January 1942 began with a flurry of movement by the MLD to new operational bases. In less than a month, the Japanese had driven the MLD back from virtually every one of its northern prewar bases. Despite determined Dutch attempts to strike back, this sledgehammer assault put them firmly on the defensive for the remainder of the campaign. During January, the MLD and other Allied forces would be driven even farther south.
The New Year saw GVT.6 on the move to Tajan on the Kapoeas River on Borneo. Here, the squadron relieved GVT.1 and took over reconnaissance duties over the South China Sea in a triangular area bounded by Natoena-Tambelan-Sarawak. Hiding its planes under the low-hanging branches of thick trees on the river banks, the squadron flew a number of missions against the airfield at Kuching and harassed Japanese craft traversing the rivers and east coast of Borneo.
In Malaya on January 1, FV-U (formerly Y-53) was one of two Royal Air Force Catalinas from 205 Squadron that were ordered to carry out an evening raid on the captured airfield at Gong Kedah in northern Malaya. Although the two seaplanes inflicted little damage to the Japanese facilities, heavy AA fire destroyed FV-U’s starboard engine and badly damaged the other. Still, the pilot managed to bring his PBY back to Seletar in one piece.
About this time, the repeated raids by Japanese “Mavis” flying boats on the MLD base at Sorong prompted a Dutch response. Without air cover or effective AA defenses, these attacks had forced the Dutch to all but abandon the base shortly after the attacks began. Although aircraft were unable to use the base on a regular basis, a small ground force remained with a stockpile of supplies to service any Allied plane that might arrive at the port. In an effort to relieve pressure on Sorong, and to perhaps make it secure enough to resume flight operations on some level, the Dutch requested assistance from their Australian allies.
In response, 24 Squadron (RAAF) sent three Hudson bombers from Laha Airfield on Ambon to fly a CAP over the harbor on January 1. It was hoped that these speedy aircraft would be able to intercept the Japanese raiders and encourage them to not return. Blessed with incredible structural strength that gave them superior maneuverability for a twin-engine aircraft and good defensive armament, the Hudsons were certainly more than an even opponent for the “Mavis.” But after circling the base for two hours, the Hudsons saw nothing and turned for home. It was at that point that one of them suddenly spun into the sea and crashed; one badly burned survivor was eventually pulled out of the water.
On the 2nd, GVT.4 moved to Telok-Bajor near Tarakan to relieve GVT.7, which had operated from the base since December 7. Upon arrival, the squadron took over reconnaissance duties over the Celebes Sea. The next day, GVT.7 headed home to Morokrembangan for repair and overhaul of its planes and much-needed rest for the aircrews and ground personnel. To initiate the new arrivals, the Japanese also chose January 3 to launch their first air raid on the island in preparation for its invasion one week later.
With the Japanese threatening to pour across the East Indies, the Dutch frantically sought reinforcements from the United States. In an effort to enlist more aid, Lieutenant-Governor Hubertus J. van Mook was dispatched to Washington, DC. Doctor van Mook left Java aboard a KNILM plane on January 4 and flew to Sydney, Australia. From there, he departed for the United States on January 8 aboard the PBY Y-70, which had recently arrived from Pearl Harbor. Piloted by Lieutenant A.D. de Bruyn, Y-70 flew van Mook to California via the Southern Pacific air route and Pearl Harbor. He continued on to Washington for a series of quick visits with government officials before returning to the East Indies aboard Y-70 in late January.
About this time, the Dutch transferred five PBYs to PatWing 10.1 The unit had suffered heavy losses since evacuating the Philippines, and the USN turned to the MLD for reinforcements, as the Dutch could not man all the PBYs they had on hand. Three of these aircraft—Y-39, Y-41 and Y-42—came directly from the MLD flight-training school at Morokrembangan, which was in the process of being shut down as the Dutch moved their training operations from Java to Australia.
