CHAPTER 6

The Defense of the Realm

A la Tierra Han Grand Debdo de Amarla e de Acrescentarla e Morir por Ella

In order to maintain his people in peace, the king had to protect them against external enemies (E 2, 1, 5; SP 2, 1, 5; 2, 10, 1–3).1 The Espéculo (3, 1–8) and, more fully, the Partidas (2, 18–29) offered a thorough exposition of military doctrine, based partly on the fourth-century Roman author Vegetius, whose book Juan Gil de Zamora summarized.² Also infusing the discussion of warfare were practices developed during the reconquest and recorded in municipal fueros.³ The king explained that warfare has two natures, evil and good, in that it caused great destruction, but when properly conducted led to peace, happiness, and friendship. Echoing St. Augustine’s notion that “the purpose even of war is peace” (De Civitate Dei, 15.4), he remarked that it “seems a great marvel… that peace should be gained by war” (E 3, 5, pr.). A war fought to repossess a man’s land or rights or to protect himself and his property was just, but a war lacking a righteous cause was always unjust (SP 2, 23, pr., 1).⁴ Surely the king believed that the reconquest, fought to recover Christian lands usurped by the Muslims, was justified and that he would be assured of the help of God and of his friends (SP 2, 23, 2).⁵

Responding to Alfonso X’s request for help in suppressing the Mudéjar revolt in 1264, Jaime I, after citing familial obligations, acknowledged the power politics of the situation and the wisdom of diverting war from his own realm:

First, because I do not wish to betray my daughter [Queen Violante of Castile], nor my grandchildren, nor do I wish to disinherit them. Secondly, although I need not aid him out of valor or duty, yet I should help him because he is one of the most powerful men in the world, and if I do not aid him now and he emerges safely from this conflict in which he now finds himself, he will always hold me as his mortal enemy… and if he can pressure me he will do so as often as he can and he will have good reason. Thirdly… if the king of Castile loses his kingdom we will be badly off in our own kingdom. Therefore it is better to hasten to defend his kingdom now, than to have to defend ours later.6

Defending One’s Country and Dying for It

The royal jurists noted that there were three reasons that justified going to war: to defend the faith; to serve one’s lord; and to protect oneself and one’s country. A people who acted otherwise dishonored their king, committed treason, and forever gave the kingdom and its inhabitants an evil reputation (SP 2, 19, pr., 1–2). The natural bond between the land and its people, the king’s natural vassals, required everyone to participate in the defense of the realm that “touches the king himself and the kingdom” (E 3, 4, pr.; 3, 5, 2). No one was excused because “the injury and damage touches all” (SP 2, 19, 3) and “it is the defense of the king who is lord of the kingdom that is common to all” (E 3, 5, 10). The Asturian hermandad of 1277 pledged “to defend and to protect the land of our lord the king,” and the bishops declared that the king intended “to guard his kingdoms from the dangers” on the frontier.⁷

Defense of the realm, moreover, might require that a man lay down his life for his country. Indeed, “a la tierra han grand debdo de amarla e de acres-centarla e morir por ella, si menester fuere” (men have a great debt to the land to love it, and increase it, and to die for it, if that should be necessary) (SP 4, 24, 4). “Those who die for the faith, or defending their country, or for the honor of their king” ought to receive greater compensation than those who only suffered bodily wounds. They also merited an eternal reward in paradise and a guarantee of undying fame (E 3, 7, 11; SP 2, 25, 3).⁸ The contemporary Poema de Fernán González also expressed that sentiment.⁹

In numerous charters requiring his vassals “to make war and peace,” King Alfonso reserved the right to demand military service, an inalienable attribute of sovereignty (FV 1, 1, 1).10 Everyone had to act quickly to quell rebellion, which, like poison, went directly to the heart of the kingdom and killed it. Failure to do so emboldened rebels, diminished royal authority, and besmirched the reputation of the kingdom and its people. That insistent tone was undoubtedly due to Enrique’s rebellion at the outset of the reign. Equally urgent was the obligation to oppose an invading army. No one was exempt from service, except those under fourteen or over seventy, the infirm, or those impeded by harsh weather. The call to arms might be made orally, or with bells or other noisemakers. Nevertheless, without awaiting a formal summons, everyone capable of bearing arms had to resist the enemy who threatened them all. The usual term of service was three months from departure from home, though in case of a siege, that term began upon arrival. If, for good reason, the king could not dismiss the troops at the end of three months, they had to remain. Troops stationed on the frontier had no fixed term and could not leave without permission (E 3, 1, 3; 3, 5, 1–6, 11; SP 2, 19, 3–9; 2, 26, 24).

