At 0815 on March 1 Y-66 of GVT.5(NEW) sighted a Japanese naval formation with two battleships and two light cruisers 150 miles south of Tjilatjap. These were the battlecruisers Hiei and Kirishima, escorted by the heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma, from Admiral Nagumo’s carrier force, which was now operating at will in the Indian Ocean. Squadron PBYs made contact again at 1600 hours 100 miles south of Tjilatjap; they reported the battleships but apparently did not sight the escorting cruisers. Soon afterward, these ships would participate in a murderous rampage amongst ships evacuating Java; they would also bombard Christmas Island on March 7, heavily damaging the port and sinking a merchant ship.
With their ground forces moving ashore on Java, the Japanese supported the invasion operation with a series of strong air strikes against Dutch installations all across Java. Early on the morning of March 1, nine Tainan Air Wing Zeros hit Morokrembangan, where they caught Y-46 and Y-73 of GVT.3(NEW) on the ground, damaging both beyond repair. This effectively wiped out the squadron.
About this time, PatWing 10 personnel bolted the wing and engine assembly of 22-P-12, a damaged American PBY, to the fuselage of Y-72 and put it back into service as P-46. Several days later this seaplane was evacuated to Australia from Tjilatjap and continued to serve with PatWing 10.2 The wrecks of the two Dutch Catalinas were destroyed along with the seaplane base, port facilities and ME the following day when the base was evacuated.
By now, the aircraft reserve pool at Morokrembangan was long gone, and many of the MLD squadrons were seriously depleted. Of the four remaining units then based at Tandjoeng Priok—GVT.2(NEW), GVT.8, GVT.16 and GVT.18—only GVT.16 was fully intact with all three of its PBYs.3 After the loss of Y-63, GVT.2(NEW) had been reduced to Y-62 and Y-64, both of which were damaged and unserviceable on March 1. Although there was considerable hope for Y-64, the condition of Y-62 was poor after being splinter-damaged on February 22.
GVT.8 had only X-16 remaining after losing X-17 and X-18 over North Gebroeders Island. However, it was presently undergoing a comprehensive 200-hour overhaul and was considered unfit for duty. To make matters, the Dornier was further damaged during an air raid on MVK Priok.
As a steady stream of Allied naval crews, airmen and ground personnel evacuated Tandjoeng Priok, the crew and a group of maintenance men labored to get the Dornier into shape for the long flight to Ceylon. As the plane was pushed out of its hangar, the structure was blown up. A number of Dutch officials then boarded the plane with a New Zealand bank official and a wounded RAF NCO. The plane then took off—it was the last plane out of Tandjoeng Priok.
Japanese Air Superiority March 5, 1942. Legend: (1) Sphere of Japanese air superiority provided by JAAF units operating from Palembang. (2) Sphere of Japanese air superiority provided by IJN units operating from Den Passar, Bali.
Two hours into the flight, X-16 suffered a heavy explosion, and the burning Dornier fell into the sea off the coast of Sumatra. The bank official pushed the NCO out of the plane before it hit the water and exploded. No one else escaped. The official eventually died in the water, but after several hours, the wounded NCO was picked out of the water by a native prau, whose crew handed him over to Dutch officials. He was later transferred to the hospital ship Wu-Seh and transported to Bombay, India.4
From GVT.18 only Y-45 was operational after seeing the rest of its squadron mates damaged or destroyed in Japan’s final push against Java. Y-47 had been lost in the landing accident at Tandjoeng Priok on February 24. Meanwhile, Y-48 was still under repair after being shot up off the coast of Sumatra on February 24.
The aircraft situation was little better at Morokrembangan, where four MLD squadrons had periodically operated from the base prior to the Battle of the Java Sea. Of these, only GVT.17 was at full strength,5 while GVT.7(NEW) had reformed with the last remaining planes in the reserve pool.6 Both squadrons were dispersed to auxiliary bases prior to the battle. GVT.6 was also operational with X-3 and X-23, although both planes were badly splinter damaged. GVT.3 also remained stationed at the base, although it existed in name only, as it had no planes.7
Meanwhile, GVT.5 continued to operate from Tjilatjap. During its encounter with Japanese Zeros over the Langley, Y-65 had been badly damaged and was almost immediately written off upon its return to base. In addition, an air raid would splinter-damage Y-66 beyond repair on March 4. As a result, Y-71 was the only PBY at the port that remained operational by week’s end.
By the first week of March, both Morokrembangan and Tandjoeng Priok were virtually untenable due to Japanese air strikes. This led Captain Bozuwa to order the dispersal of all remaining aircraft to auxiliary bases throughout East Java. Although some of these bases were on small lakes, others were little more than nondescript rice paddies and isolated rivers. All were deliberately selected so as to avoid the constant presence of Japanese reconnaissance planes.
Meanwhile, ground crews at Morokrembangan worked to repair Y-62 of GVT.2 and prepare the flying boat for evacuation. Although not fully repaired, it and Y-64 departed Tandjoeng Priok—together with Y-55, Y-56 and Y-57 of GVT.16—for Lake Bagendit, a small body of water located southeast of Bandoeng. They were followed by Y-45, of GVT.18, which headed for Lake Tjileuntja in western Java.
On the 1st the Dorniers of GVT.6 (X-3, X-23 and X-28) left Morokrembangan for Lengkong, a small, nondescript seaplane base located on the Brantas River near Modjokerto. There they would refuel and fly on to Broome, Australia. The remaining Fokker T.IVs of GVT.11 (T-15, T-16 and T-17) and GVT.12 (T-18, T-19 and T-21) were also ordered into Lengkong. They were followed by GVT.13 and GVT.14 with their four remaining single-engine Fokkers.
GVT.7(NEW) (X-1, X-20, X-24 and X-36) flew to Lake Grati, where they refueled and went on to Lengkong. Upon arrival, they too were ordered to Australia. At the same time Y-70 was attached to GVT.17, and all four planes flew to Rawah Bening irrigation reservoir at Toeloeng Agoeng, a small village south of Kediri. All of the squadrons were ordered to evacuate as many pilots, aircrew and ground personnel as possible from Morokrembangan. Special military trains would move those who could not be taken out by air to Tjilatjap for evacuation by sea.
But despite the best efforts of the MLD, the Japanese still found some of these auxiliary bases. Early on the morning of March 2, nine Zeros from the Tainan Air Wing flying from Bali’s Den Passar Airfield attacked a “seaplane base” at Malang.8 They claimed to have destroyed a single-engine seaplane, two twin-engine flying boats and a large four-engine flying boat.