A fourth PBY, Y-43, was brand new and came from the MLD reserve pool.2 But since most of the records detailing this transfer were destroyed when Java fell, the identity of the fifth Catalina remains unclear, although the author believes it could have been Y-50 despite that aircraft being listed in certain Dutch records as being lost in MLD service in February 1942.3 Nonetheless, after several days of maintenance, the first Dutch PBYs entered service with PatWing 10 in late January.
At the same time, the Dorniers of GVT.4 flew a number of reconnaissance missions over Davao. Based on the strength of their reports, nine B-17s from the 19th Bomb Group at Malang airbase on Java flew north to Borneo’s Samarinda Airfield on January 3. The next morning, Major Cecil E. Combs led eight of the bombers on a dawn strike against Davao Harbor. Although five Zeros attempted to intercept, they could not reach the bombers’ altitude before they dropped their ordnance. The bomber crews claimed to have sunk a destroyer and with three hits to a battleship and multiple strikes on a number of smaller vessels.4
However, the only damage inflicted was to the heavy cruiser Myoko, which suffered a direct hit on her #2 turret, killing 35 crewmen and wounding 29 more. As a result, the cruiser was forced back to Sasebo naval base in Japan for extensive repairs. She did not return to service until February 26.5 No other ships were hit, although a number of others suffered light to moderate splinter damage, including the heavy cruiser Nachi.6 The seaplane tender Chitose also suffered splinter damage to four seaplanes on her deck, despite being some 550 yards away.7
Japanese submarines were now becoming increasingly active in the Java Sea. On January 3, I-58 sank the 7,395-ton Dutch transport Langkoeas north of Bawean Island.8 Although her crew abandoned ship in good order, the Japanese submarine captain then embarked on a massacre of the survivors. I-58 first rammed a lifeboat; she then opened fire on the remaining lifeboats and killed all but 3 of the freighter’s crew of 94, who were eventually rescued.
Just 90 miles off the north coast of Java, the area around Bawean was a major shipping lane. The presence of a rogue submarine in these waters necessitated an increased MLD presence until it was eliminated. As a result, every available Dutch navy plane at both Morokrembangan and Tandjoeng Priok, including the Fokker T.IVa’s of GVT.11 and GVT.12, was immediately put on patrol duty in the vicinity of the sea lanes between Soerabaja and Batavia.
That evening, one of the patrol planes sighted a blur under the water near the Westwater Channel, the primary entrance to Soerabaja. The pilot immediately attacked with depth charges, bringing a large oil slick to the surface. Confident he had crippled a Japanese submarine, the pilot remained over the oil slick while a number of other planes dropped additional depth charges in the surrounding area until dark.9
At first light, another plane attacked with depth charges, bringing more oil to the surface. The seaplane then landed and collected a sample of the floating oil and flew it to Tandjoeng Priok. There, chemical analysis revealed that its mixture was likely Dutch and had probably originated from the 2,596-ton KPM steamer Van der Wijck, which had capsized in that area in 1936. Based on this information, MLD high command concluded that the first pilot had seen the wreck’s submerged silhouette in the shallow water and mistaken it for a submarine. Repeated attacks then ruptured the wreck’s bunkers, letting oil reach the surface.
On January 7, eight Japanese flying boats attacked Dutch installations on Ambon, including MVK Halong. They dropped nearly two dozen bombs and carried out a number of strafing attacks that killed three and wounded four others. Seven more aircraft targeted the naval air station the following day, although there was little damage done and no casualties. At the time, it was believed that the Japanese were testing the island’s defenses in preparation for their planned invasion.
In the early morning hours of January 9, I-58 sank the 2,380-ton Camphuys in the northern Java Sea. The Dutch cattle ship was bound for Singapore from Banjoewangi, Borneo, with a cargo of 1,700 live pigs in crates on the top deck and 35 cattle in the lower decks. The helmsman evaded the submarine’s first torpedo, which prompted the Japanese commander to surface.
