Notes

Introduction

1.S. H. Swinny, “Rationalism and International Righteousness,” in Essays Towards Peace, ed. John M. Robertson et al. (London: Watts & Co., 1913), 77.

2.Democratic Audit UK, “Understanding the ‘Rise’ of the Radical Left in Europe: It’s Not Just the Economy, Stupid,” July 12, 2018, https://www.democraticaudit.com/2018/07/12/understanding-the-rise-of-the-radical-left-in-europe-its-not-just-the-economy-stupid/.

3.Roger Cohen and Aurelien Breeden, “Pro-Macron Forces Expected to Prevail but Face Left-Wing Challenge,” The New York Times, June 12, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/12/world/europe/france-elections-macron.html?campaign_id=2&emc=edit_th_20220612&instance_id=63888&nl=todaysheadlines&regi_id=51583210&segment_id=94977&user_id=13ff8d54cbf7af799d623a24b55951c7.

4.Helen V. Milner, “Voting for Populism in Europe: Globalization, Technological Change, and the Extreme Right,” Comparative Political Studies 54, no. 13 (2021): 2286–320; Dani Rodrik, “Why Does Globalization Fuel Populism? Economics, Culture, and the Rise of Right-Wing Populism,” Annual Review of Economics 13 (2020): 133–70; Rogers Brubaker, “Populism and Nationalism,” Nations and Nationalism 26, no. 1 (2020): 44–66; Broz J. Lawrence, Jeffry Frieden, and Stephen Weymouth, “Populism in Place: The Economic Geography of the Globalization Backlash,” International Organization 75, no. 2 (2021): 464–94; Michael Cox, “The Rise of Populism and the Crisis of Globalisation: Brexit, Trump and Beyond,” Irish Studies in International Affairs 28, no. 1 (2017): 9–17.

5.Michael Hameleers and Rens Vliegenthart, “The Rise of a Populist Zeitgeist? A Content Analysis of Populist Media Coverage in Newspapers Published between 1990 and 2017,” Journalism Studies 21, no. 1 (2020): 19–36; Alexandros Kioupkiolis and Giorgos Katsambekis, “Radical Left Populism from the Margins to the Mainstream: A Comparison of Syriza and Podemos,” in Podemos and the New Political Cycle, ed. Óscar García Agustín and Marco Briziarelli (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 201–26; Nicole Ernst, Sven Engesser, Florin Buchel, Sina Blassnig, and Frank Esser, “Extreme Parties and Populism: An Analysis of Facebook and Twitter across Six Countries,” Information, Communication & Society 20, no. 9 (2017): 1347–64; Maurits J. Meijers, “Radical Right and Radical Left Euroscepticism. A Dynamic Phenomenon,” Notre Europe Policy Paper 191 (2017); Yannis Stavrakakis and Giorgos Katsambekis, “Left-Wing Populism in the European Periphery: The Case of SYRIZA,” Journal of Political Ideologies 19, no. 2 (2014): 119–42.

6.Bart Bonikowski, Daphne Halikiopoulou, Eric Kaufmann, and Matthijs Rooduijn, “Populism and Nationalism in a Comparative Perspective: A Scholarly Exchange,” Nations and Nationalism 25, no.1 (2019): 58–81.

7.Benjamin De Cleen and Yannis Stavrakakis, “How Should We Analyze the Connections between Populism and Nationalism: A Response to Rogers Brubaker,” Nations and Nationalism 26, no. 2 (2020): 314–22.

8.Brubaker, “Populism and Nationalism.”

9.As will be discussed in Chapter 1, defensive nationalism is not the same as nativism; though nativism is the right-wing expression of it, it represents only half of the concept.

10.There are of course comparable movements occurring in other parts of the world, but the scope of this project is so large that some limitations had to be put in place. Only the United States and Europe are examined.

11.See Barry J. Eichengreen, The Populist Temptation: Economic Grievance and Political Reaction in the Modern Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018); John B. Judis, The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics (New York: Columbia Global Reports, 2016); Beverly J. Silver and Giovanni Arrighi, “Polanyi’s “Double Movement”: The Belle Époques of British and US Hegemony Compared,” Politics & Society 31, no. 2 (2003): 325–55.

12.Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001).

13.Joseph A. Schumpeter, Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, Volumes I & II (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1923).

Chapter 1

1.Jürgen Habermas, “The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship,” trans. Ciaran Cronin, Public Culture 10, no. 2 (1998): 401.

2.Ibid., 402.

3.Giuseppe Mazzini, The Duties of Man and Other Essays [by] Joseph Mazzini (England: J.M. Dent & sons, ltd.; E.P. Dutton & co., inc., 1915), 52.

4.Ernest Renan, “What Is a Nation?” (Qu’est-Ce Qu’une Nation?, 1882),” in What Is a Nation? And Other Political Writings, trans. M. F. N. Giglioli (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 255. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/rena17430.15.

5.Ibid., 260.

6.Ibid., 251.

7.Rogers Brubaker, “The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distinction between ‘Civic’ and ‘Ethnic’ Nationalism,” Nation and National Identity: The European Experience in Perspective (1999): 55–71.

8.Hans Kohn, “The Nature of Nationalism,” American Political Science Review 33, no. 6 (1939): 1006.

9.Ibid., 1014.

10.Ibid., 1006.

11.Ibid., 1021.

12.Ibid., 1019.

13.Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951), 271.

14.Arendt explains this in the following passage: “Denationalization became a powerful weapon of totalitarian politics, and the constitutional inability of European nation-states to guarantee human rights to those who had lost nationally guaranteed rights, made it possible for the persecuting governments to impose their standard of values even upon their opponents. Those whom the persecutor had singled out as scum of the earth—Jews, Trotskyites, etc.—actually were received as scum of the earth everywhere; those whom persecution had called undesirable became the indesirables of Europe . . . The very phrase “human rights” became for all concerned—victims, persecutors, and onlookers alike—the evidence of hopeless idealism or fumbling feeble-minded hypocrisy.” [Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951), 269]

15.Ibid., 302.

16.Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997); David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997); Chaim Gans, The Limits of Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

17.Eric Kaufmann, “Ethno‐traditional Nationalism and the Challenge of Immigration,” Nations and Nationalism 25, no. 2 (2019): 435–48; George L. Mosse, “Racism and Nationalism,” Nations and Nationalism 1, no. 2 (1995): 163173.

18.Jürgen Habermas and Ciaran Cronin, “The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship,” Public Culture 10, no. 2 (1998): 397–416.

19.Rogers Brubaker, “Migrations of Ethnic Unmixing in the ‘New Europe,’ ” International Migration Review 32, no. 4 (1998): 1047–65.

20.Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 35.

21.Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso Books, 2006) 46.

22.Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 35.

23.Anderson, Imagined Communities, 46.

24.David Levi-Faur, “Economic Nationalism: From Friedrich List to Robert Reich.” Review of International Studies 23, no. 3 (1997): 359–70.

25.Walt Whitman Rostow, “The Problem of Achieving and Maintaining a High Rate of Economic Growth: A Historian’s View,” The American Economic Review 50, no. 2 (1960): 106–18 .W. Arthur Lewis, “Some Reflections on Economic Development,” Economic Digest 3, no. 4 (1960): 3–8; Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962).

26.Andre Gunder Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment and Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969); Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

27.Nicola Mackie, “‘Popularis’ Ideology and Popular Politics at Rome in The First Century B.C.,” Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 135, no. 1 (1992): 51.

28.Benjamin Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), 16–27.

29.See Rogers Brubaker, “Populism and Nationalism,” Nations and Nationalism 26, no. 1 (2020): 44–66; Chantal Mouffe, For a Left Populism (London: Verso, 2018); C. Mudde, “An Ideational Approach,” in The Oxford Handbook of Populism, ed. Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul A. Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Moffit, The Global Rise of Populism; Bart Bonikowski, “Nationalism in Settled Times,” Annual Review of Sociology 42, no. 1 (2016): 427–49; Slovj Žižek, “Against the Populist Temptation,” Critical Inquiry 32, no. 3 (2006): 551–74.

30.Ernesto Laclau, quoted in Žižek, “Against the Populist Temptation,” 555.

31.See Michael Hameleers and Rens Vliegenthart, “The Rise of a Populist Zeitgeist? A Content Analysis of Populist Media Coverage in Newspapers Published between 1990 and 2017,” Journalism Studies 21, no. 1 (2020): 19–36; Alexandros Kioupkiolis and Giorgos Katsambekis, “Radical Left Populism from the Margins to the Mainstream: A Comparison of Syriza and Podemos,” in Podemos and the New Political Cycle, ed. Óscar García Agustín and Marco Briziarelli (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 201–26; Nicole Ernst, Sven Engesser, Florin Buchel, Sina Blassnig, and Frank Esser, “Extreme Parties and Populism: An Analysis of Facebook and Twitter Across Six Countries,” Information, Communication & Society 20, no. 9 (2017): 1347–64; Maurits J. Meijers, “Radical Right and Radical Left Euroscepticism. A Dynamic Phenomenon,” Notre Europe Policy Paper 191 (2017); Yannis Stavrakakis and Giorgos Katsambekis, “Left-Wing Populism in the European Periphery: The Case of SYRIZA,” Journal of Political Ideologies 19, no. 2 (2014): 119–42.

32.Sheri Berman, “The Causes of Populism in the West,” Annual Review of Political Science 24 (2021): 71–88; Dani Rodrik, “Why Does Globalization Fuel Populism? Economics, Culture, and the Rise of Right-Wing Populism,” Annual Review of Economics 13 (2020): 133–70; Luigi Guiso, Helios Herrera, Massimo Morelli, and Tommaso Sonno, Demand and Supply of Populism (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2017).

33.Mabel Berezin, “Fascism and Populism: Are They Useful Categories for Comparative Sociological Analysis?,” Annual Review of Sociology 45, no. 1 (2019): 349.

34.Robert O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (New York: Knopf, 2004), 4.

35.Robert O. Paxton, “The Five Stages of Fascism,” The Journal of Modern History 70, no. 1 (1998): 1.

36.Zeev Sternhell, “How to Think about Fascism and Its Ideology,” Constellations 15, no. 3 (2008): 280–90; Roger Eatwell, “The Esoteric Ideology of the National Front in the 1980s,” in The Failure of British Fascism: the Far Right and the Fight for Political Recognition, ed. Mike Cronin (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 99–117.

37.Paxton, “The Five Stages of Fascism,” 4.

38.Gilbert Allardyce, “What Fascism Is Not: Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept,” The American Historical Review 84, no. 2 (1979): 374.

39.Paxton, “The Five Stages of Fascism,” 5.

40.Stanley G. Payne, Fascism: Comparison and Definition (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 198.

41.Zeev Sternhell, Mario Sznajder, and Maia Ashéri, The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 10.

42.A. James Gregor, Interpretations of Fascism (New York: Routledge, 2017), xxviii.

43.Sternhell et al., The Birth of Fascist Ideology, 231.

44.Stanley G. Payne, History of Fascism, 1914–1945 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), 9.

45.Jason Stanley, How Fascism Works: The Politics of Us and Them (New York: Random House, 2020), 122.

46.Payne, History of Fascism, 1914–1945, 14.

47.Sternhell et al., The Birth of Fascist Ideology.

48.Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism, 11.

49.Ibid.

50.Allardyce, “What Fascism Is Not: Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept,” 376.

51.Payne, Fascism: Comparison and Definition.

52.Hans-Georg Betz, “Nativism Across Time and Space,” Swiss Political Science Review 23, no. 4 (2017): 336.

53.Betz, “Nativism Across Time and Space,” 337.

54.Theresa Davidson and Karlye Burson, “Keep Those Kids Out: Nativism and Attitudes toward Access to Public Education for the Children of Undocumented Immigrants,” Journal of Latinos and Education 16, no. 1 (2017): 41–50; Cameron D. Lippard, “Racist Nativism in the 21st Century,” Sociology Compass 5, no. 7 (2011): 591–606; George J. Sánchez, “Face the Nation: Race, Immigration, and the Rise of Nativism in Late Twentieth Century America,” International Migration Review 31, no. 4 (1997): 1009–30; Tyler Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery the Northern Know Nothings and the Politics of the 1850’s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

55.George Newth, “Populism and Nativism in Contemporary Regionalist and Nationalist Politics: A Minimalist Framework for Ideologically Opposed Parties,” Politics (2021): 3–5.

56.John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 3.

57.Lilia Fernandez, “Nativism and Xenophobia,” The Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration (2013): 1.

58.John Higham, Strangers in the Land Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002). 4.

59.Newth, “Populism and Nativism in Contemporary Regionalist and Nationalist Politics,” 15.

60.Ibid., 4.

Chapter 2

1.See Beth Rabinowitz, “Defensive Nationalism: Where Populism Meets Nationalism,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 28, no. 2 (2022): 143–64.

2.For a thorough exploration of this process see, Ronald Grigor Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford University Press, 1993).

3.Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso Books, 2006).

4.Michael Howard, “War and the Nation-State,” Daedalus (1979): 101–10.

5.Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

6.Janet Klein, “Kurdish Nationalists and Nonnationalist Kurdists: Rethinking Minority Nationalism and the Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1909,” Nations and Nationalism 13, no. 1 (2007): 135–53.

7.Prabhat Datta, “Secessionist Movements in North East India,” The Indian Journal of Political Science 53, no. 4 (Oct.–Dec. 1992): 536–58.

8.Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: SAGE, 1995), 5.

