The month of February saw the biggest loss of MLD planes during the East Indies campaign. The majority of these losses can be credited to Japanese bomber raids and fighter sweeps across Java. Morokrembangan was a prime target for repeated air strikes as the Japanese moved to reduce ABDA air power.
The Japanese also sent their submarines south again as they moved farther into Dutch territory. From February 1 to 3, X-17 from GVT.8 rescued nearly 100 survivors from the KPM merchant ship SS Van Overstraten, which had been sunk by the Japanese submarine I-64 some 550 miles west of Sabang, Sumatra, on January 22. The ship’s 103 survivors had spent 10 days drifting in the Indian Ocean before 93 were picked up by the MLD plane and flown to Sinabang, a small port on the western coast of Sumatra. The remaining 10 survivors reached Sinabang in sloops.
The first air action of the month came on February 1 when Y-63 of GVT.2(NEW) and Y-57 (still temporarily attached to GVT.2[NEW]) sighted a Japanese convoy off the Anambas Islands while on a long-range reconnaissance patrol. While shadowing it, they were intercepted by a “Pete” from the seaplane tender Sagara Maru flown by Naval Air Pilot H. Ichikawa.1 Showing absolutely no hesitation, Ichikawa brazenly attacked the two flying boats.
A sharp air battle raged for the next 25 minutes, pitting the nimble “Pete” against the lumbering PBYs. At this point in the NEI campaign, many MLD seaplanes, including Y-57, were undermanned due to a severe personnel shortage. As a result, Y-57’s commander had to man a weapon himself, leaving Sergeant W. van der Tweel to fly the aircraft. They were further hampered by weapons jams in the nose position, where the gunner had to twice clear his guns.2
Although the Japanese pilot made three very aggressive passes, the Dutch gunners could not score any critical hits on the floatplane, although they claimed to have knocked pieces off of it. Finally, several long machine gun bursts sent it into a steep dive, and crewmen on both seaplanes claimed to have seen the “Pete” crash into the sea.3 However, the floatplane made it back to the Sagara Maru, although its condition upon arrival remains unknown.
In return, the Japanese pilot and his rear gunner expended all their ammunition, hitting Y-57 more than 50 times throughout the fuselage and hull. The damage punctured its fuel tanks and caused heavy oil leaks and heavy flooding upon landing at Blinjoe on Banka Island’s Klabat Bay. As the temporary base had no facilities, Y-57 was forced back to Tandjoeng Priok for repairs.
Meanwhile the Japanese continued their operations on Celebes. They had already taken Menado on January 11 and Kendari on January 24. Makassar was to follow on February 8. Although the Dutch did not have an exact date, they knew a landing was about to take place and sent the Catalinas of GVT.3(NEW) to evacuate MLD personnel from the port city on February 2.
By the end of January, GVT.7 was operating from a string of remote support bases between Bali and Roti Island in the Lesser Soenda Islands in the Sawoe Sea. The Sawoe Sea and air space over Timor was now extremely dangerous for MLD planes due to Japanese fighters. The Japanese were still actively adhering to their plan of systematically eliminating all MLD air bases that could be found.
This oppressive Japanese air presence over the archipelago soon led to another disaster similar to that which had befallen GVT.2 and GVT.5 at Lake Tondano in late December. This time the squadron’s only survivor was X-33, which was badly damaged on January 30 while landing at the port of Dilly on Timor. Although not fatal, the resulting leaks in the hull were serious enough to force the seaplane’s return to Morokrembangan for extensive repairs.
X-13 was ordered to replace X-33 at Rotti Island on January 30, but its timing was unlucky. Shortly before its arrival, the remaining Dorniers of GVT.7 (X-32 and X-35) were discovered on the water by an enemy reconnaissance plane. Alerted to the presence of the Dutch seaplanes, the Japanese immediately sent a strike force on February 7. They found X-35 pulled up on the beach for repairs, while X-32 was moored close to shore; X-13 had just landed. The bombers completely surprised the Dutch and burned all three flying boats without loss. Two MLD radio operators were killed in the attack.
With that raid, MLD operations in the Sawoe Sea came to an abrupt end. The survivors of GVT.7 were transported by ship to Koepang, where they joined GVT.6, which had been en route to relieve them. From there, X-3 and X-23 flew the personnel of both units back to Morokrembangan. There, GVT.7 reformed with the reserve Dorniers X-1, X-20, X-24 and X-36.4 Afterwards, because of air raids that now rolled across Java, GVT.7(NEW) operated off Java from a secret base on Lake Grati (near Modjokerto) for the rest of February.
February 2 saw the first Japanese air attacks on Allied airfields across East Java, although they did not hit West Java and Soerabaja until the following day. On the 3rd, 72 bombers and 44 fighters attacked the port at 1007. Bombing from 20,000 feet, they concentrated primarily on the naval base but did destroy a hangar and a number of planes at Morokrembangan.
Twelve Dutch Curtis CW-21B “Demon” fighters intercepted a Japanese formation over Soerabaja but were effectively kept away from the bombers. In a freewheeling series of dogfights, the Dutch shot down three 3rd Air Wing Zeros but lost seven Demons in exchange. At the same time, seven Curtis 75A-7 “Hawk” fighters from Perak slipped into a second bomber formation before their fighter escort could respond. The Dutch claimed one probable kill and several others damaged before escorting Zeros shot down five of the Hawks without loss. Six American P-40s of the 17th Pursuit Squadron also scrambled and shot down one bomber and one Tainan Air Wing Zero for the loss of a single P-40.
The next victim was a Ryan floatplane. At the controls were a Dutch student pilot and Ernest Lee, one of the 12 American civilian flight instructors in the East Indies to help train MLD pilots. The trainer was on final approach in Soerabaja’s harbor with the student at the controls when exploding bombs tore across its path, causing him to lose control. Lee tried to wrestle the floatplane back into the air, but the STM plunged into the water and sank immediately. Although both pilots survived, Dutch soldiers on shore thought they were Japanese and opened fire. Fortunately they missed and the pilots were able to swim ashore.
