Many a freedom fighter has led a brave struggle against oppression, but with little thought about what to do when the fighting was over. Abd el-Kader was different. He did know what he wanted for his people’s future: a unified Algerian state with a government based on law and justice. But how does a leader create a new state, starting with almost nothing? Despite the ever-present threat of warfare on the horizon, Abd el-Kader’s vision was so well planned and carried out that it deserves a close look.
The Emir’s new state would be almost completely different from the Ottoman regency. The old regime had depended on rulers from outside Algeria, with a social hierarchy that kept the native people at the bottom. Its practice of divide-and-rule was enforced by foreign soldiers, while a stagnant system of government permitted no political or social progress.
In contrast, Abd el-Kader wanted to put into action his devout commitment to Islam by building a society based on Islamic principles. No question of “separation of religion and state.” To Abd el-Kader, and to most Muslims and many Christians at that time, good government was based on the proper understanding and practice of religion.
Thanks to the two treaties with the French, the Desmichels Treaty in 1834 and the Tafna Treaty of 1837, Abd el-Kader had about five years of peace—or rather, only intermittent warfare. This gave him the chance to try to make Algerian society more cohesive, lawful, and ultimately peaceful. It was not, however, just admirable principles that motivated the Emir. By being head of an organized political entity, he would have much more prestige and leverage than if he were simply the leader of a group of rebellious tribes. As a “worthy opponent,” he could better resist the French adversaries during times of conflict, and bargain more successfully during the periods of peace.
In his efforts to consolidate tribal society, Abd el-Kader had to work within the existing system, knowing that he could not try to change it too quickly. But even moving carefully, he met resistance. Tribes would decide to break away whenever their confidence in him wavered, or when, for one reason or another, they felt it to their advantage to do so. Then Abd el-Kader would have to find some way to persuade them to renew their loyalty. The Berbers kept aloof in their mountainous strongholds, and the Arabs resented the Berbers, especially the very few who were part of Abd el-Kader’s administration. And there was always distrust between urban and rural populations.
Recognizing that if the tribes offset each others’ power, they would find it harder to unite against him, Abd el-Kader had to make inter-tribal rivalry work in his favor. Sometimes when a tribe refused to pay their taxes, for instance, or follow the Emir’s leadership in battle, he had a rival tribe carry out punishment by the traditional means of raiding and pillaging.
Abd el-Kader did not try to encourage friendly relations, cooperation, and a sense of solidarity among the tribes. That would have been a hopeless task. Democracy and equality were not part of the state he envisaged at this stage. Rather, the tribes were governed by a hierarchy of officials, like a pyramid, with Abd el-Kader at the top. In effect, Abd el-Kader continued the “divide and rule” system of the old Ottoman government—all the while aiming at a unified society and a fair system of government. It was a very difficult balancing act.
In creating the administration of his state, it would have been natural for the Emir to choose men from his own class, the marabouts, because of their education and reputation for wisdom and virtue. But he realized that practical considerations must often outweigh principles. He chose many officials who had actually served under the Turks, because some continuity was important and their experience would be needed. At times a candidate’s wealth and family connections would be more important than his ability and character. In general the Emir drew his officials from the elite classes, although from a much wider range of backgrounds—tribal, urban, religious—than had been true under Ottoman rule.
Abd el-Kader divided his territory into roughly equal parts called khalifaliks. At first there were four, and four more were added after the Treaty of Tafna had greatly expanded the Emir’s territory. The man in charge of each khalifalik was a khalifa, like a “lieutenant governor.” These were Abd el-Kader’s right-hand men and most trusted advisers. They were responsible for collecting taxes, maintaining fighting troops, and handling complaints.
Each khalifalik was subdivided into aghaliks, which generally corresponded to the tribal divisions of land. They were all supposed to obey the same laws and follow the same administrative procedures. Abd el-Kader appointed the officials in charge of each level of administration: khalifas, aghas, qaids (chiefs at the tribal level), and shaykhs (chiefs of subdivisions within tribes). He also appointed judges, called qadis, and aimed at a uniform, fair, and responsive judicial system. The qadis were even given salaries—a new idea, intended to discourage corruption.
For the time and place, this administrative system was a radical concept. Previously, Algerian society had been a matter of each tribe for itself, with harsh discipline imposed by the regency government when things got out of hand.
Traditional tribal society soon met further challenges. Abd el-Kader abolished the privileges of the powerful makhzen tribes, who had collected taxes from the rayah, “subject” tribes. This naturally angered the makhzen and encouraged them to collaborate with the French, but it pleased everyone else. At the same time, the Emir retained the basic system for collecting taxes. The principal tribe in each aghalik was designated as the new tax-collector, and these tribes became the new makhzen tribes. Since there were more of them, their power was spread more thinly and was less of a potential threat to the Emir’s leadership.
Abd el-Kader took a pragmatic approach to taxation in another way as well. He abolished the much-resented tax imposed by the Ottoman government and replaced it with the traditional taxes specified under Islamic law. (These were the zakat tax in the spring, 3-4% of produce and other wealth, and the ushr in the fall, 10% of the grain.) In addition, when tribes submitted to the Emir’s leadership and when administrative officials were appointed, they were expected to pay certain fees and send “gifts.”
A strong, unified government needed much more income, and far more reliably, than just those taxes and gifts. Consequently, Abd elKader decided to set new taxes, which did not have a basis in religious law. Most important was a tax especially for fighting jihad, which he started levying in 1834. The jihad tax was collected during peace times as well as during war and became an essential source of income for the state.
