With the backing of three of the most important western tribes, Abd el-Kader was now the leader of resistance to the French invaders in that area. What sort of a commander would he be? Would this quiet marabout really have the skills and courage needed to carry on prolonged and fierce warfare?
A couple of years earlier, Abd el-Kader had given a strong demonstration of his political wisdom and his powers of persuasion. As the Ottoman system was falling apart in the months following the French invasion, Bey Hasan—the same man who had imprisoned Muhyi ad-Din and Abd el-Kader on their pilgrimage trip—appealed to Muhyi ad-Din for protection. Strange twist of fate! Muhyi ad-Din called a family council, who decided that honor demanded generosity. But Abd el-Kader, only twenty-three at that time, pointed out that if something should happen to their “guest” while under their protection—as indeed it might, given his well-known lack of popularity—Muhyi ad-Din would be held responsible and the prestige of his family would suffer. Abd el-Kader’s views, expressed with the gift of eloquence that served him all his life, convinced the others. Bey Hasan was advised to look elsewhere.
Abd el-Kader had little time, however, in which to demonstrate his ability to deal with hard realities. He was well aware that he would have to manage the envy, ambition, and hostility running throughout tribal society. The makhzen tribes, afraid of losing their entrenched privileges, especially resented the new Emir.
His most pressing job, therefore, was to restore law and order, which meant winning over the tribes and chiefs who had not yet declared their support. Many were scornful of his youth. Most, determined to keep their own power, would prove disloyal unless thoroughly convinced of his strong leadership. Abd el-Kader could use persuasion with those who would listen, but he would have to undermine, outwit, or over-power those who refused. He went about the job of consolidating his strength in a manner that was well planned, deliberate, and when necessary, ruthless.
Sending messages to all the tribes in the western district, Abd el-Kader made three points clear. First, he, the Emir Abd el-Kader, had been elected as the authentic leader of the western tribes. Second, his leadership would accord strictly with Islamic law and principles, and he would expect the same of his followers’ behavior. Third—and perhaps most important in the eyes of the tribesmen—he would lead jihad against the European invaders. As his father had found earlier, it would be next to impossible to motivate the tribes unless they were convinced that they were fighting a jihad.
What did jihad mean to Abd el-Kader? The basic meaning of this often puzzling concept is “struggle.” For most Muslims this usually means individual moral struggle—against temptation, bad thoughts, and wicked acts: anything that would weaken a person’s being a good Muslim. But jihad also has an “outward” expression, leading to actual combat. In such cases, the struggle should be for a religious purpose, typically described as “defending Islam and Muslims.”
For the Algerians under Abd el-Kader, jihad was indeed a “holy war.” This did not mean converting the Christian invaders to Islam, nor harming Christian Europe. Rather, jihad meant the defense of Muslim people against the attack of non-Muslim outsiders. If necessary, defense could even mean offense: waging offensive campaigns against the threatening forces.
But what would be the ultimate objective of Abd el-Kader’s jihad? That was not so clear. To drive every last European from the shores of Algeria would be neither reasonable nor necessary. In any case, Abd el-Kader knew that if he wanted the tribes to follow him, he would have to call loudly and unmistakably for jihad—even though jihad might sometimes be more of a strategy than an absolute demand.
In addition to motivation, the Emir needed a capital city that would demonstrate his supremacy. The village of his birth, Guetna, was too small, so he chose the nearby town of Mascara, which had a strategic location and many centuries of history and culture. His triumphal entry to Mascara, in November 1832, helped win the allegiance of more tribes. As everyone could see, here was a man who, in spite of his youth, could indeed command!
Another of the Emir’s useful assets was his Sufi brotherhood, the Qadiriyya. The various brotherhoods tended to compete with each other, so Abd el-Kader actively promoted his own. He sent out agents to promote the Qadiriyya beliefs and help establish new centers in both towns and tribal areas. This strategy helped widen and consolidate his control, while encouraging more support for his cause.
Meanwhile, there was a challenge to Abd el-Kader’s power from the Sultan of Morocco, Abd ar-Rahman, to whom many of the western Algerian tribes were loyal. Abd el-Kader found ways to turn the sultan’s strength to his own advantage. He widely promoted the idea that he, too, was subject to Abd ar-Rahman’s authority and that he was, in fact, governing in the sultan’s name. He even publicized a document, said to be a letter from Abd ar-Rahman, that expressed support for the Emir. In short, he used every stratagem and ploy he could to consolidate his forces.
