Federal Artillery Monuments and Markers on Hancock Avenue
(Designation and Commander as Inscribed)

Between United States and Pleasonton Avenues (South to North after 148th PA Infantry)	# Engaged and Type
5th Battery E, Massachusetts Light Artillery (Capt. Charles Phillips)	Six 3-inch Rifles
Battery B, 1st Pennsylvania Light Artillery (Capt. James Cooper)	Four 3-inch Rifles

We now pass several infantry monuments on the west side of Hancock Avenue, including the 1st Minnesota Infantry Regiment monument, as we proceed past the Pennsylvania State Memorial.

Federal Artillery Monuments and Markers on Hancock Avenue (Designation and Commander as Inscribed)

Between United States and Pleasonton Avenues (South to North after 1st MN Infantry)	# Engaged and Type
C&F Independent Pennsylvania Artillery, “Hampton’s Battery” (Capt. James Thompson)	Five 3-inch Rifles
Battery C, 4th United States Artillery (Lt. Evan Thomas)	Six 12-pounder Napoleons
1st Regular Brigade, Artillery Reserve (Capt. Dunbar Ransom)	War Department Marker
9th Michigan Battery (Battery I, 1st Michigan Light Artillery) (Capt. Jabez Daniels)	Six 3-inch Rifles

Clearly not all of these batteries were located here throughout July 3. Note, for instance, that Cooper’s battery did not arrive here until 3:00 and Ransom’s marker commemorates several batteries that were not on this part of the field.

East of Hancock Avenue and in front of the Pennsylvania memorial is a monument to Hexamer’s Battery A, 1st New Jersey. The battery was commanded at Gettysburg by 1st Lt. Augustin Parsons. Although it is in a relatively prominent position near the heavily visited Pennsylvania monument, it is probably in the wrong location. The relevant battle reports suggest that this battery arrived about 3:00 p.m. into a position several hundred yards north of here. 4

Portions of at least two additional Union batteries, two guns in each of Lt. John Turnbull’s 3rd U.S. and Lt. Richard Milton’s 9th Massachusetts, were nearby during the morning but departed by early afternoon. 5 Captain Judson Clark’s 1st New Jersey Light Artillery had seen heavy service near the Peach Orchard on July 2 and probably unlimbered to Sterling’s right on July 3 but was unengaged. 6

Army of the Potomac artillery commander Henry Hunt described his early activities on July 3:

I had just finished my inspection, and was with Lieutenant Rittenhouse on the top of Round Top, when the enemy opened, at about 1 p.m., along his whole right, a furious cannonade on the left of our line. I estimated the number of his guns bearing on our west front at from one hundred to one hundred and twenty. I have since seen it stated by the enemy’s correspondents that there were sixty guns from Longstreet’s, and fifty-five from Hill’s corps, making one hundred and fifteen in all. To oppose these we could not, from our restricted position, bring more than eighty to reply effectively. Our fire was well withheld until the first burst was over, excepting from the extreme right and left of our positions. It was then opened deliberately and with excellent effect. 7

In his post-battle writings, General Hunt varyingly estimated the overall number of Federal guns that participated in the great cannonade as being between 75 and 80. Although historians will never know the precise number, since the Army of the Potomac’s artillery commander did not know, a comprehensive modern study placed the number at 78 total cannons engaged during the cannonade (from Little Round Top to Cemetery Hill). In this specific area under our study (from Ames to Daniels’s batteries), the same analysis estimated that 26 pieces participated in the cannonade, primarily under orders from General Hancock. 8

Regardless of the exact number of field pieces engaged, the accounts of Lt. Colonel McGilvery and Brig. General Hunt both indicate that Lee’s massive artillery cannonade had little effect on the Federal batteries here. “At about 12.30 o’clock the enemy opened a terrific fire upon our lines with at least one hundred and forty guns. This fire was very rapid and inaccurate, most of the projectiles passing from 20 to 100 feet over our lines.” For those shots that did not pass overhead, McGilvery “had a slight earthwork thrown up” in front of his guns “which proved sufficient to resist all the projectiles which struck it.” 9

General Hunt was in motion during much of the barrage, but ultimately observed a considerable portion from a position behind McGilvery. Although he called the scene “indescribably grand…covered with smoke, through which the flashes were incessant,” General Hunt likewise thought the spectacle to be more visually epic than effective. ”In fact, the fire was more dangerous behind the ridge than on its crest…Most of the enemy’s projectiles passed overhead, the effect being to sweep all the open ground in our rear, which was of little benefit to the Confederates – a mere waste of ammunition.” 10