Whereas the bombers ignored Morokrembangan, the fighters did not. Zeros of the 3rd Air Wing skimmed over the American gunboat USS Isabelle to strafe at masthead height, ignoring AA fire from her .30 machine guns. X-31 of GVT.6 was the first lost, strafed on the water until it burned. A short time later, two Zeros caught Y-40 over East Java;5 as one pilot chopped her out of the air, his wingman shot down a B-17C from the 19th Bomb Group 10 miles south of Singosari.
Other fighters also attacked Morokrembangan, inflicting heavy losses on MLD reserve planes and front-line aircraft that were under repair. Front-line aircraft losses included X-6, X-30 and the still non-operational X-37.6 A number of training and auxiliary seaplanes were also lost, including two Do. 15 “Whales” attached to the flight-training school.7 D-41 was heavily damaged on the water and would be written off after the attack, while Zeros shot down D-43 near Soerabaja while on a training flight. They also caught Y-61 from GVT.3 over the Madoera Strait and shot it down as well, although it appears that this aircraft was possibly able to return to Morokrembangan in a severely damaged condition.
Two MLD Fokker T-IVs (T-20 and T-22) and a second Ryan trainer were lost on the water. The Japanese fighters also caught three Fokker C-XI floatplanes at the base.8 Although all three of the single-engine floatplanes were badly shot up, it appears that none of them was completely destroyed. However, without spare parts, it is unlikely that they were ever repaired. As a result of this damage, all would later have to be destroyed by MLD ground personnel to prevent their capture when the base was evacuated in early March.
Counting Earnest Lee’s STM, 15 MLD planes were shot down, destroyed, burned or damaged beyond repair. Together with fighters lost in the air and losses on the ground, ABDA losses totaled between 30 and 40 aircraft that day.9 In return, the Japanese lost one bomber and four fighters. One of three C5M “Babs” light reconnaissance planes that had provided navigational guidance for the fighters was also lost attacking a PatWing 10 PBY as it landed near Madoera.
In addition to massive aircraft losses, damage on the ground was severe. Both Perak Airfield and the ME had been badly damaged, as were the airfields at Singosari and Madioen. Substantial damage had also been caused to Soerabaja’s inner city when a flight of Japanese bombers dropped its ordnance in the area in an attempt to destroy the Dutch High Command. Total Allied casualties for the February 3 raid numbered 31 killed and 85 injured.10
As the Japanese hammered Morokrembangan on the 3rd, P-43 and P-44 from PatWing 10 sighted the Japanese barge fleet that had departed Balikpapan on January 27 as it slowly moved down the Makassar Strait toward Bandjermasin. However, ADBA could do little about it amid the chaos of the Japanese air strikes, and the force eventually put ashore some 50 miles southeast of Bandjermasin several days later. Nonetheless, to monitor its progress in the meantime, PatWing 10’s commander sent P-43 and P-45 back up the strait the following day.
Although P-45’s crew sighted no naval movement, it encountered a large formation of approximately 40 bombers with a strong fighter escort south of Balikpapan. While the main formation continued on to Soerabaja, three of the Zeros broke away and proceeded to maul the PBY. In a running dogfight, the PBY dodged in and out of the clouds until the fighters finally gave up and rejoined their formation. Nursing his badly damaged plane home, the pilot landed at Morokrembangan later that day with a dead engine and the hull looking like a sieve.11
“Beehive” style air raid shelters had to be built above ground at Morokrembangan due to the area’s high water table (photograph from Soerabaja 1900–1950 [2004], courtesy of Asia Maior Publishers).
Perak air field (with Morokrembangan in the background) was a frequent target of Japanese aircraft during the intense air raids of February and March 1942 (photograph from Soerabaja 1900–1950 [2004], courtesy of Asia Maior Publishers).
The second attack on Java came on February 5, when 27 Zeros and a C5M of the Tainan Air Wing struck Morokrembangan at 0933. Four Demons and two Hawks intercepted with seven USAAF P-40s. As in the first raid, they were unable to turn the raiders away and again suffered heavily. Bounced out of the sun and hopelessly outnumbered, the Dutch lost two of the Demons almost before they knew what hit them. Tainan Air Wing fighters then encountered eight B-17s that had just taken off for a mission to bomb Balikpapan and shot them up badly as well. In the meantime, another C5M guided in 11 Zeros of the 3rd Air Wing, arriving over Soerabaja 30 minutes later; almost immediately, two pilots claimed both Hawks over Soerabaja and Madoera, respectively.
Unopposed in the air, the bombers remained over Morokrembangan for 62 minutes, dropping 38 500-pound bombs. A number of repair shops were gutted, and one hangar was obliterated when a bomb penetrated the roof and detonated four 500-pound bombs slung under the wings of the American PBY 22-P-1. Bombs also heavily damaged barracks, fuel depots and water mains. As the bombers turned for home, Japanese fighters now turned their attention to the air station.
The PBYs of PatWing 10 had already been sent to a remote secondary base. However, for unknown reasons, P-43 (former MLD Y-43) remained on the water at Morokrembangan and was lost to strafing Zeros. They also burned Y-50, X-22 and X-33 as they lay on the water.12 For good measure, they also destroyed D-45 and D-46, two Do. 15 “Whales” attached to the flight training school.
The fifth PBY lost that day was Y-72, which ran into a flight of four Japanese fighters near Waroe, just south of Soerabaja, while on what was likely a training flight with the MLD’s flight training school. Although one wing and an engine were badly shot up, the PBY’s pilot managed to put the Catalina down near the city, and it was transported back to Morokrembangan by truck several days later. As two of the Zeros shot up Y-72, two more remained above the fight and protectively circled the squadron’s C5M “Babs” that had guided them in.