The king sharply condemned as traitors those who fled at sight of the enemy or before an order to retreat was given, or neglected to defend the royal standard, or abandoned the host without permission, or dismissed the troops before his command (E 3, 3, 3; 3, 5, 5, 9–19; 3, 6, 1–6; FR 4, 19, 1–5). Deprived of their rank, faint-hearted knights suffered the ignominy of having their spurs, swords, and belts stripped (SP 2, 21, 25).¹¹ The Poema de Fernán González expressed the wish that whoever fled in battle “should lie in hell with Judas.”¹² In his songs of derision, the king mocked poorly equipped soldiers, wearing old and worn-out battle jackets, and vassals who neglected to answer the summons or to bring the required number of knights. He vented his wrath at cowards too terrified to go into battle and deserters who fled the horrors of war.¹³

Military Components

In order to conduct war effectively, men, horses, and arms had to be organized, supplies and engines of war requisitioned, and the enemy’s intentions and movements ascertained (SP 2, 23, 2–3). Military forces included the king, the adult male members of his family, the mesnada del rey, bishops, members of the military orders, magnates, knights, and urban militias.¹⁴ The mesnada was an elite corps of knights assigned to protect the king (E 2, 13, 5–6; SP 2, 9, 9).¹⁵ Prelates holding land from the king owed the service of a certain number of knights, but not if he was at war with Christians. Clerics traditionally were exempt from service, but they had to aid the defense of a town attacked by the Moors (PPBM 1, 6, 64, 74; SP 1, 6, 52). Although the prelates’ primary function was to offer spiritual sustenance, in October 1275, Archbishop Sancho II of Toledo lost his life battling the Marinids near Martos. Though his head was severed from his body and his hand cut off, the Moors returned his remains for burial in Toledo. The day of the warrior-bishop was not yet over.16

The military orders of Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara (and, to a lesser extent, the Templars and Hospitallers), founded in the second half of the twelfth century, garrisoned frontier castles and provided contingents for the royal army. The title of master given to the superior of each order emphasized his military leadership. Although Alfonso X attempted to persuade Santiago and Calatrava to transfer their principal seats to Andalucía, they were reluctant to do so. Determined to protect the coastline, in 1270 he created the Order of Santa María de España and named his son Sancho as alférez and admiral, but in 1274 Pedro Núñez held the military title of master. After the Moors massacred the knights of Santiago at Moclín in 1280, the king merged the Orders of Santiago and Santa María and appointed Pedro Núñez as master.¹⁷

Magnates and noble knights, whose primary duty was to defend the realm, were expected to possess the virtues of energy, honor, and strength (SP 2, 21, pr.).¹⁸ As a privileged military caste, exempt from direct taxation, magnates had to counsel the king and serve him in war. To maintain them, he gave them lands in full ownership or monetary stipends (soldadas). Alfonso X reportedly increased their stipends “in order to bind them more surely to his service.” The Cortes of Valladolid in 1258 (art. 17) mentioned a stipend of ten thousand maravedís. When a magnate came to court, he could bring no more than ten knights and had to pay his own expenses.¹⁹ The relationship between lords and vassals, treated in the Fourth Partida (4, 25, 1–13), will be discussed in chapter 10.

In combat, some knights were heavily armored and rode a la brida, that is, with their legs stretched straight out in the stirrups so they could use maximum force when attacking. Striving for speed and mobility, others, lightly armed with a lance and a sword, a thin coat-of-mail, and an iron cap, rode a la jineta in the Moorish style, with their legs bent in short stirrups. Knights with elongated shields, lances, cylindrical or bowled helmets, chain mail and armor, and horses with protective leather or mail are depicted in CSM 63.²⁰

Although the Espéculo speaks only incidentally of knighthood, the Partidas (2, 21, 1–25) offers a long disquisition, the first in Castilian, on the Orden de caualleria.²¹ Georges Martin argued that by associating the nobility with the ideals of knighthood, Alfonso X hoped to direct their tendency to indiscriminate violence to the defense of faith, king, and country.22 As men of substance, knights were called fijosdalgo, literally sons of wealth. Endowed with the virtues of gentility, prudence, loyalty, understanding, courage, moderation, and justice, they prepared to endure the hardships of war for the common good (SP 2, 21, 1–10; 2, 23, 27; 2, 26, 18).

Ordinarily, only a knight could create another knight. In the Cortes of Valladolid in 1258 (art. 23), and again at Seville in 1261 (art. 9), the king required a magnate to receive knighthood before he could marry or create knights. The king and his son and heir, though not knights, could confer knighthood because they were “heads of the knighthood.” For example, in 1219, during mass at Burgos, Fernando III “took from the altar the military sword as a sign of knighthood,” which the bishop had previously blessed.²³ Like his father, Alfonso X, who stated that “I became king and received knighthood” at Seville, probably girded himself with his arms after they were blessed by a bishop.²⁴ In celebrations intended to express the honor and esteem accorded to knights, he knighted Prince Edward in 1254, and in 1269 his grandson Dinis, the future king of Portugal.²⁵ An empress or queen could not confer knighthood, nor could priests and monks. Knighthood could not be purchased. Barred from receiving knighthood were women, priests, monks, the insane, boys under fourteen, the poor, the physically incapacitated, merchants, traitors, anyone condemned to death, or those receiving knighthood as a joke (SP 2, 21, 11–12).

