Air Group (headquartered on Palau)
12 × flying boats
4 × reserve flying boats
22nd Air Flotilla
Operational Area: Western Netherlands East Indies, including southern Sumatra, Banka Island and western Java.
Genzan Air Wing (headquartered at Saigon, Indochina)
27 × bombers
9 × reserve bombers
Mihoro Air Wing (headquartered at Saigon, Indochina)
27 × bombers
9 × reserve bombers
23rd Air Flotilla
Operational Area: Central Netherlands East Indies, including Tarakan, Balikpapan, Bandjermasin, Makassar, Bali, eastern/central Java.
Takao Air Group (headquartered at Takao, Formosa)
54 × bombers
18 × reserve bombers
3rd Group (headquartered at Takao, Formosa)
72 × fighters
18 × reserve fighters
6–9 × reconnaissance aircraft
Later that same morning, X-17 of GVT.8 was operating out of Seletar when its crew sighted a Japanese ship in the Gulf of Siam at 1105 (Java Time).10 The pilot reported the ship’s position as being northwest of the Anambas Islands at 4° 33' North, 104° 56' East moving south at 14 knots. She flew a Japanese battle flag, and her decks were crowded with soldiers, giving every appearance of being a fully loaded troop transport. However, when the MLD plane appeared overhead, the transport immediately reversed course to the north.11 The Dutch plane shadowed this vessel as well until being forced to return to base when fuel ran low.
Admiral Helfrich ordered both squadrons to send out planes at first light the next morning to resume surveillance of the two Japanese ships. However, neither was able to regain contact, and the Japanese slipped away. In the meantime, X-13 of GVT.4 encountered a Japanese flying boat over the South China Sea, and the two seaplanes warily circled each other before continuing on without incident. The tension was building, and both sides undoubtedly knew that it would only be a matter of hours before the first shots of the Pacific War were fired.
Meanwhile, British and Australian aircraft from Singapore were also flying a series of reconnaissance patrols over the South China Sea and Gulf of Siam. Although poor weather precluded flight operations on December 4–5, three Hudson bombers from 1 Squadron (RAAF) departed from the airfield at Khota Bharu in northern Malaya mid-morning of December 6. Flying separately, two of these aircraft reported a large Japanese convoy some 200 miles off the coast of Malaya. This was Vice-Admiral Ozawa’s main force, which had joined Kashii’s smaller convoy and was now making its final run for points in Thailand and Malaya.
Extremely maneuverable and heavily armed, the primary fighter of the JNAF was the Mitsubishi A6M “Zero” (photograph courtesy of San Diego Aerospace Museum).
The first Hudson reported two minesweepers and a transport. It later found the main body of 25 transports with an escort of one battleship, five cruisers and seven destroyers. Another Hudson sighted a second convoy of 21 transports, escorted by two cruisers and 10 destroyers. Although Japanese floatplanes from the seaplane tender Kamikawa Maru attempted to intercept, the Hudson’s superior speed allowed it to pull away. Another Hudson from Khota Bharu followed late that afternoon but was unable to locate the convoy and returned home.
To follow up on these reports, the Royal Air Force’s 205 Squadron, operating from Seletar, sent out PBY FV-S to carry out a night search over the Gulf of Siam. The flying boat departed at 1830 but apparently made no contact with Seletar for several hours. As a result, the squadron ordered PBY FV-W into the air at 0200 on the morning of December 7.
Apparently flying over the aforementioned Tatsumiya Maru without sighting her in the fog and darkness, Flight Officer P.E. Bedell located a large convoy off the coast of Southern Indochina shortly before dawn. He then proceeded to dodge in and out of the clouds to avoid the convoy’s fighter escort while his radio operator sent a series of detailed reports back to Singapore. Finally, at 0820 an E13A1 “Jake” floatplane from the Kamikawa Maru intercepted the PBY 20 miles WNW of Pajang Island (south of Phu Quoc on the coast of southern Indochina).
Piloted by Ensign Eiichi Ogata, aircraft ZI-26 surprised the flying boat and put a short burst into the hull, causing Bedell to turn away from the convoy. As Bedell retired to the south, Ogata proved unable to match the PBY’s superior speed and could not make another attack, although he continued to trail behind and monitor its movements. Twenty-five minutes later, a patrol of six Ki-27 “Nate” fighters from the Japanese Army Air Force’s 1st Sentai bounced the PBY.