It was during this attack on Morokrembangan that an MLD NCO named Gerard van Schooten won the Bronze Cross, one of Holland’s highest military honors. Despite the risk of drawing attention from the fighters, which strafed anything that moved, van Schooten took a motorboat out into the harbor and rescued a number of men who had escaped from their burning aircraft. After delivering them to shore, he then took fire extinguishers and other equipment out to help save a number of less heavily damaged planes. Three weeks later, he would be awarded a second Bronze Cross for gallantry in action.
The MLD also lost another of the Naval Flying School’s Ryan floatplanes. At the controls was none other than Earnest Lee, the instructor who had barely escaped with his life in the initial raid two days earlier. Intercepted by a Zero at 7,000 feet some 20 miles north of Soerabaja, Lee dove to just above the sea as the Japanese pilot followed him down. Jinking wildly, he caused the Zero to make three passes before hitting the STM. Bullets and cannon shells shredded the fuselage, floats and windscreen, but neither Lee nor his student was hit.
A second Zero now joined his wingman, scoring a number of hits on the trainer’s wings while the first Zero circled. Then, apparently low on fuel or ammunition, each fighter made a final pass before turning away. Miraculously, the floatplane was still in the air after the 25-minute engagement. Perhaps even more amazing, both Lee and his student pilot escaped unharmed. Lee then put the badly damaged floatplane down in a rice paddy, where it immediately sank.
GVT.5(NEW), which had just become operational again that day after reforming with PBYs following the disastrous Japanese air strike against Lake Tondano, escaped damage and flew into Tjilatjap the next morning. However, the Japanese did heavily damage the reserve Catalina Y-71 as it sat in a hangar. Ground crews made it flyable with emergency repairs, and it was sent to Tjilatjap on the 7th to replace Y-67. Shortly after the squadron’s arrival, the latter had been damaged in a collision with Y-65 and was returned to Morokrembangan for repairs.
That same day the Japanese launched a third raid against Morokrembangan in retaliation for the recent MLD attacks on their invasion operation at Tandjoeng Datoek. Nine Zeros from the Tainan Air Wing shot up the base early in the morning, claiming two seaplanes destroyed on the water. These were likely older reserve or auxiliary aircraft, as no front-line MLD or PatWing 10 aircraft was lost at Morokrembangan that day. Also, since both the MLD and PatWing 10 had been quick to abandon Morokrembangan as a primary base after the first two raids, it is likely that the aircraft were actually inoperable wrecks left from the attacks of February 3 and 5.
More air strikes against both the ME and Morokrembangan followed on the 8th, 9th (two attacks), 10th, 11th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st and 25th. Dutch fighter strength had been broken in the first two raids, so there was virtually no air cover. Only six ML Demons remained, and these were quickly withdrawn to reinforce ABDA air defenses in West Java. For the remainder of the campaign, American P-40s of the 17th Pursuit Squadron, together with a handful of Dutch and British AA guns, provided East Java’s only protection against air attacks.
Within days of these devastating raids, Morokrembangan was all but abandoned. All operational MLD planes at the air station were dispersed to isolated scatter bases and small lakes throughout the interior of Java. Although ground crews remained to service the few Allied seaplanes that dared inhabit the base, the near constant presence of Japanese aircraft overhead prevented Morokrembangan from playing an important role for the remaining month of the East Indies campaign.
Meanwhile, although the MLD had been forced out of Dutch New Guinea, the Japanese still periodically caught civilian aircraft at isolated outposts. This was the case on February 8, when two Zeros with a 3rd Air Wing detachment based at Ambon took off to strafe the ports of Dobo and Kapalauan Aru. At Dobo, Naval Air Pilot 1st Class Yoshihiko Takenaka and Naval Air Pilot 3rd Class Nobutoshi Furukawa attacked and burned a Grumman G.21 “Goose” belonging to the Netherlands New Guinea Petroleum Company. The seaplane had already been heavily damaged in a previous attack, and the Zeros now finished it off for good.13
About the same time, Lieutenant Toshitata Kawazoe and Naval Air Pilot 3rd Class Tadahiro Sakai, also with the 3rd Air Wing at Ambon, took off for a strike mission against the port of Saumlaki. En route to their destination, they also attacked the same Grumman immediately after Takenaka and Furukawa departed, although the two groups were unaware of each other’s presence over the port. Not realizing their error, these two pilots claimed the same aircraft destroyed.14
Meanwhile, the MLD continued to strike back as best it could. GVT.2(NEW) had been patrolling the west coast of Borneo since January 30 when it managed a small measure of revenge on February 6. Y-62 and Y-64 were on a reconnaissance flight out of their base at Tandjoeng Pandan when they sighted a Japanese merchant ship of about 6,000 tons in the North Api Strait. Dropping eight 500-pound bombs, they claimed a direct hit on its after-funnel and a near miss that left her on fire and listing. The identity of this ship is unknown, but the 6,788-ton Kurama Maru was lost to unknown causes in the general area, although her loss is listed as February 9.15
While on patrol the following day, the third plane of GVT.2(NEW), Y-63, sighted a small boat full of men waving frantically to attract the crew’s attention. Upon landing, Y-63 found them to be MLD ground personnel from Pontianak. When the Japanese reached them, they had moved overland to Ketapang, where they secured a small prau and decided to take their chances on the open sea.
The MLD’s joy of rescuing a group of its own was soon tempered by another loss. This time it was the Catalina Y-38, which was still attached to the MLD flight training school. Its pilot had to make an emergency landing in the Westwater Channel at Soerabaja following a training flight. Although he put the Catalina down without trouble, it was lost soon afterwards. While under tow the PBY collided with the tug and suffered such heavy damage that it sank.
While other MLD planes engaged the Japanese over the increasingly unfriendly skies of Java, GVT.18’s Y-48 carried General Wavell from Tandjoeng Priok to Singapore for a series of meetings. As the general boarded the plane for his return flight later that night, he fell down a 10-foot seawall at Seletar and injured his back. As a result, he was in a great pain during the flight back to Tandjoeng Priok; nonetheless, Wavell refused to remain in the hospital and returned to his headquarters.