But the tribes, much as they liked fighting jihad, hated having to pay for it. In general, they seized every opportunity to avoid paying the jihad tax, and Abd el-Kader, relying on the khalifas’ forces, constantly had to keep after them. At one point he wrote to a French general, frankly revealing his frustrations:
The Arab people are so constituted that if they had not seen [the khalifa’s powerful forces], they would have refused to pay the tax. After a success on your part [i.e., the French], how often did I encounter difficulties in gathering the contributions!1
When hostilities did break out, some tribes reasoned that the Emir would be too busy to pay attention to them, so they could simply “forget” to pay their taxes—and take their chances on getting caught. Even under the best of conditions, the problem of inequality in taxation was a persistent problem. Some tribes paid little, especially those at the margins of the Emir’s state and power, while others paid heavily.
Abd el-Kader’s personal character and values served him well in the matter of taxation, as in so many other ways. He lived very simply and had no interest in ostentatious luxury or wealth. Thus he could convincingly claim that all the wealth collected as taxes and gifts went for the common good and not for his personal gain. That, too, was something new and revolutionary in the governance of Algeria.
At the same time that these potentially far-reaching changes were taking shape, the Algerians could not forget that they were at war—or soon would be again. Indeed, building and maintaining a fighting force was the most pressing job of Abd el-Kader’s state. He had to be able to count on a real army—not just the tribal warriors, who typically served for only a few days at a time. In fact, the tribal troops were not paid and had to provide their own food, weapons, and supplies. Little wonder that the Emir could not rely on them much.
In trying to establish an army, Abd el-Kader may well have been inspired by one of the experiences of his youth. When he and his father made their pilgrimage in the mid-1820s, stopping in Cairo for some time, they were welcomed by the ruler of Egypt, Muhammad Ali. This extraordinary individual, starting out as an Ottoman soldier stationed in Egypt, had seized power in 1805 in the most long-lasting revolution in modern Middle Eastern history. (His direct descendants ruled Egypt until 1952, when Egyptian army officers drove out the last king.) Aiming to create a strong state that could stand up to both the Ottoman Empire and the European states, Muhammad Ali had quickly introduced many reforms, especially affecting the military forces. His success in modernizing his army made a lasting impression on the visitors from Algeria.
Abd el-Kader, however, had to move even more quickly, building his state and his fighting force simultaneously. A strong army would have to be supported by a strong economy, so he encouraged agriculture, especially grain, which had a good market in Europe. His soldiers would need arms and other equipment, and he wanted to be as self-sufficient as possible. Therefore, he started a number of industrial operations on a modest scale, such as sawmills, tanneries, and forges, often with help from Europeans. There was not enough time, though, for these attempts at modern technology to get off to a good start.
As for the army itself, Abd el-Kader maintained a corps of paid “lifetime” soldiers. Mostly infantry, their numbers ranged from around six thousand to as many as nine thousand five hundred men, according to various estimates. In addition he depended on a much larger number of cavalrymen and infantrymen from the tribes, where one of the khalifas’ main duties was to keep troops ready to join the Emir’s army when needed. Historians have estimated that at the height of his military buildup, in 1840, Abd el-Kader could command around seventy-five to eighty thousand men. In 1843 he wrote a booklet of rules, regulations, and standards for the army, with all promotions to be made by the Emir himself. The French were so impressed by this booklet that they translated it no fewer than six times.
During the period of peace under the Desmichels Treaty, the French military actually provided instruction for Abd el-Kader’s army, plus uniforms, arms, and artillery. The Emir was happy to accept this help. Whatever military expertise he could acquire from his adversaries—who still regarded him as a valuable ally at that time—was a welcome boost to his own plans.
The military effectiveness of Abd el-Kader’s army, however, was another matter. The concept of a regular, trained army was entirely new for the Algerians, who had had no military experience under the Ottomans. The Emir’s uniformed and excellent horsemen looked very impressive; but when the commander of cavalry tried to persuade them to undergo training like that of the French cavalry, he got nowhere. They had complete confidence in their abilities as individual horsemen and fighters, but fighting as a unit was the last thing on their minds.
The Emir wanted a volunteer army. While his first calls attracted many young men, unfortunately, if not surprisingly, their enthusiasm for the soldier’s life quickly faded. Before long he had to resort to conscription. The quality of soldiers and their preparation must have disappointed Abd el-Kader in the first years, but by 1839 the troops were reasonably well trained and equipped. With all its problems, the regular army proved the Emir’s most effective means of extending and consolidating his control.
By the late 1830s, Abd el-Kader had laid the foundations of a new social organization and a state covering about two-thirds of the total territory of Algeria. While determined to make Islam the foundation for his government, he was a political thinker astute enough to know when and how to be flexible. He often faced problems and paradoxes that forced him to make decisions that he might not otherwise have chosen. The jihad tax was a good example: because the tax was resisted by the tribes, the Emir had to accept his French adversaries’ help for his army—which would soon be fighting those very adversaries.
Even at its most successful, in 1838-39, Abd el-Kader’s state was a loose creation, held together by little more than his own remarkable skills and by religion, especially the call for jihad. Many circumstances—the obstacles imposed by tribal society, the Algerians’ lack of experience in self-government, the technologically more advanced invaders—worked against it. Yet, designed and set up in an extremely short time, his state was not only the first completely indigenous government in hundreds of years, but was also organized more fairly and run more humanely than any other government in North Africa and the Middle East at that time.
Even though Abd el-Kader’s state lasted only a few years, his vision of new social and political possibilities was quite amazing. What might he have accomplished, in bringing his people into the fast-changing world of the nineteenth century, if he had really been able to pursue his dream of an ideal Islamic state?