That evening, the recently appointed Meade (who had complained that his predecessor Joe Hooker too often kept subordinates uninformed) summoned his senior leaders to army headquarters at the Leister farmhouse. After some discussion, including concerns about their still-vulnerable flanks, the generals voted on whether to remain in their present position and whether to attack or await Lee’s attack. The Union generals agreed, as XII Corps commander Henry Slocum famously voted, to “stay and fight it out.” 4 (Ironically, Meade was criticized by some as being indecisive for meeting with his subordinates while Lee has been criticized for not meeting with his subordinates.)

Among the attendees was Meade’s friend and II Corps division commander John Gibbon. General Gibbon technically should not have been present, but he was invited as part of the ongoing confusion over whether or not General Hancock was commanding more than just his II Corps. According to Gibbon, as he was departing the meeting, Meade said, “If Lee attacks tomorrow, it will be in your front.” When Gibbon inquired why, Meade replied, “Because he has made attacks on both our flanks and failed, and if he concludes to try it again it will be on our center.” Gibbon responded: “Well, general, I hope he does, and if he does, we shall whip him.” 5

Meade’s testimony before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War contradicted Gibbon’s oft-quoted recollections predicting an attack on the center. Meade testified:

The strong attack of the enemy that day upon my left flank, and their persistent efforts to obtain possession of what is called Round Top Mountain, induced the supposition that possibly, on the next day, a very persistent attack might be made, or that a movement, upon their part, to my left and rear might be made to occupy the lines of communication I then held with the Taneytown road and the Baltimore pike. 6

Although the decision to “stay and fight” turned out to be the correct one, the Union generals’ resolution to await attack essentially shifted the burden of responsibility to Lee, who was loathe to sit idly in enemy country. That burden was further pressed upon the Confederates when Slocum’s Union XII Corps began shelling the Southerners at Culp’s Hill during the early morning hours of July 3. Lee was denied his preferred renewal of coordinated flank attacks when Richard Ewell’s forces became engaged here before Longstreet was ready to assault the Union left. The Confederates eventually withdrew from Culp’s Hill by noon.

Meade continued to ponder and plan from these headquarters, but the morning of July 3 was not quiet. Not only did the heaviest sustained fighting of the entire battle rage on the Union right at Culp’s Hill, but skirmishing (accompanied by some artillery fire) had also occurred at the Bliss farm opposite the Union left center.

Shortly before noon, soon after the Culp’s Hill fighting had ended, General Gibbon invited Meade join him in a meal of rooster stew that had been appropriated from some unlucky farmer. Several II Corps officers (notably Generals Hancock, Gibbon, and Lt. Frank Haskell) were the primary guests at Gibbon’s headquarters in the field just south of Leister’s house. General Newton of the I Corps was also in attendance and chided Gibbon as “this young North Carolinian.” The dining table was a mess chest. Chairs were scarce and many of the officers were seated on the ground, but as the ranking officer Meade enjoyed the luxury of a cracker box to sit on. The men smoked cigars afterwards and discussed what Lee’s next movements might be. As noted previously, Gibbon’s recollections were that Meade had already predicted an assault on the Union center, but according to Haskell, “General Meade still thought that the enemy would attack his left again today towards evening; but he was ready for them. General Hancock thought that the attack would be upon the position of the II Corps.” Haskell also noted that Hancock would again assume command of his corps and Gibbon would return to commanding his own division. (The extent of Hancock’s authority over the entire Union left being yet another later point of contention.) 7

After eating, Meade then rode down his lines and briefly joined General Gouverneur K. Warren, Chief Engineer of the Army of the Potomac, on Little Round Top. By this point, the enemy was clearly massing their troops and artillery and most felt sure an attack was soon to follow. 8 Meade had a dispatch sent to General in Chief Henry Halleck in Washington at 12:30 p.m.:

At the present moment all is quiet. Considerable firing, both infantry and artillery, has taken place in various parts of our line, but no development of the enemy’s intentions. My cavalry are pushing the enemy on both my flanks, and keeping me advised of any effort to outflank me. We have taken several hundred prisoners since morning. 9