Despite taking defensive fire from Bedell’s gunners, one of the fighters immediately set the flying boat afire on its first pass. The other four “Nates” then attacked the PBY, which exploded under the weight of their combined efforts. It appears that the radio was damaged almost immediately, as Seletar suddenly lost contact with the PBY with no indication of what happened during the short fight. As a result, it was not until after the war that the world learned of the PBY’s fate. In any event, Bedell and his crew become the first casualties of the Pacific War in an attack that took place several hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor.12
As Bedell’s PBY was being destroyed, Admiral Helfrich ordered MLD aircraft to once again observe and monitor the Japanese ships sighted the previous day. Although the troopship could not be found, X-18 of GVT.8 reported a transport north of the Anambas Islands at 0920. Sighted at 4° 34' North, 105° 30' East, she held a 010° northerly course with a speed of 13 knots. Although unidentified, it appears that ship was the Tatsumiya Maru headed home after completing her minelaying mission off Tioman Island.13
As the Japanese convoys moved south, both the British and Dutch were gripped by inaction. The most obvious offensive weapons available at this stage were 15 Dutch submarines based at Soerabaja and Singapore. But although the British had a number of these boats under their operational control, they were unwilling to initiate a war without assurances of support from the United States, which refused to commit its Pacific Fleet to the defense of Singapore. So with Britain’s resources stretched to the limit by fighting in Europe and Africa, she could simply not afford to initiate a war in the Pacific—even to defend against a Japanese invasion.
The Dutch were dependent on British assistance if they hoped to prevail in a war. At the same time, the KM was also undoubtedly cautious about another large-scale deployment in light of its two prior naval deployments in May 1940 and February 1941. It was a time when the wrong move could have serious consequences, and Helfrich had to be certain before moving his forces. The Dutch and Japanese were also engaged in what amounted to an intense cold war at the time, and the KM did not wish to provoke the Japanese with any semblance of offensive action that might provide them with political justification for a “defensive” attack against the NEI.
And finally, the hidden submarines were the Allies’ most potent naval weapon at this stage of the coming conflict. Had the Japanese discovered their presence prior to the outbreak of war, their effectiveness would have been greatly reduced in the face of alert anti-submarine defenses. So although a submarine line had been deployed in the South China Sea to intercept the Japanese, the Allied boats were ordered to re-deploy to points off the coast of Malaya, Borneo and Sumatra.
The MLD suffered its first loss before the war even started. Y-44 was lost with her entire crew in a landing accident at Tandjoeng Pinang at Banka Island on December 6. However, the first war loss suffered by the MLD came during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor the following day.
The strike on Pearl Harbor commenced just before midnight on December 7 with word of the attack reaching the Dutch High Command in the city of Batavia on West Java around 0300 Java Time on December 8.14 At 0533, Admiral Helfrich signaled the following message to all KM and MLD units: “America and England at War with Japan” and subsequently ordered all Dutch merchant ships at sea to make for the nearest friendly port. At 0630 that morning, General Hein Ter Poorten, Commander-in-Chief of the KNIL, issued a general mobilization order to all Dutch ground units and called up those reserves not already in uniform. At 0700, the governor-general of the Netherlands East Indies, Dr. A.W.L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, made a formal declaration of war in a terse radio announcement.15
Meanwhile, three new Dutch PBYs—Y-68, Y-69 and Y-70—were en route to Java from the Consolidated aircraft plant at San Diego, California. All PBYs delivered to the MLD prior to the outbreak of war crossed the Central Pacific in groups of three using a civilian and military air route that staged through Hawaii–Wake Island–Guam–Manila. They were ferried across the Pacific by contracted civilian crews from Consairways, a subsidiary American airline of the Consolidated factory. MLD flight crews would meet the planes at Manila and fly the Catalinas down to Java.16
Although all three planes were supposed to remain together during flight, this particular formation had become separated. While Y-69 and Y-70 continued ahead, Y-68 was ordered to remain at Pearl Harbor for several days. Its crew was to await the arrival of Lieutenant-General Ludolph van Oyen, head of KNIL-ML forces in the NEI, who was returning to Java after wrapping up an official visit to Washington, DC, where he had requested additional military aid. He would reach Honolulu via Pan Am clipper and join Y-68 for the remainder of the trip.17
When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, Y-68 sat in a large hangar at Ford Island Naval Air Station. Y-69 and Y-70 had proceeded ahead and were already at Midway Island. As a result, Y-68 was destroyed on the ground when a bomb blast toppled one of the hangar’s huge doors onto her wing, damaging the PBY beyond repair.