Camphuys’s master then tried to outrun I-58, but the submarine opened fire with its deck gun and quickly scored a series of hits, including two under the waterline, that killed five crewmen and started a raging fire on the bow. Unarmed and unable to outrun his attacker, the Dutch captain ordered full stop and sent his crew over the side in the remaining lifeboats. The Japanese gun crew continued to shell the ship as the crew went into the water, killing two more crewmen. The submarine then disappeared, leaving the ship to burn and slowly sink.10
An ML Martin bomber from an airfield on Borneo located the survivors late that morning. Several hours later, X-32 of GVT.7 landed near the three lifeboats and picked up 54 survivors, including 7 badly wounded crewmen, and flew them to Morokrembangan. An American destroyer rescued the remaining 60 survivors early the following morning. On board, they found the survivors of the 1,003-ton KPM steamer Benkoelen, which had been forced aground in sinking condition by the submarine I-65 on the previous afternoon.11
That same evening, I-57 heavily damaged the 3,077-ton Dutch naval fleet tanker Djirak (TAN-3) off Sepajang in the Kangean Islands.12 The tanker was sailing alone when the submarine battle surfaced at 1800 and opened fire with her 5.5-inch deck gun. With a top speed of only 10 knots, Djirak had no chance of outrunning I-57, which could easily make 20 knots on the surface, and the unarmed tanker was hit repeatedly as her 40 crewmen went into the lifeboats.
These men put ashore on Sepandjang Island, where a PatWing 10 PBY on routine patrol sighted them two days later. In response to its signal, GVT.7 dispatched X-32 from Morokrembangan to rescue the tanker’s 38 survivors. Although not sunk, Djirak was left abandoned and drifting in a sinking condition. It is unclear when she sank, although two days later, Y-41 sighted her shattered hulk with several hundred fuel drums floating in the water nearby.13
On the 12th yet another Japanese submarine struck. This time it was I-56, which sighted the 2,065-ton KPM steamer Patras in the Lombok Strait. The submarine fired one torpedo that the merchant ship managed to avoid; this brought I-56 to the surface, where her crew manned the deck gun and opened fire. Captain J.J.A. van der Starre then attempted to run, but Patras had a top speed of only 13 knots while I-56 could make nearly 18 knots on the surface. As a result, she quickly closed the range and began registering hits on the zigzagging steamer.
Suddenly, the Japanese quit firing and the submarine executed an emergency dive. The reason for her sudden departure was the surprise appearance of X-23 on the horizon. Although the Dornier was on a training flight and carried no depth charges or bombs, her presence alone was fortunately enough to drive off I-56, which went to look for easier prey. To ensure that the submarine did not return, X-23 patiently circled overhead for a brief period before a shortage of fuel forced its return to Morokrembangan. The reprieve brought about by the X-boat allowed Patras to put out her fires and safely continue her voyage.
Later that same day, a Dornier of GVT.6 sighted two empty lifeboats from an unknown ship 25 miles off Tandjoeng Datoe on the northwest coast of Borneo. But despite making an extensive search of the area, the plane found no other signs of flotsam or survivors and eventually continued on its patrol. It is unknown what ship the lifeboats might have belonged to.
At 1110 on January 17, a force of Ki-21 “Sally” medium bombers from the 60th Sentai hit British Far East Forces headquarters in Singapore. As the bombers pounded their primary target, two Ki-43 “Oscar” fighters from the escorting 64th Sentai took the opportunity to strafe Seletar. The 205 Squadron Catalinas FV-Y (Y-52) and FV-P were destroyed at their moorings, while FV-T and FV-W (Y-54) were badly damaged, the latter suffering severe fire damage. As a result of this attack, the squadron was left with only five operational aircraft.
