1. The Gouvernementsmarine was a civilian paramilitary police force similar in organization and function to the United States Coast Guard. Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, its primary duties included drug interdiction, fishery regulation, search and rescue and the monitoring of Japanese spy vessels in the Netherlands East Indies. Following the outbreak of war in Europe, its ships were militarized in November 1939 and put under the command of the Royal Netherlands Navy.
2. The largest and best equipped of these forces were the Marechaussee, a paramilitary state police force charged with keeping order in both Holland and Dutch colonial territories throughout the East and West Indies. Like the Gouvernementsmarine, it was militarized in November 1939 following the outbreak of war in Europe.
3. Japan had long coveted a sustained presence in the Netherlands East Indies since before the First World War. As its government came more under the influence of nationalist military officers of the Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy, the Dutch felt more threatened. Following the German occupation of Holland in May 1940, the Japanese went so far as to issue a formal list of “requests” regarding trade relations between the NEI and Japan, immigration laws and treatment of Japanese nationals. Had the NEI government accepted these stipulations, the archipelago would have effectively become a Japanese protectorate the same way French Indochina did in 1940–41 when it accepted similar Japanese demands following the fall of France.
Although all of these demands were firmly but politely rebuffed by the Dutch, the Japanese took steps to ensure that the East Indies would not come under the control of any other nation. In June 1940 the IJN went so far as to station a naval task force at the Pacific Island of Palau to ensure that Britain, Australia and the United States would not attempt to take the Dutch territory, willingly or unwillingly, into protective custody in the same way the United States did with the Danish territory of Greenland following that country’s occupation by Germany in 1940. The formation was also intended to keep pressure on the Dutch East Indies government as the Japanese presented greater demands and hinted at the possibility of war if they were not met.
4. Even so, there existed deep divisions between the Dutch government-in-exile, which had escaped to London in May 1940, and its colonial regime in the East Indies. Prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War, a sizeable nationalist movement existed that pushed for the liberation of the NEI in a wide variety of forms, ranging from those who wanted an autonomous territory with lax ties to Queen Wilhelmina to those calling for complete independence from the Netherlands. At the same time, many East Indies government officials had been born in the colonies and were subsequently viewed with some degree of suspicion as to exactly where their loyalties lay.
This is not to question their loyalty in the fight against Japan, but rather in regard to the fate of the NEI following the eventual defeat of Japan and the archipelago’s subsequent reoccupation. Prior to the fall of Java in March 1942, H.J. van Mook, lieutenant governor of the NEI, had raised eyebrows among many in the Europe government when he openly called for Holland to loosen its colonial hold on the territory by allowing the NEI greater political representation, increased self determination regarding trade imbalances with the Dutch companies in Europe and by relaxing certain social imbalances for the Indonesian people.
These comments raised concern amongst the Queen’s government, which was weakened by the fact that it itself was already in exile and had very little strength. Although nominally backed by the London government, the East Indies government was largely on its own and had experienced a great deal of political and foreign policy independence following the occupation of Holland. Combined with van Mook’s comments, there was fear in London that certain Dutch colonial officials evacuated from Java in March 1942 might seek to create a separate Netherlands East Indies government-in-exile in Australia that would compete with London’s goal of restoring the East Indies to full colony status following the war. To head off this very possibility, the London government replaced van Mook as lieutenant governor on March 25, 1942, and recalled him to London, where they could better control his actions. Ford, Allies in a Bind, pp. 37–38.
5. Prior to 1940, Germany was a major arms supplier of the Netherlands, providing its military forces with everything from seaplanes and shipboard catapults to anti-aircraft guns, precision optical equipment and small arms. But as Nazi German became more antagonistic toward the rest of Europe these ties were cut and the orders for new weapons and equipment lapsed.
6. Also listed as 1st Lieutenant W. Bierenbroodspot, KMR
7. In 1999-2000, a Dutch aviation group attempted to locate and salvage a number of these aircraft, whose remains reportedly still existed on the bottom of Java’s Lengkong River. However, after a series of delays both attempts ended in failure and it appears that as this text is written that the aircraft will not be recovered anytime in the near future.
8. De Ruyter, Java and Sumatra shipped two aircraft each; records vary, so remains unclear if Tromp could operate one or two aircraft, although she appears to have only carried one aircraft immediately prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Dutch destroyers and several of the larger GM patrol vessels were also capable of shipping a Fokker seaplane, although they rarely did as it eliminated the use of one of the after mounts on the destroyers. Aboard ship, their primary role was to conduct short-range reconnaissance and provide shell spotting during surface engagements.
Of the cruisers, only De Ruyter was equipped with a catapult that allowed her to launch floatplanes while underway. The others were forced to stop and lower their aircraft overboard; to recover the planes, all KM ships utilized the Hein Mat system, where the ship would tow a large mesh matt alongside the ship while simultaneously dumping oil on the water to break up the wave action. Upon landing, the aircraft would taxi onto the matt and be hoisted aboard. While effective in peacetime, stopping to launch and recover aircraft was not a preferred tactic in a war zone where the danger of lurking submarines was always present.
9. It is interesting to note that despite the MLD’s successful operation of the Do. 24 for nearly four years beforehand, this was its first operational use with the Kriegsmarine.
10. These aircraft were primarily used to replace GVT aircraft that rotated in and out of Morokrembangan for repairs and routine overhaul. The latter was carried out at 200- to 400-hour intervals. However, the nature of their operations often meant that the flying boats were frequently subjected to operational periods that well exceeded these specifications.
11. All Dutch Catalinas were delivered without armament or weapons mounts, which were then installed by MLD personnel at Morokrembangan. This was presumably done as the Dutch had their own stocks of weapons and their bombs were of indigenous design and would not work with American bomb racks. Otherwise, the primary differences between the MLD Model 28 and USN Catalina were that all of the instrument panels had metric numbers and that related flight instructions and signage throughout the aircraft were posted in Dutch.
At the time of their order by the MLD, these boats were the newest version of the PBY Catalina then in production. But while the USN flew earlier PBY-4, PBY-3 and even obsolescent PBY-2 versions, which did not have self-sealing fuel tanks, the Dutch aircraft did, sometimes leading USN personnel to complain about a foreign power receiving the most modern equipment available while they had to make due with older aircraft.
12. With the pending threat of war and subsequent attack on Pearl Harbor, the MLD sought to have delivery of their remaining PBYs moved up.
13. The Dutch PBYs were built at the Consolidated Aircraft factory in San Diego, California. From there, chartered civilian flight crews ferried them across the Pacific via Pearl Harbor, Midway, Wake, Guam and Manila. At Manila, skeleton Dutch flight crews took control of the aircraft and ferried them south to Java via Tarakan or Balikpapan. Upon arrival in the NEI, they were outfitted with Dutch weapons and equipment and made ready for operational service.
14. Whereas the PBY-5 was a true flying boat that could be removed from the water only with great difficulty, the PBY-5A, and subsequent versions, was a true amphibian that could operate equally well from both water and land bases.
15. Information and other exchanges related to the British Royal Air Force taking over Dutch PBYs have been culled from the following ciphers:
August 11, 1941, PRO Air 8/461, Message for First Sea Lord from Admiralty
August 28, 1941, PRO Air 8/461, Message from Air Marshall A. T. Harris in USA to V. C. A. S. Whitehall
October 10, 1941, PRO Air 8/461, Message from Air Ministry Whitehall to Commander in Chief Far East
October 17, 1941, PRO Air 8/461, Message from Air Ministry Whitehall to Commander in Chief Far East
October 17, 1941, PRO Air 8/461, Message from Commander in Chief Far East to Air Ministry
November 14, 1941, PRO 8/461, Message from EASFAR to Air Minister Whitehall
November 20, 1941, PRO 8/461, Message from Air Ministry to EASFAR for Commander in Chief Far East
November 27, 1941, PRO 8/461, Message from EASFAR to Air Ministry Kingsway
December 1, 1941, PRO 8/461, Message from Air Ministry Kingsway to RAF Delegate Washington
December 9, 1941, PRO 8/461, Message from RAFDEL to AIRWHIT
December 16, 1941, PRO 8/461, Message from Air Ministry to EASFAR
16. This is a pattern that developed prior to Pearl Harbor and continued throughout the Singapore and East Indies campaigns. It appears that the British High Command regarded Dutch forces in the Far East as little more than a resource to be milked for their own needs, rather than a true ally. Time and again, the British asked the Dutch to contribute valuable military resources, of which they had precious little to spare, for British national interests. Yet, Britain showed a great reluctance to make similar sacrifices in order to help rebuild Dutch military strength in the Far East.
17. Had all of these aircraft arrived, the MLD would have had a total of some 72 front-line aircraft. But as it was, the squadron never had more than 60 or so operational flying boats at any given time. This total includes both front-line and reserve aircraft, so the number in service with the active MLD squadrons was much lower.
18. There remains some confusion as to the actual number of STM-S2 models delivered. Although 24 floatplane versions were ordered, most sources believe that no more than 24 were actually delivered before the fall of Java.
19. The DB-7B was an attack version featuring a solid nose cone that housed four 20mm cannon, while the DB-7C was a torpedo bomber and could house a bombardier in a glass nose.
20. That the MLD ordered these aircraft to serve as transports is really no surprise, considering that they were already in service with KNILM, the Dutch civilian airline in the East Indies. Adoption of this extremely versatile and highly popular seaplane would certainly have simplified maintenance and training for the MLD, which would eventually draw heavily on KNILM flight crews and ground personnel to fill out its ranks once the Pacific War broke out.
21. The VS-310 was an export version of the Vought OS2U Kingfisher then just entering service with the USN. As with the Model 28-5MNE Catalina, the primary differences between it and its American brethren were Dutch-language control panels, metric instruments and instructions throughout the interior and exterior of the aircraft.
22. Report of Mission Appointed to Enquire into and Verify the Requirements of the Netherlands East Indies Government for Munitions for Defense, Headquarters Philippine Department, August 23, 1941.
23. MS Tabian on January 18 carrying seven aircraft; MS Mapia on January 20 carrying ten aircraft and MS Weltevreden on February 19 carrying seven aircraft. Information provided through correspondence with Bill Devins, January 30, 2002.