The ceremony was endowed with religious significance as knighthood was compared to the priesthood and the investiture of arms was likened to priestly ordination. The royal jurists advised future knights to cleanse their minds and bodies and focus on beautiful things, “especially as their craft is harsh and cruel, as they have to wound and kill.” On the eve of investiture, the candidate’s fellow squires should bathe him, dress him in handsome clothes, and accompany him to church. There he spent the night in the vigil of arms asking God to protect him as one “entering on a career of death.” At daybreak, after mass, with spurs fastened and holding his sword in his right hand, he swore a threefold oath to give up his life for his faith, his lord, and his country. As a reminder of that oath, his sponsor gave him a ceremonial slap on the neck and kissed him as a sign of the brotherhood observed among knights. Then, an eminent knight removed the novice’s sword, thereby becoming his padrino or godfather. Georges Martin suggested that that act of disarmament reflected his amicable relationship with his fellow knights.²⁶ A special bond, comparable to that between a newly baptized person and his godparent, was created between the new knight and his padrino, whom he was bound to obey and protect, and also between him and the one who knighted him (SP 2, 21, 13–16).27 During the Cortes of Burgos in 1269 Alfonso X, after knighting Fernando de la Cerda, asked him to knight his brothers; but Jaime I, seeing the possibility of future contention, dissuaded Infante Sancho from receiving knighthood from Fernando, lest he seem to be subordinated to him.²⁸

The new knight had to observe an appropriate code of conduct. Mounted on horseback, wielding his sword, the mark of knighthood, he should dress elegantly in bright clothing signifying joy. His mantle, symbolizing humility, was his distinctive raiment. Temperate in his habits, the knight, while taking his meals, should seek inspiration by reading about great feats of arms and listening to minstrels singing songs of war. He ought never to use vulgar or arrogant language, except in battle to encourage or reprimand his followers. As motivation, he might call out the names of their sweethearts. As a sign of respect, he was entitled to sit at the front of the church, just below the clergy, and should only dine with another knight (Valladolid 1258, art. 24). His house was safeguarded against violent entry, and ordinarily, his horses and arms could not be seized as a pledge. Anyone seeking restitution from a knight absent on royal business or fulfilling his knightly duties had to await his return home. A knight accused of crime could not be tortured, except in case of treason. Should he be found guilty, he was spared the indignity of being dragged, mutilated, or hanged, but he might be beheaded or starved to death. It is difficult, however, to think of those alternatives as privileges. Aside from execution, his worst humiliation was forfeiture of his knighthood. If he sold or abused his horse or arms, or gambled them away, or gave them to wicked women, or pledged them, or engaged in commerce or a vile trade, he could be deprived of his knighthood. He would incur the death penalty if he fled in battle, abandoned a castle he was bound to defend, deserted his lord, or failed to rescue him or to give him his horse when his lord’s horse was killed. Before being executed, he was expelled from the order of knighthood. In a ceremony reminiscent of his initial investiture, a squire put his spurs on his feet and girded him with his sword, and then cut them off. Stripped of the honor and privileges of knighthood, he no longer had the right to be called a caballero. If the king spared his life, he could never again hold any public office (SP 2, 21, 17–25).

Municipal militia forces consisted of nonnoble knights (caballeros villanos) and foot soldiers (peones).²⁹ As the towns of Castile and Extremadura were now far removed from the frontier, many were reluctant to serve in Andalucía. Needing them for his wars against the Moors, Alfonso X, in the Cortes of Seville in 1252 (art. 45), required every man with a horse and arms to be prepared for war. Determined to make military service more attractive, in 1255 he granted tax exemptions to residents of Burgos who had a horse, arms, and body armor. In the following year he extended those exemptions to urban knights with arms and horses worth at least thirty maravedís and their dependents whose estimated wealth was less than one hundred maravedís. A knight’s widow was exempt unless she married a taxpayer, and so too was a knight’s son who, at age sixteen, chose to follow his father’s profession. A biannual muster usually held on 1 March and 29 September determined whether knights had the required horses and arms.30 The expense could be considerable. The Assembly of Jerez in 1268, for example, set the price of a perpunte or quilted battle jacket at one to one and a half maravedís; a shield with cords, straps, and a painted cap was twenty-five; and a painted saddle for a warhorse, with a bit and harness and gilded spurs, was twelve (arts. 10, 12). Tax exemptions were later given to other Castilian and Extremaduran towns.³¹

In April 1264 the Extremaduran towns, assembled in Seville, petitioned Queen Violante to intercede with the king concerning onerous taxation. In reporting his response, the Chronicle of Alfonso X incorrectly summarized the privileges of 1255–56.³² In fact, the king, in the Ordinance of Extremadura, clarified some aspects of those privileges and some laws in the Fuero real. He conceded tax exemptions to the brothers, sons, and nephews of knights until they came of age, and pledged a large sum of money and other privileges to those whom he personally knighted (arts. 4–5, 7–9, 12–15).³³ In subsequent years he confirmed the privileges of 1255–56 and the Ordinance of Extremadura.³⁴ Intent on fostering settlement in Arcos de la Frontera, in 1268 he exempted residents from military service except in the zone from the Guadalquivir to the Mediterranean, and conferred on knights the franchises enjoyed by knights in Seville. In 1273 he exempted the latter from several tributes.³⁵ Facing the Marinid invasion in 1275, he confirmed the exemptions given to municipal knights and their dependents.³⁶ Two years later he exempted them from the servicio then being collected in the kingdom of León.³⁷ While enjoying these benefits, some knights claimed exemptions for unqualified dependents or failed to attend the muster properly equipped.³⁸ Outraged by this dereliction, in 1276 the king authorized Zag de la Maleha to collect appropriate fines.³⁹