The Makassar invasion force comprised the same infantry units that had captured Kendari. It sailed from Staring Bay on February 6 carrying the 1st Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force aboard six transports. The auxiliary vessels of Rear-Admiral Kubo’s 1st Base Force, the light cruiser Nagara with the 8th, 15th and 21st Destroyer Divisions provided close escort. En route, the 1st/24th and 9th Destroyer Divisions and the minesweepers W.15, W.16, W.17 and W.18 from Balikpapan reinforced them. Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi provided distant cover for the operation with his 5th Cruiser Squadron and two destroyers.
The 11th Carrier Squadron (Chitose and Mizuho) provided air cover with support from the aircraft depot ship Sanyo Maru. However, in an ironic twist, Chitose herself was lost for the remainder of the East Indies campaign on February 10 when attacked by three USAAF LB-30s south of Celebes.16 Badly damaged as a result of this attack, she was forced to return to Japan for repairs. Chitose did not return to action until March 31, 1942, when she took part in a series of Japanese operations designed to occupy the north coast of Dutch New Guinea.
Moving ashore at Makassar, the Japanese encountered resistance from some 900 widely scattered KNIL regulars, recent conscripts and Home Guard auxiliary troops. The heavily outnumbered Dutch forces in Makassar held out only long enough for the airfield to be destroyed. In this action, the Japanese lost only five dead and another five wounded. Under cover of a rearguard, the Dutch then withdrew into the interior of Celebes to the Tjamba Position, an eight-and-a-half-mile defensive front in extremely rough terrain that had been prepared before the war.
In a hard-fought engagement at the Tello Bridge near the town of Maros, the Dutch rearguard ambushed a column of Japanese troops riding bicycles. The KNIL force claimed to have killed some 300 of them with intense mortar and machine gun fire before being forced to surrender in subsequent counterattacks. The Japanese almost immediately massacred the surviving Dutch troops. Meanwhile, the Tjamba position held out until March 27, when the KNIL commander surrendered his remaining troops and some 600 European civilians. In a surprising show of respect by the Japanese, the KNIL officers were allowed to keep their swords.
With their occupation of Makassar, the Japanese now controlled all of Celebes, with the exception of small pockets of Dutch guerrillas who continued to hold out. They were now in a position to launch their planned invasion of Timor in an effort to cut the flow of air reinforcements to Java from Australia.
On February 11 X-29 of GVT.6 went down following a failed evacuation flight to Bandjermasin. From January 14, the MLD had evacuated a steady flow of civilians and KNIL troops from the port. However, these flights abruptly ended when X-29 was detailed to make an evacuation flight to the city. Although repaired at Morokrembangan after its encounter with the Japanese schooner on January 26, X-29 was not considered completely airworthy and was not fully trusted by its crew. Nonetheless, the flight went well until the pilot set down on the river at Bandjermasin. As he did, a hail of gunfire erupted from the shore.17
Ramming the throttle forward, the pilot managed to drag the Dornier off the water and disappear into the coming darkness with heavy damage. The flight home was without incident, but as X-29 crossed over Madoera and descended into Morokrembangan, two engines abruptly quit. The pilot tried to make an emergency landing in the Westwater, but the plane cartwheeled into the water and exploded. Three crewmen were killed immediately, while the plane’s commander and another crewman survived. Although the survivors were picked up by a launch from Soerabaja at dawn, the badly wounded pilot died the following day.18
By this point in the campaign, MLD offensive actions had all but evaporated, and its aircraft were limited to reconnaissance missions. Still, air action remained brisk as the Japanese quickly moved south. On the 12th, X-17 of GVT.8 went out on a reconnaissance flight over the South China Sea. Near Shallow Water Island (south of Billiton Island), it was bounced by two Japanese floatplanes and forced into a running dogfight before they turned back. These were “Petes” from either Kamikawa Maru or Sagara Maru, which provided air cover for a large invasion force that was bearing down on southern Sumatra and Banka and Billiton islands.
Between February 15 and 20 X-17 and X-18 of GVT.8 flew a series of supply missions to support Allied troops still fighting in central Borneo. They flew to Sitang on the Kapoes River loaded with ammunition, portable radios, medical supplies and food for British Indian troops who had withdrawn from British Borneo in December. On return trips they evacuated 45 European women and children, dependents of KNIL personnel. It is interesting to note that Dutch policy apparently did not include the evacuation of families of their Indonesian troops.19
On the other side of the archipelago, GVT.3(NEW) loaned several flight crews and aircraft to GVT.2(NEW) at Tandjoeng Priok between February 13 and 19 as the latter was short of personnel. From there, they flew reconnaissance patrols over the South China Sea and Java Sea in conjunction with 205 Squadron PBYs, which were now conducting limited flight operations from Oosthaven on the southern tip of Sumatra following their withdrawal from NAS Seletar at the end of January.
The Japanese had been making regular reconnaissance flights over Banka Island and the city of Palembang on southern Sumatra since the first week of February. They had also increased the frequency and intensity of their air attacks on Palembang’s main airfield and Allied convoys reaching and departing that city. Convoys leaving and entering the East Indies through the northern Soenda Strait were also targeted on a regular basis.
This activity was clearly in support of an invasion convoy that reconnaissance aircraft from Palembang had reported to be concentrating near the Anambas and Natoena Islands. Air reports on February 6 put its strength at one cruiser, four destroyers and four transports.20 At the same time, a Japanese airborne division was reportedly poised for action at Camranh Bay.21 With Malaya in the bag and British forces in Singapore on the verge of surrender, the Japanese were ready to begin the isolation of western Java with the occupation of Banka and southern Sumatra.