24. Personal correspondence with Jim Maas, Bill Devins, Bert Kossen, January and April 2002.
25. It was intended that MLD flight trainees would transition to these aircraft from the Ryan primary trainers; from there, they would again transition to front-line aircraft such as the Fokker T.IV and Dornier Do. 24. In the end however, virtually all of the MLD trainees went directly from the Ryan trainers to training operation on the front-line Fokkers and Dorniers.
26. KLM and KNILM airlines started the Pacific War with a combined total of 30 land-based aircraft and seaplanes. The land planes were used by the ML, and the seaplanes by the MLD, as supply and transport aircraft, although some continued to fly a limited number of passenger flights. These aircraft included
• 3 × Douglas DC-2
• 7 × Douglas DC-3
• 4 × Douglas DC-5
• 5 × Fokker F.VII and F.XII
• 4 × Grumman G.21a
• 4 × Lockheed L-14
• 1 × Sikorsky S-42B
• 2 × Sikorsky S-43
Of these 30 original aircraft, 11 escaped to Australia, where one DC-2 crashed almost immediately when it ran out of fuel during its evacuation flight from Java. In the East Indies campaign proper, KM and KNILM suffered no fewer than 19 losses, including
• 1 × DC-2
• 5 × DC-3
• 2 × DC-5 (one captured on Java)
• 5 × Fokker (all)
• 3 × Grumman G.21a
• 1 × Sikorsky S-42B
• 2 × Sikorsky S-43
Witter, Het Vergeten Squadron.
27. As with all aircraft from the “Grumman Iron Works,” this highly versatile amphibian was both rugged and reliable, making it a popular choice for operations throughout the East Indies. In addition to KNILM, it was flown by a number of private and commercial owners, including oil companies and religious groups.
28. It appears that KNILM also operated a twin-engine de Havilland Dragon Rapide passenger plane that had likely been taken over from a commercial entity known as Servicos Aereas da Colonia Portuguesa da Timor, which had been formed by Spanish colonial authorities in 1940. This airline had been formed following prolonged Australian and Japanese efforts to set up airline passenger service between Timor, Australia and Palau. It provided weekly passenger service between the cities of Koepang in Dutch Timor and Dili in Portuguese Timor.
Although the Portuguese government owned and operated the airline, the Dragon Rapide was leased from KNILM. In addition, the plane’s pilot and mechanic were also Dutch and whose salaries were paid by KNILM, which was to be reimbursed by Servicos Aereas da Colonia Portuguesa da Timor officials. However, the Koepang-Dili leg proved unprofitable and the airline almost immediately fell some six months behind on the aircraft’s lease payments and crew salaries.
Nonetheless, the weekly flights continued when the Netherlands East Indies government stepped in and began to reimburse KNILM for its losses. Due to Timor’s close proximity to Dutch territory, Japan wanted to establish a presence in neutral Portuguese territory for espionage purposes and was severely pressuring Portugal to make concessions. Because of these ongoing efforts, the Dutch believed that the intelligence on Portuguese-Japanese relations and Japanese operations in Portuguese Timor provided by the plane’s crew during their flights into Dili justified the cost.
Archer, Report on Portuguese Territory. 1941.
29. As a result of the growing tidal wave of Japanese air supremacy over the NEI, by mid-February 1942 KNILM had lost one Grumman G-21a, one Sikorsky S-42B, one Sikorsky S-43 and two DC-3’s.
Casius and Postma, 40 jaar luchtvaart in Indie.
30. Helfrich, Memoires, Volume I, p. 274.
31. Although Admiral Hart updated Admiral Helfrich on a daily basis as a matter of courtesy regarding naval affairs, the Dutch admiral’s only steady source of information of ABDA’s strategic planning came from a naval staff officer whom he attached to the organization.
32. “It was not until 7 February that ABDA-AIR took over command of RAF and RAAF units in the Wesgroup area. Though on several occasions during the war the RAF obstinately and willfully chose to go its own way in spite of orders, the manner in which a British supreme commander and a British air commander tolerated a freewheeling organization within Wesgroup smacks of tacit collusion in the pursuit of a national interest at the expense of a wider inter-alliance commitment.” Wilmott, Empires in the Balance, p. 275–76.
33. Haslach, Nishi, No Kaze, Hare, p. 112
34. As the threat of war in the Pacific loomed, Dutch intelligence agencies clamped down on Japanese espionage activities by outlawing the transmission of any information from the NEI in any language other than Dutch or English; this applied specifically to wireless messages and international phone calls. In the end, diplomatic pouches were one of the few secure methods of communications left between the Japanese consulate in Batavia and its handlers in Tokyo.
35. Information and related exchanges between Japanese counselor personnel and Tokyo has been culled from the following declassified United States intelligence documents:
Purple Intercept Code #895, From Batavia to Tokyo, August 28, 1941
Purple Intercept Code Circular #1947, September 6, 1941
Purple Intercept Code #659, October 22, 1941
Purple Intercept Code #1150, October 25, 1941
36. For this reason, the Dutch were always concerned to see concessions made by European nations to nationalist groups in other territories. Britain’s formation of the state of Saudi Arabia in 1932 was viewed with particular alarm, as Indonesian Muslims promptly intensified their calls for a state of their own as well. Haslach, Nishi, No Kaze, Hare, p. 93.
1. Neither the MLD nor the KM as a whole ever built an independent fighter arm prior to the Second World War. The primary reason was that shortly after the fighters were ordered for Perak, the KM voluntarily surrendered the air defenses of its naval and air bases to the KNIL (presumably for budgetary reasons), which then assumed responsibility for their protection in both Europe and the Netherlands East Indies. However, during the war MLD units based in England did operate a number of fighter aircraft from converted merchant carriers. And following the end of the war, the KM immediately established a carrier-based fighter and strike force using ships purchased from the Royal Navy.
Bosscher, De Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Volume 2, p. 437.
2. Much like the RAF, MLD pilots could be full officers or noncommissioned officers, the latter typically having the rank of Sergeant-Pilot.
3. Hooftman, Van Farman tot Neptune: De Vliegtuigen van de Marine, Volume 1, p. 41.
4. Just like the volunteer pilots who slipped into China to join the American Volunteer Group, it appears that these instructors were either ex-military or military reservists from the U.S. Marine Corps or USN. This would be a logical conclusion as the Dutch needed instructors with operational experience on military aircraft, and it is logical to assume that they would come from the military ranks.
Nine instructors returned to the United States shortly after the outbreak of war. However, three of them—Captain Willard Reed, USMC, Lieutenant Thomas Hardy (service unknown) and Lieutenant John A. Robertson, USN—remained on Java and flew combat missions with the 17th Pursuit Squadron (USAAF) and Patrol Wing 10 (USN). Although Hardy safely returned to the United States, Reed was killed when his P-40 crashed, and Robertson went missing aboard the PatWing 10 PBY P-42 (former Y-42) while on a reconnaissance mission over the Makassar Strait.
Edmonds, They Fought with What They Had, p. 288.
5. Hooftman, Van Farman tot Neptune: De Vliegtuigen van de Marine, Volume 1, p. 42.
6. According to Hooftman in Van Farman tot Neptune: De Vliegtuigen van de Marine, Volume 1, p. 41, a number of twin-engine Lockheed bombers were also ordered to facilitate the transfer of trainees from the primary trainers to Dornier and Fokker seaplanes. However, the author has seen no other mention of this order in either Dutch- or English-language sources.
7. Shores, Bloody Shambles, Volume 1, p. 64
8. Shores, Bloody Shambles, Volume 1, p. 42
9. Unlike the Commonwealth and American militaries, there was no strict color barrier in the KNIL, ML, KM or MLD for Eurasians of mixed Dutch-Indonesian ethnicity during the 1930s and 1940s. Eurasians were regarded as Dutch citizens and were afforded all of the same rights. This meant they could hold high-level government and military leadership positions, and many did, including General R. Bakker, who served as chief of the general staff for the KNIL throughout the East Indies campaign.
10. A large number of these trainees were apparently later transported back to England, where they helped make up the RAF’s 320 Squadron (Dutch).
11. In May 1941 48 of these aircraft were ordered from Australia. Of this number, 33 went to the ML-KNIL and 15 to the MLD, with 11 of the aircraft being made available to the VVC and its related flying clubs. Shores, Bloody Shambles, Volume 1, p. 40.
12. Six of these light training aircraft had been ordered from Germany prior to May 1940, but by December 1941, only three were still operational, the rest being lost in flight-training accidents.
13. Two aircraft available; it appears that these aircraft might have been former civilian aircraft.
14. An extensive list of MLD naval air stations and support bases can be found in Appendix 8 of this text.
15. Wijngarden and Staal, Dornier Do. 24, p. 38–40.
16. Ibid.
17. Messimer, In the Hands of Fate, pp. 202–03.
18. Military History Section of the KNIL, Nederlands-Indie Contra Japan, Part 1, p. 225–26.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Report of U.S. Army Mission to Netherlands East Indies, Exhibit B-I, Sheets 3–5, August 8–20, 1941.
26. Bosscher, De Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Volume 2, p. 394–95.
27. It should be noted that the operational composition of each MLD squadron varied greatly as aircraft were rotated in and out for repairs and routine maintenance. As a result, their composition in September 1939 was far different in most cases than on December 7, 1941.
28. Article 17 of Convention XIII of the Second Hague Conference clearly states that a belligerent warship entering a neutral port is typically guaranteed only 24 hours for the purpose of refueling, repairs or resupply, but cannot use this time to conduct activities, such as repairs, that could restore or strengthen its fighting capabilities. However, if additional time is required for repairs related to seaworthiness, the neutral power can grant an extension of up to 72 hours. At that point, the warship must leave or face internment by the neutral power.
It is unclear how this rule applies to merchant vessels, as neutral and belligerent powers have maintained normal trade relations for as long as there has been sea traffic. However, one can assume that the German merchant ships in East Indies ports either outstayed their allowed time and were formally prevented from leaving Dutch waters, or that they simply declined to leave port on their accord to avoid capture by Royal Navy warships that continued to loiter nearby.
29. Throughout the Second World War, the Royal Navy rarely hesitated to violate the territorial waters of neutral nations in pursuit of their operational needs or national strategic goals:
In December 1939, following an engagement with the German battleship Graf Spee off the coast of South America, the Royal Navy cruiser HMNZS Achilles followed her adversary into Uruguayan territorial waters and initiated a brief fight, which was halted only when the Uruguayan cruiser Uruguay arrived on the scene to escort the German ship into Montevideo. Although the Royal Navy denies culpability in this instance and maintains that Graf Spee fired first while in neutral waters, the charts of Achilles showing her position and movements during this engagement were conveniently misplaced shortly afterward, so British claims could not be confirmed.
