As the Japanese prepared to drive into the Netherlands East Indies, the MLD began receiving unexpected, although welcome, reinforcements in mid-December. Between December 13 and December 24, Patrol Wing 10, the USN’s only airborne reconnaissance unit in the Far East, began withdrawing from the Philippines to Java.1 The Wing had experienced heavy losses since the outbreak of war and desperately needed relief from the relentless waves of Japanese fighters and bombers that prowled almost at will over the Philippines.
Although PatWing 10 had been flying reconnaissance missions over Camrahn Bay since April 1940, it had suffered no losses until the outbreak of the Pacific War.2 However, the bulk of General Douglas McArthur’s air power in the Philippines had been destroyed on the ground on the first day of war. This immediately gave the Japanese near complete air supremacy, and the PBYs of PatWing 10 paid the price. With losses totaling 10 of the Wing’s 28 planes in the war’s first week, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, the USN Asiatic Fleet commander, ordered Captain Frank D. Wagner to evacuate his remaining Catalinas south to Morokrembangan.
The evacuation began during the night of December 13–14, with messengers alerting the aircrews to prepare for evacuation from the Philippines immediately. By 0430, the first five planes were away, and the Wing’s remaining flyable PBY’s and two J2F “Duck” utility planes followed. The seaplane tenders USS Heron, William B. Preston, Childs and Langley followed, bound for the Dutch port of Balikpapan, where they would refuel and proceed onto Java.3 So abrupt was the departure that the runners missed two of the camouflaged PBYs in the darkness. Somehow sleeping through the noise, their crews woke up the next morning to find all but a few of their squadron missing.
From Balikpapan, Langley proceeded to Menado, where she provided a refueling stop for PBYs heading south. As the tender negotiated the harbor, Langley was greeted with a low flyover by the Dorniers of GVT.5, which was operating from MVK Kalkas. As the Dutch planes circled, the tender was suddenly attacked by a four-engine Japanese flying boat,4 which the crew had thought to be Dutch as it approached.5 The bombs dropped 50–100 yards to port and the plane then disappeared, giving the Dutch seaplanes no chance to intercept.
The PBYs en route from the southern Philippines were to have refueled at Lake Tondano, but the report of this attack worried Captain Wagner. Fearful of additional air attacks, he ordered the planes to divert to Balikpapan instead. However, a PBY flying on one engine and the two single-engine floatplanes did not have enough fuel to reach Balikpapan and diverted to Menado. En route, the “Ducks” were forced to land on the open sea and refuel from jerry cans their pilots carried aboard the planes. After refueling, it was too late to continue into Menado, so the three seaplanes flew to Kalkas for the night as Langley cleared the area. They landed an hour and 40 minutes after the Japanese bomber attacked Langley.
Japanese Air Superiority December 1941–Janaruy 1942. Legend: (1) Sphere of Japanese air superiority provided by JNAF units operating from Davao as of January 15, 1942. (2) Sphere of Japanese air superiority provided by JNAF units operating from Jolo as of January 15, 1942. (3) Sphere of Japanese air superiority provided by JNAF units operating from Tarakan as of January 15, 1942. (4) Sphere of Japanese air superiority provided by JNAF units operating from Menado as of January 15, 1942. (5) Sphere of Japanese air superiority provided by JNAF units operating from Kendari as of January 15, 1942. (6) Sphere of Japanese air superiority provided by JNAF units operating from Balikpapan as of January 15, 1942.
Meanwhile, some of the Wing’s ground personnel were taken out aboard the seaplane tender Childs, which left Luzon on the night of December 14 with all the spare parts and aircraft engines she could carry. A number of men were also evacuated aboard the MS Maréchal Joffre, a fast Vichy French passenger ship that had been interned in Manila on December 14. Upon being boarded, her crew was given five minutes to decide where their loyalties lay. Those who declared for Vichy were taken ashore and interned. In all, 63 crewmen stayed aboard to operate the ship.
Among Maréchal Joffre’s crew the boarding party found a diverse setting that would have made a perfect backdrop for a Humphrey Bogart movie. One crewman, it was discovered, was an operative for an American intelligence agency in Manila. He was covertly funneling information on Japanese shipping that he gathered during the ship’s frequent layovers at Saigon. However, other crewmen were less dedicated to the Allied cause.
On the other end of the extreme was a ship’s officer who had the engine’s main injection needles in his cabin and was prepared to throw them overboard. Without them, the Americans would be unable to move the ship. However, he was caught off guard by the boarding party and was unable to disable the Maréchal Joffre. Another unknown crewman attempted to destroy the ship’s auxiliary switchboard. Concerned about the situation, Admiral Hart ordered Captain Wagner to send the ship south as soon as possible.
Meanwhile, staging through the southern Philippines, Borneo and Celebes, the first nine Catalinas of PatWing 10 arrived over Soerabaja on December 20. Despite staging through Dutch territory on the trip down, no one had bothered to inform authorities on Java as to the time of their arrival. As the PBYs flew over the naval base in formation, sirens sounded all over the city and the Dutch put out an air raid alert and notified nearby airfields.