Aside from knights, infantrymen were important, not only in garrisoning castles, but also because they could move more easily in difficult terrain. Capable of enduring excessive heat and other hardships, they were armed with lances, javelins, knives, and daggers. Crossbowmen were especially effective, because their weapon could inflict great damage on a mounted knight. During sieges, foot soldiers expert in the use of artillery built and manned siege engines, including trebuchets and catapults, as well as wooden siege towers (SP 2, 22, 7; 2, 23, 24).

Military success often depended on the wisdom and judgment of the commander, who, by creating a cohesive force, “could best overcome the enemy” (E 3, 6, 1). The king was the supreme commander, or in his absence, the alférez, but in 1278–79 Infante Pedro directed the siege of Algeciras, and Sancho led the invasion of Granada in 1280.40 As “warfare is full of dangers and mishaps,” the king ought to seek the counsel of a master of the art of war, who could instill confidence in his troops and instruct them in the use of weapons and the care of horses and in the importance of avoiding quarrels and obeying promptly. Before engaging the enemy, he ought to pursue every advantage, including numerical superiority, the placement of troops, and the impact of atmospheric changes. Wise leadership opened possibilities, prevented troops from becoming a disorderly mob, and pointed toward victory (SP 2, 23, 4–11).⁴¹

Serving under the general officers were the adalid and the almocadén. The adalid (ar. al-dalil) had to guide his troops through familiar terrain, select encampments, appoint sentries, secure provisions, arrange foraging parties, set ambushes, and command infantry and almogávares (ar. al-mughāwir), usually lightly mounted warriors skilled in quick strikes.⁴² The king, on the recommendation of twelve adalides, would promote a man to this office and give him a banner, clothing, a horse, and weapons. Raised on a shield by twelve adalides and making the sign of the cross with his sword in all four directions, he should defy the enemies of faith, king, and country. The almocadén (ar. al-muqāddam) was an infantry commander appointed by the adalid on the recommendation of twelve almocadenes. As a sign of his office, the king gave him new clothing and entrusted him with a lance and a small pennant bearing his insignia. His twelve sponsors lifted him up four times on the shafts of their lances, and raising his lance and pennant, he made the same declaration as the adalid. Emphasizing the importance of promotion through the ranks, the royal jurists commented that just as a good foot soldier makes a good almocadén, a good almocadén makes a good almogávar, and the latter makes a good adalid (SP 2, 22, 1–6). Numerous adalides and almocadenes shared in the partition of Seville.⁴³

Standards or banners identified various military elements. The royal standard was square, and a magnate’s had scalloped edges. A commander of fifty to one hundred men used a triangular banner, and a long, narrow banner marked one with ten to fifty men. Each military order displayed its distinctive cross on its standards.⁴⁴ In the Cortes of Seville in 1250 Fernando III declared that a knight, rather than an artisan, should carry the municipal banner.45 Serving as a rallying point, the banner had to be defended at all costs. Flight with a standard was an act of treason, because it could incite everyone to flee. Banners were prized trophies of war and brought rewards to those who captured them (E 3, 5, 13–15, 18–19; SP 2, 23, 12–15).

Each company commander was responsible for punishing lapses of discipline and major crimes, namely, informing the enemy about troop movements, desertion, disobedience, fomenting dissension, fleeing in battle, attacking one another, stealing, losing or wasting supplies, interfering with justice, and violating contracts. Lest an informer infiltrate the host, each captain had to keep a written record of the men in his company. Anyone not listed would be killed immediately. Minor transgressions might draw an oral reprimand, a laceration, or a blow with a baton. Penalties for more serious crimes included confiscation, execution, starvation, imprisonment, denial of burial in sacred ground, disinterment, dismemberment, branding, and loss of a share in booty (SP 2, 28, 1–11; E 3, 6, 1–10; 3, 8, 1–9; FR 4, 19, 5).⁴⁶

Military and Naval Actions

Custody of the hundreds of castles dotting the landscape was of major importance.⁴⁷ By law all cities, towns, and fortresses belonged to the king and the kingdom and everyone had to defend them. Upon the king’s death, every alcaide (ar. al-qāʾ id) or castellan had to surrender his fortress to the new king who could assign it to whomever he wished. The alcaide pledged to maintain the fortress in a state of readiness and defend it, to serve the king and welcome him, and to accept his coinage. Asserting the principle that every fortress was ultimately held from the king, the law required everyone holding a castle from another lord to do homage to the king (SP 2, 13, 21–23).