On the Confederate side of the field, Colonel Alexander claimed that he delayed Longstreet’s advance because the Federals’ return fire did not provide a suitable opportunity for Alexander to give the order. Given that Longstreet had described his intent “to advance the infantry if the artillery has the desired effect of driving the enemy’s off,” at least one historian has raised the interesting question as to what would have happened if the Union artillery had simply not stopped firing from Cemetery Ridge? Would Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimble’s forces have still marched forward? Would uninterrupted enemy fire have given Longstreet the latitude to call off the attack? 1

Ultimately, several Union officers claimed credit for originating the idea to stop the artillery fire. Henry Hunt could be expected to have responsibility for the directive. In his Official Report, he wrote:

As soon as the nature of the enemy’s attack was made clear, and I could form an opinion as to the number of his guns, for which my position afforded great facility, I went to the park of the Artillery Reserve, and ordered all the batteries to be ready to move at a moment’s notice, and hastened to report to the commanding general, but found he had left his headquarters. I then proceeded along the line, to observe the effects of the cannonade and to replace such batteries as should become disabled. About 2.30 p.m., finding our ammunition running low and that it was very unsafe to bring up loads of it, a number of caissons and limbers having been exploded, I directed that the fire should be gradually stopped, which was done, and the enemy soon slackened his fire also. 2

In his later Battles and Leaders account, Hunt jumbled the order of events and elaborated on his intentions. In this version, he rode along the lines and discovered his own ammunition running low. He then hastened to “advise” Meade of the need for “its immediate cessation and preparation for the assault that would follow.” With Meade’s headquarters having been abandoned, Hunt ended up searching the cemetery for his missing commander, but instead found XI Corps commander Gen. Oliver Howard who agreed with him. Hunt then rode south again along the lines back toward the Union left and ordered the guns to cease fire. “This was followed by a cessation of that of the enemy, under the mistaken impression that he had silenced our guns, and almost immediately his infantry came out of the woods and formed for the assault.” He then met up with Henry Bingham of Hancock’s staff near the Taneytown Road, who carried an order from Meade to cease firing, “so I had only anticipated his wishes.” 3 Hunt later learned that General Warren had come to the same conclusion from Little Round Top and had also sent Meade a similar message to cease fire. 4 In Meade’s published Life and Letters, it was Meade who determined and decided to give orders to stop the artillery assault, although the editors (Meade’s son and grandson) acknowledged that Hunt also came to the decision independently. 5

Major Thomas Osborn, commanding the XI Corps artillery, claimed that he initiated the suggestion to stop firing during conversation on Cemetery Hill with Generals Hunt, Howard, and Carl Schurz. “It was conceded by all that the mass of Lee’s army was concentrated behind Seminary Ridge and in front of Meade’s left wing…We also believed that Lee’s primary object was to drive the guns off of Cemetery Hill.” According to Major Osborn, he made the proposal that the Federal batteries should stop firing to which Generals Hunt and Howard agreed. Hunt then gave the order and said he would ride down the line and stop all firing. Whether the idea originated with Meade, Hunt, Warren, or Osborn, the episode proves once again that success has many authors. 6

As trained artillerists, both General Hunt and Lt. Colonel McGilvery had issued orders for their subordinates to conserve ammunition through controlled counter-battery fire. Hunt had given “instructions to the batteries and to the chiefs of artillery not to fire at small bodies, nor to allow their fire to be drawn without promise of adequate results; to watch the enemy closely, and when he opened to concentrate the fire of their guns on one battery at a time until it was silenced; under all circumstances to fire deliberately, and to husband their ammunition as much as possible.” Hunt claimed that his intent was to create a “cross-fire” to break the enemy’s infantry formations. 1

Unfortunately for Hunt, Maj. General Winfield S. Hancock had others ideas. Hancock had been given temporary command of the field on July 1, which he relinquished when the senior Maj. General Henry Slocum arrived at Gettysburg. During the late fighting of July 2, Meade had ordered Hancock to take command of the III Corps in place of the wounded Maj. General Daniel E. Sickles. Meade implied in his report that this arrangement continued on July 3, stating that Hancock commanded an ambiguous “left center” and that Brig. General John Gibbon had Hancock’s II Corps. Gibbon, on the other hand, wrote that at 1:00 p.m., Hancock “resumed command of the corps” and Gibbon “returned to my division.”2