After briefly taking fire from Dutch AA,6 the planes set down in the channel leading to Morokrembangan. However, the pilots did not realize that the channel was very shallow and inundated with mudflats. This made it extremely easy to run aground if one did not know the harbor, or deviated from the center of the channel, which was clearly marked with buoys. As a result, five of the American PBYs ran aground shortly after putting down.7 A tenth PBY from Balikpapan landed safely the following day.
In total, PatWing 10 brought ten PBYs, two J2F “Ducks,” four OS2U “Kingfishers” and one SOC “Seagull” utility plane south to Java in its evacuation of the Philippines. In addition, the USN added four seaplane tenders, which like the GM vessels would offer tremendous flexibility for operations across the East Indies. But despite the large percentage of aircrews brought out aboard the seaplanes and tenders, PatWing 10 left some 500 ground personnel behind. With no way to evacuate them, the majority of these men were captured when the Philippines fell.
Ashore, the men of PatWing 10 found the MLD personnel at Morokrembangan to be extremely generous. The Dutch made available the tremendous resources offered by the base, including its comprehensive machine shops, hangars and other facilities. Still free from air attack at that time, the seaplane base provided an excellent opportunity to service and overhaul the planes, many of which had not been out of the water since the outbreak of hostilities.
During their stay at Morokrembangan, the American enlisted men and NCOs were quartered in an empty hangar on the seaplane base. Some officers lived in regular quarters on base, but most were housed at the Oranje Hotel in Soerabaja. After their tour in the Philippines, the Americans found Soerabaja to be a welcome respite. Not only did the Dutch serve mess four times a day, but there was always plenty of beer. In addition, the Dutch offered a rest camp at Tretes, high in the mountains of Central Java. A prewar resort, the Commodore Hotel made an excellent rest facility.
Although enamored with Soerabaja, the stay at Morokrembangan was brief for many of the new arrivals. On December 23–24, eight PatWing 10 PBYs left the base in two four-plane sections, bound for Ambon where they joined the PBYs of GVT.17. There, Captain Wagner established his HQ and began reconnaissance operations over the northern and eastern parts of the archipelago.
On Christmas Day, the four American seaplane tenders also departed for ports throughout the East Indies and Australia.8 The men who remained at Morokrembangan were periodically rotated among the active squadron and tender crews so that all the American airmen could have leave on Java. For those not fortunate enough to be on Java, most spent the next few months being harried from remote island base to remote island base before finally being withdrawn to Australia.
Action remained brisk off western Borneo as the Americans moved south. On the 17th, while on patrol out of Seletar at Singapore, X-20 sighted a Japanese motor schooner off the Badas Islands and attacked it with bombs and heavy strafing. When the Dornier finally turned for home, the schooner was heavily afire and sinking. This boat apparently belonged to a fleet of fishing vessels that was intercepted and their crews interned by the Dutch minelayer Willem van der Zaan in the Riouw Strait several days later.
That same day, a four-engine Kawanishi “Mavis” flying boat again attacked Ternate, which had already been abandoned as a primary base following the Japanese raids on December 16. The “Mavis” dropped two bombs on the GM patrol vessel Poolster, both of which missed. X-30 of GVT.5 then appeared just as the Japanese plane retired. After a 25-minute pursuit at full throttle, the MLD plane caught up to the Japanese plane and a brief firefight ensued in what might very well have been the first dogfight in history between flying boats.
Unable to seriously damage the other with their machine guns, the two flying boats traded fire with their single 20mm cannons. X-30’s tail gunner then got lucky and hit the Mavis’s starboard, inboard motor and shredded an aileron with his 7.7mm machine gun. However, the fight abruptly ended when the Japanese plane’s 20mm cannon shot out X-30’s middle engine and electrical system. Unable to continue, X-30 broke off and returned to Ternate. After temporary repairs, she flew to MVK Ambon on two engines for advanced repairs.
On December 18 X-35 of GVT.1 engaged nine “Nells” from the Mihoro Air Wing in the Api Passage near Natoena Island. In a fight off the Borneo coast, X-35 took several hits to her center engine before breaking off the action. Afterwards, the Japanese reported engaging a British flying boat that eventually broke off the action and dove into a cloud with white smoke trailing from one of its engines.9
In support of their western Borneo operations, the Japanese maintained a series of strong air raids against British and Dutch installations along the island’s northwest coast. On the 19th, six “Nells” from the Genzan Air Wing in southern Indochina and one Kawanishi H6K “Mavis” flying boat heavily bombed the port city of Kuching. Although there was no major military damage, some 100 civilians were killed, and the local airfield’s entire fuel supply was destroyed.
At the same time, nine “Nells” from the Mihoro Air Wing raided Pontianak. They caught GVT.1 on the water, including X-36, which lay in drydock undergoing repairs. The seaplane had been towed to the base after engine trouble forced the pilot to make an emergency landing in the South China Sea south of Natoena Island several days earlier. A series of strafing attacks by the bombers further damaged the Dornier’s middle engine. In exchange, a trio of Dutch Buffalos intercepted the formation and shot up one of the “Nells” so badly that it was forced to ditch in the sea 20 miles south of its base at Hanoi on the return flight.