At this stage of the East Indies campaign, it was almost impossible to identify individual single-engine aircraft lost on Java.9 However, if the Japanese claims are true, the single-engine aircraft was likely a Ryan STM trainer or one of the Fokker floatplanes from GVT.13 or GVT.14, while the larger plane might have been a KNILM S-42.10 The identity of the twin-engine flying boats remains unclear, as no MLD Dorniers or Catalinas were lost at Malang that day. Also, all of the older Do. 15 “Whales” and Fokker T.IVs have been accounted for. Just as likely, the Japanese claims could have been duplicate or inaccurate claims. It is possible they could have been wrecked aircraft.
If this was the case, it would appear that the seaplane base attacked by the Tainan Air Wing fighters was actually the secret MLD auxiliary base located on the Brantas River. There was no seaplane base at Malang, and all the auxiliary aircraft attached to GVTs 11, 12, 13 and 14 had been transferred to Lengkong by March 2. Unfortunately there are no records to confirm or deny this hypothesis, although it is the most likely scenario.
As Japanese troops poured ashore on Java, the Allies began to evacuate the island. On March 1, RAF HQ at Bandoeng ordered 205 Squadron to evacuate its two remaining PBYs from Tjilatjap. FV-W/Y-54 departed for Broome, Australia, that morning and was followed out by FV-H that afternoon. Ground crews departed aboard the tender Tuong Song, which also transported personnel from 84 Squadron, 211 Squadron and 151 Maintenance Unit to Fremantle, Australia. This officially closed the book on 205 Squadron in the NEI and Malaya. From December 7, 1941, to March 1, 1942, the unit lost 10 PBYs, and the toll would go even higher.
As the Japanese landed on Java, the Dutch destroyed all military installations and equipment, including this floating seaplane dock (photograph from Soerabaja 1900–1950 [2004], courtesy of Asia Maior Publishers).
At the same time, Vice-Admiral W.A. Glassford, commander of USN forces in the NEI, and Rear-Admiral Sir Arthur Palliser, commander of RN forces in the Far East, departed Bandoeng for Tjilatjap. There, they boarded PatWing 10’s new hybrid Catalina P-46 and departed Java for Colombo.
Admiral Helfrich followed them that evening. He traveled by car from Bandoeng to Lake Bagendit, where the dispirited admiral and key members of his staff flew out aboard Y-56 early on the morning of March 2. The other two PBYs of GVT.16 (Y-55 and Y-57) and Y-64 of GVT.2(NEW) flew the remainder of his staff out of Tjilatjap.11 All four aircraft flew to China Bay, Ceylon, where they were to continue the war with what Dutch naval forces remained.
Helfrich flew off Lake Begendit’s short waterway with only the uniform on his back and one small valet case. He needed no baggage to carry the miserable feeling of abject failure he had for failing to save the Indies. He left everything behind—his family, home, friends and, perhaps worst of all, thousands of comrades who would not escape. He later wrote how he felt like a miserable recruit in an admiral’s uniform as he boarded the plane that day.12
Alone in the air, everyone aboard Helfrich’s plane kept a tense watch for the Japanese. As the PBY flew up the coast of Sumatra, it circled the Dutch naval fleet tanker Petronella (TAN 8), which, not knowing the identity of the plane, got underway and prepared for air attack. It later flew over the KPM transport Siberg, which was en route to Java from Padang, Sumatra, with a battalion of KNIL troops. She was steaming close to shore to avoid detection from the air.
Y-56 then landed at Emmahaven, the port of Padang. There, Helfrich contacted the KNIL garrison commander by phone and informed him that they had sighted Japanese troops moving north from Palembang. Only 42 miles from the port, the Japanese would soon be on his doorstep. After a short stay for rest and refueling, the flight resumed without incident to Colombo, where Helfrich set up his new HQ and reestablished contact with those Dutch naval forces still on Java.
Admiral Helfrich and his staff were not the only ones leaving Java, as a general evacuation of MLD aircraft was now under way. All planes with sufficient range were ordered to make for either Australia or Ceylon. The ports of Broome and China Bay, respectively, were their primary destinations.
Following Helfrich’s departure, his chief-of-staff, Captain J.J.A. van Staveren, assumed command of the remaining Dutch naval forces on Java. He was temporarily promoted to the rank of rear admiral and given the responsibility of continuing the naval defense of Java. When that option was no longer viable, he was to implement and oversee pre-planned evacuation plans for the navy and ensure that its installations were destroyed.13
March 2 officially ended the KM’s offensive air and sea operations in the East Indies. That day the governor-general confirmed Admiral Helfrich’s orders to begin the evacuation of all remaining KM and MLD units to Australia and Ceylon. The evacuation was to take place by both sea and air with aircrews given priority, presumably as the MLD still had large numbers of aircraft on order from the United States and planned to take possession of them in Australia or Ceylon.
Any remaining naval personnel at Soerabaja and Tandjoeng Priok who were not flown out were to be transported by rail to Tjilatjap or Wijnkoops Bay on the south coast of Java for evacuation by sea. This is how most MLD ground personnel were taken out. Helfrich’s biggest fear was that a rapid Japanese advance would cut off their escape route; his fears intensified when a troop train carrying approximately 2,200 unarmed RAF and RAAF personnel was ambushed and derailed by Japanese troops, supported by mortar fire, inflicting heavy losses on the night of March 6–7.
Due to demands by the KNIL, which was trying to move its troops into position, there were only a limited number of rail cars allocated to the KM. As a result, space was limited for the MLD personnel, who were allowed only a small bag to carry what they could away from the burning hell that was now Java. Despite the psychological blow they suffered having lost the fight so badly, many of these men now faced yet another blow far more crushing.
As the overcrowded trains pulled out of Soerabaja at nightfall on March 1, a mob of tearful family members saw the naval personnel off. Admiral Helfrich strictly forbade the navy to evacuate nonmilitary personnel, including the men’s family members. In any event, there was no practical way to evacuate the civilians anyway. As a result, thousands of wives and children were separated from their husbands and fathers at the train station. The troops were evacuated to Australia or Ceylon, while the civilians were left to face three and a half years of brutal Japanese internment.14
At Tjilatjap the MLD men joined a mass of military personnel, government officials and civilians—Europeans, Americans, Chinese and Indonesians alike—all trying to evacuate Java. The docks were littered with abandoned military vehicles, supplies and equipment. Much of it had arrived only days earlier. Mixed in was a diverse assortment of abandoned civilian transport, luggage and personal items. In the background, huge plumes of black smoke filled the sky as engineers destroyed the KM’s remaining fuel and ammunition stocks.