In response to this build-up, General Wavell urgently requested that General Hein ter Poorten, the KNIL commander-in-chief, reinforce Palembang, Banka and Billiton, two small islands off the coast of Sumatra. Billiton’s primary importance lay in the large number of tin mines on the island, while Banka contained an excellent harbor that could be used for further naval operations against Java. General ter Poorten addressed Wavell’s concerns by sending the 9th Infantry Battalion to the two islands aboard two transports escorted by Java. The operation was carried out on February 5 under cover of a strong covering force of British and Australian warships. Although attacked by Japanese bombers, none from the latter force suffered any damage.
On February 9 an advance force sailed from Camrahn Bay carrying elements of the 38th Infantry Division, who had orders to seize Banka Island. The light cruiser Sendai, 20th Destroyer Division (with the destroyer Fubuki attached), two sub chasers and the 21st Minesweeper Division escorted its eight transports. They were followed the next day by a covering force of Ryujo, the 7th Cruiser Squadron (with the heavy cruiser Chokai attached) and the 19th Destroyer Division.
The invasion of Palembang was to be spearheaded by 360 paratroopers of the IJA’s Airborne Raiding Regiment, which would seize the city’s oilfields and refineries. They would be reinforced by a main body composed of the 229th and 230th Infantry, which left Camrahn Bay on February 11 aboard 13 transports. The light cruiser Kashii, frigate Shimushu, sub chaser Ch.9 and four destroyers from the 11th and 12th Destroyer Divisions escorted them. Both convoys were preceded by submarines of the 4th Submarine Division, which had orders to operate against ships evacuating Singapore and any ABDA warships attempting to interdict the Sumatra and Banka operations from Tandjoeng Priok.
The British Catalina FV-Y/Y-52 sighted the Banka convoy on February 12 and reported 12 transports escorted by nine destroyers 20 to 25 miles off the coast of Sumatra. Although the pilot attacked out of low clouds, he immediately encountered heavy AA fire from the escorts but claimed a number of near misses before turning away. ABDA Headquarters correctly assumed that this convoy carried troops for the invasion of either Banka or Palembang. In response, the RAF immediately began preparations for the eventual withdrawal of Tung Song to Tandjoeng Priok, and 205 Squadron operations at Oosthaven soon came to an end.
Y-55 of GVT.16 again picked up the convoy at 0735 on the morning of February 13. Her wireless operator reported two cruisers, two destroyers and two transports approximately 60 miles south of Anambas Island on a south-southwest course. Thirty minutes later, the PBY reported another convoy composed of one cruiser, three destroyers and eight transports moving south 20 miles east of the first group. Other reconnaissance planes reported three cruisers, five destroyers and one transport on a westerly course some 60 miles north of Banka at 1530; and at 1630, two destroyers and fourteen transports 100 miles north of Billiton moving south-southwest.22
On February 13 the Japanese took Banka. Muntok, the island’s primary harbor, then became the primary staging point for invasion convoys moving on southern Sumatra and western Java. To provide the anchorage with air cover, Kamikawa Maru and Sagara Maru were ordered to detach six “Petes” from their combined complement of sixteen aircraft. They would operate from a temporary seaplane base in Muntok Harbor.23 ABDA HQ almost immediately received word of their arrival, although they were reported as flying boats. A force of RAF Hurricanes was dispatched from Palembang, but failed to find the seaplanes and returned home empty-handed.24
It was now clear that the Japanese intended to seize Palembang. To stop them, Admiral Doorman sortied with his Combined Striking Force at 1600 on the 14th. Bad luck soon struck that night as the Dutch destroyer Van Ghent ran aground in the Stolze Strait and was lost; her crew was taken off by Banckert and returned to Soerabaja. De Ruyter launched a floatplane at dawn that reported the presence of seven cruisers and three destroyers 45 miles north of Banka. However, all were moving northwest at high speed and Doorman was unable to intercept.
In return, the CSF was sighted by a floatplane from Chokai, which promptly reported its position. Beginning at 1150 that morning, the Allied ships were subjected to a series of intense air attacks that lasted throughout the day, and the British cruiser Exeter had its Walrus seaplane put out of action as it sat on the ship’s catapult. Without air cover, Doorman was forced to withdraw his ships out of range of the Japanese bombers. Although none of the ships was hit, several had suffered near misses and all were low on fuel from high-speed maneuvering.
With Doorman’s withdrawal, the road to Palembang lay wide open for Admiral Ozawa’s invasion force. The invasion kicked off on the morning of the 14th as the Airborne Raiding Regiment gained a foothold on the city’s airfield and among many of the oil wells, pumps and refineries. Although the KNIL garrison launched a series of strong counterattacks, it proved unable to dislodge the Japanese forces.
Admiral Ozawa’s invasion convoy anchored off the mouth of the Moesi River at 0830 on February 15. All ABDA could do was send out reconnaissance planes to track his movements. One of these planes, Y-62 of GVT.2(NEW), encountered a flight of A5M “Claude” fighters from Ryujo as it shadowed the convoy at 0700. The PBY slipped away before they could attack and reported a Kaga-class heavy carrier and six destroyers in the vicinity of the Anambas Islands. It also reported being intercepted by German-made Messerschmidt ME-109 fighters, which the Japanese never flew. Clearly MLD recognition skills left much to be desired.
Meanwhile, the Japanese main force quickly moved to relieve the paratroopers, who were still gamely holding out. Despite extremely heavy air attacks from RAF and RAAF units, their ground troops pushed up the Moesi River in barges in an effort to reach the paratroopers.25 When they reached Palembang on midnight of the 16th, General Wavell ordered southern Sumatra abandoned.