By early January, the Dutch were concerned about Japanese troops infiltrating across the Malacca Strait to Sumatra from occupied Malaya. They were also concerned about the possibility of a surprise invasion of north and central Sumatra from the Indian Ocean. For these reasons, on the 6th, GVT.8 detached X-17 to operate from Blinjoe, Banka, to fly reconnaissance and escort convoys from the Soenda Strait and Indian Ocean to Singapore. After the sinking of the Langkoeas, X-17 was to be especially alert for Japanese submarines that were reported in this area as well. On the 25th, X-17 moved to Lake Toba and flew reconnaissance missions between central Sumatra and the island of Nias off Sumatra’s southern coast in the Indian Ocean.
January 8 saw the arrival of the first PBY by way of the new Western ferry route across the Atlantic Ocean via Africa and Rangoon.14 The fall of Manila and occupation of the southern Philippines had by now cut the established prewar route from the United States to Java. Despite the extra distance of the new air route, over the next two months, new Catalinas continued to arrive and provide the MLD with reinforcements, although all but a handful would arrive after the fall of Java.15
On January 10, the American, British, Dutch and Australian governments agreed to form a joint Allied command. Formed 33 days after the start of the Pacific War, this command was called ABDA, for the four nations it represented. Covering a vast area bound by the northern coast of Australia in the south and the Burmese-Indian border and Chinese coast in the north, ABDA theoretically included the Philippines, but General MacArthur’s isolated garrison remained an independent command throughout the short life of ABDA.
Overall command rested with British General Sir Archibald Wavell, who reached Java from India on the 10th to officially activate ABDA. Three subcommands—ABDA-LAND, ABDA-FLOAT and ABDA-AIR—were set up to coordinate the respective land, sea and air aspects of the war around the Malay Barrier. However, friction between the Allies concerning ABDA’s top command positions was evident from the start, particularly among the Dutch, upon whose territory most of the fighting was now taking place.
With the exception of Major-General Hein ter Poorten, KNIL, who received command of ABDA-LAND, the Dutch were shut out of ABDA’s top command positions. ABDA-AIR was assigned to Major-General Lewis H. Brereton, USAAF, who served as command-in-chief until Air Vice Marshal Sir Richard Peirse, RAF arrived. ABDA-FLOAT was assigned to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, who had evacuated the USN Asiatic Fleet from the Philippines to Java in late December. Although Admiral Helfrich retained tactical command of local Dutch naval forces in the NEI, he was excluded from any strategic direction within ABDA.
Helfrich’s only regular source of information concerning the strategic direction of ABDA was a Dutch naval officer acting in the liaison role. This lack of information was a constant irritation for Helfrich. Although Admiral Hart regularly met with Helfrich to update him, this was a formality and not an invitation for strategic input on the operation of ABDA. As Helfrich soon learned, ABDA was primarily an American and British command, which often put national interests ahead of Allied objectives.
Y-70 at the PAA seaplane facility in Dinner Key, Miami, prior to departing for Java via the Atlantic Air Route in January 1942 (photograph courtesy of Institute for Maritime History).
To what degree Helfrich cooperated with General ter Poorten is unknown.16 However, the general met daily with Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, the governor-general of the Netherlands East Indies, who under the Dutch Constitution was commander-in-chief of all Dutch forces in the Far East. The governor-general of course then circulated all information to his commanders. Exactly how much ter Poorten really knew can be debated, as the Americans thought the British spoke for the Dutch due to their dominant position in the Far East.
However, the British did not trust the Dutch and told both them and their own Australian allies very little about the strategic direction of ABDA. By keeping the Dutch and Australians in the dark, Prime Minister Winston Churchill sought to manipulate Allied war planning and conceive a Pacific strategy that would preserve as much of the British Empire as possible. However, the Americans discounted British efforts and dominated Pacific War planning.17 For their part, the Australians were somewhat disillusioned by prewar British promises of aid that went unfilled and placed their faith in the Americans and their more visible means of support.
As it turned out, ABDA was powerless to prevent the Japanese from driving down the length of the East Indies. The primary problems were insufficient strength, poor allocation of resources on more than one occasion and, at least in part, the British, who rarely chose to be team players when the situation did not suit their national interests.