On February 16, 1940, the Royal Navy destroyers Cossack, Intrepid and Ivanhoe ignored protests from two neutral Norwegian warships and entered that nation’s territorial waters. Still in neutral waters, Cossack forced the German merchant vessel Altmark aground and boarded her, killing eight German seamen in the process. They then proceeded to free 303 Allied merchant seaman being transported to Germany after being captured when Graf Spee seized their ships. Unchallenged by the Norwegian torpedo boats Kjell and Skarv, the British destroyers then retired from Norwegian waters.
Two months later, in direct violation of international law, the Royal Navy carried out a series of mine-laying operations inside Norwegian territorial waters between April 5–8, 1940. The reason given was that Britain remained unconvinced of Norwegian assurances to prevent German merchant ships from using Norwegian waters to transports raw materials to Germany. Although the Nazi invasion of Norway was already well under way before this operation took place, Germany later defended its invasion by stating that it was acting to protect Norwegian neutrality from British aggression.
30. Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1939–42, p. 250.
31. In reality, the Japanese likely could have invaded the NEI with little interference from either the United States or Britain. Although President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated that he would not tolerate additional Japanese aggression in the Far East, he clearly would have had immense trouble gaining the political and popular support needed for a declaration of war. At the time, Congress was divided between isolationist “Doves” and militaristic “Hawks” who pushed for a large US military build-up in order to confront Nazi Germany and Japan. The American people were themselves equally divided, and it is unlikely they would have supported military action against an Asian nation halfway around the world in order to help preserve a colonial territory for a European nation.
Likewise, England was enveloped by its war in Europe and Africa, and it is highly unlikely that Winston Churchill would have attempted to block the Japanese without a firm guarantee of support from the United States. So even though most Dutch oil from the East Indies went to Great Britain, it is just as likely that the British would have deemed themselves capable of surviving without it. However, it is also entirely possible that the British would have viewed an attack against the Dutch as being too great a threat against their naval base at Singapore and acted in defense of the Dutch anyway.
32. German naval intelligence.
33. Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1939–42, p. 250.
34. Ibid.
35. Netherlands Information Bureau, Ten Years of Burrowing in the Netherlands East Indies, p. 36.
36. Womack, Sword of the Rising Sun, World War II magazine, p. 36.
37. Although not overtly stated in Dutch records, this build-up by the Dutch was clearly a reaction to the earlier reports they had received in April 1940 concerning Japanese plans for surprise landings at key areas of the East Indies.
38. Netherlands Information Bureau, Ten Years of Japanese Burrowing in the Netherlands East Indies, p. 38.
39. This was clearly an attempt to coerce Japanese military officials into acting on their threat to prevent another power from taking the East Indies into protective custody. See Chapter 1, endnote #3.
40. Netherlands Information Bureau, Ten Years of Burrowing in the Netherlands East Indies, p. 38.
41. Ibid.
42. Honselaar, Vleugels van de Vloot, p. 116.
1. The Japanese began landing troops in Malaysia and neutral Siam 70 minutes before the attack on Pearl Harbor began. Secondary landings took place at Prachaub, Siam (one transport), Jumbhorn (two transports), Nakhorn (three transports) and Khota Bharoe (three transports), while 18 transports landed the main force at Singora and Patani.
At Khota Bharoe, rough seas hampered the landings, as did stiff resistance from Indian troops of the 8th Brigade, who were well-supported by artillery. Offshore, the light cruiser Sendai, screened by the 19th Destroyer Division (Isonami, Uranami, Shikinami and Ayanami) and the minesweepers Sokaitei, W-2 and W-3 with several submarine chasers provided cover.
The destroyer Sagiri (headquarters ship for all landing beaches) and 20th Destroyer Division (Amagiri, Asagiri and Yugiri) covered the landings at Singora. The first wave of troops moved ashore at 2400, meeting only weak resistance from Thai police and military units. As they moved inland, the transports withdrew north, and the destroyers moved to join the escort off Khota Bharoe.
Sixty-five miles to the south, at Patani and Tepoh, the 12th Destroyer Division’s Shirakumo, Shinonome and Murakumo covered troops landing at Patani. At Patani, troops of the 42nd Infantry Regiment initially met heavy resistance on the beach from the Royal Thai Army. This was soon overcome, and the destroyers withdrew to Khota Bharoe once the landings were complete.
The patrol boat Shimushu covered the operation at Nakhorn, as did the light cruiser Kashii at Bandon. The transports at Prachaub and Jumbhorn landed their troops without escort as no resistance was expected. None encountered any resistance, and the transports withdrew north and the warships to Khota Bharoe upon completion of the landings.
2. Greenwich Mean Time + 7∂ hours.
3. The source of this information remains unknown, although it possibly originated from decoded radio intercepts or MLD reconnaissance flights from the Minahassa Peninsula. A third source could also have been the work of Dutch operatives, although this possibility is considered extremely remote by the author given Japanese security measures and the veil of secrecy that had been drawn over the Japanese Mandate Islands since the early 1930s.
4. Shores, Bloody Shambles, Volume 1, pp. 52–53.
5. Ibid, p. 54.
6. For the most part, these Japanese tenders operated F1M “Pete” seaplane fighters, which were highly maneuverable and versatile aircraft that proved to be extremely tough opponents for the Allied seaplanes they encountered throughout the NEI campaign. Some tenders also operated a small number of E13A “Jake” seaplanes, which were slowly replacing the “Pete” in front-line service. However, the limited number of “Jakes” soon disappeared as the NEI campaign progressed, allowing the obsolescent “Pete” to remain in front-line service, where it feasted on Allied flying boats.
Although seaplane tenders played a vital role in providing air cover and A/S support for numerous Japanese invasion convoys throughout the Philippine and East Indies campaigns, all paid heavily in lost aircraft. A number of these losses can be attributed to air action, but many more were the direct result of non-combat operational accidents. To make good the losses of “Petes” and “Jakes” and to keep the squadrons operating at peak efficiency, second-line E8N1 “Dave” seaplanes were also used, although the Japanese tried to keep them out of front-line service.
For example, when the tender Sanuki Maru set up a temporary seaplane base at Batan Island on December 10, 1941, to cover the initial stages of the Philippine campaign, she lost no fewer than six of her eight “Petes” in six hours due to heavy seas. It was not uncommon for the Japanese tenders to lose 2 aircraft for every 25 sorties they flew, making it extremely difficult to maintain a full complement of aircraft for extended periods of time. Nor was it uncommon for surviving aircraft to experience popped rivets and split seams in their floats. Personal correspondence with Allan Alsleben, June 2002.
7. Ministrie van Oorlog, Nederlands-Indie Contra Japan, Deel IV, pp. 32–34.
8. Bosscher, De Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereld Oorlog, Volume 2, p. 126.
9. The barrage laid by Tatsumiya Maru during the night of December 6–7 numbered 456 mines, approximately 60–70 yards apart in a single, continuous line. Despite the presence of a suspected Japanese minelayer near Tioman Island, the Allies had no evidence to support the presence of the minefield or its precise location. Nonetheless, they ordered major surface ships to avoid the area.
The spread was laid along the anticipated sea route allied warships would take to reach the Japanese landing sites. Although the Royal Navy’s major surface vessels avoided them, the mines resulted in the loss of the auxiliary patrol boat (also listed as an auxiliary minesweeper) HMS Banka on December 10. Likewise, the Dutch submarines K-XVII and O-16 were lost to the barrage, the former with all hands on or about December 14, and the latter on December 12 with the loss of all but one crewman.
Royen van, Hr.Ms. K-XVIII en Hr.Ms. O-16, 1997. p. 40.
10. Ibid.
11. The identity of this ship is unclear; it could have been a Japanese transport making preparations to land troops on Malaya. However, in his book Hr.Ms. K XVII en Hr.Ms. O 16: De ondergang of twee Nederlandse onderzeeboten in de Zuid-Chinese Zee (1941), Dr. P.C. van Royen e.a. states that it could have been a second minelayer. According to British and Australian naval sources, the auxiliary minelayer Chose Maru had also been ordered to accompany Tatsumiya Maru on her minelaying mission. However, Chose Maru turned back upon being sighted by British (Dutch?) aircraft and did not complete her mission.
12. Shores, Bloody Shambles, Volume 1, pp. 74–76.
13. Royen van, Hr.Ms. K-XVIII en Hr.Ms. O-16, p. 48.
14. Although the attack on Pearl Harbor officially took place on December 7, 1941, in the Far East, it fell on December 8 in the NEI because of the International Date Line.
15. “Citizens of the Netherlands East Indies! In its unexpected attack on American and British territories, while diplomatic negotiations were still in progress, the Japanese Empire has consciously adopted a course of aggression. These attacks, which have thrown the United States and the British Empire into active war on the side of already fighting China, have as their objective the establishment of Japanese supremacy in the whole of East and Southeast Asia. The aggression also gravely threatens the Netherlands Indies. The Netherlands government accepts the challenge and takes up arms against the Japanese Empire.”
Mook, van, The Netherlands Indies and Japan, p. 130.
16. Since these aircraft belonged to a foreign nation (they were also legally considered civilian planes since they were not U.S. military aircraft), American neutrality laws prevented them from being armed while in U.S. territory. Nor could Dutch military personnel operate or fly aboard them while on the U.S. mainland.
As a result, the Dutch had two choices when it came to shipping the aircraft to the NEI: 1) transport them via ship at $20,000 per aircraft, or 2) fly them directly to Java at considerable cost savings of approximately $10,000 per aircraft, which included all operating expenses, such as fuel, flight crew wages and bonuses. The MLD chose the latter, and Consairways crews would ferry the aircraft across the Pacific to Manila, where Dutch crews took over. The flight across the Pacific typically took five to six days, followed by a two-week trip back to San Diego via commercial steamer. The flight from Manila to Morokrembangan usually took a couple of days and staged through either Tarakan or Balikpapan.
17. It appears that General van Oyen flew to Hawaii via Pan Am clipper because of American neutrality laws, which at the time prevented foreign military personnel from traveling aboard any aircraft other than civilian passenger planes while within the continental United States.