Y-69 and Y-70 had already departed Midway for Wake Island at 0600 local time when word of the Pearl Harbor attack reached the island. Both planes were immediately recalled and landed back at Midway later that day. It quickly became clear that the Japanese were moving all across the Pacific, and the status of the prewar air route was unclear. As a result, both planes were ordered to remain at Midway where the island’s Marine Corps commander immediately seized them and their cargo. Although they had no bomb or gun mounts, they were pressed into service alongside 12 USN VP-21 Catalinas that were operating from Midway at the time.
As VP-21 ground crews worked to make the Dutch PBYs ready for war patrols, Vice-Admiral Chuichi Nagumo’s carrier strike force retired from the area around Hawaii. To cover his withdrawal and minimize the chance of counter air strikes from Midway, Japanese planners of the Pearl Harbor raid had detailed a small surface force, composed of the destroyers Ushio and Sazanami, to shell the airfield.18 But although given the rather grandiose designation Midway Destruction Unit, their mission would be considered little more than a nuisance raid by the American military at the time.
Supported by the naval tanker Shiriya, Ushio and Sazanami departed Japan at the same time as Admiral Nagumo’s force and made their way independently to Midway. They arrived off the island on the night of December 7 and opened fire at 2131. Encountering only uncoordinated resistance from Marine shore batteries, Ushio fired 108 5-inch rounds, and Sazanami 193, in a bombardment lasting 54 minutes. Although the runway was undamaged, they did hit a number of oil tanks and shore installations, including the Pan American Airways radio center, knocking off-line the island’s only communications with the outside world. In return, the Marines claimed damage to one of the destroyers, although this is unconfirmed. The force then returned to Japan by way of Kwajalein Island.
The bombardment also set afire a hangar at the seaplane base in which a VP-21 PBY was lost. Shrapnel also badly damaged Y-69. The next morning ground crews counted more than 300 holes in its wings and fuselage that required 334 patches to repair.19 Following extensive repairs by naval personnel, Pan American Airways mechanics and civilian contractors, the PBY was test flown on December 17 and returned to Pearl Harbor the following day by a reserve VP-21 crew that was flown out for that purpose.20 Y-69 returned to San Diego for overhaul and was later delivered to MLD forces in Australia in March 1942;21 she and other surviving Dutch PBYs were then flown to Ceylon in a non-stop flight in May.
Following the Japanese bombardment, Y-70 was ordered back to Pearl Harbor on December 8, where the USN again seized it. It probably would have remained there if not for General van Oyen. The general reached Pearl Harbor immediately following the attack, only to find that the U.S. military had terminated all air traffic across the Pacific. And with Y-68 destroyed, van Oyen effectively found himself stranded in Hawaii before the arrival of Y-70 from Midway.
Although the seaplane was immediately impounded upon landing, van Oyen was able to secure the release of Y-70. However, the prewar ferry route remained closed, so the PBY took a longer, less-developed route through the southern Pacific via Christmas Island–Canton Island–Samoa–Australia before it flew on to Java. Although most frequently used by civilian flights to Australia and New Zealand, most of these bases had been completed only that year and were extremely primitive, isolated and poorly equipped. As a result, a damaged plane could be stranded for weeks while a spare part was located and flown in.
Nonetheless, now carrying General van Oyen, Y-70 staged through these primitive island bases and reached Morokrembangan without incident on December 27.22 Upon their arrival, the PBY’s entire Consairways ferry crew received the Dutch Flying Cross.23
Just hours after Pearl Harbor on December 8, X-27 of GVT.5 was on patrol out of Ternate when its pilot sighted a large concentration of fishing boats off Halmahera Island. A closer look revealed that one of the ships flew a “Rising Sun” on the bow, revealing its Japanese ownership. With orders to clear Dutch waters of all Japanese fishing craft, the X-boat set down on the water and taxied to the Japanese craft. An armed party of naval troops, which the plane carried for such an occasion, then boarded the fishing boat and interned it and the crew.