At this point, ABDA High Command determined that Billiton was untenable and attempted to evacuate the infantry company deployed to the island just two weeks earlier. On February 17, the Dutch destroyer Van Nes and KPM passenger ship Sloet van de Beele were ordered to execute the operation. Admiral Helfrich had opposed the troop transfer to Billiton from the beginning. He thought the island was too small and isolated to be effectively defended and was now extremely annoyed with having to expend valuable Navy resources to withdraw the troops.26
Nonetheless, the evacuation initially went well. The transport embarked the KNIL troops and a large number of European civilians without problems, and both ships then raised anchor and sailed for Java. However, shortly after their departure, a Japanese seaplane from the heavy cruiser Mogami sighted them and signaled, “Large Merchant Ship and Destroyer Sailing Southward of the Gaspar Straits.” In response, 15 G3M “Nells” of the Genzan Bomber Wing and 10 B5N “Kate” level bombers from Ryujo were immediately dispatched and quickly found Van Nes and Sloet van de Beele sailing alone without air cover.
As the Japanese bombers appeared overhead, the Dutch cruiser Tromp and Y-45 picked up a signal from Van Nes reading “Convoy Hit by Bombers.” Soon after, the PBY received another signal reporting that the destroyer had been “Slightly Damaged.” A third signal reported that Sloet van de Beele had been lost and that the destroyer was under heavy air attack. There were no more radio transmissions as Van Nes was sunk under a hail of bombs at 1615.
On the 17th, X-17 and X-18 sighted a Japanese destroyer in the Banka Strait off Tandjoeng Lelari. Although both Dorniers made a number of bomb runs on the ship, the squadron commander, Lieutenant-Commander W. van Prooijen, was confused by the actions of the ship and refused to let them drop any bombs. He initially believed that the destroyer might be Allied because it held a steady course and speed, even when the seaplanes threatened to attack.
However, when Van Prooijen went down for a closer look, a barrage of AA fire lightly damaged X-17. At that point, still unsure of the ship’s nationality, he withdrew without attacking. One possibility for the destroyer’s erratic behavior was the fact that the Banka Strait offered such little maneuvering room. Her captain might have concluded that the risk of damage from the two seaplanes was smaller than trying to evade their bombs in such a confined area.
By the morning of February 19, KM HQ in Soerabaja had not received a transmission from Van Nes since the previous afternoon. Harboring no illusions as to her fate, Dutch naval authorities issued a position report and ordered all available Allied air and naval units to initiate search-and-rescue efforts. Within hours, X-28 of GVT.6 sighted the first group of survivors while on a reconnaissance patrol out of Morokrembangan. Setting down on the water, it rescued 21 men from Sloet van de Beele and flew them to the ME.
The Dutch auxiliary minesweeper Djombang rescued another 38 survivors from the transport several hours later and returned them to Tandjoeng Priok. In the meantime, the KM commander at Tandjoeng Priok asked the Royal Navy for assistance. In response, the Australian sloop Yarra departed the harbor on February 20. A lifeboat filled with survivors had been sighted in the same general area previously swept by Djombang and the Australian ship turned toward it.
However, X-16 of GVT.8 sighted the sloop and rescued its survivors while the Australian ship was still 25 miles off. The Dornier crew also sighted a second lifeboat and several individual rafts later that day. Despite his plane being damaged and long past its scheduled 200-hour overhaul, the pilot again demonstrated the rugged construction of the Do. 24 by rescuing two officers and 35 crewmen from Van Nes and another 37 men and one nurse from Sloet van de Beele in three flights. X-18 rescued 34 more survivors from the transport later that day.
But as impressive as X-16 might have been considering its condition, the grand prize went to 2nd Lieutenant H. Dorré (KMR) flying GVT.18’s Y-45 on February 21. The PBY left MVK Priok that morning and sighted a lifeboat approximately 100 miles off the coast of Java. Upon landing, the seaplane’s flight crew found it to contain 27 survivors from Sloet van de Beele, whom they promptly returned to Tandjoeng Priok. During the return flight, the survivors told of being in contact for a short time with a sloop loaded with 80 survivors.
Upon landing, Dorré immediately made plans to go back out in search of the lifeboat. X-18 was supposed to accompany him but was still refueling when air raid klaxons sounded the approach of Japanese planes, so Y-45 hastily took off alone. Although the PBY searched for hours in the same area where the first boat had been found, the crew sighted nothing. As evening came on, Dorré was low on fuel and about to turn for home when a crewman sighted a speck on the water in the falling dusk—the missing lifeboat!
Upon landing, Dorré found 79 men commanded by Billiton Island’s head civilian official. He reported that they had been in the boat for four days without food or water, other than a few cans of condensed milk. Dorré conferred with a crewman and they concluded that the condition of the men was too poor to leave any in the boat, and that it was also too dangerous to await the arrival of X-18. As a result, he decided to take all 79 men aboard, although they would put the PBY a full two tons over its maximum flight weight.
Despite nearly ramming the stationary lifeboat in the process, Dorré managed to eventually lift Y-45 off the water in what surely ranks as one of the longest take-offs on record for a PBY. As he cleared the water, X-18 belatedly arrived overhead and could only watch as the Catalina turned for home. Upon their arrival at Tandjoeng Priok, Dorré and his crew received a hero’s welcome. But more important to the crewmen, they received a 24-hour pass.
Meanwhile, X-18’s trip was not wasted, as its crew almost immediately sighted a large circle of survivors floating in the water a short distance away. Upon landing, the X-boat rescued another 52 crewmen from Van Nes and returned them to Tandjoeng Priok as well. Under the command of the destroyer’s first officer, Lieutenant-Commander B.C. Fock, these men had spent 92 grueling hours in the water without food or water.
Based on X-18’s position report, the Royal Navy ordered 205 Squadron to dispatch one of its PBYs from Tandjoeng Priok. This operation resulted in the rescue of another 11 survivors from Sloet van de Beele. However, the physical condition of these men was so poor that all died shortly after their return to Java. This proved to be the last mission flown by the squadron from Tandjoeng Priok and the last of its operational PBYs soon departed for Tjilatjap.
As the MLD’s rescue operation wound down, controversy erupted over the KM’s handling of the rescue effort. It was believed that many more lives could have been saved had KM HQ initiated a rescue effort sooner. Many believed that even a few hours would have saved hundreds more lives before the currents dispersed them. At least one group of survivors reportedly landed on a small island in the Java Sea and starved to death when they were unable to attract the attention of passing planes.
