8

FRENCH FORCES IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

French armies, like the English, looked impressive. Before the Battle of Roosebeke, Philip van Artevelde warned his men that the French lines would ‘gleam with gold and silver, with crested helmets’.¹ Nor was it just a matter of appearance. There were good reasons to expect French armies to be successful in the war that began in 1337. The French could recruit far larger armies than the English could muster, and did not have to face the problems involved in fighting overseas. Admittedly, they had suffered a disastrous defeat at the hands of the Flemings at Courtrai in 1302, but in 1328 they had their revenge at Cassel, where they countered a surprise Flemish attack. Though they lost many horses, French mounted forces were triumphant. Against the English, the French were successful in the War of Saint-Sardos in Gascony in 1324. Though Bordeaux remained in English hands, the Agenais and other lands were lost, and the Earl of Kent was forced to surrender La Réole.

RECRUITMENT

The recruitment and organization of French armies has been ably set out by Philippe Contamine.² The traditional feudal obligation, whereby those who held land directly from the king had a duty to provide troops at their own expense for a 40-day period, was of limited relevance by the 1330s. However, a general obligation on the nobility to serve when summoned was effective in producing large numbers of paid troops. Also, a much broader obligation, known as the arrière-ban, could be invoked in times of urgent necessity, though it was not used after 1356. This extended to all between 18 and 60. The requirements of the arrière-ban could be met by paying what amounted to a tax in lieu of physical service. A group of a hundred households might be charged to pay for up to six soldiers. Cities and towns contributed: in 1337, Paris made a grant of 400 cavalry for a six-month period, provided the king led the host in person. If he was not present, service was for four months.

The French crown also used letters of retainer, similar to the contracts employed in England, if not as precise in wording. In 1339 the Count of Foix was retained to serve with 330 men-at-arms and 300 foot-soldiers. Foreign mercenaries, such as the Genoese crossbowmen slaughtered at Crécy, were also recruited by means of contracts. Other foreign troops were provided in significant numbers by rulers allied to the French, such as the King of Bohemia and the Count of Savoy. Money-fiefs might be used to bind such rulers to the French cause; thus the Duke of Brabant did homage to Philip VI in 1332 in return for an annual fee of 2,000 livres tournois. By 1339, however, the duke had entered English allegiance, accepting a promised £1,500 a year from Edward III.

The range of recruitment methods may appear unsystematic, but the French crown had no difficulty in raising large numbers of troops. In 1339 a plan envisaged 10,000 men-at-arms and 40,000 foot-soldiers in royal pay, with the forces of the king and his son in addition. That this was no flight of fancy is indicated by accounts which show that on all fronts the French had about 28,000 men-at-arms and 16,700 infantry in pay in September 1340. It is not possible to calculate French numbers at Crécy, but there is no doubt that the English were very significantly outnumbered there.

In addition to paid troops, there was a profusion of servants and camp followers. Merchants, artisans, prostitutes and others provided services which were surely appreciated by the troops, if not by their commanders. They were a hindrance; on the Roosebeke campaign in 1382 the elderly and sick, and all those incapable of bearing arms, were ordered to leave the French camp.

ORGANIZATION

In the field, the army was divided into up to a dozen ‘battles’. That led by the Count of Alençon in 1340 totalled over 1,200 men. Within this force, units varied greatly in size. The count’s own household provided 73 men-at-arms. There were 23 retinues led by bannerets, varying in size from 60 down to 14. A hundred units led by knights averaged just five. Twenty squires in groups of up to five made up the rest of the contingent.

French forces, despite success in recruiting large numbers, failed disastrously at Crécy. Following that catastrophe, King John issued an ordinance in 1351 in which he attempted to shape the armies more systematically. The main commanders, in charge of their organization, were the Constable, the Marshal and the Master of the Crossbowmen. New wage levels were set. Knights and men-at-arms were to be mustered in units of at least 25, with a maximum of 80. Knights who were in charge of companies of 25 or 30 would be paid as bannerets. Musters were to be held at least twice a month, with written records kept. All the horses were to be valued, and branded with a hot iron for identification. Crossbowmen were to be equipped with bow, sword and knife, and have body defences of steel plates as well as steel skull-cap and gorget (throat protection). Other infantry, termed pavisiers, should have plate armour, or a mail hauberk, as well as bacinet, gauntlets, sword, knife and spear. The foot-soldiers were to be in companies of 25 or 30, each with a constable in charge.³

This ordinance shows both the similarities, and the differences, between French and English armies. The organization of the cavalry differed relatively little. The pay differentials were much the same, as was the principle of valuing horses so that compensation could be paid for losses in war. The contrast came with the infantry. There was no French equivalent to the English mounted or foot archers. The elite among the foot-soldiers were the well-armoured crossbowmen, while the other infantry were to be far better equipped with armour than was the case with the English archers. They were equipped not with bows, but with a range of weapons such as swords, spears and billhooks. The proportions were very different, for in a French army men-at-arms usually outnumbered infantry.