9.Carl Gans, “Punctuated Equilibria and Political Science: A Neontological View,” Politics and the Life Sciences 5, no. 2 (1987): 220–27.

10.Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976).

11.David Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: the Making of American Nationalism, 1776–1820 (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia, by the University of North Carolina Press, 1997).

12.See Steven M. Van Hauwaert, “Thinking Outside the Box: The Political Process Model and Far Right Party Emergence,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 29, no. 1 (2021): 84–98; Daphne Halikiopoulou and Tim Vlandas, “What Is New and What Is Nationalist about Europe’s New Nationalism? Explaining the Rise of the Far Right in Europe,” Nations and Nationalism 25, no. 2 (2019): 409–34; Manuela Caiani, “The Populist Parties and Their Electoral Success: Different Causes behind Different Populisms? The Case of the Five-star Movement and the League,” Contemporary Italian Politics 11, no. 3 (2019): 236–50; Geertje Lucassen and Marcel Lubbers, “Who Fears What? Explaining Far-Right-Wing Preference in Europe by Distinguishing Perceived Cultural and Economic Ethnic Threats,” Comparative Political Studies 45, no. 5 (2012): 547–574.

13.See Beverly Crawford, “Theory and Arguments: The Causes of Cultural Conflict: An Institutional Approach,” in The Myth of ‘Ethnic Conflict’: Politics, Economics, and ‘Cultural’ Violence (University of California, Berkeley: Institute for International Studies, 1998), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7hc733q3. Philip G. Roeder, “Liberalization and Ethnic Entrepreneurs in the Soviet Successor States,” in The Myth of “Ethnic Conflict”: Politics, Economics and “Cultural” Violence, ed. Beverly Crawford and Ronnie D. Lipschutz (University of California, Berkeley: Institute for International Studies, 1998); Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars.” International Security 20, no. 4 (1996): 136–75.

14.Bojana Blagojevic, “Causes of Ethnic Conflict: A Conceptual Framework,” Journal of Global Change & Governance 3, no. 1 (2010): 10.

15.Max Weber quoted in Uta Gerhardt, “The Use of Weberian Ideal-Type Methodology in Qualitative Data Interpretation: An Outline for Ideal-Type Analysis,” Bulletin of Sociological Methodology/Bulletin de Méthodologie Sociologique 45, no. 1 (1994): 79.

16.This civic notion of the national belonging can even be expanded to incorporate noncitizens who reside in the territory.

17.Rafal Soborski, “National Populism and Fascism: Blood and Soil against Globalization,” in Ideology in a Global Age, ed. Rafal Soborski, 107–139 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013)..

18.The term “volk” is used as a shorthand. However, normally it more narrowly refers to a concept from nineteenth-century German “völkisch” movements and their contemporary “neo-völkisch” counterparts.

19.For a similar characterization of the right, see also Andreas Novy, “The Political Trilemma of Contemporary Social-Ecological Transformation–Lessons from Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation,” Globalizations 19, no. 1 (2022): 59–80.

20.Angela Nagle, “The Left Case against Open Borders,” American Affairs 2, no. 4 (2018), https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2018/11/the-left-case-against-open-borders/.

21.Katya Johanson and Hilary Glow, “Honour Bound in Australia: From Defensive Nationalism to Critical Nationalism,” National Identities 11, no. 4 (2009): 386.

22.Ibid., 388.

23.Ziya Öniş, “Conservative Globalists versus Defensive Nationalists: Political Parties and Paradoxes of Europeanization in Turkey,” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 9, no. 3 (2007): 247–61.

24.This also distinguishes the concept from Novy’s “nationalistic capitalism,” which is only focused on right-wing responses.

25.Christian Fuchs, Nationalism on the Internet: Critical Theory and Ideology in the Age of Social Media and Fake News (Milton: Routledge, 2020), 240–41.

26.Sebastian Edwards, “On Latin American Populism, and Its Echoes Around the World,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 33, no. 4 (2019): 76–99.

27.Gareth Dale, Karl Polanyi: A Life on the Left (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016); Gareth Dale, “Karl Polanyi’s the Great Transformation: Perverse Effects, Protectionism and Gemeinschaft,” Economy and Society 37, no. 4 (2008): 495–524.

28.See Richard Sandbrook, “Polanyi’s Double Movement and Capitalism Today,” Development and Change 53, no. 3 (2022): 647–75; Hans-Jürgen Bieling, “Aufstieg des Rechtspopulismus im heutigen Europa–Umrisse einer gesellschaftstheoretischen Erklärung,” WSI Mitteilungen 8 (2017): 557–565; Claus Thomasberger and Michael Brie, “Karl Polanyi’s Search for Freedom in a Complex Society,” Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie 44, no. 2 (2019): 169–182; Klaus Dörre, “Take Back Control!,” Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie 44, no. 2 (2019): 225–43; Robert Kuttner, Can Democracy Survive Global Capitalism? (New York: WW Norton & Company, 2018); Dale, Karl Polanyi: A Life on the Left; Dale, “Karl Polanyi’s the Great Transformation.”

29.See Dale, Karl Polanyi: A Life on the Left; Dale, “Karl Polanyi’s the Great Transformation”; Gareth Dale and Mathieu Desan, “Fascism,” in Karl Polanyi’s Political and Economic Thought: A Critical Guide, ed. Gareth Dale, Christopher Holmes, and Maria Markantonatou, 151–170 (Newcastle, UK: Agenda Publishing, 2019); Sang Hun Lim, “Look Up Rather Than Down: Karl Polanyi’s Fascism and Radical Right-Wing ‘Populism.’” Current Sociology (2021), 00113921211015715.

30.SeeSang Hun Lim, “‘Look Up Rather Than Down’: Karl Polanyi’s Fascism and Radical Right-Wing ‘Populism.’” Current Sociology (2021): 00113921211015715; Kris Millett, “On the Meaning and Contemporary Significance of Fascism in the writings of Karl Polanyi,” Theory and Society 50, no. 3 (2021): 463–487. Dani Rodrik, “What’s Driving Populism?,” Project Syndicate 9 (2019); Karina Becker and Klaus Dörre, “Völkisch Populism: A Polanyian-Type Movement?,” in Capitalism in Transformation, ed. Roland Atzmüller, Brigitte Aulenbacher, Ulrich Brand, Fabienne Décieux, Karin Fischer, and Birgit Sauer (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), 152–68; Brigitte Aulenbacher, Richard Bärnthaler, and Andreas Novy, “Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, and Contemporary Capitalism,” Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie 44, no. 2 (2019): 105–113; Dörre, “Take Back Control!”; Dale, “Karl Polanyi’s the Great Transformation”; Dale and Desan, “Fascism”; Lim, “Look Up Rather Than Down.”

31.See Michael Brie, ed. Karl Polanyi’s Vision of a Socialist Transformation (Black Rose Books Ltd., 2019); Roland Atzmüller, Brigitte Aulenbacher, Ulrich Brand, Fabienne Décieux, Karin Fischer, and Birgit Sauer, eds., Capitalism in Transformation (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019); Richard Bärnthaler, Andreas Novy, and Basil Stadelmann, “A Polanyi-Inspired Perspective on Social-Ecological Transformations of Cities,” Journal of Urban Affairs (2020): 1–25; Michael Brie, “Karl Polanyi and Discussions on a Renewed Socialism,” Culture, Practice & Europeanization 4, no. 1 (2019): 116–34; Klaus Dörre, “Landnahme: un concepto para el análisis de la dinámica capitalista, o: superando a Polanyi con Polanyi,” Política. Revista de Ciencia Política 54, no. 2 (2016): 13–48; Axel Honneth, The Idea of Socialism: Towards a Renewal (Montreal, Quebec: John Wiley & Sons, 2016); Brigitte Aulenbacher, Fabienne Décieux, and Birgit Riegraf, “The Economic Shift and Beyond: Care as a Contested Terrain in Contemporary Capitalism,” Current Sociology 66, no. 4 (2018): 517–30.

32.Sandbrook has also examined how scholars might use Polanyi to analyze the double movement today by comparing the 1830s–1931 with the neoliberal phase of the late 1970s until today. But his analysis is much looser and does not offer a schematic model such as the one presented here. See Richard Sandbrook, “Polanyi’s Double Movement and Capitalism Today,” Development and Change 53, no. 3 (2022): 647–75.

33.Richard Sandbrook, “Karl Polanyi and the Formation of This Generation’s New Left,” IPPR Progressive Review 25, no. 1 (2018): 81.

34.Andreas Novy, “The Political Trilemma of Contemporary Social-Ecological Transformation—Lessons from Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation,” Globalizations 19, no. 1 (2022): 72.

35.Sandbrook, “Karl Polanyi and the Formation of this Generation’s New Left,” 86.

36.Helen V. Milner, “Voting for Populism in Europe: Globalization, Technological Change, and the Extreme Right,” Comparative Political Studies 54, no. 13 (2021): 2286–2320; Dani Rodrik, “Why Does Globalization Fuel Populism? Economics, Culture, and the Rise of Right-Wing Populism,” Annual Review of Economics 13 (2020): 133–70; Rogers Brubaker, “Populism and Nationalism,” Nations and Nationalism 26, no. 1 (2020): 44–66; Broz J. Lawrence, Jeffry Frieden, and Stephen Weymouth, “Populism in Place: The Economic Geography of the Globalization Backlash,” International Organization 75, no. 2 (2021): 464–94.; Michael Cox, “The Rise of Populism and the Crisis of Globalisation: Brexit, Trump and Beyond,” Irish Studies in International Affairs 28, no. 1 (2017): 9–17.

Chapter 3

1.See also Helen V. Milner and Keohane Robert, Internationalization and Domestic Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1996), 257.

2.Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944), 10.

3.Ibid., 10.

4.Ibid., 43.

5.Ibid., 48.

6.Ibid., 45.

7.Ibid., 88.

8.Ibid., 82.

9.M. C. Buer, “The Trade Depression Following the Napoleonic Wars,” Economica 2 (1921): 169.

10.David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London: John Murray, 1821), 60.

11.Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 131–32.

12.Ibid., 86.

13.Ibid.

14.Ibid., 202.

15.Ibid., 261.

16.Ibid., 26.

17.Ibid., 262.

18.Ibid., 203.

19.Herbert Spencer, The Proper Sphere of Government: A Reprint of a Series of Letters, Originally Published in “The Nonconformist” (London: W. Brittain, 1843), 60.

20.Ibid., 187.

21.Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 10.

22.Ibid., 39.

23.Ibid.

24.Ibid., 73.

25.Ibid., 162.

26.Ibid., 151.

27.Ibid., 136.

28.Ibid., 250.

29.Ibid. 252.

30.Ibid., 248.

31.Ibid., 32.

32.See, for example, Christopher Holmes, Polanyi in Times of Populism: Vision and Contradiction in the History of Economic Ideas (London: Routledge, 2018); Martijn Konings, The Emotional Logic of Capitalism: What Progressives Have Missed (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015); Fred Block and Margaret R. Somers, The Power of Market Fundamentalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014); Gareth Dale, Polanyi: The Limits of the Market (Cambridge, Ma: Polity Books, 2013); Richard Sandbrook, “Polanyi and Post-neoliberalism in the Global South: Dilemmas of Re-embedding the Economy,” New Political Economy 16, no. 4 (2011): pp. 415–43; Beverly J. Silver and Giovanni Arrighi, “Polanyi’s “Double Movement”: The Belle Époques of British and US Hegemony Compared,” Politics & Society 31, no. 2 (2003): 325–355; Ronaldo Munck, “Globalization and Contestation: A Polanyian Problematic,” Globalizations 3, no. 2(2006): 175–186.

33.Gareth Dale, “Double Movements and Pendular Forces: Polanyian Perspectives on the Neoliberal Age,” Current Sociology 60, no. 1 (2012): 12.

34.Quinn Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).

35.Ibid.

36.Ibid., 80.

37.Ibid., 153.

38.Dale, “Polanyi: The Limits of the Market,” 86.

39.Ibid., 78.

40.Silver and Arrighi, “Polanyi’s ‘Double Movement,’ ” 329.

41.Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 32.

42.Dale, “Double Movements and Pendular Forces,” 11.

43.Gunnar Olofsson, “Embeddedness and Integration,” Capitalism and Social Cohesion (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 38.

44.Dale, “Double Movements and Pendular Forces,” 20–21.

45.Several Polanyian scholars have worked to reconcile the ambiguities of the concept and explain its utility. SeeChristopher Holmes, “Problems and Opportunities in Polanyian Analysis Today,” Economy and Society 41, no. 3 (2012): 468–84; Greta Krippner, Mark Granovetter, Fred Block, Nicole Biggart, Tom Beamish, Youtien Hsing, Gillian Hart et al., “Polanyi Symposium: A Conversation on Embeddedness,” Socio-economic Review 2, no. 1 (2004): 109–35; Gareth Dale, “Lineages of Embeddedness: On the Antecedents and Successors of a Polanyian Concept,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 70, no. 2 (2011): 306–39; Kurtuluş Gemici, “Karl Polanyi and the Antinomies of Embeddedness,” Socio-economic Review 6, no. 1 (2008): 5–33.

46.Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 205.

47.Ibid.

48.Ibid., 155.

49.Ibid.

50.Ibid., 156.

51.Ibid., 157.

52.Gerardo Quinones, Richard Heeks, and Brian Nicholson, “Embeddedness of Digital Start-Ups in Development Contexts: Field Experience from Latin America,” Information Technology for Development 27, no. 2 (2021): 171–90; Sandbrook, “Polanyi and Post-neoliberalism in the Global South.”