18. These ships belonged to the IJN’s 7th Destroyer Division. A third destroyer in their group, the Akebono, had originally been detailed to take part in the Midway mission as well. However, she suffered damage to one of her propeller shafts prior to the departure date and was forced to remain in Japan for repairs. This chain of events has caused confusion in some sources over the years, many of which list Akebono in place of Sazanami.
Boeichio Kenshujo Senshishitsu (Senshi Sosho, Volume 5), Hawaii Sakusen (Hawaiian Operation); information and translations provided courtesy of Allan Alsleben.
19. Naval Air Station Midway Island War Diary, December 18, 1941, p. 6.
20. Patrol Wing Two War Diary, U.S. Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, December 18, 1941.
21. Upon her arrival in Australia, Y-69 appears to have been attached to the MLD Flight Training School, which was evacuated from Java to Australia on February 19, 1942. She could also have been used to train flight crews who had formerly flown Dornier Do. 24s as the MLD continued its conversion to the PBY following the fall of the East Indies.
22. The arrival of Y-70 at Morokrembangan is also listed as December 16, 1941. Hooftman, Van Farman tot Neptune, Volume 1, p. 19.
23. It is unknown who flew Y-70 on this flight, as both Consairways flight crews (a total of eight men) at Midway had been left behind on the island when Y-69 and Y-70 were returned to Pearl Harbor. However, the likely candidates would seem to be the displaced crew of Y-68, which had been destroyed on December 7. The Consairways flight personnel at Midway were not evacuated to Pearl Harbor until the morning of December 26 aboard the seaplane tender USS Wright.
Naval Air Station Midway Island War Diary, December 26, 1941, p. 8.
24. These forces consisted of the 4th Submarine Squadron (8 boats), 5th Submarine Squadron (6 boats) and the 6th Submarine Squadron (4 boats).
25. Y-52, Y-53 and Y-54, which were renumbered FV-Y, FV-U and FV-W, respectively, in RAF service.
26. Following the loss of Admiral Sir Tom Phillips with the battleship Prince of Wales and battlecruiser Repulse to Japanese bombers on December 10, the RN had no immediate plans to undertake any offensive action against the Japanese. Prince of Wales and Repulse had been the heart of the Far Eastern Fleet, and their loss was a crushing blow. The most powerful remaining Allied ships in the Malay Barrier were now the heavy cruisers HMS Exeter and USS Houston. But although supported by a host of light cruisers and destroyers, they were no match for the powerful Japanese units facing them.
The situation worsened on December 12 when the British Admiralty all but ruled out any future offensive action. The remaining RN ships would be used primarily for convoy duties between Singapore and the Indian Ocean. Since 1939, the RN had suffered grievous losses (particularly among its small ships) and now chose to concentrate its remaining heavy units at Ceylon to hold the Indian Ocean. As of 1941, RN losses included no fewer than 3 battleships, 3 aircraft carriers, 9 cruisers, 56 destroyers, 31 submarines, 23 small warships and 14 auxiliaries. The total was even higher when one counted the hundreds of small auxiliaries that had also been lost.
Following the loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse, the primary surviving ships at Singapore included the light cruisers Dragon, Durban and Danae with the destroyers Encounter, Electra, Express, Jupiter, Stronghold, Tenedos, Vampire, Scout and Thanet. Virtually all of these ships dated from the First World War and definitely could not be counted as front-line units. The RAN corvettes Burnie, Goulburn, Bendigo and Maryborough and armed merchant cruiser Manoora were also in harbor, as was the armed merchant cruiser Kanimbla. The destroyer Isis, from the Mediterranean Fleet, was refitting alongside the Australian sloop Vendetta.
On December 23, the RN announced its permanent plans following the loss of Force Z. The battleships Revenge and Royal Sovereign, together with Dragon, Durban, Danae, Jupiter, Encounter, Electra, Express and Vampire would form part of the Eastern Fleet surface forces at Singapore. Ironically, two elderly World War I–era cruisers (Dragon and Danae), which Admiral Phillips had refused to take to sea because of their advanced age, would now replace Prince of Wales and Repulse. But despite their attachment, Revenge and Royal Sovereign never moved to Singapore and remained with the main fleet at Ceylon.
27. Mostly likely these were either F1M “Pete” or E8N1 “Dave” floatplanes from the seaplane tender Kamikawa Maru.
28. Honselaar, Vleugels van de Vloot, pp. 140–41.
29. Netherlands East Indies Campaign Update, New York Times, December 19, 1941, Section L-6.
30. Bureau Maritieme Historie, De strijd in Nederlands Oost-Indie: Verrichtingen van de MLD in Nederlands Oost-Indie Gedurende de Japanse Opmars, p. 107. Provided courtesy of Jan Visser.
31. Visser, Who Sank the Shinonome?, p. 2.
32. According to De luchtstrijd om Borneo by P.C. Boer and Verkennen en bewaken by N. Geldhof, X-34 suffered mechanical failure, which forced her to make an emergency landing while en route to Miri. However, Japanese records clearly state that an engagement with an Allied flying boat took place over Borneo on this date. As there were no other engagements between Japanese aircraft and Allied flying boats that day, this could only have been X-34 and Kamikawa Maru’s seaplane.
33. National Historical Society, The Fall of the Philippines, p. 113.
34. Ibid.
35. So poorly equipped were these troops that many of them, although armed, had weapons that were either broken, defective or otherwise did not work. In any event, none of them had more than a small handful of ammunition, which made the outcome of a fight for Jolo a foregone conclusion.
1. Patrol Wing 10 consisted of two USN patrol squadrons, VP-21 (redesignated VP-101 in late 1940) and VP-26 (renumbered VP-102). VP-21 arrived in the Philippines from Pearl Harbor in September 1939 and was followed out a year later by VP-26 in December 1940; PatWing 10 was officially formed upon its arrival. Between the two squadrons, the reconnaissance wing operated a total of 28 PBY-4s, an earlier version of the MLD’s Catalina flying boats, which were severely hampered by weak armament, and more important, a lack of self-sealing fuel tanks.
Badly weakened by Japanese aircraft in the early days of the Philippine campaign, PatWing 10 was reinforced by VP-22 in January 1942. This squadron had been present at Pearl Harbor on December 7 and had lost several aircraft during the attack. However, these aircraft were either repaired or replaced by the time VP-22 departed for Java on January 1, 1942. Unlike VP-21 and VP-26, the new arrivals operated a total of 12 newer PBY-5 Catalinas.
2. Messimer, In the Hands of Fate, p. 13
3. Four seaplane tenders supported the aircraft of PatWing 10. USS Langley had originally entered service with the USN in 1922 as its first aircraft carrier. She was converted into a seaplane tender in late 1936 as newer, larger ships rendered her obsolete in the carrier role. Langley was transferred to the Philippines in mid-1940 to support VP-21. There, she joined USS Heron, a converted “Bird”-Class minesweeper, which had served in the Philippines since the 1920s. Throughout the East Indies campaign Heron served as tender for PatWing 10’s utility aircraft, which consisted of one SOC “Seagull,” four J2F “Duck” and five OS2U “Kingfisher” seaplanes.
The USS Childs and USS William B. Preston were both former World War I “four stacker” destroyers of the “Clemson” Class that had been converted into seaplane tenders in 1938 and 1939, respectively. They were transferred to the Philippines in late 1940 to support the aircraft of VP-21 and VP-26. As converted destroyers, both possessed extremely good speed and above-average armament compared with other seaplane tenders.
4. At this stage of the campaign, this was most likely a long-range Kawanishi H6K “Mavis” from the Toko Air Wing then based at Palau, some 700 miles to the northeast. With a range of nearly 4,000 miles, the flying boat was operating well within its range.
5. The American crewmen obviously believed this was a Sikorsky S-42, clearly demonstrating that they had been briefed on the various types of aircraft operated by the Dutch.
6. Unknown to the American flight crews at the time, formation flights over Soerabaja were forbidden without first alerting the appropriate Dutch authorities, who were extremely concerned with the possibility of Japanese air raids on the city.
7. See reference on, Chapter 2, p. 18.
8. Throughout the NEI campaign, the tenders of PatWing 10 operated from a number of temporary seaplane bases throughout the Lesser Soenda Islands in the southeastern region of the East Indies. These included Morokrembangan (PatWing 10 HQ) and the islands of Soembawa (Childs), Timor (Preston) and Tanimbar (Heron). For the most part, Langley operated from either the port of Tjilatjap on Java’s southern coast, or the Australian port of Darwin.
9. Shores, Bloody Shambles, Volume 1, p. 202.
10. New York Times, December 21, 1941, p. L-2.
11. The speed and efficiency in which MLD ground crews at Morokrembangan were able to repair routine battle damage often allowed the aircraft to be returned to operational status in record time. Although routine maintenance, such as 200- to 400-hour aircraft overhauls, and certain types of heavy battle damage could keep an aircraft out of service for several weeks, most were repaired and put back into action within a matter of days. However, this efficiency would be severely impaired once the Japanese began bombing and strafing Morokrembangan in early February 1942.
12. Honselaar, Vleugels van de Vloot, p. 146.
13. This is an interesting, perhaps fatally flawed, operational strategy on the part of Lieutenant Burgerhout. As American and British bomber raids over Germany and Japan would subsequently show, aircraft had a much higher chance of survival if they remained in formation during fighter attacks, as it offered a greater concentration of firepower. Likewise, fighters tended to single out individual aircraft that were crippled or otherwise isolated from the main formation.
14. This claim is not confirmed in Japanese records, as no Toko Air Wing flying boats were lost at Davao that day.
15. Honselaar, Vleugels van de Vloot, p. 147.
16. In Dutch, the word for fighter is “Jager,” thus the gunner transmitting the letter “J” instead of “F” to notify his crewmates.
17. Japanese Defense Agency, Boeichio Kenshujo Senshishitsu (Senshi sosho), Volume 23.
18. Although the specific damage to Tonan Maru is unclear, she was the only Japanese vessel hit that day.
19. The Beaufort (Wind Speed) Scale lists Force 6 conditions as a strong breeze with speeds ranging from 25 to 31 miles per hour (22 to 27 knots) with large waves in the area of 10 feet high, typically accompanied by some sea spray. On land, large tree branches move, wires whistle and umbrellas are difficult to control. Copyrighted information courtesy of Russ Rowlett, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill.