Fig. 11: A mid-fourteenth-century French knight in full armour

In the 1351 ordinance, there was no attempt to copy the English use of archers. Yet, hardly surprisingly, some efforts were made to employ integrated retinues comprising both men-at-arms and archers, on the English model. In 1351, Jean de Beaumanoir, marshal of Brittany, had a following of four knights, 28 squires and 30 archers. Similarly, in the next year Yvain Charruel, a Breton knight, had a retinue of two knights, 21 squires and 30 archers. A smaller retinue under a squire, Jean de Kergolay, consisted of two knights, five squires and ten archers.⁴ This, however, was a short-lived experiment. Later musters show that it was very rare for archers or other infantry troops to feature in retinues.

COMMAND

Command in the field naturally went to the great men, the dukes and counts. At Crécy the King of Bohemia and his son Charles of Luxembourg headed ‘battles’. The Duke of Lorraine, the counts of Flanders, of Blois, of Harcourt and of Alençon had similar positions. The Constable and the two Marshals had important roles in command; the latter had responsibility for musters, and disputes within the army were heard in their court. Men of skill and experience, not necessarily of great wealth, were usually appointed to these posts. Moreau de Fiennes, appointed Constable after the disaster of Poitiers, had been brought up in the English court. His military experience went back to 1340, when he campaigned with four knights and 25 squires. He had fought in Artois, Picardy and Normandy in King John’s early years on the throne, and remained Constable until his death in 1370. Arnoul d’Audrehem’s military career began in 1330s; he was appointed Marshal in 1352, and resigned in 1368, when he accepted the honour of carrying the Oriflamme. Boucicaut the elder, who became Marshal in 1357, was another highly experienced soldier, who had first fought in 1337. His successor, Jean, Sire de Blainville, appointed in 1368, was a Norman noble of no great wealth, but with extensive military experience. The most notable appointment came two years later, when the remarkably able soldier Bertrand du Guesclin became Constable, with authority in the field even over dukes who were members of the royal house.

One suggestion is that the appointment of du Guesclin in particular, and a more general shift in French attitudes, was influenced by the doctrines set out in the widely-read late Roman treatise by Vegetius. Charles V was an enthusiast for classical learning, and had his own copy of Vegetius. The treatise stressed the importance of experience and skill in appointing military leaders, and this was reflected in Charles’s actions. There is no doubting the popularity of Vegetius; the problem is that it is difficult to determine how far efforts were made to put his theories into practice. Though his authority was greater, du Guesclin’s elevation was not so radically different from previous practice in appointing Marshals and Constables. Where Vegetian concepts were perhaps most important was not in the details of military practice, but in the way in which the army was seen as an instrument of the state, acting for the common good. This contrasted strongly with the individualism which found its worst expression in the routier leaders.

CHANGE AFTER 1369

Warfare was changing in this period. Skirmishes and sieges, not battles, were the order of the day. Armies were smaller than in the past; most French ones were probably similar in number to the English at around 5,000, though large numbers were recruited for the campaign of 1382 which culminated in the Battle of Roosebeke, and the abortive invasion of England in 1386.

Forces were generally in the field for longer than had been the case in the early years of the war. This brought greater cohesion and professionalism. Command still went, where possible, to members of the upper aristocracy, but, as the career of du Guesclin shows, ability was recognized. As was the case with the English, some captains had lengthy experience. Morice de Trésiguidy, a Breton, was one of the Thirty of 1351. He fought with du Guesclin at Cocherel in 1364 and went with him to Spain. He campaigned regularly in the 1370s, and fought at Roosebeke in 1382. His military career probably ended at Nicopolis in 1396.⁵

There were general summonses issued to the nobility, but the crown largely relied on the service of paid troops recruited by means of letters of retainer. Just as the proportion of bannerets and knights fell in English armies, so it did in the French. Whereas in 1340 there had been one banneret to every 70 men-at-arms, 50 years later the proportion was one to a hundred. That of knights fell similarly, from 15 per cent to 10 per cent. There were significant regional variations; knighthood was less common in the south than in the north. A horse valuation list for a contingent serving with the Duke of Anjou in Gascony in 1369 shows that it was led by a squire and consisted of 87 other squires and ten mounted archers. On the other hand, Olivier de Clisson had two bannerets, 32 knights and 165 squires in his retinue in Brittany in 1380.

Fig. 12: A late fourteenth-century French knight

In parallel with the decline of knighthood, so the destrier, the great warhorse, featured less and less in the records of musters. By the mid-fourteenth century, the elite horse was normally a courser, with others simply termed ‘horses’. A muster at Dijon in 1366 revealed three coursers, 19 horses and 12 rounceys. Horses were needed for skirmishing and scouting; in battle, men were expected to fight on foot; at Roosebeke only Charles VI was mounted.