53.Michael Levien and Marcel Paret, “A Second ‘Double Movement’? Polanyi and Shifting Global Opinions on Neoliberalism,” International Sociology 27, no. 6 (2012): 724–44.

54.See, Ronaldo Munck,“The Resistible Rise of Market Fundamentalism: Rethinking Development Policy in an Unbalanced World,” Capital & Class 35, no. 3 (2011): 491; Thomas A. Stewart, Intellectual Capital: The New Wealth of Organization (New York: Currency, 2010).

55.Fred Block and Margaret R. Somers, The Power of Market Fundamentalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).

56.Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 157.

57.See Phillip McMichael, “World-Systems Analysis, Globalization, and Incorporated Comparison,” Journal of World-Systems Research (2000): 668–89; Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century. New and updated edition (London: Verso, 2010); Silver and Arrighi, “Polanyi’s ‘Double Movement.’ ”

58.See Barry Eichengreen, “Hegemonic Stability Theories of the International Monetary System,” International Political Economy (2002): 230–54; Isabelle Grunberg, “Exploring the ‘Myth’ of Hegemonic Stability,” International Organization 44, no. 4 (1990): 431–77; Robert Gilpin, “The Theory of Hegemonic War,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (1988): 591–613; Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, “Global Wars, Public Debts, and the Long Cycle,” World Politics 35, no. 4 (1983): 489–516.

59.See Michael Colaresi, “Shocks to the System: Great Power Rivalry and the Leadership Long Cycle,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 5 (2001): 569–93; William R. Thompson, “Polarity, the Long Cycle, and Global Power Warfare,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 30, no.4 (1986): 587–615.

60.Silver and Arrighi, “Polanyi’s ‘Double Movement,’ ” 326.

61.John Agnew, “The New Global Economy: Time-Space Compression, Geopolitics, and Global Uneven Development,” Journal of World-Systems Research (2001): 143.

62.Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 263–66.

63.Ibid., 266.

64.John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez, “World Society and the Nation-State,” American Journal of Sociology 103, no. 1 (1997): 144–81.

Chapter 4

1.Joseph A. Schumpeter, Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, Volumes I & II (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1923), 170.

2.Ibid., v.

3.Nikolai D. Kondratieff and W. F. Stolper, “The Long Waves in Economic Life,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 17, no. 6 (1935): 115.

4.Ibid., 304.

5.Ibid., 156.

6.Ibid., 137.

7.Ibid., 105

8.Ibid.

9.Ibid., 264.

10.Ibid., 276–78.

11.Ibid, 260.

12.Ibid, 310.

13.Schumpeter, Business Cycles Vol. 2, 639.

14.Ibid., 268–69.

15.Ibid., 293.

16.Ibid., 294.

17.Ibid., 698–700.

18.This is a common theme in World Systems theory, Long Cycle Theory, and Hegemonic War Theory, each of which examine aspects of capitalist cycles, cycles of hegemonic power, and cycles of major World Wars. See Arrighi, “Global Inequalities and the Legacy of Dependency Theory”; Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: Theory and Methodology 1 (Beverly Hills: Sage, Incorporated, 1982); Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, “Global Wars, Public Debts, and the Long Cycle,” World Politics 35 (July 1983): 489–516; Christopher Chase-Dunn and Joan Sokolovsky, “Interstate Systems, World Empires, and the Capitalist World Economy: A Response to Thompson,” International Studies Quarterly 27 (Sept. 1983): 364–66; Raimo Vdyrynen, “Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Political Management and Wars between Major Powers,” International Studies Quarterly 27 (Dec. 1983): 389–418; George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press,1985); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Jack S. Levy, “Theories of General War,” World Politics 37, no. 3 (Apr. 1985): 344–74.

19.Fredric Jameson, “Culture and Finance Capital,” Critical Inquiry 24, no. 1 (1997): 251.

20.Paul Bairoch and Richard Kozul-Wright, “Globalization Myths: Some Historical Reflections on Integration, Industrialization and Growth in World Economy,” UNCTAD Discussion Papers 113 (1996).

21.Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Why Global Markets, States, and Democracy Can’t Coexist (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 76.

22.Munck, “Globalization and Contestation: A Polanyian Problematic,” 178.

23.Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox.

24.David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 239–40.

25.Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (1986): 1152.

26.Glenda Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 16–17.

27.Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” World Politics 59, no. 3 (2007): 343.

28.World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2013, 49.

29.There are dissenting opinions on this. Thus, Paul Bairoch and Richard Kozul-Wright argue:

“Contrary to much conventional wisdom, the inter-war period was not one of stagnation but contained spurts of rapid growth. Indeed, the 1920s grew considerably faster than any previous decade, and taking a long perspective there was, in fact, very little difference in the annual growth rate in the globalization era the period 1913–1950. It is also a myth that globalization tendencies were absent from the inter-war period. Although the average annual growth of trade in the 1920s was slower than in the previous epoch it was actually faster than in the period 1870–1890 and trade grew very rapidly between 1924 and 1929. Indeed, by 1929 the share of trade in world output was close to its 1913 level, and actually peaked in some countries, most notably Japan. Also, between 1914 and 1938, the stock of FDI rose significantly, almost doubling from $14.3 billion to $26.4 billion. There was particularly rapid. Without elaborating further on these trends, they do go some way to exposing the myth that the disintegration of the global economy can be explained simply by irrational political factors unleashed by the First World War and its aftermath. At the very least, the political economy of the inter-war period involved a complex intertwining of domestic and international economic forces.” Paul Bairoch, and Richard Kozul-Wright. “Globalization Myths: Some Historical Reflections on Integration, Industrialization and Growth in the World Economy,” in Transnational Corporations and the Global Economy, ed. Paul Bairoch and Richard Kozul-Wright (London: Palgrave Macmillan 1998), 50.

But even their trade numbers indicate that there was a general slowdown in trade in the interwar years. They show that trade as a percentage of GDP: 1890 11%; 1913 12.9%; 1929 9.8%; 1938 6.2%; 1950 7.8%; 1970 10.2: 1992 14.3%s See table 1 in their original paper: Paul Bairoch and Richard Kozul-Wright, Globalization Myths: Some Historical Reflections on Integration, Industrialization and Growth in the World Economy,” Paper prepared for the WIDER Conference on Transnational Corporations and the Global Economy (Kings College, Cambridge (UK), Sept. 1995), 6.

30.Jeffry A. Frieden, Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), 282.

31.Benjamin H Higgins, “Agriculture and War: A Comparison of Agricultural Conditions in the Napoleonic and World War Periods,” Agricultural History 14, no. 1 (1940): 11.

32.John Boli and George M. Thomas, Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 22.

33.Douglas Kellner, “The Postmodern Turn: Positions, Problems, and Prospects,” in Frontiers of Social Theory: The New Syntheses, ed. George Ritzer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 286, 289.

34.There have been other studies that have sought to explain the simultaneity of the kinds of populist movements that swept across the globe in the early twenty-first century in terms of globalization. For example, in one of the more comprehensive analyses, Dani Rodrik (2021, 2018) has developed a conceptual framework to explain how globalization relates to populism. He argues that economic dislocations caused by globalization impact people’s preferences for policies, shape politicians’ platforms, and increase the salience of certain identity divisions. Rodrik’s work touches on many of the points identified here, but it does not speak as directly to the relationship between nationalism and populism, nor to how today’s movements relate to other forms of nationalism and populism. Therefore, the concept of defensive nationalism used here allows for greater elaboration of how and why such movements develop. See Dani Rodrik, “Why Does Globalization Fuel Populism? Economics, Culture, and the Rise of Right-Wing Populism,” Annual Review of Economics 13 (2020): 133–70; Dani Rodrik, “Populism and the Economics of Globalization,” Journal of International Business Policy 1, no. 1 (2018): 12–33.

35.Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 153.

36.Ibid., 159.

37.Ibid., 42–43.

38.Bairoch and Kozul-Wright, “Globalization Myths,” 14.

39.James M. Gillies and Robert Cailliau, How the Web Was Born: The Story of the World Wide Web (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 2.

40.Ibid.

41.Roxana Radu, Negotiating Internet Governance (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 44–45.

42.Paddy Scannell, “The Dialectic of Time and Television,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 625, no. 1 (2009): 219–35.

43.Anuj Agarwal, “High Frequency Trading: Evolution and the Future,” Capgemini, London, UK (2012): 4.

44.Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylor, “Globalization and Capital Markets,” in Globalization in Historical Perspective, ed. Michael D. Bordo, Alan M. Taylor, and Jeffrey G. Williamson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 144.

Chapter 5

1.L. Welch Pogue, “The Next Ten Years in Air Transportation,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 21, no. 2 (1945): 23.

2.John Harold Clapham, The Economic Development of France and Germany, 1815–1914 (England: The University Press, 1923), 339.

3.Eric J Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital 1848–1875 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1975), 55.

4.Philip Bagwell and Peter Lyth, Transport in Britain: From Canal Lock to Gridlock (London and New York: Hambledon and London, 2002), 54.

5.In 1844, only 30 percent of the railway journeys were made by third-class passengers. By the 1870s that percentage had doubled. See Philip Bagwell and Peter Lyth, Transport in Britain: from Canal Lock to Gridlock, 58.

6.Clapham, The Economic Development of France and Germany, 339.

7.John F. Stover, The Routledge Historical Atlas of the American Railroads, ed. Mark C. Carnes (New York and London: Routledge, 1999), 38.

8.“ACROSS THE CONTINENT: From the Missouri to the Pacific Ocean by Rail. The Plains, the Great American Desert, the Rocky Mountains. One Hundred Hours from Omaha to San Francisco,” New York Times, June 28, 1869, http://cprr.org/Museum/Newspapers/New_York_Times/1869-06-28.html.

9.Binder, Frederick M., “Pennsylvania Coal and the Beginnings of American Steam Navigation,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 83, no. 4 (1959): 424.

10.Ramon Knauerhase, “The Compound Steam Engine and Productivity Changes in the German Merchant Marine Fleet, 1871–1887,” The Journal of Economic History 28, no. 3 (1968): 392.

11.World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2013: Factors Shaping the Future of World Trade (2013), 46–47.

12.Luis Carlos Barragan, “The Egyptian Workers Who Were Erased from History,” Egyptian Streets, Sept. 14, 2018. https://egyptianstreets.com/2018/09/14/the-egyptian-workers-who-were-erased-from-history.

13.Alfred Dupont Chandler, Takashi Hikino, and Alfred D. Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge, MA; and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1994), 53.

14.World Trade Organization, Factors Shaping the Future of World Trade, 47.

15.Ibid.

16.Adam McKeown, “Global Migration, 1846–1940,” Journal of World History (2004): 164.

17.Ibid., 157.

18.World Trade Organization, Factors Shaping the Future of World Trade, 48.

19.Robert Hoe, A Short History of the Printing Press and of the Improvements in Printing Machinery from the Time of Gutenberg up to the Present Day (New York: R. Hoe, 1902), 32.

20.See “Graphic History,” http://www.designhistory.org/BookHistory_pages/Letterpress.html.

21.A. J. Valente, “Changes in Print Paper during the 19th Century,” Charleston Library Conference, 2012.

22.World Trade Organization, Factors Shaping the Future of World Trade, 47.

23.The United States Postal Service, “The Mailing Industry and the United States Postal Service: An Enduring Partnership,” Smithsonian National Postal Museum, https://postalmuseum.si.edu/americasmailingindustry/United-States-Postal-Service.html.

24.Bessie Emrick Whitten, and David O. Whitten, The Birth of Big Business in the United States, 1860–1914: Commercial, Extractive, and Industrial Enterprise (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 33.

25.Encyclopedia of Chicago, “Mail Order,” http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/779.html.

26.Byron Lew and Bruce Cater, “The Telegraph, Co-ordination of Tramp Shipping, and Growth in World Trade, 1870–1910,” European Review of Economic History 10, no. 2 (2006): 147.

27.Menahem Blondheim, News over the Wires: The Telegraph and the Flow of Public Information in America, 1844–1897 (Cambridge, MA; and London: Harvard University Press, 1994), 15.

28.Christopher Hoag, “The Atlantic Telegraph Cable and Capital Market Information Flows,” The Journal of Economic History 66, no. 2 (2006): 342.

29.Tom Standage, The Victorian Internet: The Remarkable Story of the Telegraph and the Nineteenth Century’s Online Pioneers (New York: Berkeley Books, 1999), 101–2.

30.Morton Rothstein, “Centralizing Firms and Spreading Markets: The World of International Grain Traders, 1846–1914,” Business and Economic History (1988): 106.

31.Standage, The Victorian Internet, 166–67.

32.Ibid., 165–67.

33.Lew and Cater, “The Telegraph, Co-ordination of Tramp Shipping, and Growth in World Trade,” 149.

34.Craig Carey, “Breaking the News: Telegraphy and Yellow Journalism in the Spanish-American War,” American Periodicals (2016): 135.

35.Chandler, Hikino, and Chandler, Scale and Scope, 62.

36.Standage, The Victorian Internet, 169.

37.David Hochfelder, “The Communications Revolution and Popular Culture,” in A Companion to 19th-Century America, ed. William L. Barney (Malden, MA: and Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2001), 312–14.

38.Geoffrey Poitras, “Arbitrage: Historical Perspectives,” Encyclopedia of Quantitative Finance (2010): 17.

39.Hochfelder, “The Communications Revolution and Popular Culture,” 314.