As the chaos continued, few of the evacuees lucky enough to find a ship away from Java knew that Admiral Nagumo’s powerful carrier and battleship task force lay only a few hundred miles south to prevent just such an evacuation. Most of those civilians and government officials who did know still chose to take their chances at sea rather than face certain capture on Java. The military personnel had no choice, for duty compelled them to risk the treacherous voyage.
On March 2, X-3 and X-23 of GVT.6 flew to Broome from Lengkong, followed by GVT.7(NEW) with X-1, X-20, X-24 and X-36 off Lake Grati and GVT.17 (Y-59, Y-60, Y-67, Y-70). They carried the personnel of GVT.11, GVT.12, GVT.13 and GVT.14, which were forced to burn their planes on the Brantas River, as they had insufficient range to reach Australia or Ceylon. Their evacuation by ship, as with the Ryan trainers, was not possible given the rapid Japanese advance and the late date Admiral Helfrich gave for the evacuation to begin.
The commander of GVT.11 (T-15, T-16 and T-17), Lieutenant-Commander J. Craamer, requested permission to evacuate his Fokker T.IVs to Australia by staging through the Cocos Islands. But since the Cocos were located nearly 1,000 miles south of Java and the Fokkers had a maximum range of only 970 miles, his request was denied.15 As a result, the aircraft were destroyed along with the single-engine Fokker floatplanes (W-1, W-8, W-11 and W-13) and a civilian Fairchild 24 that had been requisitioned by the MLD.16
At 0700 on March 1, Rear-Admiral van Staveren ordered Rear-Admiral P. Koenraad, to destroy the ME and naval air station.17 The operation at Morokrembangan began at 0530 on the 2nd as the radio station, seaplane ramp, hangars, slips, cranes, docks, fuel and oil stocks and ordnance dumps were rigged for demolition with mines and time-delayed fuses. While ground crews prepared the installations for demolition, others destroyed those unserviceable aircraft that could not be flown out. These included Y-46, Y-73, D-44 (the last remaining Do. 15) and a number of single-engine Fokker seaplanes from the flight training school.
Beginning at 0600, Morokrembangan—the largest, most well-equipped seaplane base in the world—was rocked by a series of heavy explosions. The demolitions were over by 1000, and huge plumes of thick, black smoke filled the sky. At 0600 on the 3rd, the first busload of MLD and KM ground personnel pulled out of Soerabaja. They were bound for Wijnkoops Bay on the southern shore, where they would be evacuated to Colombo by ship.
Although the demolition of Morokrembangan was reported complete at 1100 on March 2, Admiral Koenraad discovered otherwise when he carried out a personal inspection of the ME and naval air station on March 4. The ME was completely demolished, but many of Morokrembangan’s hangars still stood, and a number of bombsights and aircraft engines remained untouched. Koenraad immediately called upon KNIL engineers to finish the job. However, it turned out to be a much more difficult job than planned, as desertions, faulty explosives and the sturdy construction of the hangars themselves combined to limit their effectiveness.18 As a result, many of the facilities at Morokrembangan were captured intact.
Of the Dutch naval personnel on Java, only a battalion (four companies) of Royal Marines remained to continue the fight on the ground. Most of these men were professional soldiers who had been trained for ground combat. The exception was the 3rd Company, which comprised 300 MLD ground personnel who were untrained for combat. Because of their lack of training and the need for their technical services elsewhere, these technicians were soon evacuated.
The company was sent to Andir Airfield, where it was detailed to recondition a number of American P-40Es that had been left to the ML when the USAAF evacuated Java. The mechanics made six Kittyhawks airworthy, and those were immediately thrown into action. Although Java was all but lost, the mechanics were glad to contribute to the fight after having to blow up the MLD facilities. But with the Japanese about to overrun the base, the 3rd Company was then ordered to Wijnkoops Bay for evacuation.
Demolition crews were also working to destroy the seaplane base at Tandjoeng Priok. There, maintenance personnel of GVT.18 were still trying to repair the damage that Y-48 had suffered in an earlier attack. However, ground defenses around the port were threatening to collapse, and it was rumored that the Japanese were about to enter the city by the night of March 2. As a result, MLD ground personnel were forced to blow up the PBY on the 3rd to prevent its capture.
At the same time, the seaplane tender Rigel was scuttled as a blockship in the northern entrance to the harbor. Merel, Poolster, Fazant, a British gunboat and a number of auxiliary minelayers were also sunk by naval gunfire as harbor blockships. From March 1 to March 5, demolition crews ashore blew up hangars, machine shops and virtually any other installation that could possibly be of use to the Japanese. The final phase (perhaps the most damaging for future historians) began at 0600 on March 5 when all of the operational records at MVK Priok were burned in a huge fire, including its squadron reports, secret communiqués and codebooks. The base coding machines were shipped to Bandoeng.
The majority of MVK Priok’s naval personnel were evacuated on March 1. Coast-watch positions in the harbor were turned over to KNIL troops as the KM personnel prepared for evacuation by train and motor vehicle. There was no formal order ever given for the navy and civilian demolition crews to abandon Tandjoeng Priok, but it was the logical thing to do once the operation was complete, as they were the only KM personnel left in the city.
On March 3, a disaster of epic proportions took place at the port of Broome on the northwest coast of Australia. As the fighting on Java came to a head, this previously isolated port quickly became the primary evacuation point for evacuees from Java. The first planes coming out of Java were Empire flying boats, DC-3s and B-17s, which began arriving on February 25. Within days, they were making nonstop evacuation flights between Java and Broome.
They were soon joined by MLD and ML transport planes, which were also carrying out evacuation flights from airfields and auxiliary seaplane bases all over Java. Although the MLD aircraft had received orders from Admiral Helfrich to take out only essential military personnel needed to help continue the war outside the East Indies, many of the flying boats still departed Java heavily loaded with family members and numerous other nonmilitary passengers. Of all the squadrons that left Java that week, only GVT.6 left without carrying evacuees of any kind.
And of the remaining aircraft, only one left the island with extra passengers who had not been previously approved by the pilot.19 Although all the squadron commanders condoned the practice of evacuating civilians, it is believed that several senior KM staff officer, such as Rear-Admiral van Staveren, were also aware that MLD flight crews were violating Helfrich’s orders and chose not to intervene.20 As a result, the temporary MLD commander, Captain P.J. Hendrikse, allowed the planes of GVT.7 and GVT.17 to take on up to 35 civilians per aircraft, including his own wife. Although one can understand the desire to save one’s family and loved ones when the means and opportunity are available, the practice would have grievous consequences.