Ordinarily, a royal herald gave custody of a castle to an alcaide who would be charged with treason if he lost it. When the king visited, his banner was raised on the highest tower as a sign that he had taken possession. Forbidden ever to surrender the castle, the alcaide had to maintain a garrison, post sentries, and provide food, water, clothing, weapons, and stones to be used as missiles. No one was to undertake a sally except by his order, and while relying on his own expertise, he should heed the counsel of skilled warriors. During a siege, he ought to conceal his losses and immediately repair any breach in the walls.⁴⁸ If he believed that he could not hold the castle and asked the king to relieve him, but was persistently refused, he could depart after dismissing his company, locking the gates, and returning the key to the king, or throwing it over the walls into the castle. Once he informed the local town council that he had yielded custody, he would not be liable if the castle was lost. Occasionally, as security for fulfillment of treaty obligations, kings pledged castles to one another. Whenever anyone conquered a city or castle, he had to cede it to the king on penalty of treason. The royal jurists, perhaps with Infante Enrique in mind, declared that the reason for this was to prevent any of the king’s relatives from seizing his lands (E 2, 7, 1–5; 2, 8, 1; 2, 9, pr., 1; SP 2, 18, 2–32).

Two stories perhaps having a historical basis suggest the hazards facing an alcaide. CSM 191 tells of a poor alcaide “who went to get his pay” and left his castle untended, except by his wife. Unfortunately, she fell off a cliff but was saved by the Virgin. CSM 185 relates that the Muslim alcaide of Belmez seized the alcaide of Chincoya and handed him over to the emir of Granada. Learning that only fifteen men guarded Chincoya, the emir demanded their surrender; rather than do so, they placed a statue of the Virgin on the walls and compelled the Moors to withdraw. The historicity of another example is unquestioned, as the king himself reported it. According to CSM 345, when the Mudéjars of Jerez revolted in 1264, Nuño González de Lara, the alcaide, appealed for help. When a small relieving band arrived, he abandoned the citadel, leaving behind a few ill-equipped men. Though the king reproached Nuño, his good friend, he failed to punish him as a traitor, as the Partidas required.49

Troops preparing for action were organized in different formations. A rounded block, for example, provided an effective defense against an enveloping enemy, while a wedge divided the enemy; a square protected the baggage train, and a corral of infantry guarded the king. As troops advanced, commanders maintained strict discipline lest the enemy pick off stragglers and stray animals. A vanguard and a rearguard protected against surprise attack (SP 2, 23, 16–17).

Typical military operations were raids, skirmishes, sieges, and pitched battles. Raids (algara, ar. al-gārah), carried out quickly and often at night, destroyed harvests, disrupted water supplies, foraged for food, and seized booty (SP 2, 23, 25–30).⁵⁰ In the spring of 1273, the king, hoping to subdue the Moors, ordered Fernando de la Cerda to destroy orchards and vineyards, the economic heart of Granada.⁵¹ CSM 344 and 374 described raiding parties, but, however destructive they might be, they could not bring the enemy to his knees.

A siege was more protracted, often requiring weeks or months.⁵² Sieges are illustrated in CSM 15, 28, and 99. Protected by a ditch, and sometimes by a palisade, the besiegers laid out their tents in streets marked by the officers’ banners. The royal tent was always in the center. Though skirmishes occurred, they were never decisive. Siege engines included the counterweight trebuchet, a wooden beam on a rotating axle, with a sling attached to the end of the beam, and capable of launching a projectile over the walls. The traction trebuchet was powered by a crew pulling ropes, and the hybrid trebuchet employed both the counterweight and the pulling crew.53 While battering rams attempted to demolish walls, miners worked to undermine them, and soldiers used ladders to scale them. Wooden castles moved up on wheels or logs enabled the besiegers to climb onto the walls. If not overcome by assault, the defenders, when deprived of food and water, would be compelled to surrender (SP 2, 23, 18–23, 26; E 3, 6, 8–9).

In 1261, after besieging Jerez for a month, Alfonso X, realizing that the siege would drag on, negotiated an accord allowing the Moors to remain, while a Castilian garrison was admitted into the citadel. Next, in February 1262, after a siege of nine and a half months, he received the surrender of Niebla. During the Mudéjar revolt, he besieged Jerez again but probably did not recover it until 1266.⁵⁴ Resolved to oust the Marinids from Algeciras, in August 1278 he sent Pedro Martínez de Fe, with eighty galleys and twenty-four ships, to establish a blockade. In the following February, he dispatched troops commanded by his son Pedro to complete the siege. As siege engines and cannons battered the walls, the Castilians attempted to sever the food supply, but after three months many men, believing their obligatory term of service was over, returned home. Those remaining suffered, unpaid, through a cold and wet winter. After a Muslim fleet of seventy-two ships destroyed four hundred Castilian ships on 24 July 1279, the remnants of the army abandoned the siege and retreated to Seville.⁵⁵