The number of survivors pulled out of the water totaled 358, although a number of others died of injuries afterward. It is unknown how many passengers and crew were aboard Sloet van de Beele, although the number 1,058 has been given.27 In addition to 400 KNIL troops, she reportedly took on large numbers of European civilians as the entire island was being evacuated. However, only 272 of her passengers and crew were rescued. From Van Nes, a total of 86 survivors were pulled from the ocean with another 68 being lost in the attack or succumbing at sea.28
Most of the MLD planes that rescued survivors of Van Nes and Sloet van de Beele were returning from minelaying missions over Sumatra. The Allied retreat from Palembang started a frenzied minelaying operation between February 22 and 24 by the planes of GVT.16 (Y-51, Y-56, Y-57); GVT.18 (Y-45, Y-47) and X-17 of GVT.8 in the mouth of the Moesi River and in the Banka Strait. Flying out of Tandjoeng Priok, the Dutch seaplanes laid magnetic mines29 in nonstop air operations to deny the Japanese free access to these vital arteries.
On the evening of February 23, Y-47 was lost on one of these minelaying flights. While landing at Tandjoeng Priok, the Catalina crashed into the water and exploded in flames, killing five of its seven crewmen. Exactly what caused the PBY to crash is unknown, although heavy fog combined with pilot exhaustion was strongly suspected as most MLD pilots and aircrew were spending 16 to 18 hours a day in the air for days at a time without a break. A persistent fog that constantly hung over the base was also thought to be a contributing factor.30
By this time in the campaign, exhaustion among Dutch flight crews was common. In mid-February, MLD Chief Medical Officer Lieutenant-Commander P.C. Broekhoff reported to the KM chief-of-staff that the flight crews were suffering from severe physical and mental exhaustion brought on by long hours of flying and constant withdrawals. He regarded the situation as being critical and strongly urged more rest for the crews. In response, the chief-of-staff promised to try to provide longer rest periods if operations permitted.31
Broekhoff would later write that the MLD squadron commanders had become convinced that extended night operations without proper rest were useless. This was because where a seaman aboard a surface ship might stand watch for maximum of one hour, air crews were doing the same thing for up to 12 hours at a time. The interrupted monotony of nothing but ocean and seascape made them unable to effectively perform their tasks. Medics aboard the aircraft were also seeing an increase in visual problems among crewmen. But while annoying and sometimes frightening, the symptoms usually disappeared with rest.32
But despite the chief-of-staff’s best intention, there was simply no way to rotate the squadrons out of the line for longer periods of rest. The manpower shortage faced by all branches of the KM also applied to the MLD, which, as the reader has already seen, was obliged to relinquish control of no fewer than eight of its new PBYs to the British and Americans as it had no crews to man them. And although flight times became somewhat shorter as the Dutch were pushed back toward Java, there was little or no respite as this allowed the Japanese to intensify their air campaign and put even greater pressure on the surviving flight crews.33
On February 18, another of the single-engine Fokker reconnaissance planes went missing during an air raid on Soerabaja. The famed Japanese fighter ace Saburo Sakai, flying with the elite Tainan Air Wing, caught W-12 (flying off the cruiser De Ruyter) over Maospati, Java, while the floatplane was on patrol along the north coast of Java. Sakai broke formation just long enough to shoot down the hapless plane in flames, giving the ace his 12th kill of the war.34
Although the pilot of W-12 had a parachute, his observer did not. So when the pilot bailed out, he went over the side with his crewman hanging on to his belt. Unfortunately, the force of the parachute opening caused the observer to lose his grip and fall to his death. The pilot safely reached the ground.
On the 19th, JAAF units struck Western Java for the first time using their newly captured airfields on southern Sumatra. Escorted by 19 Ki-43 “Oscars” from the 59th and 64th Fighter Groups, five Ki-48 “Lillys” of the 84th Bomber Group attacked Semplak Airfield at 0930. Eight ML B-339s intercepted over the airdrome, but the “Oscars” easily kept the badly outnumbered Dutch fighters away from the bombers. Although a totally different design, the “Oscar” was nearly equal in performance to IJN’s “Zero” in virtually every respect, except range and armament, where the Army fighter was substantially inferior. Despite their claims of two fighters shot down, the Buffaloes were completely outclassed; unable to compete in the brief, one-sided dogfight, they had four planes shot down and a fifth was forced to crash-land.35
Unhindered in the air, the “Lillys” took their time and destroyed nine Allied planes and one of the airfield’s pristine wooden hangars. Among the losses were a Grumman G.21 “Goose” and two Sikorsky S-43 flying boats operated by KNILM. An elderly tri-motor Fokker F.XIII belonging to the airline was also destroyed, as was one of the ML’s Ryan STM primary trainers. Four RAAF Hudson bombers were also lost; to top off the raid, fragments from one of the bombers totaled a Sikorsky seaplane when it blew up.36
The 19th was a busy day for the MLD, which shut down its flight training school and evacuated its planes and personnel to Australia so that training could continue out of range of Japanese air strikes. The aircraft evacuated included Y-49, which had been attached to GVT.3(NEW) and five of the older reserve Dorniers (X-5, X-7, X-8, X-9 and X-10). They never returned to Java and Y-49 later flew with surviving MLD forces following the fall of Java in early March.
The Dorniers were among the oldest in the MLD’s Do. 24 fleet, having been delivered to the East Indies between 1938 and 1939. Well beyond their operational prime before the outbreak of war, they had been assigned to the flight training school. In addition, years of constant flight had worn them out to the extent that they were now extremely difficult to maintain in the face of heavy air attack. When the Dutch later moved all flight training operations to the United Sates in April 1942, the five X-boats were sold to the RAAF for continued use in training and supply roles. Finally, with no more spare parts available, the last plane was eventually scrapped in 1943.