The first war action for the MLD came in the Bougainville Strait on December 8, when X-12 of GVT.2 sighted a Japanese convoy composed of the 161-ton schooner Koukoku Maru towing four small sailboats, which were apparently pearl-diving boats. X-11 immediately strafed and bombed the schooner, near-missing her with four 100-pound bombs, but observed no damage before the plane had to turn for home. Believing that the ships carried infiltrators to be put ashore in Dutch New Guinea, the squadron commander, 1st Lieutenant W. J. Reijnierse, ordered X-11 to find the convoy again the next morning.
X-11 found the convoy again on the morning of the 9th and attacked Koukoku Maru with four 100-pound bombs, near-missing her once. It then called in X-25, which was on its morning patrol. When X-25 arrived, it found the schooner had lost speed and was leaking oil. X-25 too dropped four 100-pound bombs, hitting it directly amidships once. Koukoku Maru erupted in a blast of flame, killing 10 crewmen and leaving a column of black smoke to mark its position as the planes returned to Sorong.
Soon after, the base radio operator picked up a report from the Y-47 of the approach of enemy planes. With no air cover or AA defenses, the planes of GVT.2 immediately scrambled and scattered so as not to be caught on the water. The anticipated air attack never materialized, and the planes returned to Sorong several hours later. X-11 then made a final reconnaissance flight over the Koukoku Maru, which it found abandoned and afire; the Japanese ship sank later that day. At the same time, X-12 flew to Ambon to reload with bombs.
On the 10th, X-18 of GVT.8 sighted a surfaced submarine while on patrol out of Seletar. The submarine immediately crash-dived upon sighting the approaching seaplane. The Dutch pilot did not attack as he could not ascertain the identity of the submarine and was afraid of attacking a friendly vessel. Although the submarine could have been a Dutch boat operating under British operational control, she did not attempt to flash any Allied recognition signals. At the time, there were no fewer than 18 Japanese submarines operating in the South China Sea to screen the landings in Malaya.24
Later that day, GVT.3 replaced GVT.8 at Seletar, and the squadron returned to Morokrembangan for routine maintenance and overhaul of its aircraft. For the rest of December, GVT.3 flew patrols over the South China Sea and attacked Japanese fishing boats in the area. The squadron also evacuated a number of women and children from Tarempah Island in the Poelau Archipelago.
On December 12, the MLD made good on its prewar promise and transferred three unmanned MLD Catalinas—which the Dutch did not have crews for—from the reserve pool at Morokrembangan to the Royal Air Force at Singapore.25 The Catalinas were ferried from Morokrembangan by skeleton British crews to the Seletar where they reinforced 205 Squadron. Their arrival allowed two elderly Royal New Zealand Navy Singapore III flying boats to be transferred to Fiji. But even with their arrival, the British need for reconnaissance aircraft remained critical throughout the Malaysian and NEI campaigns.
Later that day, GVT.16 was ordered to provide A/S support for SM-1, a large convoy leaving Singapore for the Indian Ocean via the Soenda Strait. That day, four British and three American merchant ships left Singapore escorted by the Dutch light cruiser Java and the destroyers Evertsen and Van Nes. Also in escort were the Australian armed merchant cruiser Kanimbla and the British destroyers Stronghold, Encounter and Tenedos. In conjunction with planes of the ML on southern Sumatra, PBYs of GVT.16 provided A/S cover for the convoy until it dispersed south of the Soenda Strait on December 16.
X-22 of GVT.3, flown by 1st Lieutenant G.F. Slotje, claimed the MLD’s first aerial kill of the war. The X-boat was operating out of Poeloe Samboe, Sumatra, on December 13 when it encountered what the crew reported as three Japanese fighters near Kuantuan. X-22, with its 20mm cannon, drove them off, claiming one heavily damaged. Villagers claimed to have seen the damaged plane crash into the sea, although this was never confirmed. Nonetheless, Machinist Mate Leo Willems was decorated for this action. The “fighters” were actually G3M “Nell” bombers of the Mihoro Air Wing, which was operating out of Southern Indochina.