Located in the territory of Western Australia, Broome was a small pearling port with a prewar population of about 1,700, although most of its residents had moved away since the start of the Pacific War. Situated on Roebuck Bay, the one-mile-square harbor had a single pier that extended approximately half a mile into the bay at high tide. At low tide, however, a 29-foot tidal range ensured that it ended a full half-mile from the water. Qantas Airlines had three mooring buoys in the harbor and operated a small ferry service for the passengers of arriving seaplanes. The airline also operated a single lighter for refueling its planes.
Broome was poorly equipped to handle the sudden influx of military personnel and civilian evacuees, many of whom could not be adequately fed or housed. And with as many as 57 aircraft carrying 8,000 evacuees arriving in single day, the port facilities were also overwhelmed, leading to refueling times of up to 12 hours. Priority for evacuation was given to the wounded, followed by women and children. They were sent by air farther down the coast to Port Hedland or Perth, but thanks to the large numbers, progress was slow. As a result, many evacuees came down with dengue fever that quickly spread through the town and refugee camps.
On March 2, GVT.17 received orders from Soerabaja via phone to evacuate its four PBYs to Broome that evening. Among the passengers aboard Y-70 were Captain Hendrikse, his wife, seven MLD staff officers and their family members. The total number of civilians carried by the formation numbered 140, most of whom were women and children.21
Knowing Broome had limited refueling facilities and that large numbers of Allied planes were already there, the pilot of Y-70, Lieutenant-Commander A.J. de Bruijn, recommended in the air that the formation divert south to the port of Geraldton. However, Captain Hendrikse had his orders, and he was senior officer. He overruled de Bruijn, and the Catalinas went into Broome as planned. They arrived early in the morning of March 3.
Five Dorniers had already preceded them. X-1 and X-20 of GVT.7(NEW) and X-3, X-20 and X-28 of GVT.6 had arrived at the port one and two days earlier, respectively. They spent the night of March 2–3 resting on the mud of Broome harbor waiting for orders and the tide to come back in.
Evacuation operations proceeded smoothly until 1500 on the 2nd, when a four-engine Japanese flying boat appeared. The “Mavis” leisurely circled the harbor at approximately 13,000 feet, photographing the entire harbor. At 0400 on the 3rd, a second seaplane visited Broome. The tower assumed it was a friendly plane from Java and flashed the airfield lights to alert the pilot. The Japanese plane made several low-level passes over the bay and airfield, confirming the presence of Allied planes. It then flew away into the night.
The fighters belonged to the 3rd Air Wing based at Koepang, Timor. Upon receiving the flying boats’ reconnaissance reports, the wing commander, Commander Takeo Shibata, ordered an immediate attack on Broome. At 0705, nine Zeros led by a C5M for navigation, lifted off from Koepang and headed for Broome. They were followed by eight more 3rd Air Wing Zeros, also guided by a C5M. This force assumed a course for the port of Wyndham, which lay up the coast from Broome.
This was actually the second raid ordered against Broome. Shibata had ordered a raid on the port the previous morning when he first received word that the Allies were staging through Broome. Although unsure of what the port held, he ordered off a strike force at dawn on March 2. However, with the 3rd Air Wing fewer than 60 miles north of the port, it encountered extremely bad weather and was forced to return to Koepang.
After the appearance of the Japanese flying boats, all of Broome expected some type of attack in the immediate future. Orders were issued for all Allied planes to be away from the port by 1000. So as quickly as the planes could be refueled and loaded, they were sent out. However, only three B-17s, one LB-30 and a flying boat had flown out before the Japanese appeared. They caught seven planes on the airfield and 15 more on the water in Roebuck Bay.
The first flight arrived over Broome at 0930, immediately jettisoning external 320-liter drop tanks that had been required due to the range. Three fighters each were detailed to attack the airfield and harbor, while the remaining three remained up top to provide a CAP. When it became apparent that no Allied fighters were present, these planes also joined the attack. The C5M orbited the port and directed the attack from a safe altitude and was not damaged.
Warrant Officer Osamu Kudo initiated the raid by bouncing an American SOC Seagull floatplane that had taken off for a flight down the coast to Port Hedland. Piloted by Lieutenant Jack Lamade, the SOC was the sole surviving floatplane from the American heavy cruiser Houston. In addition to the Australian light cruiser Perth, Japanese forces in the Soenda Strait had sunk Houston on the night of March 1–2 as they tried to leave the Java Sea. The floatplane had not been aboard when Houston went down, having previously been ordered to Broome.
Lamade had just finished refueling and was taking off when Kudo attacked. In an unequal fight lasting just minutes, Kudo forced down the virtually defenseless biplane. Although the plane was badly damaged, Lamade managed to put the shattered SOC down on the water. He and his observer then abandoned the plane without injury.
Kudo now turned his attention to an American B-24 piloted by Lieutenant Edson Kester. The bomber had just taken off from the airfield with 33 servicemen aboard when Kudo attacked. Kester turned away in a futile bid to escape, but Kudo easily followed and shot down the B-24 in flames six miles off Cable Beach. Thirty-one men aboard died or drowned in the crash. The two survivors—Sergeant Melvin Donaho and Sergeant William Beatty—spent 24 hours in the water before reaching shore. Donaho recovered, but Beatty succumbed to exhaustion shortly afterwards.
When the 3rd Air Wing appeared, the Dorniers still awaited orders while refueling for the flight south to Perth, and the Catalinas had just landed. Most of their passengers remained aboard the crowded planes due to 27-foot waves that made it difficult to ferry them ashore. Even had they gone ashore, there was nowhere to go, as Broome’s few accommodations had long since been overwhelmed.
The first seaplane lost was the RAAF “Empire” flying boat Centaurus, which lay at the dock with the Qantas “Empire” flying boat Corinna loading refugees. Hit by 20mm cannon fire, Centaurus exploded into flames almost immediately, and the crew abandoned the plane for the dubious safety of a dinghy. Corinna quickly followed. Due to the strict orders of Commander Shibata to concentrate only on military targets, the Zeros did not strafe the crowd of civilians assembled on the dock.22
As the Zeros came in low across the water, the Dutch seaplanes returned fire from their moorings, but the fight was no contest. The crew of Y-70 prepared to put the passengers over the side into the plane’s inflatable dinghy. But because of seasickness, several of them had much trouble evacuating the plane, which was not helped by the loose dinghy floating away. In the process, fighters strafed Y-70, setting it afire and sinking the plane. The Zeros then burned and sank Y-59, Y-60 and Y-67. X-1, X-3, X-20, X-23 and X-28 soon followed.