The raid itself lasted approximately 45 minutes, in which time the Japanese dropped some 50 bombs, destroying the fuel depot and burning an oil company warehouse. Civilian and military casualties numbered 81 dead and 290 wounded.10 But although damage to the seaplane base and surrounding facilities was severe, all three Dorniers of GVT.1 escaped destruction. However, X-35 and X-36 were forced back to Morokrembangan (both on two engines) for repairs later that day. X-6 temporarily replaced them until they rejoined GVT.1 on December 23.
The action continued when X-20 and X-22 of GVT.3 encountered a pair of Kawanishi “Mavis” flying boats on the 20th. The fight ended when both sides broke off and headed for home. In the running engagement X-22 suffered extensive damage but was able to return to the MLD support base at Tandjoeng Pinang for local repairs. X-20 was involved in another fight in the same area three days later. Again, neither side suffered any mortal damage. These encounters with Japanese bombers and flying boats became increasingly frequent on the patrols to the north as the Japanese exerted their air power over the East Indies.
The GVTs were constantly on the move. On December 20, GVT.16 (Y-51, Y-56, Y-57) became operational and moved to Tandjoeng Priok on western Java to fly reconnaissance over the Indian Ocean, Java Sea, Karimata and Gaspar Straits. The following day, GVT.2 moved its three X-boats from their prewar base at Sorong, New Guinea to Babo, New Guinea. From here, the squadron flew to Lake Tondano in northern Celebes on the 23rd.
As GVT.2 descended on Kalkas, X-6 of GVT.1 (which had replaced X-36 after she departed for repairs at Morokrembangan) sighted a Japanese convoy north of Tandjoeng Datoe and her pilot reported one cruiser, two destroyers, four transports and one tanker. As the X-boat shadowed the convoy on the morning of the 23rd, a Japanese fighter intercepted her and damaged the aircraft. The boat’s commander, 2nd Lieutenant W.C.L. Nuver, was also slightly injured while pulling out of a power dive he used to help evade the Japanese plane. As the Dornier turned for home, X-35 (2nd Lieutenant P. Jaapies) took over.
This was another invasion convoy under the command of Admiral Hashimoto, whose forces had taken Miri, Seria and Lutong the previous week. Bound for Kuching some 300 miles to the south, six transports departed Miri on December 22 carrying two battalions of the 124th Infantry Regiment. Again, the convoy received a close escort from Yura, 12th Destroyer Division (minus Shinonome) and the minesweepers W.3 and W.6. Seaplanes from Kamikawa Maru provided air cover. The light cruiser Kinu with the heavy cruisers Kumano and Suzuya provided distant cover with the destroyers Fubuki and Sagiri. They were further reinforced by the 2nd Division/7th Cruiser Squadron, which was screened by the destroyer Hatsuyuki.
As the convoy neared Kuching, X-35 established contact with the Dutch submarine K-XIV, which was on patrol in the area and informed her of the convoy’s position. With light signals, the X-boat signaled: “Eight Enemy Ships About 50 Nautical Miles North of You, Course 210, Speed About 10 Knots.” She then flew off to get another sighting that was also reported to K-XIV. In a third signal, the flying boat informed the submarine that two floatplanes had been catapulted off and that the convoy escort has assumed an anti-submarine formation.
One of the floatplanes was off Kamikawa Maru, while the other belonged to Yura. X-35 engaged both planes and led them away from the submarine, allowing it to close on the convoy unmolested from the air. Later that night, K-XIV attacked the convoy off Kuching, sinking or heavily damaging four transports. This action was a clear example of what the MLD and Dutch surface fleet trained for. Had the MLD been allowed to remain with its parent organization, Japanese losses to Dutch submarine and surface ships would undoubtedly have been much higher.
As for X-35, Kamikawa Maru’s floatplane claimed to have shot her down in a running air fight at 1,000 feet. However, these records are in error as X-35 returned to base, although with heavy damage to its center engine. Its hull and fuel tanks were also heavily holed, so that when the seaplane landed back at Singapore, it immediately had to be beached to prevent it from sinking. The next day, X-35 flew to Morokrembangan for repairs. These repairs were completed on December 27, and the seaplane rejoined the squadron at Tajan on the coast of Borneo.11
December 23 turned into a busy day for the MLD. That afternoon, two X-boats encountered a Japanese fighter patrol off Pontianak but held their own. And for the second time, there was an attack on Dorniers near Sorong, but the flying boats drove off the Japanese without loss.
At the same time, GVT.8 moved to Tandjoeng Priok from Morokrembangan, from where it flew convoy escort between the Soenda Strait and Singapore and reconnaissance missions over the Indian Ocean, Java Sea, Karimata and Gaspar Straits. But despite this flurry of action, the 23rd was also notable as the date the MLD launched its first major counterattack against the Japanese.
On the morning of December 23, the planes of GVT.2 (X-11, X-12 and X-25) and GVT.5 (X-26, X-27 and X-30) were making plans to attack Davao, which had been occupied by the Japanese on December 20. Under the command of 1st Lieutenant W.J. Reijnierse, GVT.2 was based on a small lake near Babo, New Guinea, when it landed while GVT.5, under the command of 1st Lieutenant H.V.B. Burgerhout, KMR, set up reconnaissance operations at a small secondary base on Talisei, a small island off the northern tip of the Minahassa Peninsula.