20. In addition to commanding all naval forces, Hekking was also senior commanding officer in charge of all MLD flight and reconnaissance operations in the eastern half of the East Indies archipelago. However, given the dearth of naval forces at Ambon, the MLD aircraft stationed at MVK Halong were his only operational forces.
21. Shores, Bloody Shambles, Volume 1, p. 204.
22. GMT + 9 hours.
23. At the time of the attack, the Sikorsky had just recently arrived at Lake Tondano. Its pilot, Carl Rüpplin van Keftikon, was standing on the dock reviewing his cargo manifest with a KPM official from Menado. He reported hearing the sound of aircraft and then gunfire. So fast was the initial Japanese attack that by the time he turned to look, his plane was already in flames and three passengers still aboard were killed.
Witter, Het Vergeten Squadron.
24. It is interesting to note that the Japanese pilots, all of whom were universally liberal when it came to victory claims, actually understated their success at Lake Tondano on December 26. Although they had effectively annihilated two complete MLD squadrons, they claimed to have destroyed only three tri-engine flying boats and a large four-engine seaplane. Shores, Bloody Shambles, Volume 1, p. 204.
25. In addition, one of the wounded men died shortly after the New Year, thus bringing the total KIA for the raid to 18.
26. Another reason adding to the Dutch sense of security was the location of the seaplane base itself. Kalkas was located directly at the foot of an 825-foot mountain; because this would make it difficult for fighters to pull up, the MLD believed this would help guard against sustained air attack from strafing fighters.
27. These were “Mavis” flying boats from the Toko Air Wing, which was still operating at Davao.
28. Lieutenant Burgerhout, commander of GVT.5, had sent a lengthy message to Captain Hekking at Area Combined Headquarters on Ambon immediately upon his return from the Davao raid. In it, he expressed his concern about trying to launch any more attacks from Lake Tondano. Burgerhout thought Kalkas was too exposed and that MLD aircraft on Lake Tondano should be withdrawn immediately to avoid a likely Japanese counterstrike.
Furthermore, Burgerhout believed that GVT.2 and GVT.5 had gotten lucky in their first attack and that the raid on Davao had achieved such good success only because the Japanese had been taken by surprise. He correctly anticipated that the Japanese would very quickly strengthen their air defenses, resulting in much heavier losses in future attacks. He stressed that it would be useless to try to attack a heavily defended target with flying boats in the face of heavy enemy defenses. Bosscher, De Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereld Oorlog, Volume 2, pp. 517-18.
29. Following the attack on Lake Tondano, a meeting between Lieutenant Burgerhout and Captain Hekking took place on Ambon later on December 26. Although Burgerhout once again stressed his opposition to attacking heavily defended targets with flying boats, a simple fact remained—had not all but one flying boat of GVT.2 and GVT.5 been destroyed at Kalkas, the two squadrons would have been back over Davao the following morning. Despite strong warnings from senior MLD personnel, which were in line with the concerns expressed by Lieutenant Burgerhout, Admiral Helfrich personally ordered that another attack take place on December 27. Ibid.
30. Following the evacuation of Java, Lieutenant Burgerhout later wrote a highly critical report that raised serious concerns regarding a “lack of insight in the use of aircraft” by Captain Hekking and his subordinate, Lieutenant-Commander J. Luske, KMR, who together were responsible for the command of all naval and air operations in the Eastern East Indies from ACH on Ambon. The primary issue revolved around the fact that neither Hekking nor Luske had any aviation experience, yet they were responsible for controlling air operations in their sphere of command.
In response, Commander J.A.C. Broesder, commander of MLD units in Australia, wrote that MLD HQ had not been consulted when Admiral Helfrich and his staff had set up this command structure before the start of war. When word of this command structure did reach Captain Bozuwa at Morokrembangan, the war was already in progress, and he did not feel comfortable asking for such a radical change at that point. So despite extensive talks among Broesder, Bozuwa and the commanders of GVT.2 and GVT.5 following their return to Java, there were no changes in the process of how KM officers were chosen to oversee MLD operations until the squadron had been evacuated to Australia and Ceylon.
Ibid.
31. These aircraft were P-1, P-6, P-9 and P-11.
32. Honselaar, Vleugels van de Vloot, p. 158.
33. Shores, Bloody Shambles, Volume 1, p. 210.
34. Bosscher, De Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereld Oorlog, Volume 2, p. 175.
X-34 from GVT.7 on December 17; X-27 from GVT.5 on December 23; X-11, X-12 and X-23 from GVT.2 on December 26; X-26 from GVT.5 on December 26 and X-15 from GVT.1 on December 29.
35. Helfrich, Memoires, Volume I, p. 242.
1. The exact date of this transfer remains unclear, although it apparently took place sometime in the second or third week of January. The only correlating document is a Dutch naval report dated January 19, 1942, that confirms the transfer of Y-39, Y-41 and Y-42 from service with the MLD flight-training school to PatWing 10 in January 1942.
Author’s correspondence (Reference numbers: 00/2163/71/AvdP and 00/2253/71/AvdP) with Dr. A.P. van Vliet, Dr. A.J. van der Peet and Dr. N. Geldhof of the Institute for Maritime History, The Hague, Netherlands, July 2000.
2. Although there is no written documentation to confirm this transfer, the author believes this is the most likely scenario. It is based on the fact that the original 40 PBYs of VP-21 and VP-26 were sequentially numbered P-1 through P-40, while those of VP-22 were numbered 22-P-1 through 22-P-12. As VP-22 was at full strength when it arrived on Java about the time the transfer took place in January 1942, the two original PatWing 10 squadrons absorbed all five of the transferred Dutch PBYs. In USN service they were also sequentially numbered P-41 through P-45.
It is known that Y-41 and Y-42 retained their original hull numbers and were put into USN service as P-41 and P-42, respectively. If Y-43 was the fourth transferred PBY, it would make sense that it would have retained its original hull number as well, entering service as P-43. The author’s assumption is further based on the fact that there is no mention in any Dutch sources of Y-43 entering service with an operational GVT before or after the transfer took place in January 1942. Nor is there any mention of this Catalina being destroyed by the Japanese in combat or on the ground by Dutch personnel to prevent its capture when Java fell in March 1942.
On February 5, 1942, the USN PBY P-43 was destroyed during a Japanese air raid on Morokrembangan. From her serial number, it is known that this Catalina was a former MLD aircraft. Combined with the numbering sequence of Y-41 and Y-42, and given the total lack of any reference being made to Y-43 in Dutch service, the author believes this makes a strong, albeit circumstantial, case for Y-43 to be listed as the fourth PBY.
3. Although Y-50 had originally departed the Consolidated aircraft plant at San Diego, California prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, she did not reach Morokrembangan until January 16, 1942. This was because while en route to Manila, she suffered heavy damage after running aground on a reef at Midway and had to be returned to San Diego for extensive repairs. Her late arrival at Morokrembangan, combined with the fact that it was a brand-new aircraft that had never seen combat, surely made it an attractive piece of equipment for the USN.
A second, although less likely, candidate for the fifth transferred PBY was Y-73, which also did not reach Morokrembangan until January 1942. The last of the Dutch PBYs to depart San Diego, it was rerouted and delivered to the NEI via a new, much longer route via the Atlantic Ocean, Africa and the Indian Ocean. She did not depart Dinnerkey, Miami, until January 6, 1942, and it is uncertain she could have made such a long flight and arrived on Java in time to be absorbed by PatWing 10. It is possible she was transferred to the USN prior to or immediately upon her arrival.
4. Edmonds, They Fought with What They Had, p. 262.
5. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, pp. 52–53.
6. Ibid.
7. Hara, Japanese Destroyer Captain, p. 61.
8. Langkoeas was the former German merchant ship Stassfurt, which had been seized at Tjilatjap on May 10, 1940. When word came of German forces moving into Holland, the Dutch immediately enacted previously formulated plans to seize a total of 19 German merchant ships at various ports throughout the East Indies. All had previously been interned after entering then neutral Dutch territorial waters to avoid capture or destruction by Royal Navy warships.
9. It is likely these were Fokker T.IVs of GVT.11 and GVT.12, as they were the primary A/S aircraft operating from these ports at the time.
10. Bakker, De K.P.M. in Oorlogstijd, pp. 45–47.
11. Ibid.
12. Djirak (TAN 8) was one of 10 civilian tankers belonging to the Netherlands Colonial Steam Boat Company that were either chartered or militarized by the KM in 1939. All were used throughout the NEI campaign to transport fuel oil from outlaying refineries to Java to keep the East Indies naval squadron operating. Although all of the requisitioned tankers kept their civilian names, eight of them also received the designation TAN 1–8. The KM also utilized four KPM coastal freighters as benzine transports, which were designated BEN 1–4 in addition to their civilian names. Because these boats carried their highly flammable cargo in drums on deck, they quickly earned the nickname “Fire Boats.”
13. Again, the muddied puzzle of PBYs transferred to PatWing 10 comes up. As previously discussed, Y-41 was nominally attached to the MLD flight-training school at Morokrembangan prior to being transferred to Patrol Wing 10. However, according to a Dutch source (Honselaar, Vleugels van de Vloot, p. 169), this was the PBY that sighted the wreck of Djirak on January 11. It is possible that Y-41 was still attached to the flight training school and was on a training flight, which is entirely plausible as the Kangean Islands are less than 100 miles north of Soerabaja. It is also possible that the flight-training school had already been shut down and Y-41 was flying reconnaissance missions prior to being transferred to PatWing 10 despite being unattached to a GVT at the time.
14. With the exception of Y-73, the identity, sequence and dates of arrival of these PBYs via the Atlantic is unknown. The only MLD PBYs that had not yet reached Java at this point in the campaign were Y-69 (damaged at Midway and returned to San Diego for repairs), Y-71, Y-72 and Y-73. But since Y-73 did not depart Miami until January 6, it can be safely ruled out.
15. These were 12 PBY-5A amphibians with the serial numbers Y-74 through Y-85, which were delivered to the MLD in September 1942.
