Howard’s artillery chief, Maj. Thomas Osborn, confirmed that long distance shell was initially used on the enemy and after “about one third of the distance from Seminary Ridge to our line, their ranks had been a good deal cut out.” The Southerners halted to dress lines “which were materially shortened” as “fearful artillery fire…was cutting them down by the hundreds every minute.” Despite the mounting losses, there was still “no hesitation or irregularity in the movement” when the final charge was made at a double quick over about 1/8th a mile against both Yankee musketry and canister. Osborn added that Union batteries also opened fire as the Confederates retreated and “did them considerable damage,” ceasing fire only when they reached the relative safety of Seminary Ridge. 6 Osborn’s recollections about firing on retreating soldiers contradicts the misimpression that many battlefield visitors have over this being a “gentlemen’s war.”
GPS: 39°48’48.76”N, 77°14’7.63”W; Elev. 601 ft.
Captain William Arnold’s Rhode Island battery of six 3-inch ordnance rifles defended the stone wall along the Inner Angle up through the great cannonade that preceded the charge. The battery’s left gun was said to be at the corner of the wall itself. 7 Sergeant Major William Hincks, a Medal of Honor recipient from the nearby 14th Connecticut, later recalled that the orders to burn the Bliss barn on the morning of July 3 had been given because Rebel sharpshooters located there were “severely annoying” Arnold’s battery, although at distances approaching 650 yards such shots would have been unlikely. 8
By all accounts, this battery suffered severely during the artillery portion of the assault. Modern estimates place it as the third highest amongst all numeric Union battery casualties at 32 and fifth highest in percentage loss at 27.4%. 9 Major Charles Richardson, 126th New York, said that the battery was so disabled that several men of the 126th helped work one of the guns. 10 But whether or not the entire battery was withdrawn, and if so when, remains conjecture like so many aspects of this battle.
General Henry Hunt wrote in Battles and Leaders that Arnold’s battery (and Brown’s) were “so crippled that they were now withdrawn” about the time of the artillery cease-fire. 11 Artillerist Capt. John Hazard implied in his report that Arnold was withdrawn due to lack of ammunition during the Southerners’ advance. 12 Major Theodore Ellis, commanding the 14th Connecticut, wrote on at least two occasions that he moved his regiment into Arnold’s position after the battery withdrew “entirely disabled” from the field. 13
However, the battery’s withdrawal was conspicuously absent from their regimental history to the extent that the historian also implied that they fired some of the last shots of the entire afternoon. This has caused Arnold’s battery to become best remembered for a feat which they probably did not accomplish: specifically firing canister directly into the face of the 26th North Carolina Regiment.
According to battery historian and veteran Thomas Aldrich, as the 26th approached, a battery sergeant yelled to one Pvt. William Barker: “Barker, why the devil don’t you fire that gun! Pull! Pull!” Barker obeyed and the “gap made in that North Carolina regiment was simply terrible.” Double shots of canister hit the North Carolinians “as the last shot fired from our battery when the rebels broke in retreat.” Pettigrew’s Confederates had reached farther than Pickett’s men, “and up to the wall running north and south in front of our battery, where they were killed and captured in great numbers, but did not cross the wall.” 14