All this time, Muhyi ad-Din was working vigorously as his son’s agent, traveling from tribe to tribe, explaining the importance of what Abd el-Kader was doing and winning their support. But on July 20, 1833, Muhyi ad-Din died suddenly. Even this grievous loss worked to Abd el-Kader’s advantage, however, because it seemed to fulfill a prophecy from one of Muhyi ad-Din’s dreams about Abd el-Kader becoming the new leader. This helped convince people that Muhyi ad-Din’s baraka, the blessing believed to have been divinely bestowed on him, would now rest on Abd el-Kader.
Having managed to win the allegiance of most of the tribes in the western province, this marabout-warrior now felt ready to take on the French army in Oran. With their far superior training and weaponry, the French forces could have defeated the Algerians fairly easily. In spite of this, they did not have the manpower both to fight in the countryside and to hold on to the territory they had won. Moreover, the European style of warfare, with its pitched battles, would not work in dealing with the Arabs’ irregular method of fighting. Therefore the French chose to stay inside the walls of Oran, occasionally going out to make punitive raids on villages.
With his adversaries more or less locked up, Abd el-Kader could pursue his own strategy. Experience had shown him that direct military assaults on Oran would only sacrifice more fighting men. The essential move, he decided, was a siege of the French enclaves on the coast, the enemy-held towns of Oran, Mostaghanem, and Arzew. He would have to disrupt the trade in livestock, grain, and produce that certain tribes were engaging in with the French enemy. This trade, at inflated prices, had produced much wealth for some Algerians, and naturally they did not want to lose it. Earlier, when Muhyi ad-Din was still the leader of the cooperating tribes, he had faced the same problem and had dealt with it harshly. Anyone caught supplying the French with provisions suffered the loss of his ears, nose, and one hand.
Abd el-Kader took an even more drastic step, declaring that anyone who defied his orders against trading with the French would be executed. These measures, showing that he meant business, helped him successfully impose a siege on the three French-held towns. The invaders were forced to depend on food and provisions supplied by sea from France, which was both hazardous and costly.
Meanwhile the French had been inflicting considerable damage. The general in charge of Oran ordered such ruthless massacres of villagers that he became notorious for his cruelty. In April 1833, however, a shift in command put the conflict on quite a different footing. A new general, Louis-Alexis Desmichels, took charge of Oran and soon became painfully aware of the hardships caused by Abd el-Kader’s siege. He could also see that his occasional forays against the tribes were only strengthening support for his adversary. He sent Abd el-Kader a proposal for an exchange of prisoners—and a peace treaty.
In his response to this opening, Abd el-Kader demonstrated his grasp of political strategy. He rejected Desmichels’ letter almost rudely. Then, a little later he instructed his agent in Oran, an Algerian Jew skilled at dealing with both Europeans and Arabs, to suggest that the general try again. Desmichels did so. This time Abd el-Kader pointed out that according to Islamic law, peace could be considered—provided the offer came first from the non-Muslim side. To Desmichels’ third letter, Abd el-Kader responded courteously. In February 1834, through translators and other intermediaries, a treaty was worked out to the satisfaction of both sides.
But not to everyone’s satisfaction. This curious agreement, usually known as the Desmichels Treaty, was actually two treaties, one in French and the other in Arabic. In certain important respects they were actually contradictory—yet both were considered legally valid. The Arabic version contained a secret clause recognizing Abd el-Kader as the controlling power in the western half of Algeria. The government in Paris naturally expected just the opposite: they wanted France recognized as the superior power. By the time they learned the truth, the treaty was already signed and they could do nothing about it.
Under the Desmichels Treaty—the Arabic version—the French retained control over the ports of Oran, Mostaghanem, and Arzew. Subject to the Emir’s permission, they could trade in the territory he controlled. The French prisoners (four soldiers who had been caught in an ambush) were released. In return, France would recognize the Emir’s sovereignty over the rest of the western province, plus his monopoly on trade. The treaty was a diplomatic triumph for Abd el-Kader and brought a stop to hostilities and bloodshed—for a while.
Why did Abd el-Kader and General Desmichels both agree to a treaty that would, in some ways, seem to be the opposite of what they wanted? In Abd el-Kader’s case, he had to give up the call for jihad, which had been so important in rallying the tribes to accept his leadership. He also had to allow the French army to hold the coastal towns, and even protect them if necessary. But apparently he considered this a fair price to pay for what he really wanted: breathing space. He needed time to consolidate his power, which now extended over more than half of Algeria, and to revive and organize his people. His objectives were growing more ambitious and complex.
