WE have seen how the conception of the Law of Nature, which originated in early Greek philosophy, has steadily increased in dignity and importance, having been finally worked up into a system by such writers as Grotius, Pufendorf, and Locke.
The basis of Natural Law was the idea that there exists an essential justice, which is the same for all men of whatever race or State they might be members. The Laws of Nature were considered as being independent of tradition; as being given with the constitution of man; as being founded in reason, and as being unchangeable by any human, or even divine, power. These Laws of Nature were of course not legally binding upon men, since there was no authority to impose a penalty upon their infraction. But they were regarded as morally binding upon all men. It was a question of ought. The positive laws of every State ought to conform to the Laws of Nature. The citizens of every land ought to enjoy their natural rights; their rights as men; the rights to which the constitution and needs of human nature entitle them. These rights might be denied them in any State; but the denial meant that the government exceeded its just powers and had become tyrannical. Of course, de facto the sovereignty of the State is unlimited. Should it be de jure? Should there be a sphere within which the State must not interfere; namely, the sphere of the rights each citizen ought to possess as an individual, as a man? These questions were by the writers on Natural Law answered in the affirmative. They often forgot, however, that these so-called Laws of Nature are only morally, not legally, binding.
It is evident that the theory of Natural Law is admirably adapted to become the theory of revolutions, whereby the ordinary course of custom and tradition is interrupted and new standards are sought. When men are dissatisfied with things as they are, they will inquire, How ought conditions be? At such times they will ask for the reason back of customs and institutions.
It was but natural that the doctrines of Natural Law should be employed during the American, and more especially during the French, Revolution to attack abuses which had accumulated for centuries. Natural Law taught that men were naturally free and equal; that such rights as freedom of conscience, of religious worship, of speech, of the press, of public meeting, followed from the very constitution of human nature; that, given the personality of man, these rights are absolutely necessary to secure its development. The actual condition of affairs was far from agreeing with these demands of Natural Law in the Europe of the eighteenth century.
Not only did the disparity between theory and actual conditions render the doctrines of Natural Law dangerous to the order of things prevailing during the eighteenth century, but the danger had become particularly great, because of the general spread of these views, which was a consequence of the advance and wide dissemination of education.
Natural Law had a peculiar attraction for the people who lived at this period. It was a period during which men were singularly devoid of reverence for the past. The historical spirit was lacking. There was a general longing to be freed from the thraldom of antiquated customs and institutions. The foundations of things were examined. The fact that privileges had existed for ages was no longer regarded as a sufficient title why they should exist forever.1 Reason was regarded as the panacea for all human ills. No other age had such a faith in the perfectibility of things. It was believed that the Golden Age could be realized by enthroning Reason. The application of reason to science resulted in a wonderful advance of human knowledge at this time. It was held that laws and political institutions must also conform to reason. The simple and perfect Laws of Nature were regarded as immeasurably preferable to the multitudinous and conflicting laws of the existing type.
Another reason for the popularity of Natural Law was the universal desire for individual liberty which marks this epoch. To the people of this period the constant meddling of the government in private affairs, carried on to a ridiculous extent, had grown almost intolerable. They sighed for liberty, for the free disposition of themselves and their property. They longed to be rid of the shackles of custom. As a reaction against paternalism and overcentralization the desire arose to restrict the interference of the State to a minimum. This movement culminated in the writings of Kant, Fichte, W. von Humboldt, John Stuart Mill, and Herbert Spencer.