Pitched battles were rare, especially as the outcome could be disastrous (SP 2, 23, 27).⁵⁶ At Écija on 7 September 1275, the Marinids crushed the Castilians commanded by Nuño González de Lara and sent his severed head as a trophy to the emir of Granada. Then, on 20 October, at Martos, Archbishop Sancho II of Toledo was routed and killed.⁵⁷ A third battle at Moclín on 23 June 1280 also ended in disaster. Despite their victories, the Muslims made no significant territorial gains.⁵⁸ Infante Sancho achieved a measure of recompense when he overwhelmed the Moors near Granada on 25 June 1281.⁵⁹ The Cantigas de Santa Maria depict numerous scenes of warfare.⁶⁰

The Castilian kings had little need of a fleet until Fernando III engaged Ramón Bonifaz of Burgos to bring thirteen galleys and some smaller vessels to blockade Seville in 1247. Although he has been described as the first admiral of Castile he was never officially designated as such.⁶¹ In 1251, Fernando III authorized the “men of the sea,” settled in the barrio de la mar in Seville, to have their own alcalde de la mar, who, assisted by six experts in maritime law, would “judge every affair of the sea.” One could then appeal to the king. The mariners owed three months’ service at sea; beyond that he would pay their expenses. Twenty carpenters, three blacksmiths, and three alfajemes (ar. al-ḥajjām), barbers or surgeons, assisted them. Granted the honor of knights, they were exempt from sales taxes and were permitted to have a slaughterhouse.62

Expressing the hope that “he might have a fleet at sea so that he might be more feared” (CSM 376), Alfonso X summoned the ports on the Bay of Biscay to provide ships for a Moroccan invasion and later for the siege of Algeciras. Besides rebuilding the shipyards in Seville,⁶³ he contracted with twenty-one mariners from Cantabria, Catalonia, France, and Italy to serve as cómitres or ship captains. In return for lands, houses, and money, each one promised to maintain an armed galley for service.⁶⁴ In 1256 he contracted with Pisa and Marseilles to provide ten galleys for three months’ service,⁶⁵ and two years later he urged the Galician and Asturian towns to send their sailing ships and galleys to Cádiz on 1 May for the “affair of the crusade.”⁶⁶ He also appointed Roy López de Mendoza as the first almirante de la mar or admiral.⁶⁷ After Roy’s death, he named Juan García de Villamayor as adelantado de la mar with “all the rights that an admiral ought to have.”⁶⁸ In the expedition against Salé in Morocco in 1260, Pedro Martínez de Fe, incorrectly identified as admiral by the Chronicle of Alfonso X, held the fleet offshore while Juan García led the assault. Later, while commanding the fleet besieging Algeciras, Pedro Martínez was captured.⁶⁹

In the Partidas, Alfonso X, “the true creator of the Castilian naval force,”⁷⁰ described naval warfare. Mariners had to have a thorough knowledge of the sea and the winds. Their vessels had to be well constructed, adequately provisioned, and manned by loyal crews. As the fleet was comparable to an army, the admiral had the same power as if the king were present. An honorable person of good lineage, knowledgeable in maritime and landed affairs, he should be a courageous leader. As disobedience could lead to disaster, his crew, on penalty of death, should immediately execute his orders. By generously sharing booty with them, he would win their respect and loyalty. Prior to assuming office, he ought to keep a vigil in church. On the next day, dressed in rich silks, he would receive from the king a ring, a sword, and a royal standard, signifying the power of command. He should promise to defend the faith, the king, and the common good, even to the point of death (SP 2, 9, 24; 2, 24, 3). The Espéculo did not discuss the admiral’s functions, although it did have a formula of appointment for various officials, including an admiral; the fee for issuing the charter was two hundred maravedís (E 4, 12, 17, 55). Ship captains had similar authority. After twelve experienced seamen assessed the qualifications of a man aspiring to command, he would be clothed in red, be given a royal standard, and take possession of his galley. A navigator, familiar with currents, winds, weather, islands, and harbors, received a tiller and a rudder as a sign of his office. Also essential were marines armed with cross-bows and other weapons, and mariners who handled the everyday business of propelling the ship with oars or sails (SP 2, 24, 4–6).71

Ships should be constructed with duly seasoned wood and properly equipped with banks of oars, a rudder, sails, masts, anchors, ropes, and cables for towing. Also necessary were weapons, iron hooks to latch onto enemy ships, jars of lime to blind the enemy, jars of soap to make him slip, and liquid pitch or Greek fire (alquitrán, ar. al-qiṭrān) to burn his ships. Conserving food supplies, the crew should eat and drink in moderation and guard against too much wine. Given the hazards of naval warfare, it was essential that the crew be paid promptly and receive their share of booty (SP 2, 24, 7–10). Sailing ships of various types are illustrated in the Cantigas.⁷²

Lacking enough ships of his own, Alfonso X turned elsewhere. In 1264, for example, he persuaded Bonagiunta de Portovenere, a Genoese merchant, to build three galleys for the “admiral of Castile.” Two weeks later, Raimundo Danza di Vintimiglia promised Hugo Vento, “admiral of the king of Castile,” a loan for armament of the ships. As we hear no more of Admiral Hugo, Florentino Pérez Embid seems to be correct in noting that this was an isolated instance when the king attempted to secure Genoese collaboration.⁷³

Fleets guarding the strait intercepted enemy invaders and supplies sent to relieve ports under siege. When battle was imminent, oarsmen maneuvered their galley and attempted to ram the enemy galley, perhaps disabling it, running it aground, or seizing it with grappling hooks. Marines then leaped into it and assaulted the enemy. The winds of the Atlantic and the strait, however, could be particularly treacherous, and heavy rain in the fall and winter made life miserable for seamen.