With their operations in Malaya securely in hand, thus adequately protecting their flank, the Japanese now undertook the invasion of the East Indies. Their plans called for a series of southward pincer movements down through the eastern and western halves of the archipelago. The western pincer would commence operations from Camranh Bay in Southern Indochina with the goal of securing British Borneo, western Dutch Borneo and southern Sumatra.
The eastern pincer would commence operations from the port of Davao on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao. This port would be occupied in late December and would serve as the springboard for the invasion of the eastern East Indies. It would also protect the Japanese flank against counterattack from the Philippines during their East Indies campaign. Moving south from Davao, Japanese troops would then secure eastern Borneo, Celebes, Ambon and the Lesser Soenda Islands. Loss of the Lesser Soendas cut off Allied air reinforcements from Australia.
As each primary invasion point was secured, subsidiary operations would branch out in supporting movements to secure oil fields, refineries, airstrips and seaports that would protect the flanks of the next stage of the operation. Priority was placed on putting captured airfields back into use as soon as possible in order to maintain air cover during every stage. Using captured airfields on Celebes, Borneo and Southern Sumatra, the Japanese anticipated complete air supremacy over the entire East Indies by February 1942. At that point, they would be in position to carry out a simultaneous invasion of Java on both its eastern and western ends.
Action grew heated as the Japanese intensified their air operations over the South China Sea in an effort to cover an invasion convoy that departed Camrahn Bay on the morning of December 13. Under the command of Admiral Shintaro Hashimoto, it consisted of 10 transports bound for Miri, North Borneo, with troops of the 2nd Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force and 124th Infantry Regiment. In close escort was the light cruiser Yura with the 12th Destroyer Division and Subchaser 7. The tender Kamikawa Maru provided air cover and A/S support.
The 17th Cruiser Squadron, screened by the destroyers Fubuki and Sagiri, provided additional support against a possible Royal Navy sortie from Singapore.26 The 2nd Division/3rd Battleship Squadron, 1st Division/4th Cruiser Squadron further reinforced them from northeast of the Natoena Islands with the 6th Destroyer Division and 2nd Section/8th Destroyer Division. A line of submarines was also deployed between Natoena Island and the coast of Borneo.
On the 14th, GVT.1’s X-15 and X-35 encountered three enemy fighters flying cover for this convoy near Natoena Island while on a reconnaissance patrol out of Pontianak.27 The flying boats claimed one Japanese plane shot down, but this claim was also unconfirmed. The following day the squadron’s third aircraft, X-36, suffered engine failure while on a reconnaissance flight over the South China Sea and was forced to set down on the open water south of the Natoena Islands. It was eventually towed to the MLD base at Pontianak for repairs.
These aircraft presented a threat to Japanese invasion forces, and they were quick to respond to their continued operations. On December 16–17, H6K “Mavis” four-engine flying boats attached to the Toko Air Wing at Palau began a concentrated campaign to hunt down and destroy the MLD forward bases. Although the Japanese hit all across the East Indies, they directed initial attacks on MLD bases throughout the eastern half part of the NEI, particularly Sorong, Ternate and Menado. As the campaign progressed, they would also be joined by other seaplane units, which moved from Palau to Davao and Jolo in the southern Philippines as those points were occupied.
A “Mavis” flying boat from the Toko Air Wing attacked Sorong at 1030 on the 16th. The Japanese pilot concentrated on the seaplane tender Arend, which had just delivered a load of aviation fuel. The bombs missed by a quarter-mile, and X-12 and X-25 scrambled to intercept. However, the faster Japanese plane soon outran the Dorniers and disappeared in the clouds as the Dutch planes reached 8,000 feet.28
However, the squadron commander of GVT.2—1st Lieutenant W.J. Reijnierse—believed the Japanese plane would return the next morning, so he conceived a plan to intercept the raider. At 0830 the following day, X-12 and X-25 took off and patiently circled in the clouds while X-11 remained on the water to act as “bait.” At 0905 the crew of X-11 heard an approaching aircraft and taxied out for takeoff. But the engines quickly faded and X-11 returned to her anchorage.