40.A contemporary at the time describes the extent of Credit Mobilier’s activities: “In 1858, a contemporary described the scope of the operations of this new financial institution: the Society had erected the Western Railway Company by the buying-up and consolidation of several old Companies and by guaranteeing a million sterling of bonds required by the new Company. It had extended similar advantages to the Southern and Eastern Railway Companies. The operations on the Dole and Salins line had been suspended, and the Society had ensured the completion of the works by advances and by purchasing 16,000 bonds. To the Austrian Railway the Society had advanced three and a third millions sterling; it had become largely interested in the Ardennes lines; it undertook lines upon an extensive scale in the Pyrenean Department; it gave credit largely to two Swiss railways; it became mixed up with a railway in Spain; it undertook canals; it bought up all the omnibuses ‘in Paris, and established a General Omnibus Association; it started a General Maritime Association, by purchasing sixty vessels, sailers and steamers: it bought up all the Gas Companies in Paris, and brought out a Central Gas Company; and considerable progress was made in buying up a Salt Works in the South of France.’ ” William Newmarch, “On the Recent History of the Credit Mobilier,” Journal of the Statistical Society of London 21, no. 4 (Dec. 1858): 447–48.

41.Carlo Brambilla, “Assessing Convergence in European Investment Banking Patterns Until 1914,” in Convergence and Divergence of National Financial Systems: Evidence from the Gold Standards, 1871–1971, ed. Anders Ögren and Patrice Baubeau (United Kingdom: Pickering & Chatto, 2014), 90.

42.Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwards in Historical Perspective: A Book Essays (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962), 13.

43.Gerschenkron, Economic Backwards in Historical Perspective, 13.

44.Steven I. Davis, The Euro-Bank: Its Origins, Management and Outlook (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1980), 16.

45.Brambilla, “Assessing Convergence in European Investment Banking Patterns Until 1914,” 90.

46.Polanyi refers to this as the emergence of “the self-regulating market.”

47.Albert Fishlow, “Lessons from the Past: Capital Markets during the 19th Century and the Interwar Period,” International Organization 39, no. 3 (1985): 383.

48.World Trade Organization, Factors Shaping the Future of World Trade, 50.

49.Jeffrey D. Sachs, Andrew Warner, Anders Åslund, and Stanley Fischer, “Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1995, no. 1 (1995): 47.

50.Sebastian Conrad, Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 51.

51.Sachs, Warner, Åslund, and Fischer, “Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration,” 7.

52.Guillaume Daudin, Matthias Morys, and Kevin O’Rourke, “Globalization, 1870–1914,” The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe (2010), 6.

53.Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon, 1944), 15.

54.Leland H. Jenks, “Railroads as an Economic Force in American Development,” The Journal of Economic History 4, no. 1 (1944): 13.

55.Standage, The Victorian Internet, 159.

56.Ibid., 163.

57.Glenda Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 14–15.

58.John A. Hobson, “The Ethics of Internationalism,” The International Journal of Ethics 17, no. 1 (1906): 17.

59.John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920), 11–12.

60.John Boli and George M. Thomas, eds., “INGOs and the Organization of World Culture,” in Globalization: Critical Concepts in Sociology, ed. Roland Robertson and Kathleen E. White (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 22.

61.Harald Fischer-Tiné, “Global Civil Society and the Forces of Empire: The Salvation Army, British Imperialism, and the ‘Prehistory’ of NGOs (ca. 1880–1920),” in Competing Visions of World Order Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–1930s, ed. Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 30.

Chapter 6

1.L. Welch Pogue, “The Next Ten Years in Air Transportation,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 21, no. 2 (1945): 23.

2.Richard Gilbert and Anthony Perl, Transport Revolutions Moving People and Freight Without Oil (Philadelphia: New Society, 2010), 16.

3.David Oxley and C. Jain, “Global Air Passenger Markets: Riding Out Periods of Turbulence,” IATA The Travel & Tourism Competitiveness Report (2015): 59.

4.Gerald N. Cook, “A Review of History, Structure, and Competition in the US Airline Industry,” Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research 7, no. 1 (1996): 34.

5.World Trade Organization, Factors Shaping the Future of World Trade, 53.

6.Gilbert and Perl, Transport Revolutions Moving People and Freight without Oil, 16.

7.World Trade Organization, Factors Shaping the Future of World Trade, 53.

8.Ibid.

9.David Hummels, “Transportation Costs and International Trade in the Second Era of Globalization,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21, no. 3 (2007): 132–34.

10.Ibid., 52.

11.Marc Levinson, “Container Shipping and the Decline of New York, 1955–1975,” Business History Review 80, no. 1 (2006): 49.

12.For the debate over the see Hummels; 2007; and Levinson, 2006.

13.David Hummels, “Have International Transportation Costs Declined,” Scientific and Technical Aerospace Reports 45, no. 18 (2007): 5–6.

14.Marc Levinson, The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger (Princeton, NJ; and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), 14–15.

15.Ibid., 15.

16.Richard R. John, “Rendezvous with Information? Computers and Communications Networks in the United States,” Business History Review 75, no. 1 (2001): 4.

17.Robin Chandler, “Creative Parallel Spaces in Science and Art: Knowledge in the Information Age,” The Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society 29, no. 3 (1999): 163–6.

18.R. R. John, “Rendezvous with Information? Computers and Communications Networks in the United States,” 4.

19.Sheila C. Murphy, How Television Invented New Media (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2011), 48.

20.Ibid.

21.Ibid.

22.RS Components Pty Ltd, “How Did Semiconductors Change Our Lives,” https://au.rs-online.com/web/generalDisplay.html?id=infozone&file=eletronics/how-did-semiconductors-change-our-lives.

23.Levinson, The Box, 3.

24.Ibid.

25.Thomas Marill and Lawrence G. Roberts, “Toward a Cooperative Network of Time-shared Computers,” in Proceedings of the November 7–10, 1966, Fall Joint Computer Conference, 425–431.

26.Joseph C. R. Licklider, “Man-Computer Symbiosis.” IRE Transactions on Human Factors in Electronics 1 (1960): 4–11.

27.Judy E. O’Neill, “The Role of ARPA in the Development of the ARPANET, 1961–1972,” IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 17, no. 4 (1995): 76–81.

28.George A. Miller, and Joseph C. R. Licklider, “The Intelligibility of Interrupted Speech,” The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 22, no. 2 (1950): 167–73.

29.The interent has also been argued to have been the inheritor of an earlier technology, frequency hopping, the invention of which has been attributed to the glamorous Hollywood starlit Hedy Lamar. To help with the war effort during World War II, Lamar, who was a technological genius, researched ways to safely conduct submarine communications through radio transmissions. She and her partner patented a frequency-hopping technique for “secret radio transmission,” but it was never practically implemented. However, there is some controversy over how original and useful Lamar’s invention was. See Tony Rothman, “Random Paths to Frequency Hopping,” American Scientist, Jan.–Feb. 2019, https://www.americanscientist.org/article/random-paths-to-frequency-hopping.

30.James M. Gillies and Robert Cailliau, How the Web Was Born: The Story of the World Wide Web (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 11.

31.Ibid., 1.

32.Ibid., 236.

33.Mark Handley and Jon Crowcroft, The World Wide Web: Beneath the Surf (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), vii.

34.Agence France Presse, “A 25-Year Timeline of the World Wide Web,” Insider, Mar. 9, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/a-25-year-timeline-of-the-world-wide-web-2014-3.

35.To mark the occasion—and not miss an opportunity for publicity—the chairman of the AT&T ceremonially made the first phone call transmitted via satellite from his company’s plant in Maine to US President Lyndon B. Johnson in the White House.

36.Laura Silver, “Smartphone Ownership Is Growing Rapidly Around the World, but Not Always Equally,” Pew Research Center, Feb. 5, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/02/05/smartphone-ownership-is-growing-rapidly-around-the-world-but-not-always-equally/.

37.Although large disparities in cell phone usage remains between the Global North and the Global South, as well as between the wealthy to poor in developing countries, communications access on the whole has increased spectacularly. According to World Bank data, it is estimated that at its height, in 2007: only 13 percent of the population in low- and middle-income countries had fixed telephone subscriptions, up from just under only 3.5 percent in 1995. By contrast, cell phone subscriptions increased from only 0.25 percent in 1995, to 102 percent in 2018! An indication of the rapid expansion of satellite usage is that whereas in 1966 only three countries—Canada, the Soviet Union, and the United States—had operational satellites, today the majority of countries across the globe have acquired them. As of July 2020, the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCSUSA) reported that the total number of satellites operating in orbit was 2,666. See Union of Concerned Scientist, “USC Satellite Database,” published Dec. 8, 2005, updated Jan. 1, 2022, https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/satellite-database.

38.David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (United Kingdom: Wiley, 1989), 316.

39.World Trade Organization, Factors Shaping the Future of World Trade, 55.

40.Makeda Easter, “Remember When Amazon Only Sold Books?,” Los Angeles Times, June 18, 2017, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-amazon-history-20170618-htmlstory.html.

41.Ebay, “Our History,” https://www.ebayinc.com/our-company/our-history/.

42.Anuj. Agarwal, “High Frequency Trading: Evolution and the Future,” Capgemini, London, UK (2012): p. 4.

43.Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, 161.

44.World Trade Organization, Factors Shaping the Future of World Trade, 54.

45.Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, 161.

46.Ibid.

47.Ibid.

48.World Economic Forum, https://www.weforum.org/join-us/home.

49.World Trade Organization, “What We Stand For,” https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/what_stand_for_e.htm.

50.Rupert Taylor, “Interpreting Global Civil Society,” Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 13, no. 4 (2002): 339.

51.Alexander Halavais, “National Borders on the World Wide Web,” New Media & Society 2, no. 1 (2000): 7.

52.Ibid., 11.

53.Stephen Gill, “Globalizing Capital and Political Agency in the Twenty-first Century,” in Questioning Geopolitics: Political Projects in a Changing World-System, ed. Georgi M. Derluguian and Scott L. Greer (Westport, CT; London: Greenwood Press, 2000), 15.

54.Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius, and Mary Kaldor, “Introducing Global Civil Society,” Global Civil Society 2001 (2001): 17.

55.Ronaldo Munck, “Global Civil Society: Myths and Prospects,” Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 13, no. 4 (2002): 349–61.

56.Taylor, “Interpreting Global Civil Society,” 340–41.

57.Ibid., 340.

Chapter 7

1.Henry George, Progress and Poverty an Inquiry into the Cause of Industrial Depressions and of Increase of Want with Increase of Wealth: The Remedy (Kingsport Press, 1935), 8.

2.Paul Hayes, ed., Themes in Modern European History 1890–1945 (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 30.

3.Eric J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital 1848–1875 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1975), 231.

4.Vincent E. McHale and Eric A. Johnson, “Urbanization, Industrialization, and Crime in Imperial Germany: Part II,” Social Science History 1, no. 2 (1977): 210.

5.Jesús Mirás Araujo, “Urbanization in Upheaval: Spanish Cities, Agents and Targets of a Slow Transformation,” in The Routledge Hispanic Studies Companion to Nineteenth-Century Spain, ed. Elisa Martí-López (London and New York: Routledge, 2021), 218–34.

6.Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 167.

7.Adam McKeown, “Global Migration, 1846–1940,Journal of World History (2004): 155–89.

8.Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 229.

9.Adam McKeown, Global Migration, 157.

10.Fathali M. Moghaddam and Anthony J. Marsella, eds., Understanding Terrorism: Psychosocial Roots, Consequences, and Interventions (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2004), 208.

11.Luigi De Rosa, “Urbanization and Industrialization in Italy (1861–1921),” Journal of European Economic History 17, no. 3 (1988): 477–78.

12.Ossi Kotavaara, Harri Antikainen, and Jarmo Rusanen, “Urbanization and Transportation in Finland, 1880–1970,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 42, no. 1 (2011): 92.

13.Hayes, ed., Themes in Modern European History, 30.

14.Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 206.

15.Ibid., 212.

16.Ibid., 207.

17.Ibid., 206.

18.Charles Kindleberger, “Group Behavior and International Trade,” Journal of Political Economy 59, no. 1 (1951): 31.

19.Charles Kindleberger, Manias, Panics and Crashes. A History of Financial Crises (London: Macmillan, 1978).

20.O. V. Wells, “The Depression of 1873–79,” Agricultural History 11, no. 3 (1937): 239.

21.Elmus Wicker, The Banking Panics of the Great Depression (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 20.

22.Wells, “The Depression of 1873–79,” 241.

23.H. Michell, “The Gold Standard in the Nineteenth Century,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue 17, no. 3 (1951): 375.

24.Donald Le Crone McMurry, Coxey’s Army: A Study of the Industrial Army Movement of 1894 (Boston: Little Brown, and Company, 1929), 3.

25.Herman C. Voeltz, “Coxey’s Army in Oregon, 1894,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 65, no. 3 (1964): 263.

26.Marc Levinson, The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger (Princeton, NJ; and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), 3.

27.See Arun Kundnani, “Where Do You Want to Go Today? The Rise of Information Capital,” Race & Class 40, no. 2–3 (1999): 49; and Chia-Yu Hsu, Bo-Ruei Kao, Lin Li, and K. Robert Lai, “An Agent-Based Fuzzy Constraint-Directed Negotiation Model for Solving Supply Chain Planning and Scheduling Problems,” Applied Soft Computing 48 (2016): 703–15.