The Dutch and Australians put far more faith into ABDA than did the Americans or British. The Dutch needed Allied support to hold the East Indies, while Australia firmly believed at the time that the East Indies likely represented the last shield between its mainland and Japanese invasion. With this in mind, the Australian government made a firm commitment to building up the Dutch defenses, although their military situation was little better.
However, the British and Americans were interested in holding the East Indies merely as a tool to help retain their own territory. Once Malaya fell and the Philippines were written off, both quickly lost interest in defending Dutch territory. Australia was chosen as the springboard for a counteroffensive against the Japanese. The Dutch, with no military or political leverage, were left to twist in the wind as their East Indies Empire crumbled around them.
Nonetheless, the Dutch did manage a small victory within ABDA. When ABDA-AIR was formed, all long-range reconnaissance planes (minus the British, who continued to operated independently of ABDA) were combined into a joint subcommand called REC-GROUP. Each country’s planes remained under national command but carried out strategic ABDA directives according to how each commanding officer thought it best to execute an assigned mission.
The reconnaissance group was initially put under the command of Captain F.D. Wagner, commander of Patrol Wing 10. However, intense political pressure on President Franklin Roosevelt by the Dutch soon brought about a change in command. On January 18, Captain G.G. Bozuwa of the MLD formally took over command of REC-GROUP, although Wagner stayed on as his chief of staff. Their staff consisted of five KM, two RAN, two USN and one RAF officers. REC-GROUP first operated from the city of Lembang on western Java until the end of January, when it relocated to the Bandoeng Technical High School.
Not all of these missions involved reconnaissance flights. With the number of land-based bombers too small to force the point, the Dutch and American seaplanes were forced back into a bomber role, just weeks after Admiral Helfrich had made the decision to withdraw the MLD from these types of action due to heavy losses. By the end of the East Indies campaign, the MLD represented the bulk of ABDA’s long-range bomber force.
January 9 brought the first MLD air raid of the year. It was the last mission off Tarakan, as a Japanese invasion force was fast approaching the island. With 12 100-pound bombs aboard, X-13 took off to attack Jolo on the night of January 9–10. Although one bomb fell in the town, three burned or destroyed several buildings on the airfield. The remainder cratered the south end of the airfield. On the way out, two fighters scrambled and followed X-13 out to sea for some distance before the flying boat’s pilot managed to shake them off.
En route to Tarakan, X-13 received a signal to proceed to Telok-Bajor, a small auxiliary seaplane base located on the Beraoe River, approximately 65 miles south of Tarakan. A Japanese invasion convoy was nearing the island, and the rest of GVT.4 had already been evacuated earlier that morning.
Although on the outskirts of the Dutch East Indies Empire and only 25 square miles in diameter, Tarakan was of critical importance to the Japanese. Their primary target was the island’s 700 oil wells, refineries and airstrip. The wells could pump 5,000 barrels of crude oil a day, the quality of which, it was said, was so pure that it could be pumped directly into ships without refining. Although the swampy runway hardly warranted the name and was often closed by bad weather and poor runoff facilities, the Japanese needed it to provide air cover for their planned invasion of Balikpapan, some 200 miles to the south.
Under the command of Rear-Admiral Sueto Hirose, the Tarakan invasion convoy left Davao on the night of January 7–8 carrying the 56th Infantry Regiment and 2nd Kure Special Naval Landing Force aboard 16 transports. Ships of the 2nd Base Force, 11th and 30th Minesweeper Divisions, 31st Submarine Chaser Division and the patrol boats P-36, P-37, P-38 and P-39 escorted them. The 4th Destroyer Flotilla provided additional close escort with the light cruiser Naka and the 2nd, 9th and 24th Destroyer Divisions. The 23rd Air Flotilla at Jolo and seaplanes from the seaplane tenders Sanyo Maru and Sanuki Maru provided air cover and A/S protection.