16. It would appear that there was at least some friction between Admiral Helfrich and General ter Poorten, although the exact level and the extent are unknown. This primarily stemmed from the fact that Helfrich felt slighted by the ABDA command in more ways than one. Not only was Helfrich left out of the ABDA command structure, but according to the Dutch constitution, his position in the “Royal” Netherlands Navy afforded him greater military status than General ter Poorten, who, although an experienced general in his own right, was a member of the “Colonial” armed forces. However, by virtue of his seat on the ABDA command, ter Poorten now technically outranked Helfrich.
17. While Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt got along famously on a personal level, it is less well known that the president considered the concept of colonial rule distasteful at best. For this reason, he consistently blocked any strategies during the Pacific War that might have helped strengthen British and Dutch efforts to restore their postwar colonial empires.
18. This ship was the former Japanese fishing vessel Borneo Maru, which had been seized and put into Dutch service at the outbreak of war. In some sources, the name of this ship is also listed as being van Mastdijn.
19. Bataafsche Petroleum Company, which owned the drilling rights on Tarakan.
20. Along with GVT.16 and GVT.17, GVT.18 was the only MLD squadron able to convert over to PBYs prior to the outbreak of war. All three were new squadrons likely formed with new trainees and reservists. The first two units were already in service on December 7, but GVT.18 became operational only in mid-January 1942 and this was its first assignment.
21. The MLD base at Emmahaven was demolished during a Japanese air raid on January 27. This raid also sank the SPM steamer Poelo Tello and Buyskes (KPM), while damaging the KPM merchant ships Mijer and Elout. They also burned harbor warehouses and much material.
Emmahaven was hit again the next day, and Elout was lost, as was the KPM motorship Boelongan. The KPM ship Van der Capellen received shrapnel damage. Although Padang remained open, it proved increasingly difficult to operate from. It was critical that Padang remain open, as Java’s railroads depended almost entirely on Sumatran coal transported via interisland steamer.
1. Lieutenant-Colonel van den Hoogenband commanded the KNIL’s 6th Infantry Battalion, which, like Lieutenant-Colonel S. de Waal’s 7th Battalion on Tarakan, was to defend the port only long enough for the oil facilities to be destroyed. With that mission accomplished, he was to withdraw into the interior of Borneo to join other KNIL forces, or to begin guerrilla warfare if this were impossible.
2. Colijn might also have been chosen for the diplomatic task because his father had also successfully served as prime minister of the Netherlands in the 1930s.
3. Also listed as Parsipal in some Dutch sources.
4. Nortier, De Japanse Aanval Op Nederlands-Indië, p. 139.
5. One reason Colijn and Reinderhoff opposed destruction of the launch and its occupants was that they feared for the safety of the military prisoners and a number of female detainees the Japanese still held on Tarakan.
6. It appears that these men were evacuated aboard the aircraft of GVT.4, which were ordered back to Morokrembangan around the same time demolition of Balikpapan’s facilities began.
7. Killed: 2nd Lieutenant R.H.J. de Vries, Sergeant-Pilot J. Steen, Telegraphist Mate A. Hensing and Aircraft Machinist Mate C.P. de Wit.
8. Due to the unexpected loss of the two Dorniers during the evacuation operation, a substantial number of demolitions personnel had to be left behind and could not be evacuated. Of this group, eight later reached Java aboard small native boats, while 10 more eventually marched overland and reached the Dutch airbase at Samarinda II in the interior of Borneo, from which they were flown to Java. KNIL HQ on Java lost radio contact with the remainder at the end of February.
9. Sakai, Samurai, pp. 57–58.
10. The minesweepers W-13 and W-14 had been sunk by Dutch shore batteries on Tarakan shortly after the garrison agreed to surrender. However, a well-defended coastal position did not receive word of the surrender, as its communications with the rest of the island had been cut on the first day of the invasion. So when the 11th and 30th Minesweeper Divisions moved to begin sweeping Tarakan’s main harbor, the battery opened fire immediately, sinking the two Japanese ships. A short time later the battery surrendered and 85 men of its crew were promptly massacred.
11. Piloted by Lieutenant J.E. Dougherty, this plane was damaged and ran low on fuel, forcing it to set down on the beach at Greater Masalembo Island. There, the crew waited with the wrecked bomber for nine days until spotted by a low-flying B-17, which reported their presence. This report prompted MLD HQ to send out X-19; upon her loss, a PatWing 10 flying boat was given the job, which it completed successfully after a somewhat wild pickup of the bomber crew.
12. 2nd Lieutenant D.J. Bakker and Sergeant-Pilot W.J. Jansen.
13. Messimer, In the Hands of Fate, pp. 212–16.
14. Ministerie van Oorlog, Nederlands-Indie Contra Japan, Deel V, pp. 84–93
15. When interviewed by Dwight Messimer for his excellent text In the Hands of Fate, a number of former PatWing 10 personnel expressed hard feelings toward the Dutch. While some regarded the Dutch as ungrateful, others questioned the value of fighting for Dutch territory, perhaps unknowingly underscoring their own lack of commitment to the NEI campaign.
“The American-Australian joint effort was very successful, and relations between the two units were very friendly. Unfortunately, the same relationship did not exist in regard to American-Dutch relations. Generally speaking, men who were assigned to staff positions thought the Dutch were pretty good fellows. But most of the men who flew the patrol missions considered the Dutch as little more than ‘haughty-taughty Krauts.’
“The Dutch are sore at us if we help them, and they have to feed us. And they gripe if we don’t help them. To hell with the stingy louses!”
Don Chay, PatWing 10 crewman
“I hope no Dutchman hears this record, because all the Dutchmen that I ever came into contact with had the attitude that everything you did for them was just doing yourself a favor to do it for them. They had the attitude that it was just your duty to do these things for them, and you were honored to do it.’”
Nick Keller, PatWing 10 crewman
Messimer, In the Hands of Fate, pp. 133–34.
16. This attack originated from Davao and consisted of six H6K “Mavis” flying boats of the Toko Air Wing and 21 G4M “Bettys” from the Kanoya Air Wing. However, one of the flying boats crashed en route, and only three of the remainder reached Ambon, along with 14 of the “Bettys.”
Shores, Bloody Shambles, Volume 1, p. 211.
17. Although three Buffalos were originally assigned to the defense of Ambon, one was lost during a landing accident, so that only two remained operational by the time of the first Japanese attack. Both of these fighters were shot down on January 15.
18. Despite the arrival of VP-22 and the transfer of the Dutch planes, most of PatWing 10’s remaining aircraft were still older PBY-4 models without self-sealing fuel tanks. But even with these vital improvements, the newer aircraft of VP-22 were still easy prey for virtually any Japanese aircraft they encountered.
19. Although GVT.17 had pulled out, a small cadre of 20 officers and seamen under Commander J.J. Jager, KMR remained at Halong, where it continued to service a small number of PatWing 10 and MLD planes that periodically visited the base until it was captured.
20. At this point, Japanese AA defenses at Kuching consisted of at least eight 75mm guns and multiple light cannon and machine gun positions.
21. A Dutch intelligence agency that prior to the war had put most of its efforts into controlling Indonesian nationalist groups and Japanese espionage activities. After the fall of the East Indies, the Netherlands Interior Service also played a key role in continued Dutch operations throughout Dutch New Guinea.
22. Witter, Het Vergeten Squadron.
23. Shores, Bloody Shambles, Volume 1, p. 227.
24. Ibid.
25. Helfrich, Memoires, Volume I, pp. 304–05.
26. The identity and composition of this convoy is unknown. No invasion convoys are known to have been in the area of Boeton Island at this time, although it is possible that the ships observed belonged to a small supply convoy. At the same time, no Japanese ships were reported damaged or lost on the night of January 31.
1. Shores, Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, p. 149.
2. Bosscher, De Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, p. 581, note 418.
3. Ibid, pp. 252–53.
4. X-1 and X-24 joined the squadron after being overhauled following the closure of the MLD flight-training school in January. The remaining aircraft, X-20 and X-36, had started the war with GVT.3 and GVT.1, respectively. They had been overhauled and put into the reserve pool when GVT.1 was disbanded in early January and GVT.3 reequipped with PBYs in late December. It appears that these were the last available aircraft in the MLD reserve pool.
5. As previously detailed, Y-40 had previously served with the flight-training school and was never attached to an operational GVT. However, with the closure of the flight-training school in January due to a lack of new personnel, Y-40’s operational status was unclear at the time of its loss.
6. Although it had been rebuilt into a command plane for Captain Bozuwa, X-37 still remained inoperable after having arrived on Java in May 1940 with a dead engine.
7. It is important to note that many second-line aircraft lost by the MLD during the Japanese air raids on Java cannot be confirmed or definitely attributed to a specific day. Many of the available Dutch sources conflict with one another regarding specific dates; nor can Japanese records be taken wholly at face value given their pilots’ tendency to dramatically exaggerate and the fact that they also likely made repeat claims on wrecks of aircraft destroyed earlier. With these factors in mind, dates of loss for the single-engine Fokkers and Dornier “Wals” are approximate at best.
8. These were W-4, W-10 and W-14, which were likely still being used as advanced torpedo and weather-training aircraft for pilots who would fly the new Douglas DB-7 torpedo bombers then en route to Java.
9. Bloody Shamble, Volume 2, pp. 150–57. Chris Shores details the loss of 16 Allied fighters shot down or crash-landed and three flying boats and two B-17s shot down. In addition, he lists at least 10—and possibly as many as 13—flying boats and floatplanes being destroyed at anchor.
10. Bosscher, De Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Volume 2, p. 585, n. 62.
11. Messimer, In the Hands of Fate, p. 234.
12. As discussed earlier (see Chapter 5, endnotes 1-3), it is possible that Y-50 was not destroyed in this attack, as it might have been one of the five PBYs transferred to PatWing 10 in mid-January. Likewise, it is also possible that Y-50 received the serial number P-43 upon being transferred to PatWing 10 and was then destroyed on February 5. In the confusion, it is possible that records could have duplicated its loss in both USN and MLD records.
13. Shores, Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, p. 167.
14. Ibid.
15. JANAC, Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses, p. 30.
16. Shores, Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, p. 172.
17. Honselaar, Vleugels van de Vloot, pp. 186–87.
18. Killed outright in the initial crash were Sergeant-Pilot P.J. de Ru, the wireless operator Leading Seaman 1st Class J.J. Woltjes and Sergeant J. de Vries. The badly injured pilot who died the following day was 1st Lieutenant P.L.G. Adriani.