Although Davao officially fell into the American sphere of operations, Admiral Helfrich ordered both squadrons to attack shore installations and shipping in the harbor because he correctly assumed that it would be the springboard for an invasion into the East Indies. As long as the Japanese occupied it, his northern flank would be threatened. Also, the USAAF had no air units capable of hitting back, as the only heavy bombers in the Philippines had already been withdrawn to Australia due to a lack of air cover. Although, as already noted, when B-17s from Australia did eventually bomb the port, they had to cross 4,000 miles and stage through Java.
Because the MLD command considered Babo too exposed for the operation, GVT.2 was ordered to Lake Tondano, where it arrived at the Kalkas seaplane base on the 22nd. However, the base was not suited for large-scale operations, and GVT.2’s arrival severely strained base resources. The loading of fuel and 500-pound bombs took place on the lake throughout the night of December 22–23 amid a pouring rainstorm. The operation proceeded slowly as there was only one motorboat and two praus available at the base to service the seaplanes. At the same time, these craft also had to offload the personal effects and squadron gear of the new arrivals.
The mission’s operational plan called for GVT.2 to depart Lake Tondano at 0200 on the 23rd. GVT.5—which had remained at Talisei due to the inadequate facilities at Lake Tondano—would follow 30 minutes later. The altitude, airspeeds and respective courses of the two squadrons were coordinated so GVT.5 would arrive over Davao five minutes ahead of GVT.2. The two squadrons would then attack in separate waves. However, the slowness of fueling and arming the seaplanes at Kalkas delayed their departure, so GVT.2 did not lift off the water until 0300. According to plan, GVT.5 followed 30 minutes later.
The Dorniers of GVT.5 formed up about a mile north of Talisei and set a course for Davao at an altitude of 13,000 feet. Although Lieutenant Burgerhout aboard X-30 commanded GVT.5, his most experienced bombardier was the pilot of X-26. Because of this, X-26 assumed the lead, with X-27 trailing slightly behind to port and X-30 to starboard in a tight V formation. Prior to takeoff, Burgerhout carefully briefed his flight crews;12 they were to execute their bomb runs at all costs, while the pilots of the trailing planes were not to not drop their bombs until they saw X-26 do so. They were to scatter only if attacked by Japanese fighters.13
Although the squadron’s aircrews were inexperienced in formation flight at night, the mission started well. They initially encountered calm seas, moderate winds from the east and scattered clouds that allowed the pilots to retain visual contact in the moonlight. However, north of Tahoena Island, GVT.5 encountered strong headwinds and heavy clouds that plunged the sky into darkness. X-30 quickly dropped back out of sight, and X-26 soon followed.
The MLD thought the secondary seaplane base at Kalkas to be out of range of Japanese attack until the raid of December 26 (photograph courtesy of the Australian War Memorial).
Unable to see the water or each other, all three planes were forced to proceed on instruments independently. Approximately 20 miles north of the Kawio Islands, the wind died down around 0500, and the crewmen could see small patches of sea as visibility improved. Just before 0600, the pilot of X-27, Ensign F.W.J. Sürink, sighted X-30 north of Tanica Point, and the two planes formed up. However, there was still no sign of X-26, and they continued on alone.
X-27 and X-30 arrived over Davao at 0600 and found the harbor full of shipping, including both warships and merchant vessels. Initially, AA fire from shore batteries was light, but quickly intensified as the Dorniers set up their attack. X-27 dropped her bombs on a group of large seaplanes moored near the beach and claimed to have left many wrecked or burning.14 These were nine Kawanishi H6K “Mavis” flying boats belonging to the Toko Air Wing, which had arrived from Palau on December 21. X-30 dropped her six 440-pound bombs on a large warehouse complex, leaving its warehouses and quays in a mass of flames nearly 1,000 feet in diameter.
X-27 was then bracketed by a barrage of flak and suffered damage to her starboard engine, which developed a severe oil leak and soon quit. Without the power of her third engine, X-27 quickly fell behind X-30 as both Dutch seaplanes flew over the harbor and turned over Davao to evade the AA fire, which was now becoming very heavy. At this point, X-27 encountered a number of Japanese floatplanes flying a CAP over the harbor.
With the departure of Chitose and Mizuho to Palau for refueling, the primary air defenses for Davao Harbor now rested with the air group from the seaplane tender Sanuki Maru. Upon dropping anchor in Malalang Bay on December 21, her eight “Pete” floatplanes immediately began flying CAP and A/S missions over those ships still remaining in the bay. Although four floatplanes were on patrol over Davao that morning, only two “Petes” were in position to intercept the MLD aircraft.