28.Bernard Hoekman and Carlos A. Primo Braga, “Protection and Trade in Services: A Survey,” Open Economies Review 8, no. 3 (1997): 286.

29.Robert Rowthorn and Ramana Ramaswamy, “Deindustrialization: Causes and Implications,” Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 10, 1997, 2.

30.Robert Gilpin, The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century (Princeton, NJ; and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018), 31–32.

31.Keith Eugene Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2000), 2.

32.Kundnani, “Where Do You Want to Go Today,” 50.

33.Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy, 2.

34.David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (United Kingdom: Wiley, 1989), 155.

35.Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, Deindustrialization, 2.

36.Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, 150.

37.Lloyd Rodwin and Hidehiko Sazanami, eds., Industrial Change and Regional Economic Transformation: The Experience of Western Europe (London: Routledge, 2017).

38.Ibid.

39.See John R. Walter, “US Bank Capital Regulation: History and Changes since the Financial Crisis,” Economic Quarterly 1Q (2019): 1–40.

40.A financial derivative is a contract that derives its value from an underlying entity, such as an asset, index, or interest rate. They are used to shield investors from potential risk. The more common derivatives are forwards, futures, options, and swaps.

41.Derivatives are one of the three main categories of financial instruments, the other two being equity (i.e., stocks or shares) and debt (i.e., bonds and mortgages).

42.Martin Neil Baily, Robert E. Litan, and Matthew S. Johnson, “The Origins of the Financial Crisis,” Initiative on Business and Public Policy at Brookings, 2008, 8.

Chapter 8

1.For more on the history of fake news, see Julien Gorbach, “Not Your Grandpa’s Hoax: A Comparative History of Fake News,” American Journalism 35, no. 2 (2018): 236–49; Jonathan Albright, “Welcome to the Era of Fake News,” Media and Communication 5, no. 2 (2017): 87–89; Robert Darnton, “The True History of Fake News,” The New York Review of Books, 2017.

2.Mark Wahlgren Summers, The Press Gang: Newspapers and Politics, 1865–1878 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 13.

3.Ronald J. Zboray and Mary Saracino Zboray, “The Changing Face of Publishing,” in The Oxford History of Popular Print Culture: Volume Six: US Popular Print Culture 1860–1920 (Oxford University Press, 2011): 30.

4.Matthew Rubery, “A Transatlantic Sensation: Stanley’s Search for Livingstone and the Anglo,” in The Oxford History of Popular Print Culture Volume Six US Popular Print Culture 1860–1920, ed. Christine Bold (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1860): 501–17.

5.Mary Vipond, The Mass Media in Canada (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 2000), 17.

6.Aled Jones, Powers of the Press: Newspapers, Power and the Public in Nineteenth-Century England (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), 24.

7.Richard Bach Jensen, The Battle against Anarchist Terrorism: An International History, 1878–1934 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 53.

8.Michael Schudson, “The Objectivity Norm in American Journalism,” Journalism 2, no. 2 (2001): 149–70.

9.Summers, The Press Gang, 13.

10.Ibid., 10.

11.Theodore Peterson, Magazines in the Twentieth Century (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956), 2.

12.Ibid.

13.Ibid.

14.Summers, The Press Gang, 10.

15.Frankie Hutton and Barbara Straus Reed, eds., Outsiders in 19th-Century Press History: Multicultural Perspectives (Bowling Green, KY: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1995), 3.

16.Zboray and Zboray, “Publishing between The Civil War,” 34.

17.Schudson, “The Objectivity Norm in American Journalism,” 156.

18.Jessica E. Jackson, “Sensationalism in the Newsroom: Its Yellow Beginnings, the Nineteenth Century Legal Transformation, and the Current Seizure of the American Press,” Notre Dame Journal of Law & Ethics & Public Policy 19 (2005): 790.

19.Kevin Williams, Read All About It! A History of the British Newspaper (London; New York: Routledge, 2009), 139.

20.Anthony M. Nadler, Making the News Popular: Mobilizing US News Audiences (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2016) 38

21.Summers, The Press Gang, 14.

22.Robert E. Park, “The Natural History of the Newspaper,” American Journal of Sociology 29, no. 3 (1923): 281, 283.

23.Summers, The Press Gang, 10.

24.Richard L Kaplan, Politics and the American Press: The Rise of Objectivity, 1865–1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 24, 27.

25.Maria Petrova, “Newspapers and Parties: How Advertising Revenues Created an Independent Press,” American Political Science Review 105, no. 4 (2011): 793.

26.Julian Petley, Film and Video Censorship in Modern Britain (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 186.

27.Park, “The Natural History of the Newspaper,” 286.

28.Ernest Gellner, “Introduction,” in Europe and The Rise of Capitalism, ed. J. Baechler, J. A. Hall, and M. A. Mann (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).

29.Jones, Powers of the Press.

30.John Steel and Marcel Broersma, “Redefining Journalism during the Period of the Mass Press 1880–1920: An Introduction,” Media History 21, no. 3 (2015): 235–37.

31.Park, “The Natural History of The Newspaper,” 286.

32.Richard L. Kaplan, “Yellow Journalism,” The International Encyclopedia of Communication 11 (2008): 5369.

33.David W. Bulla and David B. Sachsman, “Introduction,” in Sensationalism: Murder, Mayhem, Mudslinging, Scandals, and Disasters in 19th-Centry Reporting, ed. David B. Sachsman, David W. Bulla, and David B. Sachsman (London and New York: Routledge, 2013).

34.Park, “The Natural History of The Newspaper,” 287.

35.Ibid.

36.Ross Eaman, Historical Dictionary of Journalism (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2009), 282.

37.Zboray and Zboray, “Publishing between The Civil War,” 32.

38.Ibid.

39.Williams, Read All About It!, 127.

40.Ibid.

41.Ibid., 135.

42.In Europe, the concentration of media ownership was in large part driven by government policies. Although liberal reforms adopted across Europe after 1848 meant that outright censorship was no longer practiced, “ ‘indirect’ forms of press controls, involving the requirement that publishers pay security bonds or ‘caution money’ and that newspapers pay special taxes. The caution money requirement was intended to ensure that only the relatively wealthy could publish newspapers, while the purpose of special press taxes was to ensure that only the relatively wealthy could buy them.” See Robert Justin Goldstein, Political Repression in 19th Century Europe (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2013), 41.

43.Steel and Broersma, “Redefining Journalism during the Period of the Mass Press 1880–1920,” 235.

44.Park, “The Natural History of The Newspaper,” 285.

45.Ibid., 287.

46.Jones, Powers of the Press.

47.Hochfelder, “The Communications Revolution and Popular Culture,” 314.

48.David Spencer, The Yellow Journalism: The Press and America’s Emergence as a World Power (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 148–9.

49.Zboray and Zboray, “Publishing between The Civil War,” 32.

50.Jones, Powers of the Press, 74.

51.Ibid.

52.Arthur A. Baumann, “The Functions and Future of The Press,” Fortnightly 107, no. 640 (1920): 621.

53.Fredrick Lewis Allen 1931, http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks05/0500831h.html, accessed July 25, 2021.

54.Roland T. Rust and Richard W. Oliver, “The Death of Advertising,” Journal of Advertising 23, no. 4 (1994): 75.

55.Ibid., 74.

56.Ibid., 73.

57.Johanna E. Möller and M. Rimscha, “(De) centralization of the Global Informational Ecosystem,” Media and Communication 5, no. 3 (2017): 38

58.Evangelos Pournaras, “Decentralization in Digital Societies—A Design Paradox,” arXiv:2001.01511 (2020): 8.

59.Félix Tréguer, “Gaps and Bumps in the Political History of the Internet,” Internet Policy Review 6, no. 4 (2017): 4

60.Möller and Rimscha, “(De) centralization of the Global Informational Ecosystem,” 40.

61.Maximilian Hösl, “Semantics of the Internet: A Political History,” Internet Histories 3, no. 3–4 (2019): 285.

62.Cynthia Kroet, “‘Post-Truth’ Enters Oxford English Dictionary,” Politico, June 27, 2017, https://www.politico.eu/article/post-truth-enters-oxford-english-dictionary/.

63.Eric Alterman, “Out of Print,” The New Yorker, Mar. 24, 2008, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/03/31/out-of-print.

64.Isabella Simonetti, “Over 360 Newspapers Have Closed since Just Before the Start of the Pandemic,” New York Times, June 29, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/29/business/media/local-newspapers-pandemic.html.

65.European Parliament, “Europe’s Media in the Digital Decade,” https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/690873/IPOL_STU(2021)690873_EN.pdf.

66.Eric Alterman, “Out of Print: The Death and Life of the American Newspaper,” The New Yorker, Mar. 24, 2008, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/03/31/out-of-print.

67.Edelman Trust Barometer 2020, https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2020-03/2020%20Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer%20Coronavirus%20Special%20Report_0.pdf.

68.Mattia Ferraresi, “As Europe Confronts Coronavirus, the Media Faces a Trust Test,” Nieman Reports, Apr. 24, 2020, https://niemanreports.org/articles/a-trust-test-for-the-media-in-europe/.

69.Albright, “Welcome to The Era of Fake News,” 87.

Chapter 9

1.John M. Merriman, The Dynamite Club (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 2016), XI.

2.Richard Bach Jensen, “Daggers, Rifles and Dynamite: Anarchist Terrorism in Nineteenth Century Europe,” Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 1 (2004): 134.

3.Jensen, “Daggers, Rifles and Dynamite,” 135.

4.Ibid., 134.

5.Richard Bach Jensen, “The International Anti-Anarchist Conference of 1898 and The Origins of Interpol,” Journal of Contemporary History 16, no. 2 (1981): 324.

6.Jensen, “The International Anti-Anarchist Conference of 1898 and The Origins of Interpol,” 324.

7.Jensen, The Battle Against Anarchist Terrorism, 238.

8.Beverly Gage, The Day Wall Street Exploded: A Story of America in Its First Age of Terror (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 44.

9.Ibid.

10.Emma Goldman, Anarchism and Other Essays (3rd rev. ed., New York: Mother Earth Publishing Association, 1917), https://www.lib.berkeley.edu/goldman/pdfs/EmmaGoldman_THEPSYCHOLOGYOFPOLITICALVIOLENCE.pdf, 7, 12.

11.Sara Kalm and Johannes Lindvall, “Immigration Policy and the Modern Welfare State, 1880–1920,” Journal of European Social Policy 29, no. 4 (2019): 463–77.

12.Guillaume Daudin, Matthias Morys, and Kevin H. O’Rourke, “Europe and Globalization, 1870–1914,” Paris: OFCE 17 (2008): 17.

13.Ashley S. Timmer and Jeffrey G. Williams, “Immigration Policy Prior to the 1930s: Labor Markets, Policy Interactions, and Globalization Backlash,” Population and Development Review (1998): 744.

14.Richard Bach Jensen, The Battle against Anarchist Terrorism: An International History, 1878–1934 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 139–40.

15.Ibid., 247.

16.Ibid., 7.

17.Ibid., 7.

18.Frank Harris, The Bomb, by Frank Harris (New York (State): M. Kennerley, 1909), 230.

19.Ibid., 275–76.

20.Ibid.

21.Thomas Hegghammer, “Islamist Violence and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia,” International Affairs 84, no. 4 (2008): 703.

22.Hegghammer, “Islamist Violence and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia,” 706.

23.Tony Evans, “The Limits of Tolerance: Islam as Counter-Hegemony?,” Review of International Studies 37, no. 4 (2011): 1761.

24.United Nations, The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes (New York: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012), 11.

25.Assaf Moghadam, The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and The Diffusion of Suicide Attacks (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2008), 4.

26.Ibid., 38.

27.Ibid., 2.

28.Olivier Roy, “Al Qaeda in the West as a Youth Movement: The Power of a Narrative,” CEPS Policy Briefs 1–12 (2008), 4.

29.Ibid., 6.

30.Ibid., 7.

31.Hania Zlotnik, “Trends of International Migration since 1965: What Existing Data Reveal,” International Migration 37, no. 1 (1999).

32.Ibid., 24.

33.John Salt, and James Clarke, “International Migration in the UNECE Region: Patterns, Trends, Policies,” International Social Science Journal 52, no. 165 (2000): 316.

34.Mathias Czaika and Hein De Haas, “The Globalization of Migration: Has the World Become More Migratory?,” International Migration Review 48, no. 2 (2014): 285; Stephen Castles, “International Migration at the Beginning of the Twenty‐First Century: Global Trends and Issues,” International Social Science Journal 52, no. 165 (2000): 274.

35.Czaika and De Haas, “The Globalization of Migration,” 285.

36.Hania Zlotnik, “Trends of International Migration since 1965: What Existing Data Reveal,” International Migration 37, no. 1 (1999): 22.

37.Christine Ogan, Lars Willnat, Rosemary Pennington, and Manaf Bashir, “The Rise of Anti-Muslim Prejudice: Media and Islamophobia in Europe and the United States,” International Communication Gazette, 76, no. 1 (2014): 27.

38.Michelle Mittelstadt, Burke Speaker, Doris Meissner, and Muzaffar Chishti, “Through the Prism of National Security: Major Immigration Policy and Program Changes in the Decade since 9/11,” Migration Policy Institute 2 (2011): 1.

39.Terri A. Winnick, “Islamophobia: Social Distance, Avoidance, and Threat,” Sociological Spectrum 39, no. 6 (2019): 359.

40.Ibid.