It is interesting to note that the conception of Natural Law found expression in the Antimachiavelli of the young Prussian Crown Prince Frederick, later known as Frederick the Great. The book was written as a refutation of the political principles of Machiavelli, during Frederick’s happy Rheinsberg days, between 1736–1740. Frederick thinks that before considering the different forms of states, the great Florentine should have examined the origin of princes and discussed the reasons which induced free men to submit to masters. He thinks it might not have been convenient to mention what should remove crime and tyranny, in a book which proposed to defend these. Machiavelli was perhaps unwilling to say that the people found it necessary for their repose and preservation to have judges to regulate their differences; protectors, to shield them from their enemies in the possession of their property; sovereigns, to unite all various interests in a single common interest. He was reluctant to acknowledge that the people had chosen those whom they believed the wisest, the most just, the least biassed, the most humane, and the most watchful, to govern them. “Justice ought to be the chief object of the sovereign. He should prefer the welfare of the people he governs to every other interest. What becomes, then, of those ideas of interest, of grandeur, of ambition, and of despotism? It will be found that the sovereign, far from being absolute master of the people which are under his domination, is but their first servant.”1
It was from this point of view that Frederick II. regarded his position as king of Prussia. At a time when rulers had adopted the phrase of Louis XIV., “L’état c’est moi,” and held their subjects to exist but for their sake, Frederick, influenced by Natural Law and the compact theory, labored for the good of his subjects and conceived himself to be, not the lord, but the first servant, of the State.1 Though wielding despotic power, he was influenced by considerations of justice and morality and did not use his vast power for personal ends, but to promote the welfare of Prussia. The influence of Natural Law upon the work of the great king can be seen from the following extract taken from his famous Code of Laws: “The good of the State, and of its inhabitants in particular, is the end of the civil association and the universal object of the laws. The head of the State, whose duty it is to further the public welfare, is entitled to guide and determine the external actions of all the inhabitants in conformity with this object. The laws and ordinances of the State may not limit the natural liberty and rights of the citizen any further than the above-mentioned object requires.”2
An enthusiastic disciple of Frederick, and likewise a representative of the system of “enlightened despotism,” was Joseph II. of Austria. He reformed the judicial system of his States, abolished serfdom and all unjust privileges, promoted education, strove in every way to elevate his people, and favored toleration and humanitarianism. He desired a complete regeneration of conditions. He had a passion for reforming. He was animated by the noblest motives of justice, equity, and love of humanity. But Joseph’s great weakness was his lack of reverence for historical development. He respected nothing which did not conform to his ideals. He had been schooled in the principles of Natural Law as contained in Martini’s work. These principles he applied to existing institutions. He said that since he had ascended the throne he had made philosophy the lawgiver in his realm.1 Despite his want of historical understanding, a fault which caused general opposition to his well-meant plans on the part of those he sought to benefit, and which eventually caused the failure of wellnigh all his reforms, Joseph deserves honor and credit for his noble spirit and his devotion to the welfare of his subjects.
The representative philosopher of the eighteenth century was Christian von Wolff, the famous professor at Halle, who, though his works are now seldom read, in his day enjoyed an almost incredible reputation. Even in France his popularity was so great that for a time it seemed as if his works were destined to supplant those of the English writers. Driven from Halle by the pietistical Frederick William I., he was recalled by Frederick the Great. His return to Halle was regarded as an event of national importance. Wolff’s influence declined during his later years, but only because his theories had become the common property of his contemporaries. Wolff usually entitles his books Sensible Thoughts. Perfectibility is the corner-stone of his system. He declares it to be the duty of the human race to strive for perfection. He deducts Natural Law from the moral nature of man. The Rights of Man flow from his duties. The former are inherent because they arise from innate duties. Rights and duties are equal for all men because they flow from human nature. All men are naturally equal. Acquired rights alone cause differences among individuals. No prerogative comes from human nature. No one has any power over another by nature. From the duty to perfect personality, which is incumbent upon every person, Wolff deduces personal rights, such as the right to self-culture, to the preservation of one’s body, to labor. He declares the purpose of the State to be the realization of the common safety and welfare. Each individual sacrifices only so much of his natural liberty as is necessary to secure the common welfare.1
The views of Wolff on Natural Law are practically the same as those of Locke and others. But Wolff contributed greatly to their dissemination. He had a host of followers and disciples. Among them was Vattel, whose Law of Nations, which accords entirely with Wolff’s teachings, enjoyed great celebrity in both Europe and America and is frequently quoted by John Adams, Samuel Adams, Otis, Jefferson, and Hamilton.