Even then, one apparently could not reach the Dutch planes’ altitude and thus remained some 2,000–3,000 feet below throughout the subsequent air fight.15 However, the second “Pete” hung on its propeller and climbed quickly. These were likely aircraft II-B-04 and II-B-06, which later reported shooting down two Dutch flying boats that day. As the Japanese closed on the Dornier from astern, the rear gunner signaled the letter “J” to the rest of the crew to alert them.16
There was no time for anything else. The pilot of II-B-04 made three aggressive passes on X-27, rupturing her hull and fuel tanks, allowing fuel to pour into compartments 3, 4 and 5. For his troubles, the rear gunner was also seriously wounded in the leg before the “Pete” disappeared. The dorsal gunner claimed to have shot it down, but this is unconfirmed.
X-30’s gunners also claimed to have shot down a Japanese floatplane on the way out of the harbor. But since II-B-04 was the only Japanese aircraft to see action that day, it can be safely assumed that this was the same plane. Although II-B-04 returned to Sanuki Maru, the “Pete” overturned and capsized while landing due to a large hole in its centerline float.17 Although Japanese records officially list her as an operational loss, the real reason can almost certainly be attributed to damage suffered in her action with X-27 and X-30 over the harbor.
Meanwhile, X-27 struggled to stay in the air as X-30 steadily pulled away. With her fuel tanks punctured, the port and center engines were not getting an adequate fuel flow, severely reducing their power output. Combined with the loss of her starboard engine, the plane quickly descended to 7,500 feet from an altitude of 11,000 feet. With only 25 gallons of fuel left in her tanks, there was considerable doubt as to whether X-27 would make it out of Davao Harbor, much less return to Lake Tondano. A sergeant pilot then thought of pumping loose fuel back into the X-boat’s only undamaged tank using a bilge pump. Although it was not enough volume for the plane to gain altitude, it did allow Ensign Sürink to clear the harbor.
As X-27 and X-30 retired, they passed X-26, which was beginning its bombing run. Dodging in and out of the intense AA fire, X-26 attacked what its pilot reported to be a light cruiser. However, the Japanese ship reportedly reversed course at the last moment, and all six of the flying boat’s 500-pound bombs missed forward of the bow by approximately 100 feet.
Five minutes later, GVT.2 arrived over the harbor right on schedule. Although it had encountered the same weather front as GVT.5 while en route from Lake Tondano, these pilots were highly trained veterans of the peacetime MLD. In contrast to GVT.5, whose flight crews included a number of inexperienced reservists and pilot trainees, they had years of prewar experience in night-formation flying. This allowed them to remain together during the inbound flight and carry out their attack in a tight formation.
Although X-11, X-12 and X-25 encountered vicious AA fire while setting up their bomb run, they suffered little damage. In a brief attack, the squadron concentrated on the 19,209-ton tanker Tonan Maru No. 2, a converted whale factory ship that appeared to be in the process of refueling a heavy cruiser. X-11 claimed one direct hit on the tanker’s bow with a 500-pound bomb and claimed two near-misses; both ships were reportedly in flames as GVT.2 turned for home.18 The Japanese did not pursue, and the squadron landed at Lake Tondano around 0900.
Meanwhile, X-27 remained in serious trouble. Flying alone, its fuel-starved engines could not provide adequate power, and the plane settled lower with each mile. As it cleared the harbor, X-27 flew over another large Japanese cruiser escorted by a destroyer. Then, 20 miles south of the Kawio Islands, the plane passed a small Japanese convoy consisting of two destroyers and three merchant ships just two and a half miles off. Barely flying a few hundred feet off the water by now, the crew undoubtedly got a much closer look at the convoy than they desired. Still, X-27 did not break radio silence, which had been in effect throughout the entire mission.
Approximately 10 minutes later, with the convoy just over the horizon, X-27 gave up, and Ensign Sürink was forced to set down on the open sea. Force 6 weather conditions were in effect, and choppy waves and a strong north wind made for a rough landing.19 Under peacetime, non-emergency circumstances, a landing in these conditions probably would have been a court-martial offense. However, Sürink had no choice but to try with a dead engine and two others generating a fraction of their normal output.
On the first attempt, X-27 hit the rough water with a huge crack and promptly bounced back high into the air. The Dornier’s rugged construction was probably all that kept it from breaking apart. Once on the water, with its hull badly punctured, the plane began to slowly sink. The radio operator now broke radio silence as he frantically tried to raise one of the other planes. Fortunately, he was able to reach X-30, which immediately turned back.
Expecting the Japanese convoy to appear on the horizon at any minute, the crew was tense. As it waited, the pilots destroyed secret paperwork, code books and threw classified material overboard while the crew plugged the hull and cared for the wounded gunner. X-30 appeared overhead 45 minutes later and made a safe landing despite the rising seas. Its pilot later said that he would not have risked landing had it not been for the extremely poor condition of X-27.
After a rough transfer in rubber rafts, X-30 proceeded to Menado. But upon landing in the Bay of Menado, no one seemed to notice, though the Dornier’s crew clearly saw some two dozen officers milling about a club located near the shore. After several unsuccessful attempts to contact them using a megaphone, he was about to have the seaplane’s tail gunner fire a short burst in frustration. However, before he could give the order, a small motorboat appeared. After delivering the wounded man to a hospital, the plane returned to Lake Tondano late that morning.