19. This action was consistent with the policies of both the KM and KNIL throughout the East Indies campaign. European evacuees were given top priority in the event of evacuation, while Indonesian civilians were typically left behind. However, it is unknown how many of the Indonesians would have left if given the opportunity, as their loved ones were attached to military units and they were quite often dependent on this arrangement for their livelihood.
20. Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1939–1942, p. 563.
21. With no ABDA reconnaissance aircraft operating over Japanese territory this far north, the information regarding those units in Indochina presumably came from Allied operatives operating within that territory. Given the deep divisions between Vichy French and Free French personnel at the time, it is reasonable to assume that the source of this information was a sympathetic French official who opposed the Japanese occupation of the colony.
22. Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1939–1942, p. 565.
23. Japanese Defense Agency. Boeichio Kenshujo Senshishitsu (Senshi sosho), Volume 23.
24. Shores, Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, pp. 75–76.
25. The weight of these air attacks was so great that the Japanese advance was temporarily halted as their landing barges took to cover along the tree covered banks of the Moesi River. However, as ABDA airpower waned in the face of Japanese counterstrikes, the barge convoy resumed its movement toward Palembang. Had ABDA-AIR been able to sustain its air offensive against the barges, the fight for Palembang might very well have had a much different ending.
26. Helfrich, Memoires, Volume I, pp. 332–33.
27. Bosscher, De Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Volume 2, p. 579, n. 383.
28. Although a figure of 143 officers and men is listed in Dutch sources, the precise complement of Van Nes is unclear. The normal prewar crew of a “Van Galen”–class destroyer was between 140 and 150 men. However, it is very likely that the crew of Van Nes was increased beyond her prewar complement to meet wartime needs.
29. A total of 96 magnetic mines were obtained from the Royal Navy, which wanted to deploy them around Singapore. But with the British surrender in Malaya, they were rerouted to Java, where the MLD successfully tested them for airdrop delivery using PBYs equipped with locally designed minelaying racks. However, only 24 of the mines were ever deployed, 8 in the Moesi River near Palembang and 16 in the Banka Strait following the fall of southern Sumatra. The remainder were never deployed due to inaction on the part of the KM high command.
Personal correspondence with Jan Visser, 2000–2001.
30. Bosscher, De Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Volume 2, pp. 253–54.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. “En route to Malang we encountered a Dutch floatplane, and I broke formation long enough to send him crashing into the ocean.” Sakai, Samurai, p. 68.
35. Ministerie van Oorlog, Nederlands-Indie Contra Japan, Deel IV, pp. 136–37.
36. Shores, Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, pp. 202–03.
37. Although the exact ownership of these Ryan trainers remains unclear, it appears that almost all of them were MLD aircraft and none were floatplanes.
38. Ward, Boer and Casius, The Royal Netherlands Military Flying School 1942–1944, p. 18.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
1. The simultaneous occupation of Bali and Timor would ensure that the Allied air route between Java and Australia was severed. Combined with the continued Japanese air strikes against Java, it was hoped that this would effectively deprive ABDA of air power it would desperately need to interdict the planned invasion of Java. At the same time, the loss of Bali would give the Japanese an advance air base from which to interdict sea movements reinforcing or evacuating the island.
2. The missing crewmen were the plane’s commander, 1st Lieutenant S.A.M.J. Snep, Sergeant-Pilot P. v.d. Sloot, Petty Officer J.R. Kuikert, Wireless Operator A.W. v.d. Meer, Machinist Mate G.H. Hulsbergen, Machinist Mate Th. Schotten and Leading Seaman Djimoen, an Indonesian member of the crew.
3. Patrol Wing 10 War Diary, February 24, 1942.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. The lost flight crew included the pilot, 2nd Lieutenant C. van den End, Sergeant-Pilot P. Mahu, Leading Seaman-Aircraft Mechanic W.J. Geurts, Aircraft Mechanic’s Mate J.J. Pol, Aircraft Mechanic’s Mate A.K. van der Pol and Seaman L.J. van Hasselt.
7. The identity of these attackers remains unknown, although they were most likely seaplane fighters from Sanyo Maru or Sanuki Maru, or possibly even Ki-27 “Nate” or Ki-43 “Oscar” fighters from Palembang. All were operating over the Soenda Strait and Eastern Java at this time. It is also possible that they were IJAAF bombers on an anti-shipping mission against ABDA convoys moving between Tandjoeng Priok and the Indian Ocean.
8. Bosscher, De Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Volume 2, p. 304.
9. Ibid, pp. 304–05.
10. This would be the second time that Sergeant-Pilot C. van Dijk narrowly escaped death at the hands of Japanese fighters. He was also one of the pilots of the KNILM Sikorsky S-42B flying boat lost during the air strike against the Kalkas seaplane base at Lake Tondano on December 26.
11. By this point in the East Indies campaign, the end was clearly in sight for Dutch rule on Java. Buoyed by these developments, the Indonesians abandoned their colonial masters in droves and openly welcomed the Japanese as liberators. As the Japanese advanced, rebellious Indonesians in virtually all parts of the archipelago frequently killed small groups of Europeans (particularly the Dutch) and informed the Japanese of the whereabouts of larger groups.
12. Messimer, Pawns of War, pp. 28–33.
13. Ibid.
14. Shores, Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, p. 241.
15. Messimer, Pawns of War, p. 60.
16. Gill, The Royal Australian Navy 1939–1945, p. 599.
17. The Battle of the Java Sea. Dir. Niek Koppen. Odusseia Documentaries, 1997.
18. Position reported as 6º 25’ South, 117º 13’ East.
19. Bosscher, De Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereld Oorlog, Volume 2, p. 274.
20. Messimer, In the Hands of Fate, p. 267.
21. Bosscher, De Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Volume 2, p. 274.
22. Ibid.
23. Perhaps Admiral Doorman’s greatest error during the Battle of the Java Sea was his decision to put the floatplanes of Java and De Ruyter ashore prior to leaving the ME. As a result, the CSF operated blindly throughout the battle, while the Japanese were able to track Doorman’s movements step by step with the aid of floatplanes from their own cruisers.
In Doorman’s defense, it can be said that in accordance with KM operational doctrine, his plans called for a night engagement with the Japanese. This philosophy, which had been developed long before the outbreak of the Pacific War, called for ML bombers to attack the Japanese far out at sea during daylight hours. The surface fleet would then initiate a night action in which destroyers would make a series of torpedo attacks designed to reduce the enemy’s fighting strength. Doorman would then slowly withdraw with the Japanese in pursuit, dragging their warships across a line of submarines, which would further reduce their numbers. The bombers would strike the Japanese force again beginning at dawn. At some point, the CSF would engage the invasion convoy and turn it away from Java.
Another reason for Doorman’s leaving his floatplane ashore was the fact that neither De Ruyter nor Java was equipped with hangars. This meant that they would have been left dangerously exposed on their catapults throughout the battle, providing a serious fire threat if hit by Japanese shells. Likewise, only De Ruyter was equipped with a catapult, and Doorman was not inclined to have Java stop in order to launch and recover her seaplanes while operating in a battle zone.
24. Bosscher, De Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Volume 2, p. 280.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Following the loss of Tarakan, Balikpapan and Palembang, the CSF was experiencing a severe shortage of fuel, and many ships were unable to fuel completely before and after the Battle of the Java Sea. ABDA aircraft, including the MLD, were also facing shortages, as the refineries at Palembang had been the sole source of high-grade aviation fuel in the East Indies. However, it appears that the shortages did not hamper the Dutch as much as the American and Commonwealth units, because the Dutch apparently reserved much of the available fuel for their own forces.
28. This signal came in response to a directive from Admiral Helfrich that read, “The Enemy Has Been Sighted West of Bawean [Island], You Must Attack.”
Bosscher, De Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Volume 2, p. 282.
29. Shores, Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, p. 238.
30. Messimer, In the Hands of Fate, p. 268.
31. As a result of these torpedo hits, Java sank in approximately 15 minutes, while De Ruyter followed some two and a half hours later. Both cruisers went down with heavy loss of life.
32. Bosscher, De Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Volume 2, p. 610, n. 349.
33. In fairness to Doorman, it must be stated that this mine barrage was actually laid several miles from its reported position after a Japanese reconnaissance plane sighted the minelayer Gouden Leeuw. Fearful of air attack, her captain dumped his entire cargo well short of the minefield’s stated position, although only a small handful of the mines were actually armed.
1. The title of this chapter is drawn from the final conversation between Vice-Admiral Helfrich and Governor-General van Starkenborgh as the Admiral prepared to evacuate Java for Ceylon. Helfrich would later write of the conversation in his memoirs:
“It was a solemn farewell. Jonkheer Tjarda van Starkenborgh’s last words were, ‘This is the end of a courageous fight Admiral. This moment moves me. I remain and wish you luck.’ There are moments that remain sharp in one’s memory. This is without a doubt, one of them.”
Helfrich, Memoires, Volume 1, p. 441.
2. Information regarding the subsequent flight operations of Y-72 with PatWing 10 in Australia provided courtesy of squadron veterans Larry Katz and Paul Stevens, whose original flight log books provided clear proof of its evacuation from Java.
3. Y-55, Y-56 and Y-57.
4. Although this version of X-16’s destruction is recounted from Shores, Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, p. 249, it should be regarded as highly suspect. Virtually all Dutch language sources list X-16 as being destroyed on the ground in inoperable condition at Tandjoeng Priok on or about March 1, 1942. Several of these sources state that X-16 was crushed by falling debris when demolition crews, to prevent its capture, blew up the hangar it was in. Given the detailed descriptions from the participants, it is likely that this story was true, but with another seaplane in place of X-16.
5. Y-59, Y-60 and Y-67.
6. X-1 (from the flight training school), X-20, X-24 and X-36.
7. According to Hugo Hooftman on p. 21, Volume 1 of Van Farman tot Neptune: de vliegtuigen van de Marine Luchtvaart Dienst, Y-50 and Y-61 were written off by the MLD at Morokrembangan on March 1. They would then be destroyed by MLD ground personnel to prevent their capture several days later when the air station was abandoned.
8. Shores, Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, p. 311.
9. The single-engine floatplane might have been one of the older C.VII, C.VIII or C.XIV aircraft still in service with the MLD as auxiliary hacks.