Then at 0950, a four-engine Kawanishi flying boat suddenly appeared over the base. Without the benefit of radar direction, neither X-12 nor X-25 had been able to find the raider in the clouds, allowing it to approach the base undetected. The Japanese seaplane dropped three bombs near X-11 from 5,000 feet and disappeared. Again, the Dutch planes returned to Sorong empty-handed.
The Japanese also raided the Anambas Islands on the 16th. Although the MLD had a support base on Anambas, it was not at Terempa, where a small village was heavily bombed; the Japanese returned again the following day and heavily strafed Terempa. Dutch authorities initially put casualties at 40 dead and 100 wounded, although this figure was later revised to 65 dead.29 Unable to provide adequate air cover for the squadron’s aircraft, and fearful of additional attacks, the MLD ordered GVT.3 to abandon Anambas as a base and retire south to Tandjoeng Pinang in the Riouw Archipelago. In the process, the squadron evacuated the island’s European civilians and a group of interned Japanese.
At the same time, the Japanese convoy landed its troops at the western Borneo ports of Miri, Seria and Lutong before dawn on the 16th. Although the Allies were unable to mount a response that day, ML and MLD aircraft struck back with a series of heavy air attacks throughout the 17th.
Operating from Tarakan, GVT.7 (X-32, X-33, and X-34) loaded 440-pound bombs and took off to bomb oil wells the British had been unable to destroy before withdrawing into the interior of Borneo. Nine miles north of Miri, they sighted a small group of three ships off Lutong, which they reported as an anchored merchant ship, one small torpedo boat and a large cruiser, which steamed independently approximately one mile ahead of the others.30 While X-34 bombed the oil fields, X-32 and X-33 attacked the convoy in the face of light AA fire at 0650.
Attacking out of heavy cloud cover at just under 15,000 feet, X-32 dropped six 500-pound bombs on the cruiser. In reality, it was the 1,950-ton destroyer Shinonome of the 12th Destroyer Division. Although one bomb hung in X-32’s rack, five dropped, resulting in two direct hits and one near miss. Apparently one of them ignited ready ammunition in one of the destroyer’s aft turrets, causing a huge plume of white smoke to billow up 5,000–6,000 feet. Within one minute of this explosion, Shinonome lost way and heeled over as she went down by the stern, taking along her entire crew of 228 officers and men within five minutes.
X-33 followed up on this attack five minutes later. She dropped four 500-pound bombs on the merchant ship Hiyoshi Maru, which was being escorted by the minesweeper W-7. However, these bombs missed by some 65 yards. Although the Dornier’s tail gunner reported seeing black smoke emitting from the transport’s stern, Hiyoshi Maru suffered only minor damage. The two Dorniers then regrouped and returned to Tarakan several hours later.
Shinonome’s loss has been the subject of some confusion. Although Japanese monographs list her as a victim of air attack, most English sources attribute her loss to a Dutch mine, despite Miri being a British territory that was well north of any Dutch minefields. The British apparently never laid any mine barrages in the area. This belief was probably due to the fact that Shinonome went down out of sight of Hiyoshi Maru and W-7, neither of which saw X-32’s bomb run. So when their repeated radio calls went unanswered, they assumed that a mine had sunk her.31
The seaplane tender Arend was the target of a Toko Air Wing “Mavis” on December 16 while delivering aviation fuel to GVT.2 at Sorong, Dutch New Guinea (photograph courtesy of Jan Klootwijk).
Other older sources report that Shinonome had been torpedoed by X-33. Although the MLD had ordered large numbers of torpedo bombers before the war, none ever arrived. Nor was the Do. 24 designed or equipped to carry torpedoes, and there are no documented cases of it doing so in the Pacific or European theaters. And finally, since Dutch and Japanese records are in agreement, this appears to conclusively settle the debate concerning the loss of Shinonome.
As X-32 and X-33 turned for home, they realized that X-34 was no longer with them. Despite repeated radio calls to X-34, it did not respond, never returned to Tarakan and was presumed lost. Although X-32 and X-33 spent the following day searching for the downed aircraft, they sighted nothing and returned to base empty-handed. Meanwhile, X-7 replaced X-34 from the reserve pool at Morokrembangan.