The Aftermath of War

Booty made warfare a profitable business.⁷⁴ The rewards of victory included jewelry, gold, silver, rich garments, weapons, livestock, horses, and people, who might be ransomed or sold into slavery. The Poem of the Cid (canto 74), after recording the fall of Valencia, remarked that with an abundance of horses, foot soldiers became knights; that there was so much gold and silver that everyone became rich; and that the Cid’s fifth amounted to thirty thousand marks. Those lines likely stirred the imagination of listeners hoping to become wealthy.

The process of distributing the spoils elaborated in the municipal fueros was the foundation of the Alfonsine discussion.75 A soldier who abandoned pursuit of the enemy in order to plunder might be deprived of his estates, denied a share in the booty, and disgraced by having to ride on an ass, holding its tail in his hand. Once hostilities ended, the spoils were gathered in a public space for inspection and carefully guarded. Quadrilleros, one from each of four divisions of the army, arranged a public auction. Imitating the caliphs of Córdoba, the king received a fifth as an inalienable attribute of sovereignty. Cities, towns, castles, lands, ships, prominent captives, and a prisoner sold for one thousand maravedís were reserved for him. If the defenders of a city, town, or castle surrendered, he could allow them to depart with their movable goods; but if they had to leave their goods behind, he would retain half and give the other half to his troops. If he organized a fleet and provided supplies, arms, and the crew, he was entitled to all the booty; but if someone else paid the crew, the royal share would be three-fourths, or a half if he only provided the ships. The admiral’s share was one seventh (E 3, 7, 8–9, 12; SP 2, 26, pr., 1–8, 12, 19, 29–31).

After the royal mayordomo received the king’s share, and compensation for injuries was arranged and royal officers were paid, the remainder was apportioned among the victors. Goods recovered from enemy raiders had to be restored to their owners if they could be identified. Then, depending upon the extent of his service and the number of men, arms, and animals that he brought to the campaign, each soldier would receive his allotment. In order to prevent fraud, everyone had to pass under a lance held by two men, so that each soldier and his equipment could be counted, and absentees, deserters, and strangers identified. A single share or cavallería was allotted to soldiers with a horse, lance, and sword, or varying types of armor. Foot soldiers, horses, and pack animals received a half, but an ass got only a quarter. A commander was entitled to two cavallerías. If there were many adalides, each would receive only one share (E 3, 7, 1–6, 10, 14–17; SP 2, 26, 9–18, 20–28).

An auctioneer offered articles for sale to the highest bidder. A scribe recorded the final bid, noting the buyer’s name, the article purchased, the price, the date, and the place. Given a receipt with the royal seal, the buyer could remove the article provided he paid for it immediately or gave surety that he would do so within three to nine days. Otherwise, the quadrilleros could repossess the item. An auctioneer who took more than he was entitled to would be fined double the amount and banned for a year; for a second offense, he would be executed (SP 2, 26, 32–34).

The king might reward deeds of exceptional valor by ennobling a warrior, granting him estates or tax exemptions, knighting him, or arranging a good marriage for him. There were also ample financial rewards. The soldier who first gained entrance to a city, town, or castle by force would receive 1,000 maravedís and one of the best houses, except the alcázar or other houses reserved by the king. The second man would be given 500 maravedís and the next best house; the third man, 250 maravedís and another good house. Each would also receive two prisoners who could be held for ransom. Men who gained entrance into a fortress by stealth were also remunerated, as were mariners who seized an enemy ship (E 3, 5, 2, 7–8; SP 2, 27, 1–10).

The military orders and large towns usually maintained hospitals to attend to the wounded.76 A portion of the booty was allocated to compensation (erecha, lat. erecta) for injuries and loss of life. In determining the amount, assessors considered the disfigurement caused by facial or head wounds (10–12 maravedís), the loss of front teeth (40 maravedís per tooth), and the incapacity resulting from the loss of body parts (an eye, nose, hand, or foot, 100 maravedís; an arm or a leg, 120 maravedís). As loss of life was most grievous, money was set aside (150 maravedís for a knight,75 for a foot soldier) so that God would pardon the sins of the dead warrior and console his heirs. Prior to setting out on an expedition weapons, animals, and other equipment should be appraised so that appropriate compensation might be made in case of loss. If an initial appraisal was not carried out, compensation was meted out according to the value attested by the owner and confirmed by two knights. For example, as much as twenty maravedís could be given for a lost mule or horse, or five for an ass (E 3, 7, 11–12; SP 2, 25, 1–4).

