Longstreet wrote, “I felt then that it was my duty to express my convictions,” and “pointing to Cemetery Hill,” Longstreet told his commander:

General, I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions and armies, and should know as well as anyone what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no 15,000 men ever arrayed for battle can take that position. 24

But General Lee was not deterred and “ordered me [Longstreet] to prepare Pickett’s Division for the attack.” 25 Longstreet stressed that Lee “was impatient of listening, and tired of talking” so Longstreet turned his attention toward organizing the assault. 26

Colonel Armistead Long, Lee’s military secretary, claimed the decision was reached during a consultation with several members of the Confederate high command and Longstreet’s only offered objection was, “the guns on Round Top might be brought to bear on his right.” Colonel Long claimed he rebutted Longstreet with the untenable suggestion that the Confederate batteries could suppress the Little Round Top artillery. “This point being settled, the attack was ordered, and General Longstreet was directed to carry it out.”27

Much ink has been spilled debating the objective of Lee’s attack. Was it the “Copse of Trees,” the larger Ziegler’s Grove, or Cemetery Hill itself? Lee stated in his report only that the attack was “directed against the enemy’s left center.” 28 Longstreet reported the assault was to be “made directly at the enemy’s main position, the Cemetery Hill” and the “center of the assaulting column would arrive at the salient of the enemy’s position.” 29

Some historians point out that Lee’s objective was not the “Copse” (a term used to refer to a small thicket of trees) but rather the much larger and more important Cemetery Hill. The nearby Ziegler’s Grove then served as a more prominent and visible guiding landmark than the smaller Copse. As an ultimate objective, this theory has much merit since Cemetery Hill — both as an artillery position and the “hook” in Meade’s fishhook-shaped line — was arguably the most important point of the entire Union battle line at Gettysburg. The loss of Cemetery Hill would have certainly required Meade to at least abandon his position. Conversely, the Copse of Trees on Cemetery Ridge had no military significance whatsoever.

Yet Longstreet wrote that the “center” of his assault would “arrive at the salient” which implies that he intended to break through near the Copse of Trees and the area known today as the Angle. His troop dispositions—placing a second supporting line behind Pettigrew’s right and not his left—also supports this premise. Also note that many of the Confederates in Long Lane, directly opposite and closest to Cemetery Hill, did not participate in the attack, while much of Longstreet’s First Corps (particularly Brig. General James Kemper’s Brigade) would have to cover a considerable distance under fire and with their flanks exposed if they were expected to strike Cemetery Hill.

Trees were not Lee’s military objective but were more likely merely guiding landmarks to the troops while advancing under fire. Colonel Armistead Long described the attack’s goal as follows:

Cemetery Ridge, from Round Top to Culp’s Hill, was at every point strongly occupied by Federal infantry and artillery, and was evidently a very formidable position. There was, however, a weak point upon which an attack could be made with a reasonable prospect of success. This was where the ridge, sloping westward, formed the depression through which the Emmitsburg road passes. Perceiving that by forcing the Federal lines at that point and turning toward Cemetery Hill the right would be taken in flank and the remainder would be neutralized, as its fire would be as destructive to friend as foe…General Lee determined to attack at that point. 30

As with so many aspects of this battle, the debate continues, but a strategy in which Lee hoped to strike the Federal defenses near the Angle (rather than launch a direct frontal assault on the elevated and fortified Cemetery Hill), split the Union lines, and then turn toward Cemetery Hill seems as logical as any.

Curiously, Lee originally seems to have still intended for Lafayette McLaws and John B. Hood’s divisions of Longstreet’s First Corps (both of which had fought heavily the previous day and were not in an advantageous position to assault the Federal “left center”) to participate and be reinforced by George Pickett’s fresh division as the attacking column. But Longstreet convinced his commander that Hood and McLaws were needed to anchor Longstreet’s right flank and could be “attacked in reverse” by Federal forces on the elevated Round Tops, so Lee decided that Longstreet would instead be “re-enforced by Heth’s Division and two brigades of Pender’s” from A. P. Hill’s Third Corps. 31 It appears clear from the participant accounts that these portions of Hill’s Third Corps were directly placed under Longstreet’s supervision for the upcoming assault.