10. The possibility of this aircraft being a four-engine S-42B should be treated with extreme skepticism. As far as the author knows, the KNILM operated only one of this type aircraft, which served as the flagship of the airline’s seaplane fleet. And as noted earlier in Chapter 4, it was destroyed at Lake Tondano on December 26.
11. Y-62 was also slated for evacuation duties from Lake Bagendit but was left behind at the last minute when its material condition was considered to be too poor by Admiral Helfrich’s party. It remained at Lake Bagendit until March 5 when ordered to join Y-45 at Lake Tjileuntja.
12. Helfrich, Memoires, Volume 1, p. 443.
13. Details for the evacuation of the KM and MLD from Java had been planned well before the outbreak of the Pacific War. It was recognized that if and when the Japanese landed on Java, the course of the war would be out of the Navy’s hands and would depend solely on the abilities of the KNIL. With little role to play in the campaign at that point, Admiral Helfrich would evacuate as many of his remaining ships and men as possible to Australia and Ceylon.
14. In a show of solidarity to the Indonesian people, the East Indies government had not only ordered that all Dutch citizens be engaged in some type of war activity following Pearl Harbor, but it had also forbidden the evacuation of any Dutch civilians from the NEI prior to March 1942. Nor were they permitted to transfer their finances to more secure financial institutions in Australia, Ceylon or America. Ever the paternalistic colonial masters, the Dutch were naively determined to show the Indonesian people that theirs was a brotherly fight against the naked militaristic aggression of Japan. Unfortunately for the Dutch, little did they realize just how deep disaffection with their rule ran amongst the common Indonesian. So that when the Japanese appeared on the shores of Java, they were greeted as conquering liberators after 300 years of Dutch colonialism.
15. Bosscher, De Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Volume 2, p. 344.
16. Shores, Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, p. 337.
17. Technically Admiral Koenraad held the rank of captain, but he was temporarily promoted to flank rank in order to effectively oversee destruction of the ME and ensure the evacuation of its personnel to Tjilatjap and Wijnkoops Bay.
18. Bosscher, De Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Volume 2, p. 337.
19. Ibid, p. 345.
20. Ibid.
21. Honselaar, Vleugels van de Vloot, p. 221.
22. Given the propensity of Japanese pilots to strafe anything that moved during their air strikes, it remains unclear whether Shibata’s orders were strictly humanitarian in nature, or rather that he wanted his pilots to be sure to have enough ammunition to destroy as many of the Allied flying boats as possible.
23. Bosscher, De Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Volume 2, p. 346. In Vleugels van de Vloot, p. 221, Honselaar lists the same number of dead and missing but gives a figure of 32 wounded. Again, he lists most of the dead and wounded as women and children. Hugo Hooftman on p. 24 of Van Farman tot Neptune: de vliegtuigen van de Marine Luchtvaart Dienst, Volume 1 lists 48 dead and 32 wounded, including 16 MLD personnel among the dead.
24. Hendrie, The Catalina Aircraft in World War II, pp. 96–97.
25. The bulk of this section is drawn from Mervin W. Prime’s Western Australia’s Pearl Harbour: The Japanese Raid on Broome, pp. 13–18.
26. On the Do. 24, the stummel is the short float on the lower hull that protrudes from either side of the aircraft in order to help stabilize it while operating on the water.
27. The premature burning of X-36 to prevent its capture, despite the relative safety Australia provided, clearly shows the mindset of the Dutch flight crews following their exhausting campaign in the NEI and the mental stress brought on by the evacuation of Java. At the direction of X-36’s Russian pilot, the passengers and crew burned the flying boat by loading it with mattresses and other flammable materials that they then covered in engine oil and set aflame.
28. Barentz was in the final stages of being converted into a seagoing repair ship for the KM when hit during this attack.
29. This last-minute decision would later cost Bozuwa his life, as he was killed only days later aboard the transport Poelau Bras when Japanese bombers sank that ship off the coast of Sumatra.
30. Although there is absolutely no evidence to suggest this was the case, at this point in the campaign, one must certainly wonder whether the flight crew of Y-62 received the message yet chose to ignore it. After all, at this point the fight for Java was all but over, and the plane’s crew certainly could not have been happy about turning back toward territory that was bound to be captured in the immediate future.
31. The aircraft in question is unclear, and it is also possible that Rijnders and his crew had orders to retrieve Y-48, which was also under repair at MVK Priok.
32. It is unclear whether Witholt actually had any orders, or whether he simply chose to evacuate the PBY from Java on his own initiative. In either event, there were virtually no senior MLD or KM officers remaining on Java to approve or disapprove of his decision!
33. Witholt attempted to take off three times, but bad weather and unfavorable wind conditions prevented him from doing so, forcing the crew to endure a night of uncertainty on the lake.
Hooftman, Van Farman tot Neptune, Volume 1, p. 24.
34. 1st Lieutenant G. Mulder, KMR.
35. With this flight, Y-45 became the last MLD plane to leave Java just before the island was engulfed by the Japanse. In an ironic twist of fate, on September 5, 1945, despite being the oldest aircraft in the squadron’s inventory, Y-45 was also the first MLD aircraft to fly over Java following the Japanese surrender in the NEI. It carried emergency relief supplies, which were dropped into civilian internment camps on Java and Celebes.
36. Bosscher, De Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Volume 2, pp. 339–40.
37. Bezemer, Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Koopvaardij in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Volume 1, p. 746.
38. Keffikon was the same pilot who had lost his S-42 seaplane at Lake Tondano while standing on the dock talking to a KPM agent.
1. As stated earlier, the British Army operated the only land-based radar units in the East Indies and apparently did not consult with the Dutch on its operational use beyond its initial placement.
2. Helfrich, Memoires, Volume 1, p. 442.
3. Although no individual numbers exist for MLD losses, in De Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Volume 3, p. 359, n. 2, Bosscher lists the KM as a whole to have suffered 1,653 dead during the NEI campaign. In addition, another 3,847 men were captured, many of whom would also die in captivity through brutal, substandard treatment by their Japanese captors. Of those killed, more than half (938 or 57 percent) were lost during the Battle of the Java Sea aboard the cruisers De Ruyter (367), Java (512) and the destroyer Kortenaer (59).
4. As a result, the Dutch had virtually no bargaining power and thus absolutely no say in how the war in the Pacific was orchestrated or executed. At the same time, it should be pointed out that even the British with their sizeable Far Eastern Fleet and large number of land forces in India also soon found themselves to be unwanted players in the Pacific campaign. With the land war dominated by the United States Army under General Douglas McArthur, and the naval war likewise dominated by the United States Navy under the command of Admiral Chester Nimitz, the NEI quickly became a backwater in American plans to retake the Philippines and isolate Japanese forces in the Pacific. Likewise, the Dutch and British also both soon realized that President Roosevelt’s plans for a postwar Asia provided little support for the reestablishment of European colonial empires once hostilities ended.
5. These numbers do not appear to include personnel of the GM, which was demilitarized immediately prior to the surrender of Java in early March. Although a number of these ships, including the MLD’s seaplane tenders, had the range to reach Australia, it was feared that their largely Indonesian crews could not be coerced to leave their families behind if given the order to evacuate the NEI. As a result, virtually all of the ships were scuttled with their lower deck hands being released from service with final pay and three days of food. The European personnel and officers, however, were ordered to report to Soerabaja or Batavia for further duty.
6. Groen and Touwen-Bouwsma, Nederlands Indië 1942—Illusie en ontgoocheling, p. 139.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. With all flight training transferred to the United States, the Dutch sold their remaining Ryan trainers to the Australian government, which transferred them to the RAAF. Many survived the war and long beyond. As late as 1990, photos show one of the ex-Dutch planes to still be flying in the hands of a private owner in Australia. Restored to mint condition, the Ryan is painted in the markings of the RAAF and travels the air show circuit throughout Australia.
11. Of these, approximately 100 were Dutch or Indonesian flight personnel.
Hooftman, Van Farman tot Neptune, Volume 1, p. 25.
12. Although the circumstances that led to the withdrawal of the USAAF from Java can easily be justified, the evacuation itself was chaotic and unorganized for the most part. Also, no one had bothered to inform the Dutch of the evacuation, who were, to say the least, shocked by the sudden pullout of American forces. This led Major-General Ludolph van Oyen, commander of the ML, to bitterly denounce the USAAF withdrawal as little more than desertion in the face of the enemy.
So amplified were van Oyen’s comments that General George C. Marshall, commander-in-chief of the US Army, immediately ordered an official enquiry. Although his enquiry subsequently disproved the Dutch claims, it did pointedly reveal a complete lack of liaison communications between USAAF leadership on Java and their Dutch allies. In the end, van Oyen accepted Marshall’s verdict and later wrote a warm letter thanking the USAAF for its efforts to defend Java.
Edmonds, They Fought with What They Had, p. 403.
13. Teitler, Sea Power on the Decline, pp. 72–73.
14. Ibid.
15. For many Dutch in the Far East, the NEI were the only home they had ever known, having been born and raised there. Although they were staunchly loyal to Holland and Queen Wilhelmina, they were unwilling to sacrifice the East Indies in order to buy time for a stronger defense to be mounted elsewhere, as was the strategy employed by the United States in the Philippines. Unlike the Philippines, the Dutch were literally fighting for their homes and not just an expendable colonial territory. So when the British and Americans sought to convince the KM to withdraw its few remaining ships from the NEI after the Battle of the Java Sea, their pleas fell on deaf ears for this very reason. Likewise, most Americans failed to appreciate the significance the East Indies held for these people.
16. The author has no clear rationale to support this assertion, although perhaps the English regarded the Dutch, on a subconscious level, as being a bit too similar to their German enemies in language and culture.
17. Messimer, In the Hands of Fate, p. 134.
18. So valued was the contribution and sacrifices of the MLD during the East Indies campaign that the Netherlands government ordered that the entire service be awarded the Militaire Willemsorde der 4e klasse, the highest Dutch military award for bravery. Normally this award is reserved for individuals, but it was felt that the MLD merited the award as a whole. Queen Wilhelmina approved the request, and the MLD was so honored on April 9, 1942. Her award speech read:
“In the fight against Japan from the declaration of war on December 7, 1941, [the MLD] without exception, provided excellent service and performed outstanding deeds, including reconnaissance, air attack, anti-submarine duties, minelaying and convoy escort, against an overwhelming enemy, giving their utmost effort and lives in uninterrupted air battles to inflict great losses on the enemy.”