Figures
4.1 Example of CCP Default-Management Waterfall of Recovery Resources
6.1 Resolution Has Three Stages
6.2 Unit Bank: Balance Sheet Overview
6.3 Determination of Reserve Capital and ALAC Requirements
6.4 Prompt Corrective Action Limits the Need for Reserve Capital
6.5 Unit Bank with Parent Holding Company
6.6 Parent Holding Company/Bank Sub: Balance Sheet Overview
6.7 Bank Subsidiary Is Safer Than Parent Holding Company
6.9 Banking Group with Domestic and Foreign Subsidiaries
6.10 SPE Approach Requires Concurrence of Home and Host
7.1 Insolvency Event for a Dealer Bank
7.2 Recapitalization’s Ability to Stop Runs Sparked by Insolvency
7.3 Lehman Stock and Bond Prices January–December 2008
7.4 Lehman Corporate Structure
7.5 Market Valuation of Lehman’s Solvency Equity
7.6 Liquidity Losses over Lehman’s Final Week
7.8 Counterfactual Timeline of Chapter 14 Section 1405 Transfer
7.9 Structure of the Section 1405 Transfer
7.10 Recapitalizing Subsidiaries after Sale Approval
7.11 Post–Chapter 14 Asset Devaluations Short of Insolvency
7.12 G-Reliance on Fed Funding during the Financial Crisis
7.13 New Lehman’s Initial Public Offering
7.14 Approving a Plan and Paying Claimants
9.1a Number of Subsidiaries of the Largest US Bank Holding Companies
9.1b Number of Countries in Which US Bank Holding Companies Have Subsidiaries
9.2 Evolution of Average Number of Subsidiaries and Total Assets for G-SIBs
Tables
6.1 Bail-In at Parent Does Not Recapitalize the Subsidiary Bank
6.2 Bail-In at Subsidiary Bank Recapitalizes the Subsidiary Bank
6.3 Decision Rights during Resolution Process
7.1 Lehman’s and Holdings’ Balance Sheets
7.2 Post–Chapter 14 Hypothetical Liquidity Stress Test 9/8–9/26
7.3 Holdings’ Balance Sheet, Recoveries, and Claims
9.2 Disaggregation of Subsidiaries of 13 G-SIBs by Industry Classification (May 2013)