41.See Terri A. Winnick, “Islamophobia: Social Distance, Avoidance, and Threat”; Brian Robert Calfano, Paul A. Djupe, Daniel Cox, and Robert Jones, “Muslim Mistrust: The Resilience of Negative Public Attitudes after Complimentary Information,” Journal of Media and Religion 15, no. 1 (2016): 29–42.

42.Terri A. Winnick, “Islamophobia: Social Distance, Avoidance, and Threat,” 359.

43.Danielle Lee Tomson, “The Rise of Sweden Democrats: Islam, Populism and the End of Swedish Exceptionalism,” Brookings, Mar. 25, 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-rise-of-sweden-democrats-and-the-end-of-swedish-exceptionalism/.

44.Christina Schori Liang, “Europe for the Europeans,” 21.

45.Monica Scislowska, “Poland Probes Mosque Attack, Far-Right ‘Gallows’ Protest,” AP News, Nov. 27, 2017, https://apnews.com/article/7f31acb8461b4f5fb71325bb6efecfc3.

46.Angelique Chrisafis, “France’s Headscarf War: ‘It’s an Attack on Freedom,’” The Guardian, July 22, 2013. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/22/frances-headscarf-war-attack-on-freedom.

47.Hans-Georg Betz, “Mosques, Minarets, Burqas and Other Essential Threats: The Populist Right’s Campaign against Islam in Western Europe,” in Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse, ed. Ruth Wodak, Majid KhosaraviNik, and Brigitte Mral (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 72.

48.Ibid., 73.

49.Gabriela Baczynska, “Mosque Building Brings Islam Fears to Poland,” Reuters, Apr. 1, 2010, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-mosque/mosque-building-brings-islam-fears-to-poland-idUSTRE6302VN20100401.

Chapter 10

1.Guillaume Daudin, Matthias Morys, and Kevin O’Rourke, “Globalization, 1870–1914,” The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe (2010): 9.

2.Herman C. Voeltz, “Coxey’s Army in Oregon, 1894,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 65, no. 3 (Sept. 1964): 263.

3.Ibid., 264.

4.Jeffrey Ostler, “Why the Populist Party Was Strong in Kansas and Nebraska but Weak in Iowa,” The Western Historical Quarterly 23, no. 4 (1992): 453–54.

5.L. Frank Baum, The Wonderful Wizard of Oz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

6.For more on this debate, see Ranjit S. Dighe, “The Fable of the Allegory: The Wizard of Oz in Economics: Comment,” The Journal of Economic Education 38, no. 3 (2007): 318–24.

7.Hugh Rockoff argues: “On a general level the Wicked Witch of the East represents eastern business and financial interests, but in personal terms a populist would have had one figure in mind: Grover Cleveland. It was Cleveland who led the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act, and it was his progold forces that had been defeated at the 1896 convention, making it possible for America to vote for Bryan and free silver. But the American people, like the Munchkins, never understood the power that was theirs once the Wicked Witch was dead.” Rockoff, Hugh, “‘The Wizard of Oz’ as a Monetary Allegory,” Journal of Political Economy 98, no. 4 (1990): 746.

8.The history of the game Monopoly began in 1904, when a patent was granted to Elizabeth Maggie for “the Landlord’s Game.” This was the antecedent to the popular board game. Moreover, Maggie may have been a follower of Georgism, and she reputedly invented the game to teach people about monopolies and “Morganization.” See Philip E. Orbanes, Monopoly: The World’s Most Famous Game—and How It Got That Way (New York: Hachette Books, 2007).

9.See J. Bradford De Long, “JP Morgan and His Money Trust,” Wilson Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1992): 16–30.

10.Henry Demarest Lloyd, Lords of Industry (United Kingdom: G.P. Putnam’s sons, 1910): 3.

11.“The ‘Omaha Platform’ of the People’s Party (1892),” The American Yawp Reader, https://www.americanyawp.com/reader/16-capital-and-labor/the-omaha-platform-of-the-peoples-party-1892/.

12.Henry George, Progress and Poverty: An Inquiry into the Cause of Industrial Depressions The Remedy (Kingsport Press, Inc., 1934).

13.Richard Franklin Bensel, Passion and Preferences: William Jennings Bryan and the 1896 Democratic Convention (Netherlands: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 1.

14.Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, The Comintern: A History of International Communism from Lenin to Stalin (London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1996), xviii.

15.Ibid., 8.

16.A. Smith, “The Land and Its People,” 99.

17.Paul A. Fortier, “Gobineau and German Racism,” Comparative Literature 19, no. 4 (1967): 341–50.

18.Constantin Frantz, Der Untergang der alten Parteien und die Parteien der Zukunft (Berlin: Niendorf, 1878), quoted in The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany & Austria, ed. Peter Pulzer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 36.

19.Sebastian Conrad, Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 15.

20.Ibid.

21.Max Domarus and Adolf Hitler, Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations 1932–1945: The Chronical of a Dictatorship: Voume. 2, The Years 1932 to 1934 (Mundelein, IL: BolchazyCarducci Publishers, 1990), 248.

22.António Costa Pinto, “Fascist Ideology Revisited: Zeev Sternhell and His Critics,” European History Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1986): 471.

23.Mauro Marsella, “Enrico Corradini’s Italian Nationalism: The ‘Right Wing’ of the Fascist Synthesis,” Journal of Political Ideologies 9, no. 2 (2004): 206.

24.David D. Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition and Italian Fascism. (United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 1979), 120.

25.Robert Howse, “The World Trade Organization 20 Years on: Global Governance by Judiciary,” European Journal of International Law 27, no. 1 (2016): 16.

26.Hopewell, Breaking the WTO, ix.

27.Ibid.

28.Bernt Hagtvet, “Right-Wing Extremism in Europe,” Journal of Peace Research 31, no. 3 (1994): 241.

29.Manuel Funke and Christoph Trebesch, “Financial Crises and the Populist Right,” ifo DICE Report 15, no. 4 (2017): 8.

30.Jon Henley, “Support for Eurosceptic Parties Doubles in Two Decades across EU,” The Guardian, Mar. 2, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/02/support-for-eurosceptic-parties-doubles-two-decades-across-eu.

31.Helena Smith, “Greek Leftist Leader Alexis Tsipras: ‘It’s a War between People and Capitalism,’” The Guardian, May 18, 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/18/greek-leftist-leader-alexis-tsipras.

32.“READ: Jeremy Corbyn’s 2017 Labour Conference,” PoliticsHome, Sept. 27, 2017, https://www.politicshome.com/news/article/read-jeremy-corbyns-2017-labour-conference-speech.

33.“READ: Bernie Sanders’ Speech at the Democratic Convention,” NPR, July 25, 2016, https://www.npr.org/2016/07/25/487426056/read-bernie-sanders-prepared-remarks-at-the-dnc.

34.J. Lawrence Broz, Jeffry Frieden, and Stephen Weymouth, “Populism in Place: The Economic Geography of the Globalization Backlash,” International Organization 75, no. 2 (2021): 464.

35.Dustin Voss, “The Political Economy of European Populism: Labour Market Dualisation and Protest Voting in Germany and Spain,” LEQS Paper 132 (2018): 3.

36.National Front, http://www.nationalfront.org/ (since removed from the web).

37.Jefferson Chase, “AfD Cochair Petry Wants to Rehabilitate Controversial Term,” Deutsche Welle, Sept. 11, 2016, https://www.dw.com/en/afd-co-chair-petry-wants-to-rehabilitate-controversial-term/a-19543222.

38.Europe Now, “The Rise of Nativism in Europe.” By Jan Willem Duyvendak and Josip Kesic, Feb. 1, 2018, https://www.europenowjournal.org/2018/01/31/the-rise-of-nativism-in-europe/#_ftnref3.

39.Eric Thayer, “Transcript: Donald Trump’s Victory Speech,” New York Times, Nov. 9, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/us/politics/trump-speech-transcript.html.

40.Paul Bairoch, “European Trade Policy, 1815–1914,” The Cambridge Economic History of Europe 8, no. 1 (1989): 160–80.

41.Harold James and Kevin H. O’Rourke, “Italy and the First Age of Globalization, 1861–1940,” Bank of Italy Economic History Working Paper 16 (2011): 7.

42.Jeffrey D. Sachs, Andrew Warner, Anders Åslund, and Stanley Fischer, “Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity no. 1 (1995): 6.

43.Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Why Global Markets, States, and Democracy Can’t Coexist (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 30.

44.Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, Volume II: The Period of Consolidation, 1871–1880 (Germany: Princeton University Press, 2014), 7.

45.Ibid., 8.

46.See Alan John Percivale Taylor, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman. (New York: Vintage Books, 1967).

47.James C. Hunt, “Peasants, Grain Tariffs, and Meat Quotas: Imperial German Protectionism Reexamined,” Central European History 7, no. 4 (Dec. 1974), 314.

48.James and O’Rourke, “Italy and the First Age of Globalization, 1861–1940,” 8.

49.Stephen Broadberry and Kevin H O’Rourke, The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe: Volume 2, 1870 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 26.

50.Kevin H. O’Rourke, “Tariffs and Growth in the Late 19th Century,” The Economic Journal 110, no. 463 (2000): 458.

51.The Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark did not impose tariffs on wheat. See Charles Kindleberger, “Group Behavior and International Trade,” Journal of Political Economy 59, no. 1 (1951): 35.

52.David S. Wyman, Paper Walls; America and the Refugee Crisis, 1938–1941 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1968), 161.

53.Ibid., 163.

54.Marc-William Palen, “Protection, Federation and Union: The Global Impact of the McKinley Tariff Upon the British Empire, 1890–94,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 38, no. 3 (2010): 396.

55.Wyman, Paper Walls, 167.

56.Palen, “Protection, Federation and Union,” 396.

57.Friedrich August Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (New York: Routledge, 1976).

58.Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged (New York: Penguin, 2005).

59.Kristen Hopewell, Breaking the WTO: How Emerging Powers Disrupted the Neoliberal Project (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), ix.

60.Ibid., 1.

61.Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox, 76.

62.Hopewell, Breaking the WTO, ix.

63.Robert Howse, “The World Trade Organization 20 Years on: Global Governance by Judiciary,” European Journal of International Law 27, no. 1 (2016): 10.

64.Jeffry A. Frieden, Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), 348, 351.

65.Serdar Altay, “Hegemony, Private Actors, and International Institutions: Transnational Corporations as the Agents of Transformation of the Trade Regime from GATT to the WTO” (PhD diss., University of Trento, 2012), 15.

66.Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox, 75.

67.Hopewell, Breaking the WTO, 11.

68.Frieden, Global Capitalism, 347.

69.Henry George, Progress and Poverty, 9.

70.Mary Elizabeth Lease, “Wall Street Owns the Country,” History Is a Weapon, http://www.historyisaweapon.org/defcon1/marylease.html.

71.“The Omaha Platform: Launching the Populist Party,” The U.S. Survey Course on The Web, http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5361/.

72.William Jennings Bryan, “Cross of Gold Speech,” July 9, 1896. https://wwnorton.com/college/history/archive/reader/trial/directory/1890_1914/ch20_cross_of_gold.htm.

73.Ibid.

74.Megan Slack, “From the Archives: President Teddy Roosevelt’s New Nationalism Speech,” The White House, Dec. 6, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/12/06/archives-president-teddy-roosevelts-new-nationalism-speech.

75.Gene Bernardini, “The Origins and Development of Racial Anti-Semitism in Fascist Italy,” The Journal of Modern History 49, no. 3 (1977): 436.

76.Taken from Richard Wagner, “Prose Works. 3. The Theatre,” trans. William Ashton Ellis (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1894), 79–100. Essay originally published in Richard Wagner, Sämtliche Schriften und Dichtungen: Volume V (Leipzig: Breikopf & Härtel: 1850), 66–85.

77.Houston Stewart Chamberlain, The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, trans. John Lees (London: John Lane, 1911), 331.

78.Ben Macri, Vassar ‘99. “Anti-Semitism,” 1896, http://projects.vassar.edu/1896/antisemitism.html.

79.Robert D. Johnston, “The Age of Reform: A Defense of Richard Hofstadter Fifty Years On,” The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 6, no. 2 (2007): 132.

80.Facundo Alvaredo, The World Inequality Report (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 182.

81.Alvaredo et al., The World Inequality Report, 182.

82.Kerry A. Dolan, ed., “The Definitive Ranking of The Wealthiest Americans in 2021,” Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/forbes-400/.

83.“Bernie Sanders on Trade and U.S. Jobs,” FEELTHEBERN.ORG, https://feelthebern.org/bernie-sanders-on-trade/.

84.Reuters Staff, “UK’s Labour Vows Action on ‘Tax and Wage Cheat’ Multinationals,” Reuters, Nov. 22, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/britain-election-labour/uks-labour-vows-action-on-tax-and-wage-cheat-multinationals-idUSL8N2824KM.

85.Reuters Staff, “Hollande: “Mom véritable adversaire, c’est le monde de la finance,” La Tribune, Jan. 22, 2012, https://www.latribune.fr/actualites/economie/france/20120122trib000679586/hollande-mon-veritable-adversaire-c-est-le-monde-de-la-finance.html.

86.Jeremy Corbyn, “Jeremy Corbyn Speech at Labour’s Campaign Launch,” Labour, May 9, 2017, https://labour.org.uk/press/jeremy-corbyn-speech-at-labours-campaign-launch/.

87.Adam Bienkov, “Jeremy Corbyn’s General Election Campaign Lauch Speech in Full,” Insider, May 9, 2017, https://www.businessinsider.com/jeremy-corbyn-labour-party-general-election-campaign-launch-speech-in-full-2017-5.