As Admiral Hirose neared Tarakan on January 10, the Japanese formally declared war on the Netherlands. Despite the Dutch declaration of war against Japan on December 7 and the open hostilities that the two nations had engaged in for the past month, Japan had failed to declare war on the Netherlands or any of its territories. It is also interesting to note that their formal declaration of war coincided with their first attempt to capture a major piece of Dutch territory.
The Tarakan force reached the island early on the morning of January 10. At 0730, the island’s lightship reported that it was under air attack, and Japanese aircraft bombed and strafed the vessel until it sank at 0900; the lightship’s three-man crew of naval reservists then abandoned ship and was later pulled out of the water by approaching Japanese ships. The commander of GVT.4 now received orders from KM HQ on Java to find the convoy and report on its size and course.
X-14 and X-21 were ordered into the air at 1130 and succeeded in making contact with the convoy some 90 minutes later. To remain undetected and avoid the convoy’s Combat Air Patrol, the squadron commander aboard X-21 initially flew north at wave-top level along the swampy Borneo shoreline until sighting the masts of the Japanese ships in the distance. He then popped up just high enough to see the convoy before ducking back down after 3 to 5 seconds. Repeating this tactic, X-21 began transmitting reconnaissance reports on the convoy around 1400.
However within 10 minutes of the first transmission, several Japanese fighters appeared over the convoy. To avoid detection, the X-21 dove low and flew a straight line at full speed away from the convoy for several minutes. The tactic worked, and the Dornier was not sighted. The pilot then returned a short time later and continued his low-level reconnaissance without being seen. Based on his reports, the KNIL dispatched a number of Martin bombers from Samarinda II, a secret airfield in the interior of Borneo. Attacking in the face of heavy AA fire, the KNIL pilots claimed two unconfirmed hits and three Japanese fighters shot down but could not stop the convoy.
Meanwhile, X-13 had been ordered at 1300 to fly south down the Borneo coast in the Makassar Strait to locate and warn off the motorship van Masdijn.18 En route from Samarinda, Borneo, she carried 50 KNIL soldiers who were to reinforce Tarakan’s garrison. However, with no radio her captain had no idea that the Japanese were about to blockade the island.
But before the Japanese could seal the blockade, the Dutch submarine K-X slipped away, despite having to fight off bomb and strafing attacks from two of Sanyo Maru’s “Petes” while traversing the island’s minefield on the surface. The KM patrol boat P-1 and the civilian motor launch Aida joined her. However, the minelayer Prins van Oranje was less fortunate; she was sunk by the destroyer Yamakaze and the patrol boat P-38 northeast of the island. Her loss effectively completed the blockade, and any attempt to land reinforcements on Tarakan had become hopeless.
The flying boat sighted van Masdijn near Bilang-Bajor Island around 1500 and landed alongside to pass along her orders. However, a Japanese flying boat appeared overhead almost immediately, forcing X-13 to take off; as the X-boat clawed for altitude, the Japanese plane attacked and scored a direct bomb hit on the van Masdijn, killing 10 men, including her captain. A crewman took control of the badly damaged ship and ran her aground on a nearby reef. X-13 gave what help it could in the air and then landed to pick up survivors. Unable to evacuate all the survivors in a single trip, the seaplane picked up only the seriously wounded and those men who could not swim and flew them to Balikpapan.
X-14 and X-21 were still over the convoy when they received the following signal from the naval commander on Tarakan: “In the Event AA Fire Is So Strong That It Precludes a Successful Attack GVT.4 Is to Continue on to Balikpapan.” Based on this message, the Dorniers withdrew without attacking at 1730. Shortly after landing, they were ordered to rescue the remaining survivors from the Masdijn. Splashing down in the Makassar Strait just after midnight on the 11th, they rescued 45 survivors off the wreck and transported them to Balikpapan.