General Hill was then “directed to hold his line with the rest of his command, afford General Longstreet further assistance, if required, and avail himself of any success that might be gained.” 32 Two brigades from R. H. Anderson’s Division (under Cadmus Wilcox and David Lang) were later added to protect Pickett’s right flank, bringing the total in the attack force to 11 brigades with an estimated strength of perhaps 12,500 men. (This is a generally accepted number today and we will discuss this in greater detail later.) General Hill’s Corps thus was intended to play a dual role: to participate directly with Longstreet and to take advantage of any success with additional support. Not chosen to directly engage were two relatively fresh brigades in Anderson’s Division under Brig. General William Mahone and Carnot Posey.

The final critical component of Lee’s plan was the use of artillery. Infantry alone was not expected to carry the day. Lee wrote:

A careful examination was made of the ground secured by Longstreet [the Peach Orchard], and his batteries placed in positions, which, it was believed, would enable them to silence those of the enemy. Hill’s artillery and part of Ewell’s was ordered to open simultaneously, and the assaulting column to advance under cover of the combined fire of the three. The batteries were directed to be pushed forward as the infantry progressed, protect their flanks, and support their attacks closely. [Emphasis added.]

Note that in addition to the massive cannonade which would precede the attack, Lee also intended for the guns to move forward with the infantry and serve as protection for the flanks. 33 This aspect of the plan is often lost on Gettysburg students. In sum, Longstreet, Hill, and Ewell’s engaged artillery would exceed 150 and perhaps 160 field pieces. But with a few exceptions, Ewell’s positioning north and east of town would prove to make poor use of the Second Corps artillery.

Knowing the outcome in hindsight, history has been very harsh on Robert E. Lee’s decision to launch this frontal assault at Gettysburg. It should be remembered, however, that there were precedents for such successful attacks. Almost exactly one year earlier, during the Seven Days’ Battles, Lee launched a series of massive and ultimately triumphant attacks against a portion of the Union army at Gaines’s Mill. More recently, on the afternoon of July 1 at Gettysburg, Col. Abner Perrin’s South Carolina brigade overran Union I Corps positions near the Lutheran Theological Seminary. Both victories had come at heavy costs, but they demonstrated that frontal assaults could work under the right combination of tactics, leadership, terrain, artillery support, luck, and enemy performance.

On the other hand, Lee also ordered some of these same men to attack Malvern Hill a few days after Gaines’s Mill. Poor Confederate execution and murderous Federal artillery caused that attack to end in bloody failure. Lee also undoubtedly remembered his own success, and the part that his artillery played, in defending against the Union’s headlong attacks at Fredericksburg in December 1862.

Lee knew that he was taking a great risk in ordering this July 3 charge. But with proper coordination between Longstreet, Hill, their artillery, and use of the ground gained by Longstreet on July 2, Lee obviously believed that this climactic assault on Cemetery Ridge could succeed.

While we consider Lee’s strategy on July 3, the intended role of Maj. General J. E. B. Stuart’s cavalry also needs to be contemplated. Stuart’s objectives are one of the numerous contentious issues surrounding Lee’s third day goals. Many participants and historians have championed the notion that Stuart’s horsemen were part of a coordinated effort to penetrate the Union rear while Generals Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimble pierced Meade’s center. If true, then the addition of cavalry to the infantry and artillery assault would make Lee’s final Gettysburg attack a very complex combined operation using every element of his army.

On the afternoon of July 3, General Stuart and portions of his cavalry division positioned themselves on the Confederate’s left flank approximately 3.5 miles east of Gettysburg. Stuart’s horsemen collided with elements of Union Brig. General David M. Gregg’s division and a brigade under Brig. General George A. Custer on what is now known as “East Cavalry Field.” After several hours of dismounted and mounted fighting, the day culminated with Confederate Brig. General Wade Hampton leading an epic mounted charge toward the Hanover Road that was met head-on by Custer’s Michigan Wolverines and other Union forces. The Southerners were grudgingly forced to abandon the field and the Federal cavalry scored a victory by virtue of having held their ground.