At the same time, the second section attacked the airfield, burning or destroying every plane present. At 1030, the Japanese, running low on fuel and ammunition, turned north for the long flight back to Koepang. They had destroyed every plane at Broome.
In barely an hour, the Allies lost 23 planes, including all four Dutch PBYs and all five of the Dorniers. In addition, they destroyed two American PBYs of PatWing 10 and both remaining PBYs of 205 Squadron. On the airfield, fighters destroyed two transports (a Lockheed Lodestar and DC-3) of the ML’s air transport service, a RAAF Hudson bomber of 14 Squadron and an American B-24 and two B-17Es of the 435th Bombardment Squadron.
Casualties among the 140 military and civilian personnel aboard the MLD planes included 10 killed, 38 missing and 10 wounded.23 According to another source, 38 were dead, 16 of which were MLD personnel. These figures include Captain Hendrikse, his wife and two more passengers from Y-70, in addition to 11 dead on Y-59.24 Although the Japanese did not strafe the survivors in the water, burning fuel killed many. Many of the missing are believed to have been washed out to sea, killed by sharks or trapped in the sunken hulls of the flying boats.
In exchange, the 3rd Air Wing lost a single Zero to ground fire—that of Warrant Officer Kudo. Lieutenant Guus Winckel, a pilot of one of the ML transports, fired a machine gun barehanded from a slit trench throughout the attack. With the barrel resting on his exposed forearm, Winckel fired until he ran out of ammunition. Although severely burned, he hit the Zero flown by Kudo. The fighter trailed smoke and crashed into the sea off Broome, killing Kudo, a highly experienced ace with seven kills.
The 3rd Air Wing also lost the Zero flown by Private 1st Class Yasuo Matsumoto on the return trip to Koepang. After spending more time than planned over Broome, most of the fighters experienced a severe fuel shortage on the return flight, and all were extremely lucky to make it home. Only one—that flown by Matsumoto—was not so lucky; his plane ran out of fuel, and he was forced to ditch in the ocean off Roti Island. He managed to swim ashore and was eventually rescued on March 12.
Ground fire lightly wounded Kudo’s wingman, Naval Air Pilot, 1st Class Masaki Okazaki, who made it back to base. Five other Zeros were also hit, but none seriously. Although rifle fire was heavy from the Broome Volunteer Defense Corps, Winckel likely caused most of the damage. For his actions at Broome that day, he was awarded the Bronze Cross, one of Holland’s highest military awards.
The second flight of the 3rd Air Wing attacked Wyndham about the same time. However, it found very little at the near-deserted meat-processing port. Arriving back at Koepang an hour ahead of the first wave, it could only report the destruction of a two-engine biplane transport and the burning of a fuel dump. There was no resistance, and none of the Japanese aircraft was damaged. Most of the few remaining residents of Wyndham evacuated the town afterwards.
Retiring from Broome, the 3rd Air Wing encountered a KNILM DC-3 60 miles north of the port. The plane and its crew of four had departed Bandoeng, Java, at 0100 loaded with five Dutch pilots, a KNILM airline official, Maria van Tuyn (the wife of a Dutch pilot) and her 18-month-old son. When the pilot (Captain Ivan Smirnoff, a leading ace in the Imperial Russian Air Force in World War I) radioed for landing instructions, he received a cryptic reply: “The Airstrip Is Okay for the Time Being.”
Minutes later, three Zeros flown by Lieutenant Zenziro Miyano, Sergeant Takashi Kurano and Private Zempei Matsumoto, attacked the DC-3. They crippled the transport in minutes, wounding Smirnoff, one of the pilots, Mrs. van Tuyn and her child. Despite wounds in both arms and a hip, Smirnoff put the burning plane down in the surf off Carnot Beach, some 60 miles north of Broome.
The Zeros then strafed the wreck with machine gun fire, severely wounding the plane’s mechanic. Then, with their ammunition expended and fuel extremely low, the Japanese departed. It was most likely this brief action that led to the loss of Private Matsumoto’s Zero to a fuel shortage near Roti Island.
The airline official was sent back to salvage the logbooks, mail and a small, unidentified package given to Smirnoff just before the plane took off. Unknown to anyone on the plane, the box, wrapped in brown paper, contained diamonds belonging to N.V. de Concurrent Ltd., a Dutch firm in Bandoeng. Valued at over $20 million (1942 exchange rates), the diamonds had first been evacuated from the Netherlands to Java in 1940 after the German invasion. They were now being transported to Australia to keep them out of Japanese hands.
However, not knowing the value of the box, and more concerned about items of survival, the official made only a halfhearted attempt to retain the box when a large wave knocked him down inside the fuselage as the tide came in. He returned to the beach with a number of items, but the diamonds were not among them. The survivors then made camp under salvaged parachutes in the merciless sun.
That night Mrs. van Tuyn died, followed by the wounded Dutch airman at dawn. Both were buried in shallow graves. Later that morning, a Japanese “Mavis” flying boat appeared overhead after a reconnaissance flight over Broome. The seaplane made a low pass over the wreck and dropped five bombs, most of which failed to explode. It then departed.
Despite repeated attempts, all efforts to seek out help failed. In the meantime, the wounded mechanic and Mrs. Tuyn’s infant son died. A rescue mission was finally organized on the 5th when an aborigine notified authorities of a plane wreck some miles south of Broome. A clergyman, an Australian army officer and a second aborigine then spearheaded a rescue party, which succeeded in reaching the survivors’ campsite at 0300 on March 7.
As for the diamonds, they remained in the plane unknown and forgotten about by the survivors until Smirnoff reached Melbourne. There, an Australian bank official asked for the box. When told that it had been abandoned in the wreck, Australian police detectives interrogated the White Russian until they were sure he was telling the truth. It was first time anyone had told Smirnoff what the package contained.
About a week after the crash, a local beachcomber named Jack Palmer looted the wreck and found a small leather bag containing the diamonds. Over the next few weeks, he distributed many of the diamonds to a number of friends, including at least one who suggested that they turn them over to the authorities and seek a reward. However, Palmer disagreed with his suggestion and took a number of the diamonds back from him in the heated argument that followed.