As for Desmichels, he evidently thought it in the best interest of France to have a firm alliance with the strongest power among the Algerians. Indeed, he appears to have bent over backward to strengthen Abd el-Kader. He not only helped the Emir extend his authority eastward, he also generously supplied arms and military advice—as though Abd el-Kader was the partner of France rather than the adversary.
Not surprisingly, the peace achieved by the Desmichels Treaty was fragile. The fuzzy question of who was sovereign over whom angered the French, who were also upset about Abd el-Kader’s monopoly of trade. Early in 1835 Desmichels was recalled—but apparently not in disgrace, as he went on to have a satisfactory military career.
The new commander at Oran, General Trézel, promptly tried to set matters straight—for France. In June of 1835, he sent a military expedition against Abd el-Kader. It was a disaster. Abd el-Kader’s men ambushed and utterly destroyed the French forces in swampy stretches around the Macta River. Although the Algerians also lost many men, it was an important victory for them and a devastating blow to French morale.
For the French, the defeat at the Macta River demanded the severest possible retaliation. Abd el-Kader could see it coming, but his request to restore peace was refused by Count Bertrand Clauzel, one of the prominent generals during this period. He then set up a network of intelligence agents in the towns and also sought support from the British and American consuls, although without success.
As the Desmichels Treaty unraveled during the winter of 1835-36, Clauzel took his revenge. Several important towns, including the Emir’s capital, Mascara, were destroyed. When a French officer entered Mascara after the bombardment, he reported:
What I saw then was the most hideous spectacle I have ever witnessed. I had never imagined what a sacked city, where numerous inhabitants have been massacred, would be like. . . . Not a single object remained untouched, the houses were in flame. . .1
With insufficient manpower, the French again decided not to hold these ruined cities. Hence the countryside outside the French-held towns on the coast remained under Abd el-Kader’s control.
Although Abd el-Kader was now master of the larger part of Algeria and aiming to unify the entire country, another man was trying to do the same thing in the eastern part. Hajj Ahmed, from a powerful Algerian family in Constantine, had asserted himself as the new ruler of Constantine as soon as the Turks left. While he considered the area still part of the Ottoman Empire, he did make changes toward a fairer system of rule.
Inevitably a contest was shaping up between Hajj Ahmed and Abd el-Kader. In 1833 Hajj Ahmed asked the Ottoman sultan to designate him the ruler of the entire country. In 1835, after Abd el-Kader had called off the jihad because of the Desmichels Treaty, Ahmed tried to keep it going—in the Emir’s territory.
The French tried repeatedly to win Hajj Ahmed’s support, but he refused to recognize French control of any form. Finally, in the fall of 1836, General Clauzel decided to destroy Arab resistance in the eastern part of the country and sent an army of about seven thousand five hundred to seize Constantine. They met a thorough defeat.
This convinced the French Ministry of War that their armies could not fight simultaneously in different parts of the country. Since Abd el-Kader had shown willingness to negotiate, perhaps it was time to take him out of the picture again with another treaty? The French general who carried out these negotiations, Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, also wanted an interlude of peace. In May 1837 he signed a new agreement with Abd el-Kader, the Treaty of Tafna (a river in western Algeria), which ceded almost all of the western and central parts of Algeria to Abd el-Kader.
With the Emir observing peace for the time being, the French promptly set out to seek revenge for their humiliating defeat at Constantine a few months earlier. This time they succeeded, destroying a city that had been a center of learning and culture for hundreds of years. A large number of its inhabitants died, many of them falling into the gorges around the city while trying to flee. Hajj Ahmed escaped and remained a fugitive and guerilla fighter for several more years.
Abd el-Kader’s decision to step out of the fight, when it was clear that the French were preparing for another assault on Constantine, raises questions. It could be seen as the Emir’s way of getting back at Hajj Ahmed for his earlier challenges. There was more to the conflict than personal rivalry, however. The two men differed significantly in their views of Algeria’s future. Hajj Ahmed wanted to continue Ottoman-style rule, based on traditional powerful families. Abd el-Kader, trying to revive a society weak for hundreds of years, wanted a much more progressive system. His vision for Algeria was, in fact, a truly revolutionary change from the past—and one of the most striking features of his fight for freedom.