One answer to the power of English archery was to ensure that foot-soldiers were well equipped. Most had crossbows. Armour that could resist arrows was essential. Details of the purchase of infantry armour for 500 men in 1385 show that it consisted of a côte de fer (body armour), weighing 25 pounds, a bacinet with visor, weighing 14 pounds, arm pieces and gauntlets, and leg armour, with mail protection to the rear.⁶ Such men were not recruited in very large numbers; crossbowmen and other foot-soldiers were usually outnumbered by men-at-arms by about two to one. The contrast was not solely with English armies; in the forces raised in Navarre in the 1360s and 1370s, only about a third consisted of men-at-arms.

There were inevitable problems. Musters were not properly held. Captains might take money for more troops than they took on campaign, and did not always pay them satisfactorily. Men engaged in pillaging and robbery. Goods were seized and not paid for. Some men deserted, or left without leave. A royal ordinance of 1374, which aimed to prevent such abuses, rather than to make radical changes, laid responsibility for discipline on captains, and explained how men-at-arms were to be divided into companies, or routes, each of a hundred men. There were to be ten smaller units, known as chambres, within the companies.⁷ It was hard to maintain the principles of the ordinance; the death of Charles V in 1380 meant the loss of a driving force, and a slipping back into old ways. At the Battle of Roosebeke in 1382 there was a fear that large numbers would desert. Heralds announced severe penalties for any who left the lines, and the horses, on which they might flee, were put out of sight, so that the men ‘having lost hope of leaving the fight, might be more aggressive’.⁸

There was no enthusiasm among French commanders in the later fourteenth century for battle. Sieges were a different matter, with all the techniques of blockade, bombardment, mining and escalade in use. Alongside the trebuchets and other stone-throwing machines, guns began to be used on a significant scale to batter walls. Detailed documents show their use at the siege of Saint-Sauveur in Normandy which concluded in 1375. New guns were specially forged for the siege, four of them especially large and capable of firing hundred-pound stones. One such stone crashed into the chamber of the constable, Thomas Catrington, terrifying him. In all, some 30 guns were brought to bear on the castle. The accounts reveal some of the details of manufacture. It took 43 days to make one especially large gun at Caen. To prevent it rusting, it was covered with cowhide, and an iron plate was fitted over the touchhole to keep out the rain. The gun was bound round with ropes, to provide extra strength. It rested in an elaborate wooden framework, which allowed for adjustments to the elevation. For ammunition, it used stones; smaller guns shot lead pellets. In the end, however, it was gold, not stone balls, which brought surrender, with the French buying out the English with 60,000 gold francs.⁹ It would be wrong to see the use of siege guns at this time as marking a revolution in military methods, but there was an important evolution taking place, with castles and towns becoming more vulnerable to the new methods of bombardment.

SHIPPING

Naval resources were not as essential for the French as for the English, as their plans to invade England never came to fruition. It was necessary, however, to find ways to counter English strength at sea. At Rouen, there was a naval arsenal, the clos des galées, dating from the late thirteenth century. Far more elaborate than anything the English possessed, it was both a shipyard and an arms depot. In the late 1330s the French crown possessed some 50 ships, of various types. Just as in England, the bulk of the fleets were made up of impressed merchant vessels. In 1340 a fleet of 200 ships, none with a crew of fewer than 60, was assembled from northern French ports. Some French ships were very large; one royal ship, known as La Testiere, had a crew of 150 men. Galleys might have 200 sailors and crossbowmen. Maintaining the fleet in condition was always a problem. In 1374 Charles V explained that the galleys, ships, barges and other vessels that had been built or bought had deteriorated. The equipment and victuals had been bought too hastily, and at too great a cost. The hope was that by appointing a man with ‘great experience and industry in such matters’, the situation could be turned round.¹⁰ Rather than rely exclusively on their own naval resources, the French made extensive use of hired galleys, particularly from Genoa and Castile. In 1337 Ayton Doria of Genoa contracted to supply 20 galleys, each with 210 men, in return for 900 gold florins a month. In 1348 the King of Castile promised to provide 200 fully armed ships for a four-month period. Accounts for the distribution of ship’s biscuit in 1385 reveal that the fleet consisted of 32 Spanish and 21 French vessels. A dozen of the Spaniards were classed as ships; the remainder were oared barges and balingers.

THE SOLDIER

The chronicles and documents rarely provide much detail about the ordinary soldiers of this period. However, a unique and remarkable record of a muster held in Provence in 1374 gives a rare insight into one small troop, for it provides brief physical descriptions. Most of the men were mercenaries, termed brigands, contracted to serve for two months. Almost a quarter was described as ‘young’, and nearly all of these were beardless, or had only small beards. Of the others, only four out of 140 were old enough to be white-bearded. Over a quarter of those described had visible scars, perhaps acquired as much through manual labour as from fighting, for the professional hired soldiers were no more scarred than the others. The faces of the men emerge unexpectedly from the record, staring through the centuries:

Jean Bosquet of Areis, above average height, round face, pale eyes, black beard somewhat whitened, nose rather scarred, also on the right jaw, armed with plates, sword, buckler, knife, iron skull-cap and crossbow.¹¹