Despite losing X-27, the Davao raid appeared to have been a success. A large warehouse complex was burned and a number of quays destroyed. GVT.2 claimed direct hits and near-misses on a 10,000-ton tanker and the heavy cruiser she was fueling. However, neither postwar Allied nor Japanese records confirm either of these hits. One MLD pilot reported after the war to have been told in a POW camp by a Japanese naval officer that the raid killed 500 Japanese. Whether true or not, the pilot neglected to mention that he had participated in the attack.
Upon landing at Lake Tondano, GVT.2 was immediately ordered to refuel and rearm for a strike against the convoy sighted by X-27 prior to its emergency landing. However, darkness fell before the planes could be readied, so the squadron commander pushed his strike back to the following morning. But before he could launch his pre-dawn air strike, Captain A.M. Hekking, the senior KM officer on Ambon, ordered him to instead fly a reconnaissance mission to relocate the convoy and report on its final destination and anchorage.20 Based this report, GVT.2 would then coordinate its attack with bombers from Ambon.
With the aircraft of GVT.2 bombed up, an aircraft from GVT.5 was dispatched to patrol the area where the Japanese ships had been sighted. However, the Dornier sighted no trace of the convoy, so the planes of GVT.2 remained on the water throughout the day and night of December 24.
The only action that day occurred that afternoon when X-32 of GVT.7 sighted an unidentified Allied ship of approximately 6,000 tons near Tarakan while on a routine reconnaissance flight. Drawn to the ship by its funnel smoke, the Dornier encountered a lone “Pete” from Kamikawa Maru, which was observed to drop a bomb as it circled the ship. Although the ship’s davits were fully extended, there were no signs of lifeboats or survivors in the water. As the X-boat neared, the Japanese pilot immediately abandoned his attack on the ship and set up on the Dornier.
A heavy dogfight ensued in which X-32 suffered moderate damage. Despite a number of weapons malfunctions that limited their firepower, the Dutch gunners apparently killed or wounded the Pete’s observer, as return fire from the floatplane’s rear cockpit machine gun abruptly ceased. At that point, the Japanese plane began circling tightly; X-32 could not stay with it and was forced to let the floatplane escape. Although the “Pete” made it back to Kamikawa Maru, the heavily damaged floatplane sank upon landing before the tender’s crew could hoist it aboard.21
In Malaya, 205 Squadron lost another PBY on December 24 when a G3M “Nell” from the Mihoro Air Wing forced FV-Z to set down in the South China Sea following a 25-minute engagement, after which it blew up. The crew scrambled into a life raft and drifted for several hours until spotted by the pilot of FV-W/Y-54 the next day. After dropping supplies and additional lifeboats, he radioed their position, which helped the Dutch submarine K-XII rescue the British flight crew later that day. The survivors were then returned to Seletar.
Upon their return to base at Saigon, the Japanese flight crew claimed to have shot down a Dutch seaplane, but no MLD aircraft were lost in the area that day. Likewise, the Japanese list their air action as taking place on December 25, but this could possibly be explained by the fact that Japanese land, sea and air units operated and issued combat reports according to Tokyo Time, which was approximately 90 minutes ahead of Java Time.22 This time differential could have pushed the action into the following day. Some 30 minutes later, the same bomber engaged another flying boat off the coast of Malaya without results, and the unknown Allied plane slipped away.
With the exception of an inconclusive engagement between X-19 and a Japanese aircraft near the Anambas Islands, there was a brief lull in the action in the East Indies on Christmas Day. However, operations resumed on the 26th with tragic results for the Dutch planes on Lake Tondano. Immediately after the Davao raid, the Japanese deployed seven A5M “Claude” fighters and two B5M “Kate” torpedo/horizontal bombers from the light carrier Ryujo to Davao airfield.
They were reinforced that same day by 12 A6M “Zero” fighters and two C5M “Babs” reconnaissance aircraft from the 3rd Air Wing. These aircraft were to provide air cover over the harbor and interdict further Allied attacks. In retaliation for the Dutch raid, the Japanese also made plans to send a strike force against Lake Tondano, which they correctly suspected was the mission’s starting point.
For their part, the Dutch were concerned about the possibility of a Japanese air attack on Kalkas after their raid on Davao. Japanese planes had already attacked the ports of Kema and Menado on December 16, leading MLD commanders to consider the possibility of a Japanese carrier in the area. However, reconnaissance flights of the surrounding seas showed no enemy activity in the immediate area. To be sure, X-30 left Kalkas at 0600 on the 26th to fly a reconnaissance mission over Davao to determine what ships were in the harbor.
Meanwhile, the remaining X-boats of GVT.2 and GVT.5 still rested peacefully at anchor at Kalkas, armed and fueled for an attack. However, it now appeared that their target would be an invasion convoy off the island of Jolo in the southern Philippines, where the Japanese had landed the previous day. In preparation for this mission, the pilots had begun warming up their engines at 0630.
But approximately 40 minutes later, the base received an urgent phone call from the port city of Kema. Located on the north coast of Celebes’ Minahassa Peninsula, the caller reported six Japanese Zeros crossing the city in the direction of Lake Tondano. Just three minutes’ flying time from the city, Kalkas could do little but sound the klaxons before the fighters arrived overhead at 0710.