88.“Transcript: Bernie Sanders’s Full Speech at the 2016 DNC,” The Washington Post, July 26, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/07/26/transcript-bernie-sanderss-full-speech-at-the-2016-dnc/.

89.William Echikson, “Viktor Orbán’s Anti-Semitism Problem,” POLITICO, May 13, 2019, https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-anti-semitism-problem-hungary-jews/.

90.Jason Horowitz, “Where Does Italy’s Enfeebled Five Star Find Itself? At the Center of Power,” New York Times, Aug. 22, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/22/world/europe/italy-politics-five-star-democratic-party.html.

91.Vona Gábor, “Az Agónia Elkezdődött és új Világrendnek Kell Épülnie,” Mandiner.hu, May 6, 2013, https://mandiner.hu/cikk/20130506_vona_gabor_az_agonia_elkezdodott_es_uj_vilagrendnek_kell_epulnie.

92.Eric Thayer, “Transcript: Donald Trump’s Victory Speech,” New York Times, Nov. 9, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/us/politics/trump-speech-transcript.html.

93.Guardian Staff, “Donald Trump Calls Covid-19 ‘Kung Flu’ at Tulsa Rally,” The Guardian, June 20, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/20/trump-covid-19-kung-flu-racist-language.

94.“Top French Socialist and Anti-Racism Campaigner Faces Probe for Anti-Semitic Macron Tweet,” The Local, Nov. 21, 2017, https://www.thelocal.fr/20171121/top-french-socialist-and-anti-racism-campaigner; “Top French Socialist Booted from Party over Anti-Semitic Tweet,” The Times of Israel, Nov. 22, 2017, https://www.timesofisrael.com/top-french-socialist-booted-from-party-over-anti-semitic-tweet/.

Chapter 11

1.“The Omaha Platform: Launching the Populist Party,” http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5361/.

2.Voeltz, “Coxey’s Army in Oregon, 1894,” 271.

3.Vladimir Ilʹich Lenin, “Letter to the Secretary of the Socialist Propaganda League,” https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1915/nov/09.html.

4.Fortier, “Gobineau and German Racism,” 346.

5.Steven E. Ascheim, “A Critical Introduction.” In, Mosse, George L. The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich. (United States: University of Wisconsin Press, 2021), p. xiii.

6.Raul Cârstocea, “Anti-Semitism in Romania: Historical Legacies, Contemporary Challenges,” European Center for Minority Issues (2014): 7.

7.I. Michael Aronson, “Russian Commissions on the Jewish Question in the 1880’s,” East European Quarterly 14, no. 1 (1980): 60.

8.Phillip Connor, “Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015,” Pew Research Center, Aug. 2, 2016, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/.

9.Funke and Trebesch, “Right-Wing Extremism in Europe,” 7–8.

10.Danielle Lee Tomson, “The Rise of Sweden Democrats: Islam, Populism and the End of Swedish Exceptionalism,” Brookings, Mar. 25, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-rise-of-sweden-democrats-and-the-end-of-swedish-exceptionalism/.

11.Krisztian Szabados, “The Particularities and Uniqueness of Hungary’s Jobbik,” in The European Far Right: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Giorgos Charalambous (Norway: Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2, 2015), 53.

12.“Transcript: Donald Trump’s Victory Speech,” New York Times, Nov. 9, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/us/politics/trump-speech-transcript.html.

13.Ibid., 50.

14.Ibid., 49.

15.Ibid.

16.Sue Reid, “Torn Apart by an Open Door for Migrants: Sweden Is Seen as Europe’s Most Liberal Nation, but Violent Crime Is Soaring and the Far Right Is on the March, Reports SUE REID,” DailyMail.com, Nov. 13, 2015, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3317978/Torn-apart-open-door-migrants-Sweden-seen-Europe-s-liberal-nation-violent-crime-soaring-Far-Right-march-reports-SUE-REID.html.

17.“Reality Check: Is Malmo the ‘Rape Capital’ of Europe?,” BBC News, Feb. 24, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-39056786.

18.Alexander Stille, “How Matteo Salvini Pulled Italy to the Far Right,” The Guardian, Aug. 9, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/aug/09/how-matteo-salvini-pulled-italy-to-the-far-right.

19.David Duke quoted in Thomas Grumke, “Globalized Anti-Globalists—The Ideological Basis of the Internationalization of Right-Wing Extremism,” in The Extreme Right in Europe: Current Trends and Perspectives, ed. Uwe Backes and Patrick Moreau (Oakville, CT: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012), 325.

20.Formerly on their website, accessed in February 2019, which has been deleted.

21.Andreas Kemper, “AfD, Pegida and the New Right in Germany,” The European far Right: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (2015): 47.

22.Jan Willem Duyvendak and Josip Kesic, “The Rise of Nativism in Europe,” Europe Now, Feb. 1, 2018, https://www.europenowjournal.org/2018/01/31/the-rise-of-nativism-in-europe/#_ftnref3.

23.Jason Wilson and Aaron Flanagon, “The Racist Replacement Theory Explained,” Hatewatch, Southern Poverty Law Center, May 17, 2022, https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2022/05/17/racist-great-replacement-conspiracy-theory-explained.

24.Gene Bernardini, “The Origins and Development of Racial Anti-Semitism in Fascist Italy,” The Journal of Modern History 49, no. 3 (1977): 437.

25.Bridge Initiative Team, “Factsheet: Sweden Democrats,” Bridge, May 14, 2020, https://bridge.georgetown.edu/research/factsheet-sweden-democrats/.

26.David Wearing, “Labour Has Slipped Rightwards on Immigration. That Needs to Change,” The Guardian, July 25, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jul/25/labour-immigration-jeremy-corbyn-attitudes.

27.Megan Apper, “Bernie Sanders on Immigration in 2007 Video: This Is a Bad Bill for American Workers,” BuzzFeed News, Feb. 19, 2016, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/meganapper/bernie-sanders-on-immigration-in-2007-video-this-is-a-bad-bi.

28.Richard Orange, “Mette Frederiksen: The Anti-immigration Left Leader Set to Win Power in Denmark,” The Guardian, May 11, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/11/denmark-election-matte-frederiksen-leftwing-immigration.

29.Pinto, “Fascist Ideology Revisited,” 469.

30.David D. Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition and Italian Fascism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1979), 75.

31.Zeëv Sternhell, “Fascism: Reflections on the Fate of Ideas in Twentieth-Century History,” in Reassessing Political Ideologies: The Durability of Dissent, ed. Michael Freeden (London and New York: Routledge, 2001): 99.

32.A. Smith, “The Land and Its People,” 88.

33.Pinto, “Fascist Ideology Revisited,” 469–70.

34.Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany & Austria, 33.

35.Paul Lucardie, “Religious Parties in a Secular Society: The Dutch Paradox,” in Constellations of Value: European Perspectives on the Intersections of Religion, Politics and Society, ed. Christoph Jedan (Berlin: LIT, 2013), 143.

36.Pinto, “Fascist Ideology Revisited: Zeev Sternhell and His Critics,” 469.

37.George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2021), 8.

38.George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology, 9.

39.Zeev Sternhell, “How to Think about Fascism and Its Ideology,” Constellations 15, no. 3 (2008): 281.

40.Pinto, “Fascist Ideology Revisited,” 469.

41.Ibid., 471.

42.Marsella, “Enrico Corradini’s Italian Nationalism,” 205.

43.Joris Gijsenbergh, “Democracy’s Various Defenders: The Struggle Against Political Extremism in the Netherlands, 1917–1940,” in Historical Perspectives on Democracies and their Adversaries, ed. Joost Augusteijn, Constant Hijzen, and Mark Leon De Vries (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 69–98.

44.Richard Drake, “The Theory and Practice of Italian Nationalism, 1900–1906,” The Journal of Modern History 53, no. 2 (1981): 218.

45.David D. Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition and Italian Fascism (United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 1979), 120.

46.See Pinto, “Fascist Ideology Revisited: Zeev Sternhell and His Critics.”

47.Vona Gábor, “Az Agónia Elkezdődött és új Világrendnek Kell Épülnie,” Mandiner.hu, May 6, 2013, https://mandiner.hu/cikk/20130506_vona_gabor_az_agonia_elkezdodott_es_uj_vilagrendnek_kell_epulnie; Thomas K. Grose, “Europe’s Nationalists Target Climate Action,” U.S. News, https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2019-05-08/europes-far-right-focuses-on-climate-change-instead-of-immigration.

48.Peter J. Hotez, “The Antiscience Movement Is Escalating, Going Global and Killing Thousands,” Scientific American, Mar. 29, 2021, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-antiscience-movement-is-escalating-going-global-and-killing-thousands/.

49.Andrew Jewett, “How Americans Came to Distrust Science,” Boston Review, Dec. 8, 2020, https://bostonreview.net/articles/andrew-jewett-science-under-fire/.

50.Carla Montuori Fernandes et al., “The Denial of Science in the Antisystem Populist Rhetoric,” American Academic Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sciences 85, no. 1 (2022): 188.

51.Cristóbal Bellolio, “An Inquiry into Populism’s Relation to Science,” Politics (2022): 1.

52.Tom Nichols, The Death of Expertise: The Campaign Against Established Knowledge and Why It Matters (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 2.

53.Cristóbal Bellolio, “An Inquiry into Populism’s Relation to Science,” 5.

54.Kevin Freking, “Trump Tweets Words ‘He Won’; Says Vote Rigged, Not Conceding,” Associated Press, Nov. 16, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-tweets-he-won-not-conceding-9ce22e9dc90577f7365d150c151a91c7.

55.Krisztián Szabados, “Can We Win the War on Science? Understanding the Link between Political Populism and Anti-Science Politics,” Populism 2, no. 2 (2019): 207–36.

56.Darren Loucaides, “In Italy, Five Star Movement’s War on Journalism Is Picking Up Pace,” Columbia Journalism Review, June 13, 2019, https://www.cjr.org/analysis/italy-five-star-movement.php.

57.Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews, The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html.

58.Eric J. Oliver and Wendy M. Rahn, “Rise of the Trumpenvolk: Populism in the 2016 Election,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 667, no. 1 (2016): 190.

59.Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany & Austria, 33.

60.Zeev Sternhell, Mario Sznajder, and Maia Ahseri, The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution, trans. David Maisel. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 10.

61.Jason Sharlet, “‘He’s the Chosen One to Run America’: Inside the Cult of Trump, His Rallies Are Church and He Is the Gospel,” Vanity Fair, June 18, 2020, https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/06/inside-the-cult-of-trump-his-rallies-are-church-and-he-is-the-gospel.

62.George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2021), 9.

63.Aila Slisco, “One-Quarter of White Evangelicals Believe QAnon ‘Storm’ Is Coming to ‘Restore Rightful Leaders,’” Newsweek, May 28, 2021, https://www.newsweek.com/one-quarter-white-evangelicals-believe-qanon-storm-coming-restore-rightful-leaders-1596086.

64.Jason Horowitz, “Hobbits and the Hard Right: How Fantasy Inspires Italy’s Potential New Leader,” New York Times, Sept. 21, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/21/world/europe/giorgia-meloni-lord-of-the-rings.html.

65.John Last, “How ‘Hobbit Camps’ Rebirthed Italian Fascism,” Atlas Obscura, Oct. 3, 2017, https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/hobbit-camps-fascism-italy.

66.Ibid.

67.Jason Horowitz, “Hobbits and the Hard Right.”

68.Claudia Goldin, “The Work and Wages of Single Women, 1870 to 1920,” The Journal of Economic History 40, no. 1 (1980): 81.

69.Ann Heilmann, New Woman Fiction: Women Writing First-Wave Feminism (Houndmills: Macmillan Press; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 5.

70.Lucia Re, “Italians and the Invention of Race: The Poetics and Politics of Difference in the Struggle over Libya, 1890–1913,” California Italian Studies 1, no. 1 (2010): 4.

71.Lauren Alex O’Hagan, “Contesting Women’s Right to Vote: Anti-Suffrage Postcards in Edwardian Britain,” Visual Culture in Britain 21, no. 3 (2020): 335.

72.Julia Christie-Robin, Belinda T. Orzada, and Dilia López-Gydosh, “From Bustles to Bloomers: Exploring the Bicycle’s Influence on American Women’s Fashion, 1880–1914,” The Journal of American Culture 35, no. 4 (2012): 316.

73.Heilmann, New Woman Fiction: Women Writing First-Wave Feminism, 36.

74.Rafal Soborski, “National Populism and Fascism: Blood and Soil against Globalization,” in Ideology in a Global Age, ed. Rafal Soborski (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 107–39.

75.Barry J. Balleck, Hate Groups and Extremist Organizations in America: An Encyclopedia (Santa Barbara, CA; Denver, CO: ABC-CLIO, 2019), 131.

76.Francis Fukuyama quoted in The Washington Post, “Authoritarianism Is Surging. Can Liberal Democracy Fight Back? Review of ‘Liberalism and Its Discontents’ by Francis Fukuyama and ‘The Age of the Strongman’ by Gideon Rachman,” Review by Carlos Lozada, May 13, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/05/13/fukuyama-rachman/.

77.“Europe and Right-Wing Nationalism: A Country-by-Country Guide,” BBC, Nov. 13, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006; Marc Santora, “Poland Election: Law and Justice Party Holds on to Power, Early Returns Show,” New York Times, Oct. 13, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/13/world/europe/poland-election.html.