However, on April 14, Palmer appeared at an Australian Army recruitment center and turned over some of the missing diamonds when he volunteered to enlist. He told the officer in charge that he had found the diamonds in a bag, but while opening it, the remaining stones had fallen into the surf and were lost. An immediate mission to the wreck site found no sign of the missing diamonds and Palmer was held for trial on the charge of theft.
Meanwhile, small quantities of the missing diamonds began to turn up in Broome, where Palmer had given or traded them to friends, aborigines and shopkeepers. Once word got out that the police were actively looking for the diamonds, it is believed that a number of the aboriginals with stones in their possession threw them away rather than risk being incriminated. Eventually only a small fraction of the missing diamonds were recovered.
In May 1943, Palmer and two accomplices were brought to trial in Perth on the charges of stealing or receiving stolen property. Witnesses, including Smirnoff, flew in from all parts of Australia to testify. However, the evidence was not strong enough to convict the accused. In a celebrated trial that was well documented by the Australian press, a jury of six found the three men not guilty.
As for the remaining diamonds, few were ever found. One story tells of a small package of stones being found in tree in Broome. Another tells of a man who offered to do some repair work in a home in Broome. But when the owners returned, they found the work incomplete and a small hole in the fireplace where it was rumored that a cache of stones had been hidden and retrieved years later. More likely is that Palmer hid most of the stones and retrieved them after the war when interest in the case had blown over.
While Zeros were shooting up Broome, both X-24 and X-36 ran out of fuel and made forced landings. X-24 was able to put down at the small port city of Wallal, where it damaged the port stummel,26 although the plane remained flyable. At the same time, X-36 set down on 80 Mile Beach, a desolate stretch of coastline along Australia’s western shores some 90 miles south of the port. It too was badly damaged and rendered unflyable after running aground on a coral reef.
In response to her signals, Tung Song, which was en route to Fremantle from Tjilatjap, was ordered to sweep the area for survivors. However, she saw nothing and proceeded south. A civilian Lockheed 10A owned by MacRobertson Miller Aviation eventually sighted the Dornier. En route from Wyndham to Perth, the plane landed at Broome 30 minutes after the Japanese departed. The pilot loaded 22 evacuees, including a number of wounded, into the Lockheed and took off for Port Hedland. Sighting X-36, the Lockheed’s pilot, Captain Jimmy Woods, circled the Dornier and dropped instructions for the crew to remain with the plane. On a return flight to Broome that evening, Woods dropped supplies to the stranded seaplane.
It is likely that the crew had already abandoned X-36 by the time Woods returned. Shortly after landing at Wallal, X-24 intercepted X-36’s distress call; refueling the damaged Dornier with gasoline from several civilian vehicles, its pilot took off and was able to rescue X-36’s companion flying boat’s crew without further damage. Before leaving, the airmen burned the plane to prevent its capture,27 and X-24 flew everyone to Perth. In the darkness however, Woods probably could not see that the plane had been destroyed.
On March 4, Tainan Air Wing Zeros escorted 12 G3M “Nells” from Kendari to attack Tjilatjap for the first time. Despite AA fire from the ground, the bombers caused heavy damage to the port facilities and threw the Allied evacuation operation into mass confusion. The fighters remained behind after the bombers left and burned Y-66 of GVT.5(NEW) on the water without loss. They then withdrew.
The following day, aircraft from Admiral Nagumo’s carrier force attacked Tjilatjap in effort to disrupt evacuation and resupply operations. In a massive air strike reminiscent of Pearl Harbor and Darwin, 180 B5N “Kate” horizontal bombers, D3A “Val” dive bombers and escorting Zeros from the heavy fleet carriers Kaga, Akagi, Hiryu and Soryu destroyed or damaged many buildings and wiped out most of the port and its facilities. They also sank three small interisland steamers—Rokan (563 tons), Tohiti (982 tons) and Pasir (1,187 tons), in addition to the 4,819-ton freighter Barentz28 and the GM vessel Canopus (773 tons). Nine other vessels were damaged, including the 1,594-ton freighter Sipora.
At this point, the remaining personnel of GVT.5(NEW) had pretty much decided they had just about had enough of Tjilatjap and Java in general. They loaded everyone into Y-71—which was the squadron’s last flyable PBY—and flew to the shattered port of Broome.
On March 5 Captain Bozuwa received orders to evacuate Java for Australia, where he would reassume command of all remaining MLD forces from Captain Hendrikse. Commander J.H. van Rinkhuyzen (whom the KM likely wanted to keep out of Japanese hands in order to preserve the location of secret Dutch minefields located throughout the NEI for as long as possible), head of the Dutch Navy’s Mine Services in the NEI, and five other officers were to accompany him. They would depart Lake Tjileuntja aboard Y-45 of GVT.18 and the newly repaired Y-62 of GVT.2 for Tjilatjap, where they would refuel before making the flight to Australia.
Y-45, piloted by 2nd Lieutenant A.W. Witholt, departed first at 1600 carrying Bozuwa, Rinkhuyzen and a third officer. Y-62 followed a short time later carrying the remaining officers. Y-45 reached Tjilatjap that evening to find the port jammed with thousands of military personnel and burning fiercely with fires caused by the Japanese carrier air strike earlier in the day.
The presence of Japanese carriers just south of Java apparently unnerved Bozuwa. Shortly after landing, he ordered Witholt to fly his party back to Lake Tjileuntja, where they arrived late that night. The evacuees then returned to Bandoeng, where they planned to complete their escape from Java by another route. As he departed Lake Tjileuntja, Bozuwa told Witholt that it was useless to attempt an escape from Java by air and that he planned to leave the island from Wijnkoops Bay as part of Admiral Helfrich’s seaborne evacuation of KM personnel.29
Y-62 reached Tjilatjap shortly after Y-45 departed on its return trip. Although it too had been ordered to return to Lake Tjileuntja, its pilot never received the signal, as Bozuwa’s order had been transmitted on the REC-GROUP frequency and Y-62 had her radio modulated to the official MLD frequency.30 As a result of this mix-up, the Catalina remained at Tjilatjap, where it refueled and prepared to depart for Australia with Y-65, whose crew was frantically working to repair its plane after its engagement with Japanese fighters over the Langley.
As they worked, 1st Lieutenant G.F. Rijnders and his crew reached Tjilatjap by train. After flying Y-67 over the Java Sea on the night of February 26–27, they had been ordered to proceed to MVK Priok by night train to repossess and fly out Y-53, one of the PBYs that been loaned to the British in December.31 The plane had damaged a float while landing at Batavia on February 21 and had been abandoned by the British when they evacuated the city. Rijnders got as far as the town of Poerwokerto in East Java, where destroyed bridges stopped the train. From there, he and his men were ordered south to Tjilatjap.