The fighters belonged to the 3rd Air Wing, which had reached Davao two days earlier. Under the command of Lieutenant Toshitada Kawazoe, they had taken off from Davao some four hours earlier, led by one of the unit’s C5M reconnaissance planes that provided navigation support for the mission. Sweeping out of the early-morning sky, three fighters stayed with the utility plane and flew top cover at about 6,500 feet while the remainder came in low to strafe the hapless, bomb-laden Dorniers on the water. Shortly afterwards the Zeros exchanged places, and the remaining three fighters also came down to strafe the base.
With no AA defenses, the only resistance came from the light machine guns and cannon aboard the flying boats themselves. With little to deter them, the fighters burned X-11, X-12 and X-25 of GVT.2 on the water, along with X-26 of GVT.5. They also burned a recently arrived four-engine Sikorski S-42B flying boat belonging to KNILM.23 The motor sloop, which had provided the only efficient water transport for the base, was also heavily worked over.
At the time of the attack, X-30 was returning from its reconnaissance flight to Davao. It survived only because it was ordered not to approach the base. The pilot was able to remain clear of the retiring Japanese fighters and returned to Lake Tondano later that morning after the all-clear signal had sounded. Upon landing at Kalkas, her crew was immediately greeted by huge plumes of thick, black smoke as the five seaplanes burned on the water.24 On the ground, they found 6 dead and 17 wounded, including the base surgeon.25
The raid was a complete surprise to the Dutch, who thought Kalkas to be out of range of land-based fighters, although they considered it exposed and too far north after the occupation of Davao.26 However, despite the appearance of long-range Japanese reconnaissance planes over the base for a week, no attacks had followed.27 This led the Dutch to believe that Lake Tondano was out of range of their aircraft. With no carrier in the area, the MLD leadership felt secure enough to remain there for a final mission. Had reconnaissance revealed a carrier in the area, or at Jolo, Kalkas would have been abandoned. Later investigation revealed that the fighters carried auxiliary fuel tanks that they dropped before commencing their attack.
The Dutch took a calculated risk at Lake Tondano by letting their planes linger too long in an exposed area.28 The risk failed, and the MLD paid a heavy price for maintaining its offensive spirit. The raid was a costly setback.29 Kalkas was abandoned as a base and the personnel of both squadrons evacuated, with only a small ground staff remaining.30 X-30 took out GVT.5’s aircrews and ground personnel, while Y-47 of GVT.18 flew in from Tandjoeng Priok to collect the survivors of GVT.2. The flight crews of both squadrons were then flown to Morokrembangan, where they reformed with PBYs and spent the next several weeks training on their new aircraft.
By now, the MLD had orders to carry out only night reconnaissance missions over Jolo due to heavy Japanese air activity. Despite these orders and the tremendous blow suffered at Lake Tondano, the MLD sent X-33 from GVT.7, still based at Tarakan, over Jolo early on the morning of the 27th. X-32 was still under repair following her fight with Kamikawa Maru’s “Pete” two days earlier, so X-33 was the squadron’s only available aircraft. Concentrating on cruisers in the harbor, the seaplane encountered no resistance in the air, but AA fire was intense.
As X-33 lined up for its bomb run, the Dornier suffered a heavy hit under the starboard wing. The plane stayed together as the pilot dropped his bombs and turned for home. Several floatplanes attempted to intercept but could not reach the Dorniers in time. Upon their return to Tarakan, the aircrews were given distressing news that six PatWing 10 PBYs from Ambon had preceded them, drawing off the bulk of the Japanese fighters. Attacking in two waves of three planes each, the American PBYs encountered extremely heavy flak and large numbers of enemy fighters. As a result, four of the American PBYs went missing.31 Damage to X-33 was so severe that it had to return to Morokrembangan for major repairs the next day.
On the other side of the archipelago, X-19 of GVT.3 (flying out of NAS Samboe at Singapore) also saw action that day while on a reconnaissance flight over the South China Sea. It took four hits in a 90-minute fight with yet another “Nell” belonging to the Kanoya Air Wing while operating near the Anambas Islands. The bomber crew from the “Nell” claimed the Dutch flying boat was shot down, but X-19 returned home with little difficulty. In return, the Dutch gunners also claimed to have damaged the bomber before both planes broke off.
On December 27, X-15 of GVT.1 went missing south of Midai Island. At 1025, the squadron’s base radio operator picked up a partial transmission: “Air Action 03 Degrees North, 107 Degrees, 48 minutes East….”32 The message abruptly ended, and X-15 did not return to base. Despite searching those coordinates for two days, neither X-35 nor X-36 found any sign of the plane or its crew. It later transpired that X-15 had fallen victim to a “Nell” from the Mihoro Air Wing. The Japanese bomber was on a routine anti-shipping patrol when it encountered the Dutch seaplane and shot it down in a 21-minute fight in which the “Nell” suffered no damage.33
Nol Baarschers and the crew of X-15 when their plane was shot down by a G3M “Nell” near Midai Island on December 27, 1941 (photograph courtesy of Nol Baarschers).