Several weeks later, a radio report from an isolated Dutch outpost in the interior of Borneo finally shed light on the fate of X-34. On her return flight from Miri, an F1M “Pete” from Kamikawa Maru intercepted her. In lonely engagement at 8,000 feet, the Japanese floatplane damaged X-34 so badly that 2nd Lieutenant A. Baarschers, KMR was forced to crash-land on a small river in central Borneo.32
Machinist Mate T.G. van der Beek and Seaman D. Floris were killed. However, the plane’s remaining three crewmen—Baarschers, Sergeant-Pilot J.M. van Halm and the Dornier’s wireless operator, Seaman K.A. Roon—survived the crash. They hiked 120 miles through the jungle for three weeks to reach Moeara Teweh, a small town on the upper end of the Barito River on the northern coast of Borneo. However, the Japanese had already occupied the city as part of their invasions of Tarakan and Balikpapan and captured the airmen. After the war the MLD learned that all three were eventually decapitated on August 27, 1942.
Meanwhile, on the 17th, the KNIL commander at Medan in northern Sumatra signaled that a Japanese parachute drop had taken place east of him and that an attack on the city was imminent. He urgently requested a reconnaissance plane to confirm the report. Admiral Helfrich immediately dispatched a PBY from GVT.16 to Lake Toba in Central Sumatra.
After flying a number of missions over Medan and the surrounding area, the PBY saw nothing and was withdrawn. However, as the Japanese pushed down the Malay Peninsula, the Dutch feared infiltrators would cross the Malacca Strait to Sumatra, so the seaplane was again sent to Lake Toba on December 20. It flew missions along the east coast of Sumatra north to the RAF seaplane base at Penang on the west coast of Malay until the end of the month, but reported little or no Japanese movement.
Meanwhile, the Japanese were also moving forward in the eastern half of the East Indies. On the afternoon of December 16, 14 transports carrying approximately 5,000 troops of the 33rd Infantry Regiment and 146th Infantry Regiment departed Palau for Mindanao. They were given close escort by the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, which was supported by the 5th Cruiser Squadron, the light carrier Ryujo and the seaplane carrier Chitose. A lone destroyer, the Shiokaze, screened this distant covering force. As the convoy neared Mindanao, Ryujo launched a small air strike, while seaplanes from Chitose scouted the harbor.
The first Japanese troops began landing on both sides of the city before dawn on December 20. Although Davao was held by 2,000 troops of the Philippine Army’s 2nd Battalion, 101st Infantry Regiment, the Japanese met only moderate resistance, which was soon broken, giving them complete control of the city, its port and airfield by 1500 on December 20.33 Heavily outnumbered by the Japanese force, the American commander withdrew his battalion to high ground positions outside the city and dug in. However, the Japanese were interested in occupying Davao only for the present time and made no attempt to pursue them.
With the Davao invasion force safely ashore and well in control, the IJN immediately withdrew many of its forces from the area. These included eight transports and four destroyers along with Ryujo and Chitose, which all retired to Palau to refuel in anticipation of supporting the upcoming invasion of Jolo Island. Refueling quickly, the warships immediately sailed and rejoined the Jolo convoy on February 24 as it moved toward the island.
The Japanese wasted no time in moving on Jolo. Located some 300 miles southwest of Davao, it would serve as a support base and provide air cover for the invasion of the East Indies. The Jolo invasion force was planned to depart Davao immediately, but a lone Filipino machine gun detachment inflicted so many casualties on one of the IJA units before being wiped out that it had be replaced by the IJN’s Kure 2nd Special Naval Landing Force at the last minute.34 A surprise air raid by USAAF B-17s on the morning of December 22 further delayed the operation and inflicted four casualties on the destroyer Kuroshio through strafing.
Nonetheless, nine transports departed Davao for Jolo later that day carrying the Kure 2nd SNLF and the IJA’s 143rd Infantry Regiment. Jintsu and the 15th Destroyer Division gave close escort with air cover and A/S support provided by Ryujo, Chitose and Shiokaze. This force landed at Jolo on the evening of December 24; encountering weak resistance from 300 poorly armed Philippine Constabulary, the Japanese were in control of Jolo city and its airfield by the next morning.35 Upon securing the island, a forward seaplane base was immediately set up, and the Japanese were now ready to begin their invasion of the East Indies.