The subject of transferring Dutch flight training to Australia had first been raised during the initial ABDA Conference on January 10. There the ML’s chief-of-staff, Colonel E.T. Kengen, took up the matter with his RAAF counterpart, Air Vice Marshal Sir Charles Burnet. Following a brief flurry of telegraphs between the East Indies and Australian governments, the ML dispatched Major M. van Haselen and 2nd Lieutenant H.L.A. van der Kroef to Australia on February 1 to make the necessary preparations. According to the agreement, Australia would provide airfields, training aircraft and any additional instructors that were needed.
On February 10, the KM liaison officer in Australia, Commander G.B. Salm, signaled Admiral Helfrich and ter Poorten that the Australian government had consented to the request. Based on this agreement, both the MLD and ML initiated steps to shut down all flight training operations on Java as soon as possible. Eight days later, the 14,000-ton KPM ship MS Boissevain departed Tandjoeng Priok carrying 300 ML cadets and VVC and sport club trainees from the airfields at Kalidjati and Tasikmalaja, respectively. She carried no aircraft.
Boissevain was followed the next day by the 9,000-ton motorship Tjinegara of the Java-China-Japan Line. The latter transported 232 cadets and 34 Ryan STM primary trainers from the MLD flight school.37 Most of the flight-school instructors were flown out aboard Y-49 and the Dorniers.
The MS Abbekerk and MS Zaandam followed them, departing from Tjilatjap on February 27 and March 1, respectively, with more than 300 MLD and ML cadets. These included a large number of observer and bombardier trainees from the ML, in addition to the remaining MLD cadets being trained as radio operators and air gunners. Despite a severe shortage of supplies aboard Abbekerk and the constant threat of Japanese submarines that now operated in force south of Java, both ships safely made Australia without problem.
Upon arrival in Melbourne, the cadets were assigned to different locations depending on the level and stage of their training. Those aboard Boissevain and Tjinegara were assigned to the airfield at Malalla. Those flight trainees with basic training only were ordered to the Parafield Airfield. Remaining MLD personnel were assigned to Naval Air Station HMAS Rathmines on the east coast of Australia, where they completed their operational training on the Dorniers and PBYs. Those ML cadets with no previous flight training were held at Melbourne.
Although free from the Japanese air raids sweeping across Java, the MLD and ML quickly ran into other obstacles that hindered their ability to conduct flight training. These included a crippling shortage of aviation fuel caused in part by the expansion of the RAAF and the rapid arrival of large numbers of American planes, which put space on Australia’s limited number of airfields at a premium.38
At the same time, the poor condition of the RAAF’s training aircraft, coupled with the absence of additional aircraft on order from the United States, further slowed the process. Finally, with the East Indies on the verge of collapse, no one—Australian, Dutch or American—was sure of Australia’s ability to defend itself against Japanese invasion. With these factors in mind, the Dutch made further plans to move their flight training operations to another location at the earliest possible convenience.39
The next logical choice was to move the operation to India, where the MLD could draw on the facilities and logistical support of the Royal Navy. However, training facilities for the ML would be severely limited, and the Dutch wished to consolidate their remaining resources. Curaçao in the Netherlands West Indies was then considered. But the island, although sheltered from attack, faced a fuel shortage and possessed limited facilities that could accommodate the sudden influx of nearly 600 flight trainees.40
Thus, the decision was made to move flight training to the United States. Although halfway around the world, the United States offered ample fuel stocks, safe training grounds and perhaps above all, convenient access to additional aircraft that were needed to ramp up flight training. The Dutch government-in-exile formally requested the cooperation of the United States on March 17, 1942, which Army Chief-of-Staff General George C. Marshall promptly provided. Armed with this guarantee, the entire Dutch contingent boarded the 20,000-ton steamer Mariposa at Melbourne and departed for San Francisco on April 20.
As the MLD began the first phase of its evacuation from Java, 205 Squadron also began to quietly set the stage for its own evacuation of Java. On February 16, the FV-V, FV-R and FV-W/Y-54 were ordered to Tjilatjap; they were followed by FV-N on the 17th. FV-U/Y-53 was also supposed to fly in on the 18th but was unserviceable after damaging a float while landing at Tandjoeng Priok in late January. FV-R was ordered to proceed to Columbo on the 18th. The squadron had been on Java for only three weeks and was already making plans to evacuate the island.
By late afternoon of February 21, the Catalinas of 205 Squadron were already operating from Tjilatjap. One of these, FV-V was returning from an anti-submarine patrol when its pilot flew low over the American heavy cruiser USS Houston, which had just entered the harbor. Unfortunately, Dutch AA gunners mistook the PBY for a Japanese seaplane attacking the cruiser and opened fire. The blasts blew a hole in the plane’s port wing and the pilot was forced to jettison his depth charges at low altitude in order to attempt an emergency landing. However, the subsequent explosions further damaged the PBY so badly that it was written off upon landing.
Despite regular A/S patrols by GVT.5(NEW) and 205 Squadron aircraft operating out of Tjilatjap, Japanese submarines continued to inflict losses on Dutch merchant ships in the Indian Ocean. On February 18 and 19, MLD aircraft reported attacking two Japanese submarines. Y-71 spotted what was thought to be a submerged submarine and dropped depth charges but could not observe the results. Although Japanese submarines were operating south of Tjilatjap, their claims cannot be verified, and it is possible that over-anxious flight crew attacked whales, which was not an uncommon occurrence for flying boats of all countries on A/S flights.
On February 22, Y-71 of GVT.5(NEW) escorted the KPM merchant ship MS Pijnacker Hordijk into the Indian Ocean. The initial leg of the mission went well with no enemy contact. However, as night fell, the seaplanes were forced to turn for home, leaving Pijnacker Hordijk on her own; 90 minutes after their departure, the I-58 sank her. In response to her SOS, the merchant ship Rengat rescued 50 of her crew and later transferred them to the GM auxiliary vessel Zuiderkruis.