Colonel Alexander lay down for sleep on the field around 1:00 a.m. on July 3. He was awake by 3:00 a.m. and began to put his batteries in position, including the recently arrived Washington Artillery. At daylight, Alexander was panicked to realize he had placed about 20 guns in such an alignment that they were in danger of being enfiladed from Cemetery Hill. He was able to rectify his mistake before the Federals opened fire and caused any serious damage. 4

Brigadier General William N. Pendleton, the Army of Northern Virginia’s artillery chief, reported:

By direction of the commanding general, the artillery along our entire line was to be prepared for opening, as early as possible on the morning of the 3d, a concentrated and destructive fire, consequent upon which a general advance was to be made. The right, especially, was, if practicable, to sweep the enemy from his stronghold on that flank. Visiting the lines at a very early hour toward securing readiness for this great attempt, I found much (by Colonel Alexander’s energy) already accomplished on the right. Henry’s battalion held about its original position on the flank. Alexander’s was next, in front of the peach orchard. Then came the Washington Artillery Battalion, under Major Eshleman, and Dearing’s battalion on his left, these two having arrived since dusk of the day before; and beyond Dearing, Cabell’s battalion had been arranged, making nearly sixty guns for that wing, all well advanced in a sweeping curve of about a mile. In the posting of these there appeared little room for improvement, so judiciously had they been adjusted. To Colonel Alexander, placed here in charge by General Longstreet, the wishes of the commanding general were repeated. 5

According to Alexander, “Early in the morning General Lee came around, and I was then told that we were to assault Cemetery Hill, which lay rather to our left.” This required Alexander to change gun positions again while the enemy took a few occasional shots. With Dearing’s artillery now added in, Alexander estimated that by 10:00 a.m. perhaps 75 guns “in what was virtually one battery, so disposed as to fire on Cemetery Hill and the batteries south of it, which would have a fire on our advancing infantry.” 6

Most of the batteries that Alexander commanded were not in the Peach Orchard itself. Latham and Garden’s two batteries (from Maj. M. W. Henry’s Battalion, Hood’s Division) of nine cannons were amongst Sherfy’s peach trees. The rest of Alexander’s line extended north from the Peach Orchard along the Emmitsburg Road ridge toward the Rogers farm. North of Rogers’ property, the artillery continued toward the point of woods and the modern Virginia State Memorial. Counting the nine in the Peach Orchard, 73 cannons were under Alexander during the afternoon of July 3. 7

With our earlier total of 86 cannons active in Ewell and Hill’s Corps, we can calculate that the Confederates engaged approximately 159 field pieces during the entire action on July 3.

“It had been arranged that when the infantry column was ready,” wrote Colonel Alexander, “General Longstreet should order two guns fired by the Washington Artillery. On that signal all our guns were to open on Cemetery Hill and the ridge extending toward Round Top, which was covered with batteries. I was to observe the fire and give Pickett the order to charge.” 8 Longstreet wrote the order (addressed to Colonel Walton) to begin the assault around 1:00 p.m.:

Colonel- Let the batteries open. Order great care and precision in firing. When the batteries at the Peach Orchard cannot be used against the point we intend to attack, let them open on the enemy’s on the rocky hill. 9

Captain William Miller Owen of the Washington Artillery wrote that he received the message from a courier at about 1:30 p.m. The first signal gun fired, but the second delayed due to a failed friction primer. “Finally a puff of smoke was seen at the Peach Orchard, then came a roar and a flash, and 138 [sic] pieces of Confederate artillery opened upon the enemy’s position, and the deadly work began with the noise of the heaviest thunder.” 10

The Peach Orchard sector south of the Wheatfield Road was generally devoid of Confederate infantry on July 3. The remnants of William Barksdale’s Brigade were deployed on a skirmish line several hundred yards to the east, roughly halfway between the Emmitsburg Road and the Trostle farm. West of the Emmitsburg Road, the right of Wilcox and Kemper’s brigades reached nearly to the north side of the Sherfy farm.

General Pickett may have spent portions of the afternoon in this area. A colonel in Kershaw’s 7th South Carolina, posted near the Emmitsburg and Wheatfield Roads intersection, wrote that he saw Pickett nearby. A major commanding Henry’s two batteries here stated “positively and solemnly as a fact” that Pickett and staff were near here before and after the charge. 11 While Pickett was not expected to “lead” his charge as a division commander, if these allegations are true, ask yourself if this was an ideal location from which to oversee the movements of his three brigades.