The bomber was one of nine Mihoro Air Wing aircraft flying reconnaissance and anti-shipping missions in the South China Sea that day. As the Japanese moved farther south into the Netherlands East Indies, they simultaneously increased their air activities, which were designed to interdict the movement of Allied warships and supply convoys among Borneo, Singapore and Java. At the same time, the 3rd Air Wing flew regular offensive reconnaissance and strike missions against Dutch Martin bombers and Buffalo fighters operating from airfields on Borneo.
The Japanese also continued to target MLD bases in New Guinea to prevent Dutch operations against their flanks. On December 28 they again hit the seaplane base at Sorong, killing three and wounding six; two days later they also targeted Babo for the first time and left 3 dead and 14 wounded, including a number of children. Although there were no Dutch losses in either raid, it did reinforce to both the MLD and KM high commands that the Japanese air presence over the East Indies was growing stronger and bolder the farther south it pushed.
Nonetheless, the MLD continued to fly daily missions despite this pressure. On December 29, GVT.1 received orders to find and airdrop supplies to British and Indian troops who had recently evacuated the town of Sinkawang in the interior of Borneo. The squadron’s two remaining aircraft followed the column’s approximate jungle route and dropped the supplies. This was the squadron’s last mission, as it then rotated back to Morokrembangan and disbanded.
That same day, the Japanese made their first landing on Dutch territory. In the early-morning hours of the 29th, they sent a small force ashore in the Tambelan Islands, halfway between Borneo and Singapore in the South China Sea. The primary objective of the landing was part of the overall Japanese goal to eliminate the MLD’s support bases and limit its ability to interfere with invasion convoys that were beginning to move southward. With the Tambelans occupied, the MLD was now without a crucial staging base that it needed to fly long-range reconnaissance over the South China Sea.
On the afternoon of December 31, X-32 received an urgent SOS from the American merchant ship Ruth Alexander. The 8,135-ton vessel had been attacked by Japanese bombers near Cape Mangkaliat and needed immediate assistance. When the Dornier arrived, Ruth Alexander was heavily afire and sinking. Her crew had already abandoned ship after losing one dead and four wounded; X-32 landed near three lifeboats and rescued 48 survivors, who were flown to Tarakan.
On the 31st the MLD rotated GVT.3 to Morokrembangan from Tandjoeng Pinang in the Riouw Islands. After being transferred from Seletar, it had flown reconnaissance missions from the archipelago over the coast of Malaya since December 12. The aircrews spent the next two weeks re-equipping with PBYs and conducting bombing and air gunnery exercises with their new aircraft.
The squadron’s Dorniers underwent a comprehensive overhaul, their first since the start of the Pacific War. All three seaplanes were then to have entered the reserve pool. However, their state of disrepair from two months of constant daily flying without proper maintenance had taken a severe toll on the planes and their engines, for which spares were in short supply. Instead of entering the reserve pool, all three planes remained under repair and inactive for the rest of the East Indies campaign.
This last move ended the first month of war for the MLD. The Dutch were pleased with several aspects of the war, primarily the Dorniers’ ability to absorb damage and conduct long-range missions. They had carried out several demanding missions successfully. Considering the risk of these missions, it is fortunate that the Dutch did not lose more of the flying boats, although time would quickly change this.
Although Dutch flying boats had encountered Japanese aircraft on a number of occasions throughout December, their primary role was still to avoid combat and concentrate on reconnaissance. The MLD was able to substantially reduce the number of air engagements thanks to Marechaussee units stationed in outlying provinces of the NEI. A typical report that the commander of GVT.6 received from a police detachment in the Natoena Islands revealed that the Japanese adhered to a rigid patrol schedule over the South China Sea:
“1000 southbound over Sedanau … 1300 northbound over Sedanau … then southbound again at 1500 … and northbound once again at 1700”34
Using these reports, the MLD was initially able to minimize its air combat encounters with the Japanese. But although highly effective in the early part of the war, the system quickly broke down as the Japanese moved south and began occupying Dutch territory previously occupied by the Marechaussee and MLD units. With no radar or spotter network to rely on, the MLD began to suffer heavy losses from Japanese airpower. On December 31, Admiral Helfrich sent the Dutch government-in-exile in London the following telegraph to end the year:
“Japanese air action is clearly concentrating on MLD support points and air fields. The conduct of our fliers is excellent. Seven X-boats lost. I have suspended attacks on shore targets by flying boats due to increased Japanese air defenses….”35
Still, Helfrich knew he could not hold out for long without substantial help from the British and Americans. But reinforcements in the strength he needed were not forthcoming, and he would be forced to go on the offensive again with his flying boats fewer than three weeks later. And without fighter escort of any kind, they again lost heavily to the advancing Japanese forces.
However, at least one of Helfrich’s wishes came true when 205 Squadron received a flight of badly needed reinforcements. On December 31, four PBYs arrived from Gibraltar, nearly doubling the squadron’s number of operational aircraft. Three of the flying boats—FV-N, FV-P and FV-Q—went to the naval air station at Seletar, while FV-O was deployed to the seaplane base at Kogalla. Two weeks later, the Royal Navy seaplane tender Tung Song departed the port of Sabang and joined them at Singapore. However, FV-Q was lost almost immediately when it failed to return from a raid on Singora on the coast of Malaysia.