The loss of “liberty, which is the most precious thing that people can have in this world” (SP 2, 29, pr.), not only separated the captive from his family and friends, but also subjected him to a “double martyrdom” (CSM 83.18). Wearing chains about their legs and necks, captives were beaten regularly, given little to eat and drink, and had to endure attempts to convert them.⁷⁷ Their only hope was to regain their freedom by an exchange of prisoners or the payment of ransom. Those sold into slavery in Morocco likely never returned home. Pedro Marín, around 1284–87, collected stories of the miraculous deliverance of captives by Santo Domingo de Silos.⁷⁸

The royal jurists distinguished prisoners, that is, Christians taken in wars between Christians, from captives or Muslims. The former might be confined but should not be killed, tortured, or sold into slavery, but Muslims, because of the contempt in which their religion was held, could be mal-treated. Although the bond of marriage was regarded as indissoluble, captors could inflict even greater cruelty by separating husbands from wives, as well as children from parents (SP 2, 29, 1–2).⁷⁹

Christians were expected to contribute to the liberation of their fellow Christians, but some persons, seeking their own advantage, chose to leave relatives and friends in captivity. A son, for example, could refuse to secure his father’s release, but the latter, on being set free, could disinherit him. A vassal who failed to liberate his lord could be executed and his property confiscated. A vassal abandoned by his lord could offer allegiance to another. If a person died in captivity because no one ransomed him, a notary would inventory his property to be sold at auction and the proceeds used to ransom other captives. A captive’s relatives were required to maintain the value of his property until he was liberated. On the assumption that a captive acted under compulsion, his will was usually declared invalid. A child born in captivity and later set free was entitled to inherit the property of its parents. If the child of a Christian captive and a Muslim woman was reared as a Christian, and acknowledged by its father, it could inherit his estate. The relatives of a person who died in captivity could dispose of his estate, provided they had not deliberately neglected to ransom him. Laws protecting the property of Christian captives did not apply to those who chose to live among the Moors, but were imprisoned by them. Christians who, without royal authorization, entered the service of the Moors and were captured could be sold into slavery, but only to Christians. That law was prompted by the fact that Spanish Christians had often served in the army of the Moroccan rulers.80 A man who ransomed another was allowed to retain him, not as a slave, but in service for five years or until he was reimbursed (SP 2, 29, 3–12).

The business of ransoming was not for amateurs. Merchants were often employed by families to ransom their relatives, but by the twelfth century the task was in the hands of professionals. Families could purchase Muslim slaves to exchange for Christians. Twelve good men appointed by the king or a municipality would choose a person familiar with the Arabic language as a ransomer or alfaqueque (ar. al-fakkāk, redeemer) and entrust him with a royal pennant. After negotiating the ransom or exchange of captives, he would be compensated by the king or the municipality and would also be paid by the captive or his family. His commission was usually 10 percent of the ransom or a gold maravedí for each prisoner exchanged. Alfaqueques who carried out their duty responsibly “should be greatly honored and protected because they accomplish works of piety for the common good of all” (SP 2, 30, l–3).⁸¹

Deffender lo Ssuyo e Ganar de lo de los Henemigos

In thirteenth-century Castile, war or preparation for war was the natural order of events. Not only did Alfonso X hope to subjugate the emirate of Granada, but he also planned to seize the ports on both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar so as to prevent invasion from Morocco. As he explained, the people needed to do two things: “deffender lo ssuyo et ganar de lo de los henemigos” (to defend their own and to seize the enemy’s) (E 3, 6, pr.). Although wars fought to defend the faith and recover lands believed to be rightly his were thought to be just, they necessarily caused grief and destruction. For that reason, it was essential that war be undertaken only after careful preparation.

The duty of military service, arising from the natural bond between every person and his native land, was shared equally by all, because it affected all. In fulfilling that duty, a man might have to lay down his life, thereby gaining everlasting glory and entrance into paradise. While prelates provided spiritual counseling and contingents of knights, nobles, as royal vassals and members of the order of knighthood, had a special responsibility for defense of the realm, as did the military orders. The municipal militias provided valuable cavalry and infantry elements. Under the direction of experienced commanders, castles were maintained as the first line of defense, and offensive operations such as raids, sieges, or pitched battles were carried out. From time to time, fleets were deployed to secure the strait. The penalties for failing to respond to the summons to war or to come properly equipped were harsh, but deserters were charged with treason and punished by loss of life and property, and everlasting infamy. When a campaign ended successfully, booty was apportioned in a prescribed manner and monetary compensation was given to the wounded or the families of those who died. Professional ransomers were employed to rescue captives.

While acknowledging the harm accompanying warfare, the king also argued that, by conquering the enemy, peace could be achieved. However, until the Moors were entirely vanquished and Morocco, as part of the Visigothic inheritance, was recovered, there could be no permanent peace. Given those suppositions, the Alfonsine Codes emphasized war rather than peace.