Upon reaching the port, they found the crew of Y-65 working frantically to repair their Catalina. Rijnders and his crew took over P-3, a damaged PBY-4 inherited from PatWing 10. P-3 was one of three PBYs that had flown in from Exmouth Gulf, Australia, on March 2 to evacuate Captain Wagner and his staff but had suffered engine problems. Pressed for time after attempting brief repairs, its crew at the time further disabled the PBY and flew out aboard P-10.
Rijnders, then, found P-3 in extremely poor shape. In its hurried attempt to disable the aircraft, the P-3’s American crew had smashed the instrument panels, slashed the tires and cut the rudder cables, among other things. There were also the engine problems that had first grounded the plane. Among these were burned-out starter motors on both engines, which were frozen and refused to turn over.
Nonetheless, Rijnders found a host of willing volunteers to help try to rebuild the PBY, to which he informally assigned the MLD serial number Y-3. The crew and passengers of Y-65, who had given up hope of fixing their own plane, soon joined them. Working nonstop for three days, MLD ground crews recently evacuated from Morokrembangan got Y-3 airworthy.
Carrying eight crewmen and some 50–60 passengers, Y-62 was to make for Broome early on the morning on the 6th. But as the PBYs warmed their engines prior to take-off, the generator wiring to Y-3’s starboard engine short-circuited, and it would not start. Unable to lift off on one engine, her crew and passengers could only watch as Y-62 roared off Lake Tjilatjap and disappeared into the night.
To make matters worse, Japanese land bombers again heavily bombed the port later that morning. This raid sank the KPM interisland steamers Mandar, Dajak and Atjeh and heavily damaged the 696-ton Poseidon. Believing these attacks to be a prelude to the invasion of Tjilatjap, port authorities scuttled all remaining ships in port to prevent their capture and block the harbor. By the end of the fighting on Java, 23 sunken ships littered the harbor, totaling approximately 23,000 tons. This ended Tjilatjap’s use as a port, leaving a large number of Allied troops trapped on Java with no means of escape.
Fully aware that no ships remained to evacuate them, the crew and passengers of Y-3 set about trying to repair the flying boat. Normally, the plane would have had a separate manual handstarter for both engines, but the starter for the dead engine had disappeared. So, unsure whether it would even work, mechanics transferred the starter from the port engine to the starboard engine. The pilot then started the port engine using the generator, while a crewman hand-started the starboard engine.
Both engines instantly turned over, and the crew made plans to leave immediately. However, the flight would not be easy. Y-62 was to have provided navigation on the flight, as Y-3’s damaged compass was off by 10 degrees. The American crew had also taken the navigation charts, so the MLD crew had only a foldout poster from the Australian Railways Company for navigation along the Australian coast. And finally, unable to find any fuel, Rijnders took off with only half a tank of gas for the 1,800-mile flight to Broome.
In the air, he followed a course given to the navigator by Y-62. However, few relaxed given the defective compass and the fact that everyone aboard knew Japanese carriers were operating at will south of Java. The recent engine trouble also weighed heavily on their minds, for if the plane went down, there would be no rescue. Nonetheless, Rijnders hit Broome dead-on the following morning and made a perfect landing. There, Y-3’s crewmen rejoined the MLD forces in Australia, and it was turned over to the RAAF.
As Y-3 left Tjilatjap, the Japanese pasted Morokrembangan with yet another air raid. Most of the few planes that remained there were under repair or inoperable. The shattered remains of Y-46 were destroyed, while Y-73 was damaged beyond repair. Naval ground personnel destroyed the plane later that day to prevent its capture. At the same time, they also likely destroyed a number of smaller Fokkers and older Dornier “Whale” seaplanes, which were unserviceable and could not be evacuated from Java. The single-engine aircraft did not have the range to reach Australia or Ceylon, while many of the others had suffered heavy damage in earlier raids and could not be repaired in time or were damaged beyond repair.
At this point, Y-45 was the last flyable MLD plane left on Java. Following Witholt’s return to Lake Tjileuntja, he was ordered to stand by on March 6 to evacuate 16 naval officers, including Captain P.J.M. Cikot, commander of the KM marine battalion. However, their ETA was uncertain at best, as plans were also being made to evacuate the officers from Bandoeng aboard a DC-5. As it turned out, they were evacuated from Java through Wijnkoops Bay, although the Japanese sank their ship and a number were killed, with the remainder being captured.
When the officers’ party failed to arrive, Witholt then decided to leave Java on the morning of March 7.32 However, bad weather delayed his departure until the following morning,33 when Y-45 departed Lake Tjileuntja at 1145, carrying his crew, an ML pilot and his wife. The PBY flew to Lake Bagendit, where Witholt hoped to refuel for the long flight to Padang. But upon landing, he learned that the fuel depot had been destroyed several hours earlier. Luckily though, the demolition had been hurriedly completed using pickaxes, and many drums had been punctured in a manner where they still contained a great deal of fuel. By picking through the drums, Witholt and his crew were able to find enough fuel for a seven-hour flight.
Leaving Bagendit, he set course for the small coastal village of Pameungpeuk on the south coast of Java. Here, Witholt hoped to rest up and top off the plane’s fuel tanks while he picked up an ML sergeant and corporal whom he had promised to evacuate. Unfortunately, when the PBY arrived overhead, rough sea conditions prevented it from landing, and Witholt was forced to reluctantly continue on to Padang, leaving the soldiers to their fate on Java. Reaching Padang late that night, the PBY was able to refuel as the exhausted crew rested.
The flight continued the next day when the PBY lifted off the water, bound for the Cocos Islands in the Indian Ocean. Witholt also carried out Padang’s harbormaster as the NEI had formally surrendered to the Japanese by now and the port had been completely demolished.34 Although the PBY reached the archipelago without any trouble, disaster befell the plane during the landing. Y-45 struck a submerged reef in the harbor that tore a gash in the flying boat’s hull, letting two tons of water flood the Number 3 and 4 compartments. As a result, the Catalina nearly sank in the lagoon before Witholt was able to run the damaged plane onto the beach.