78.National Front, http://www.nationalfront.org/ (since removed from the Web).

79.Thomas Friedman, The World Is flat (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2016).

Part V

1.The Coalition Forces that came together to rebuff Napoleon Bonaparte’s attempt to expand French territory and colonize Europe were the United Kingdom Austrian Empire, Kingdom of Prussia, Kingdom of Spain, Kingdom of Naples and Sicily, Kingdom of Sardinia, Dutch Republic, Russian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, Kingdom of Portugal, Kingdom of Sweden, and various Confederation of the Rhine and Italian states at differing times in the wars.

2.Kevin H. O’Rourke, “The Worldwide Economic Impact of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1793–1815,” Journal of Global History 1, no. 1 (2006): 123–49.

3.Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2001), 9.

4.Ibid.

5.Ibid., 8.

Chapter 12

1.Richard B. Elrod, “The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System,” World Politics 28 (1976): 159.

2.Ibid., 160.

3.Fredrich von Gentz quoted in Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present (New York: Penguin, 2012), 4.

4.This includes “the Napoleonic Wars of 1800–1815. If we focus on wars between Polanyi’s ‘Great Powers’—the Austro-Sardinian War (1848–49), the Roman Republic War (1849), The War of Italian Unification (1859), The Seven Weeks War (1866), and the Franco-Prussian War (1970–71) amounted to a total of 17.7 months.” Eric Royal Lybeck, “The Myth of the Hundred Years Peace: War in the Nineteenth Century,” in At War for Peace, ed. Mohammadbagher Forough (Oxford: Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2010), 3. See also Richard J. Evans, The Pursuit of Power: Europe 1815–1914 (New York: Penguin, 2016).

5.Eric Royal Lybeck, “The Myth of the Hundred Years Peace: War in the Nineteenth Century” (2010), 3. See also Evans, The Pursuit of Power, 3.

6.Kyle Lascurettes, “The Concert of Europe and Great Power Governance Today: What Can the Order of 19th-Century Europe Teach Policymakers about International Order in the 21st Century?,” RAND National Defense Research Institute Santa Monica United States (RAND Corporation, 2017), 4.

7.Ibid., 4.

8.Lybeck, “The Myth of the Hundred Years Peace: War in the Nineteenth Century,” 1.

9.Meredith Reid Sarkees, Frank Whelon Wayman, and J. David Singer, “Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars: A Comprehensive Look at Their Distribution over Time, 1816–1997,” International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 1 (2003): 62.

10.David Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity: An Inquiry into the Conditions of Cultural Change (Hoboken: Blackwell Publishers, 1989), 264.

11.Kevin H. O’Rourke, “The Worldwide Economic Impact of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1793–1815,” Journal of Global History 1, no. 1 (2006): 148.

12.Benjamin H. Higgins, “Agriculture and War: A Comparison of Agricultural Conditions in the Napoleonic and World War Periods,” Agricultural History 14, no. 1 (1940): 7.

13.O’Rourke, “The Worldwide Economic Impact of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1793–1815,” 5.

14.E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital 1848–1875 (London: Little, Brown and Co., 1977), 49.

15.Mabel C. Buer, “The Trade Depression Following the Napoleonic Wars,” Economica 2 (1921): 162.

16.Higgins, “Agriculture and War,” 2.

17.Buer, “The Trade Depression Following the Napoleonic Wars,” 160.

18.J. H. Clapham, “The Economic Condition of Europe After the Napoleonic War,” The Scientific Monthly 11, no. 4 (1920): 322.

19.Higgins, “Agriculture and War,” 9.

20.Joseph A Schumpeter, Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, Volume I (London: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1923), 267. Digital Library of India Item 2015.150123 https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.150123/mode/2up.

21.Higgins, “Agriculture and War,” 9.

22.Schumpeter, Business Cycles Vol. I, 276.

23.Buer, “The Trade Depression Following the Napoleonic Wars,” 169.

24.Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital 1848–1875, 45.

25.Ibid., 44.

26.Ibid., 45.

27.According to Buer: “it was estimated that between 1815–25, £36,000,000 was lent to France, £9,000,000 to the United States and £10,000,000 to Russia.” At the same time, “in 1824–25 there were forty-one foreign and other trading ventures set up with nominal capitals to the amount of £32,840,000 on account of which upwards of £3,000,000 was actually paid. This makes a total of £8,000,000, a surprising one for that period and for an exhausted country.” Buer, The Trade Depression Following the Napoleonic Wars, 167.

28.Charles Kindleberger, “The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe, 1820–1875,” in The Rise of Free Trade, ed. Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1997), 195.

29.Charles Kindleberger, “The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe, 1820–1875,” The Journal of Economic History 35, no. 1 (1975): 26.

30.Ibid., 31.

31.Ibid.

32.Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital 1848–1875, 49.

33.Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 202.

34.Christopher Kennedy, The Evolution of Great World Cities: Urban Wealth and Economic Growth (Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 96.

35.Michael D. Bordo and Eugene N. White, “A Tale of Two Currencies: British and French Finance during the Napoleonic Wars,” The Journal of Economic History 51, no. 2 (1991): 315.

36.Kennedy, The Evolution of Great World Cities, 96.

37.Ibid.

38.Ibid., 99.

39.Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century. New and Updated Edition (London: Verso, 2010), 267.

40.Ibid., 55.

41.Robert Latham, “History, Theory, and International Order: Some Lessons from the Nineteenth Century,” Review of International Studies 23, no. 4 (1997): 426.

42.Michele Fratianni and Andreas Hauskrecht, “From the Gold Standard to a Bipolar Monetary System,” Open Economies Review 9, no. 1 (1998): 621.

43.Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, 55.

44.Ibid., 56.

45.Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 32.

46.Luca Einaudi, Money and Politics: European Monetary Unification and the International Gold Standard (1865–1873) (Oxford: Oxford University Press on Demand, 2001), 21.

47.Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylor, “Globalization and Capital Markets,” in Globalization in Historical Perspective, ed. Michael D. Bordo, Alan M. Taylor, and Jeffrey G. Williamson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 124.

48.Giulio M. Gallarotti, The Anatomy of an International Monetary Regime: The Classical Gold Standard, 1880–1914. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995): 141.

49.Gallarotti, The Anatomy of an International Monetary Regime, 142.

50.Einaudi, Money and Politics, 20.

51.Ibid., 13.

52.Einaudi, Money and Politics, 37.

53.Ibid.

54.Ibid., 54–55.

55.See Bordo and White, “A Tale of Two Currencies”; Gallarotti, The Anatomy of an International Monetary Regime; Joseph S Nye, “The Changing Nature of World Power,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 2 (1990): 177–92; Kindleberger, “The Rise of Free Trade.”

56.Lord Stanley quoted in Einaudi, Money and Politics, 55.

57.Ibid.,189.

58.Ibid., 195.

59.Eric Helleiner, “Economic Nationalism as a Challenge to Economic Liberalism? Lessons from the 19th Century,” International Studies Quarterly 46, no. 3 (2002): 313.

60.Ibid., 315.

61.Fredrick List quoted in Helleiner, “Economic Nationalism as a Challenge to Economic Liberalism?,” 311–12.

62.Gallarotti, The Anatomy of an International Monetary Regime, 145.

63.World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2013: Factors Shaping the Future of World Trade, 36.

64.Kennedy, The Evolution of Great World Cities, 97.

65.Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy (New York: WW Norton & Company, 2011), 25.

66.Ibid., 36.

67.Harold James and Kevin H O’Rourke, “Italy and the First Age of Globalization, 1861–1940,” Bank of Italy Economic History Working Paper, no. 16 (2011): 13.

68.Rudiger Dornbusch and Jacob A Frenkel, “The Gold Standard Crisis of 1847,” Journal of International Economics 16, no. 1–2 (1984): 2.

69.Mark Traugott, “The Mid-Nineteenth-Century Crisis in France and England,” Theory and Society 12, no. 4 (1983): 457.

70.Ibid.

71.Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity, 262.

72.Ibid., 261–62.

73.J. S. Mill quoted in Dornbusch and Frenkel, “The Gold Standard Crisis of 1847,” 2.

74.Brian S. Roper, The History of Democracy: A Marxist Interpretation (London: Pluto Press, 2013), 179.

75.Traugott, “The Mid-Nineteenth-Century Crisis,” 457.

76.Ibid.

77.Ibid., 458.

78.Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 23.

79.Ibid.

80.Mike Rapport, “1848: European Revolutions,” in The Edinburgh Companion to the History of Democracy: From Pre-History to Future Possibilities, ed. Benjamin Isakhan and Stephen Stockwell (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 282.

81.Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 39.

82.Rapport, “1848: European Revolutions,” 286.

83.Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 50.

84.Ibid.

85.Ibid., 51.

Chapter 13

1.Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylor, Global Capital Markets: Integration, Crisis, and Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 125.

2.Meredith Reid Sarkees, Frank Whelon Wayman, and J. David Singer, “Inter-state, Intra-state, and Extra-state wars: A Comprehensive Look at Their Distribution over Time, 1816–1997,” International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 1 (2003): 62.

3.Jeffry A. Frieden, Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century (WW Norton & Company, 2006), 282.

4.Frieden, Global Capitalism, 279, 347.

5.Ibid., 280–81.

6.Ibid., 288.

7.Ibid.

8.Ibid.

9.Andrew G. Terborgh, “The Post-War Rise of World Trade: Does the Bretton Woods System Deserve Credit?” IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc no. 78/03, 2003, p. 13.

10.Frieden, Global Capitalism, 289.

11.Ibid.

12.Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, 283.

13.Barry Eichengreen, Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the International Monetary System. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 30.

14.A. D. Chandler, “The Competitive Performance of US Industrial Enterprises since the Second World War,” Business History Review 68, no. 1 (1994): 3.

15.Ibid., 4.

16.Eichengreen, Exorbitant Privilege, 30.

17.Fratianni and Hauskrecht, “From the Gold Standard to a Bipolar Monetary System,” 619.

18.Ibid., 5.

19.Ibid.

20.Kennedy, The Evolution of Great World Cities, 102.

21.Ibid.

22.Frieden, Global Capitalism, 293.

23.Geoffrey Jones, Multinationals and Global Capitalism: From the Nineteenth to the Twenty First Century (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

24.Frieden, Global Capitalism, 283.

25.Chandler, “The Competitive Performance of US Industrial Enterprises since the Second World War,,” 51.

26.Ibid., 46.

27.Frieden, Global Capitalism, 296.

28.Obstfeld and Taylor, Global Capital Markets, 125.

29.Frieden, Global Capitalism, 291.

30.Ibid., 291–92.

31.William Glenn Gray, “Floating the System: Germany, the United States, and the Breakdown of Bretton Woods, 1969–1973,” Diplomatic History 31, no. 2 (2007): 296.

32.See Frieden Global Capitalism; Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century; John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” in International Regimes, ed. Stephen Krasner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

33.Terborgh, “The Post-War Rise of World Trade,” 23.

34.Kennedy, The Evolution of Great World Cities, 102.

35.Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity, 141.

36.Frieden, Global Capitalism, 345.

37.Gray, “Floating the System,” 295.

38.Frieden, Global Capitalism, 342.

39.Obstfeld and Taylor, Global Capital Markets, 125.

40.Jeffry A Frieden, “Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance,” International Organization 45, no. 4 (1991): 346.

41.Gray, “Floating the System,” 295.

42.Ibid., 434.

43.Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity, 141.

44.Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, 2.

45.Ibid., 287.

46.Ibid., 287.

47.Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity, 168.

48.Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, 72.

49.“The Reagan-Thatcher Revolution,” Deutsche Welle, https://www.dw.com/en/the-reagan-thatcher-revolution/a-16732731.

50.John Lanchester, “Margaret Thatcher’s Revolution,” The New Yorker, July 29, 2013, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/05/1979-and-all-that.

51.Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity, 168.

52.Ibid., 170.

Conclusion

1.Henry George, Progress and Poverty an Inquiry into the Cause of Industrial Depressions and of Increase of Want with Increase of Wealth: The Remedy (Kingsport Press, 1935), 6.

2.Anthony M. Nadler, Making the News Popular: Mobilizing U.S. News Audiences, 114 (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2016), 39.

3.Julien Gorbach, “Not Your Grandpa’s Hoax: A Comparative History of Fake News,” American Journalism 35, no. 2 (2018): 248.

4.Jonathan Albright, “Welcome to the Era of Fake News,” Media and Communication 5, no. 2 (2017): 87.

5.Peter Robins, ed., “On the Path to Day X: The Return of Germany’s Far Right,” New York Times, June 5, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/25/world/europe/germany-nazi-far-right.html.

6.“Germany Arrests 25 Suspected of Planning to Overthrow Government,” New York Times, December 7, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/07/world/europe/germany-coup-arrests.html.

7.“Why Is There a Growing Far-Right Threat in Italy?,” TRTWorld, June 29, 2021, https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/why-is-there-a-growing-far-right-threat-in-italy-47933.

8.“SUPO: Right-Wing Terrorism a Growing Threat in Finland,” Mar. 23, 2021, https://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/news-in-brief/18916-supo-right-wing-terrorism-a-growing-threat-in-finland.html.

9.See Norman Angell, Essays Towards Peace, by Rationalist Peace Society; ed. John Mackinnon Robertson, p. ix. https://archive.org/details/essaystowardspea00ratiiala/page/74/mode/2up.

10.S. H. Swinny, “Rationalism and International Righteousness,” in Essays Towards Peace (Watts, 1913), 78.