By January 13 the Japanese had forced KNIL Lieutenant-Colonel S. de Waal and the battered remnants of his 7th Infantry Battalion to surrender. But before doing so, the KNIL demolished the island’s oil wells and refineries and caused significant damage to the airfield. At the same time, KM ground personnel also destroyed the naval air station’s buildings and workshops.
However, engineers from the 2nd Base Force had the runway operational again by January 16, although it consistently remained in poor shape throughout the remainder of the East Indies campaign. Still, its reopening allowed aircraft of the 23rd Air Flotilla to be immediately moved onto the airfield in order support the invasion of Balikpapan, which lay some 315 miles south of Tarakan. The flotilla’s headquarters officially moved onto the base on January 25.
On the night of January 13–14, X-13 and X-21 evacuated 30 civilians and 15 BPM19 personnel from Telok-Bajor to Balikpapan. The squadron then operated from Balikpapan until January 22, when it was ordered back to Soerabaja. On the night of the 15th–16th, X-14 landed at Boelongan on Borneo’s east coast to rescue escapees from Tarakan. This group included 25 KNIL soldiers who had escaped via small boat. The Dornier also brought out the crew of a Dutch Martin bomber that had crash-landed on Tarakan’s airfield after being engaged by two “Petes” off the Sanyo Maru. Despite the danger of air attack, the evacuees were flown to Balikpapan without incident.
As the Tarakan force moved toward Tarakan, six transports and the 1st Base Force under Rear Admiral Kyuji Kubo departed Davao on January 9. His convoy carried the sailors of the 1st Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force, which had orders to take Menado, Kema and Bangka Roads on the island of Celebes. Their objectives were the airfield near Menado and seaplane base on Lake Tondano on Celebes’ Minahassa Peninsula. The 334 paratroopers of the Yokosuka Naval Air Landing Force would support them. Rear-Admiral Raizo Tanaka’s 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, with the 15th, 16th and 1st/8th Destroyer Divisions, provided escort for the convoy. The 11th Carrier Squadron with Mizuho and Chitose provided air cover; “Mavis” seaplanes of the 21st Air Flotilla, now operating at will from Davao, supported them.
As the convoy moved south on January 10, one of the MLD planes sighted three Japanese destroyers bombarding Sangi, a small island midway between Mindanao and Menado. The information was relayed to PatWing 10, which ordered its planes at Ambon to attack the ships immediately.
Just 200 miles south of Davao, Sangi was well within range of Japanese fighters, and the American aircrews were not optimistic about their chances of successfully completing the mission. Nonetheless, three PBYs went out at 1400 to attack the Japanese destroyers. However, 50 miles south of Sangi they sighted the convoy, which was reported as 10 transports escorted by 6 cruisers and 18 destroyers. Forgetting about the destroyers off Sangi, the three PBYs all made bomb runs across the convoy in the face of heavy AA fire. Bombing from 17,000 feet, all nine 500-pound bombs missed, and the Catalinas returned to Ambon.
GVT.17 (Y-58, Y-59 and Y-60) was ordered to make a strike on the invasion fleet to contest the landings. Although Y-59 was unable to locate the convoy and returned home without dropping her bombs, the remaining two PBYs attacked in the face of heavy flak and fighter interception without fighter escort of their own. Y-58 was last seen falling toward the ocean some 20 miles off the coast shortly after her bomb run; it never returned to base and apparently fell victim to a “Pete” from Mizuho. At the same time, a flight of “Petes” simultaneously swarmed over Y-60 shortly after it completed its bomb run. Y-60 suffered heavy damage with two dead and two seriously wounded but managed to return to Halong.
Despite losing one plane, four PatWing 10 PBYs following GVT.17 scored no hits either. Eleven RAAF Hudsons from Laha airfield on Ambon followed. Not even the faster, more maneuverable bombers were able to avoid the floatplanes, although they did claim four hits and four fighters shot down with two losses of their own. Unfortunately, none of these can be confirmed. In a later raid the Hudsons shot down one “Pete” and damaged two more so badly that they were forced to crash-land on the water, where they sank. Still, the only damage to the Japanese invasion fleet off Menado was limited to a near miss on the 7,620-ton transport Amagisan Maru.