Although the Cocos were British territory, the KM had established a small MLD support base there before the war through an agreement with the Royal Navy. With the help of British residents and 100 coolies, the crew used cement and planks from stored MLD supplies to patch the hole. The crew then waited three days for the cement to dry properly before Witholt would risk putting the PBY in the water. Once assured of the plane’s integrity, they then topped off the fuel tanks and flew to Perth, Australia, in a 14-hour flight.35
Those MLD personnel not flown out were to be evacuated by ship. But with no escort to protect against powerful Japanese naval units operating south of Java, the prospect of evacuation by sea was an extremely poor one. Of more than 3,000 naval personnel evacuated by ship from Tjilatjap and Wijnkoops Bay on Java’s southern coast, fewer than 2,000 reached safety.36
Commander B.J.G. Schokking (KMR), the port commander and senior naval officer at Tjilatjap, had orders to evacuate as many KM officers and men to Australia and Colombo through the port as possible. To do the job, he had the transports Zaandam, Generaal Verspyck, Tjisaroea, Tawali, Duymaer van Twist, Kota Baroe and Sloterdijk. This number was quickly reduced by Zaandam and Generaal Verspyck, which Schokking made available to the British when they requested additional shipping to transport their evacuees off Java.
Once the evacuation commenced, the port quickly became crammed with naval personnel of every branch. Most were from Soerabaja, but the group included European and Indonesian personnel alike from every part of Java. There was little organization to the loading, and ships were ordered to depart individually as they filled. Few evacuees knew that the powerful Japanese naval units that had earlier attacked the port still lurked just to the south and would soon take a huge toll on their numbers.
The greatest loss came aboard the transport Tjisaroea, which left Tjilatjap with 800 men aboard. As the ship headed for Australia, Japanese warships appeared and ordered her captain to heave to and surrender. Unarmed with no escort or hope of outrunning them, he had no choice but to comply and be escorted to Makassar, where all aboard were made POWs.
Tjisaroea was joined a short time later by the 1,030-ton merchant ship Duymaer van Twist. The latter had left Tjilatjap shortly after Tjisaroea with 350 MLD and KM personnel aboard. Japanese warships also stopped and boarded her, forcing the transport’s surrender. About the same time, they captured the 1,579-ton KPM steamer Sigli. A short time later she picked up 50 survivors from the sunken British destroyer Stronghold before the arrival of a Japanese cruiser prevented the rescue of any more; those fortunate enough to be pulled from the floats were later transferred to the Japanese cruiser Maya.
Of the five transports that originally left Tjilatjap carrying naval personnel, only Tawali, Kota Baroe and Sloterdijk survived the treacherous trip through the Japanese blockade. In the process, they often steamed through the flotsam of Allied ships that had preceded them. Shortly after sailing, Tawali sailed through the wreckage of a small convoy that had been annihilated by the Japanese cruisers Atago, Takao and Maya and their destroyer screen just hours earlier. She detoured long enough to rescue 57 survivors from the British depot ship Anking before continuing.
MLD personnel from Tandjoeng Priok were slated for evacuation through Wijnkoops Bay aboard the transports Poelau Bras and Siberg on March 6. This operation proved to be a failure, and nothing more was heard from either ship after they sailed. It was not until after the war that their fates were learned.
Siberg did not even clear the bay and was captured completely intact after her entire crew abandoned ship in a panic on March 6.37 As with Duymaer van Twist and Tjisaroea, she had no opportunity to escape and was captured intact. She too was taken into Makassar and her passengers made POWs. The Japanese pressed all the captured ships into service.
The 9,278-ton transport Poelau Bras cleared Wijnkoops Bay in good order and set a course for Ceylon. Among her evacuees were the ground personnel of the 3rd Company from Andir and the remaining staff members of the KM’s High Command. However, she was sighted soon afterwards by a Japanese reconnaissance plane, and bombers soon appeared overhead, sinking the transport 180 miles south-southwest of Java.
Two lifeboats with 118 survivors reached the coast of Sumatra, where they were interned or made POWs. Among the dead were most of the Marine Battalion’s 3rd Company and Rear-Admiral J.J.A. van Staveren. Through no fault of his own, van Staveren’s final task of overseeing the evacuation of Dutch naval forces and personnel had failed miserably for the most part.
When Java capitulated and the Netherlands East Indies formally surrendered on March 9 and the smoke cleared, the Japanese found themselves in possession of a large number of captured Allied aircraft. These included the Douglas bombers that the MLD ground crews had frantically tried to assemble on the dock at Tjilatjap. When it became obvious that there was not enough time to finish the job, the unassembled planes were wrecked and left on the dock.
There, the Japanese found them and immediately put a group of Dutch prisoners to work trying to assemble one of the wrecked aircraft using components from the other planes. By May, one of the DB-7s was ready to fly, but the Japanese proved unwilling to fly the bomber off the narrow dock themselves. Perhaps fearing sabotage by the Dutch mechanics, they ordered a KNILM official—Theodore de Bruyn—to find a pilot to fly the plane to Bandoeng.
A KNILM pilot named Karl Rüpplin van Keffikon agreed to make the flight.38 But he also stated that if an opportunity for escape arose, he would take it. Two Dutch flight mechanics volunteered to accompany Keffikon, and the three men formulated a bold plan. Once in the air, Keffikon would fly the plane inland for 30 minutes to determine if it had enough fuel and range to reach Christmas Island, 300 miles southwest of Java. If it did, he would remove his helmet, the sign for the mechanics to club their lone guard with a large wrench and overpower him. Keffikon would then take the plane to Christmas Island where it would refuel.
But after 30 minutes in the air, Keffikon ascertained that the bomber did not have the range to reach Christmas Island. Because of this, he continued the flight as planned, into Bandoeng. From there, the plane was taken to Japan for evaluation and displayed as a war prize. Its wreck was recovered after the war.
Could Keffikon have made the flight? Provided he had a full tank of gas to begin with, the DB-7 had a range of 525 miles, which normally should have been enough to reach Christmas Island. However, this was Keffikon’s first time in a DB-7, and he was no doubt guessing greatly at its range. Also, subtract the distance already flown inland from the plane’s endurance, and there was not much room for error. If he was off course even slightly, the flight crew could easily have been lost in the vast emptiness of the Indian Ocean.
In the end, it might have been fortunate that Keffikon and his colleagues did not reach Christmas Island. Japanese troops occupied the island on March 31, capturing its small civilian population and military garrison. Although they held the island for less than a week before withdrawing, the Japanese likely destroyed all fuel, food stocks and other equipment that they could not carry away or did not want. If that was the case, Keffikon and his crewmates could have been indefinitely marooned on the island without food or water.