When Lee launched his Northern invasion that summer, he apparently hoped to avoid an offensive engagement. He wrote in his battle report, “It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy.”2 This intention to fight a defensive battle, if possible, undoubtedly suited Lee’s senior subordinate, Lt. General James Longstreet. According to Longstreet, by mid-1863 “the war had advanced far enough for us to see that a mere victory without decided fruits was a luxury we could not afford. Our numbers were less than the Federal forces, and our resources were limited while theirs were not.” 3 General Longstreet believed the one-sided Confederate victory at Fredericksburg in December 1862, in which Union leadership ordered their men to make numerous futile frontal assaults against Longstreet’s entrenched position, had shown the “advantage of receiving instead of giving attack.” Heavy losses from offensive operations would deplete Southern manpower to such an extent that “we should not be able to hold a force in the field to meet our adversary.” Although Lee reportedly later characterized any pre-campaign “promise…not to fight a general battle” as “absurd,” Longstreet insisted he and Lee had agreed on fighting a defensive battle “in a position of our own choosing” as the “ruling idea of the campaign.” 4

Any hopes for fighting a defensive battle were dashed, however, by the Confederate victory of July 1, 1863. General Lee had not planned to fight a battle at Gettysburg on that day, but Maj. General Henry Heth’s Division of Lt. General A. P. Hill’s Third Corps unexpectedly collided with Union Brig. General John Buford’s cavalry division and Maj. General John Reynolds’s infantry I Corps in the fields west of Gettysburg. As the day progressed, Hill’s men were joined by Confederate Lt. General Richard Ewell’s Second Corps and succeeded in defeating the Federal I and XI Corps (who had reinforced Reynolds’s corps north of the town in the afternoon). After retreating through the town, however, the Northern forces rallied by nightfall on the heights of Cemetery Hill and Culp’s Hill south of Gettysburg. Although Lee and his generals may not have yet fully realized it, their July 1 victory had ironically only served to drive the Union forces into a stronger defensive position.

In the process of scoring this fruitless victory, Lee had also allowed his army to be drawn away from his communication and supply lines which had been west of the South Mountain range. (These mountains are clearly visible from Gettysburg on the western horizon.) That evening on Seminary Ridge, General Longstreet arrived and allegedly proposed that the Confederate army move farther south toward Washington, locate a strong defensive position, and force the Yankees into making a presumably futile attack. Lee disappointed Longstreet by rejecting this proposal: “No, the enemy is there [on Cemetery Hill], and I am going to attack him there.” 5 Longstreet found Lee to be uncharacteristically agitated, in part due to the absence of J. E. B. Stuart’s cavalry, which had lost contact with Lee’s main body during the march north. As a result of Lee’s insistence on attacking, Longstreet properly deferred to his commanding officer and returned to his bivouac in order to prepare for the following day’s offensive operations. 6

Lee later elaborated on his desire to renew the attack:

[F]inding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal Army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our large trains. At the same time, the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies while in the presence of the enemy’s main body… A battle thus became, in a measure, unavoidable. Encouraged by the successful issue of the engagement of the first day, and in view of the valuable results that would ensue from the defeat of the army of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack. 7

On July 2, Lee launched his main attack by directing Longstreet’s First Corps to partially envelop the Army of the Potomac’s left flank “which he was to drive in” and also to “endeavor to gain a position from which it was thought that our artillery could be brought to bear with effect.” 8 Both Generals Ewell and Hill were essentially ordered to cooperate and prevent Federal reinforcements from being sent against Longstreet, and take advantage of any opportunities that might present themselves. After some delays in getting into position, Longstreet finally began his attack at 4:00 p.m., commencing three hours of epic fighting at locations that have since taken on legendary status: Little Round Top, the Peach Orchard, Devil’s Den, and the Wheatfield. Longstreet gained some ground, notably capturing the elevation known as the Peach Orchard along the Emmitsburg Road from Union General Daniel E. Sickles’s III Corps. However, the attack petered out along General Hill’s front, as two brigades in R. H. Anderson’s Division (commanded by Generals William Mahone and Carnot Posey) barely engaged the enemy. Ewell’s Second Corps meanwhile succeeded in capturing the lower summit of Culp’s Hill on the Union right flank in an early evening assault, but daylight faded before they could take the summit and the nearby Baltimore Pike.

Despite some serious failures by the Confederates to coordinate their attacks, and despite the fact Meade’s army still held Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Ridge, in Lee’s words, “These partial successes determined me to continue the assault next day.” Lee further wrote:

The result of this day’s operations induced the belief that, with proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed, and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack. 9

“We have not been so successful as we wished,” was Longstreet’s rebuttal. 10 But Lee was encouraged that Longstreet’s capture of the Peach Orchard and surrounding ground would provide sufficient artillery positions from which to converge fire onto Cemetery Hill and support further offensive operations. In addition, after two days of fighting, Lee’s army had badly damaged at least three of the Army of the Potomac’s infantry corps (Reynolds’s I, Sickles’s III, and Oliver Howard’s XI) and inflicted casualties on nearly all of the others.