The Japanese landed a strong invasion force at Menado on the morning of January 9. There were still a few MLD ground personnel at Lake Tondano following the Japanese air raid of December 26. The first indication these men had of the landings on Celebes came when a large Japanese flying boat landed in the middle of the lake at 0900 and began unloading troops. Although a KNIL detachment in the area was equipped with a rapid-fire 37mm cannon, the seaplane took care to remain well out of its range. Japanese paratroopers also began dropping near the base on the 11th, spurring the MLD ground personnel to destroy Kalkas and withdraw into the rugged interior of Celebes. After an arduous trip by automobile that lasted several exhausting days, they reached Makassar on the island’s southern tip.
Despite heavy resistance from KNIL troops, the Japanese were able to take control of both Kema and Menado by January 11. However, the KNIL troops held out long enough for their engineers to complete preplanned demolitions that badly damaged the airfield facilities and runway. As a result, the Japanese were unable to make use of Kalawiran Airfield until January 24. Still, the capture of the Minahassa Peninsula not only gave them a firm foothold in the East Indies, but it also extended their sphere of air superiority. At the same time, the Japanese had effectively isolated American forces in the Philippines from resupply, except by submarine and long-range aircraft, which now had to circumvent occupied territory.
In mid-January the first of the reformed GVTs went back into the line. GVT.5(NEW) had spent the period between December 28 and January 12 training and reequipping with PBY Catalinas. The squadron went back into action on the 12th and operated from Tjilatjap until being pulled back to Morokrembangan on February 5. During this deployment, GVT.5(NEW) operated in the A/S role for convoys in the Indian Ocean, escorting a total of 34 ships.
Four days later, on January 16, GVT.18 with its three Catalinas, flew into Tjilatjap to join GVT.5(NEW).20 There, GVT.18 took over reconnaissance patrols in the area amid Java, Sumatra and Borneo. It remained at the port until March 1, when its planes were detailed to fly Admiral Helfrich and his staff out of Java.
GVT.2(NEW) was now reactivated and moved back into the line. After being destroyed at Lake Tondano on December 26, the squadron moved to Morokrembangan, and its personnel had reequipped with and trained on new Catalinas between December 30 and January 13. The planes assigned to GVT.2(NEW) were Y-62, Y-63 and Y-64.
On January 19, the squadron moved to Emmahaven, the port of Padang on the southern coast of Sumatra, where it provided A/S support for convoys in the Indian Ocean.21 From January 22 to 28, the squadron flew off Lake Toba in central Sumatra until that base was also discovered. The seaplanes then moved south to Oosthaven on the 28th and to Tandjoeng Pandan on Biliton Island two days later. The squadron returned to Tandjoeng Priok when Biliton came under air attack.
The newly reformed GVT.3(NEW) also became operational on January 16. Flying out of Morokrembangan, the squadron extensively trained on PBYs. In particular, heavy emphasis was placed upon air gunnery, night flying and bombing. The aircrews undoubtedly realized that this was an omen as training continued for the next several weeks.
By mid-January GVT.8, GVT.16 and the newly formed GVT.18 were operating from Tandjoeng Priok. Between the 19th and the 21st, all three squadrons provided A/S escort for the MS.2 convoy, which consisted of the 44,786-ton British transport Aquitania carrying 3,456 troops bound for Singapore. Aquatania entered Ratai Bay on southern Sumatra on January 20, where she transferred her troops to seven smaller ships of a convoy later designated as MS.2A to keep the valuable transport out of range of Japanese bombers. Later that day, GVT.8 released X-16 for duty on Lake Toba, where it flew reconnaissance missions over the east coast of Sumatra.