Let us now inquire what the views of the leading French writers were in regard to Natural Law, and what effect their ideas had in preparing the way for the French Revolution.
The despotism of Louis XIV. had exerted a blighting influence upon French literature. The recovery from this condition was due to the fact that the French sought for a new stimulus in a different country. This country was England. In science, ethics, rational theology, and political philosophy the English had at this time made a most remarkable progress. The people on the Continent were wholly unfamiliar with the ideas of Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Newton, and other brilliant English thinkers until after the first quarter of the eighteenth century. After that time English philosophy, science, and principles of government began to spread to France and Germany, and to exert a most salutary influence. It was in England that Montesquieu, Voltaire, and a host of other Frenchmen received their inspiration and many of their ideas. Buckle has carefully collected a list of Frenchmen who visited England, or were familiar with the English language. This list is a very large one.1 It was especially the English system of government, and the liberty of the people of England, which filled the French with admiration.
During the first half of the eighteenth century it was the Church which the French writers attacked. After 1750 the opposition turns against the State. It is after this date that the chief French books which deal with Natural Law or politics were written. Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws is an exception to this statement, having been published in 1748.
It is with Montesquieu that we must first concern ourselves. He is not really a member of the school of writers on Natural Law, but rather a forerunner of the historical school. He does not believe in abstract justice, neither does he attempt to establish a system of perfect laws or to enumerate the Rights of Man. Montesquieu’s method is based upon the relativity of politics. He concerns himself with all forms of government, endeavoring to discover the principles underlying each form, rather than to determine the best system of government.
Yet Montesquieu is familiar with the theory of Natural Law. This conception is, however, of subordinate importance with him. He defines Law in general as human reason, inasmuch as it governs all the peoples of the earth; and considers the political and civil laws of each nation as the particular cases to which this human reason ought to apply.1 He speaks of Laws of Nature which flow from the constitution of our being,2 regarding these laws as those which man received before the establishment of society.3 “Individual beings possessing intelligence,” he says, “may have laws of their own making; but they likewise have those they have not made. These laws of the latter sort were possible before intelligent beings existed. There were relations possible, and consequently laws possible.—To say that there is no justice or injustice, except as the laws ordain or prohibit, is to say that before one had drawn a circle the radii were not equal.”4 And yet he defines liberty as the right to do that which the laws permit.5 Writers of the Natural Law school would qualify this definition by adding as long as the laws are just. Montesquieu is not entirely logical. He seems to believe in essential justice, yet this belief is of no further consequence.
But even though Montesquieu makes no attempt to lay down laws of Natural Justice or enumerate the Rights of Man, he must be regarded as one of the greatest champions of liberty France ever produced. It is well known that Voltaire bestowed upon him the very much exaggerated praise that he had conferred upon the human race the rights it had almost everywhere lost.1
Montesquieu distinguishes between political liberty in relation to the constitution and in relation to the citizen. He avoids the error which the ancients committed, and which has so often been made since, of confusing liberty with democracy. This mistake was also made during the French Revolution. It might have been avoided if the views of Montesquieu, rather than those of Rousseau, had been followed. Montesquieu also discriminates between liberty and equality. He regards equality as the principle of the democratic form of government, taking honor to be the principle of the monarchical form and moderation of the aristocratic form. He holds that each form degenerates from an excess or deficiency of its principle; thus a lack or an excess of equality would prove alike destructive to a democracy.2 Montesquieu points out the diverse meanings which have been attached to the word liberty. Some regard the power to depose a tyrant as equivalent to the possession of liberty, while some identify liberty with the right of electing the ruler. Liberty is sometimes confounded with the right of bearing arms, or of exercising violence, or of being governed by a ruler belonging to one’s own nation; or even, as was the case in Russia, with the right of wearing a long beard. Often liberty has been put in the existence of a particular form of government, such as a democracy, and the power of the people is confused with the liberty of the people.3 Even though in democracies the people may seem to be able to do what they please, democracies and aristocracies are not free by their nature, for liberty does not consist in doing what one pleases, and real liberty exists only in moderated governments.1 While philosophical liberty consists in the exercise of one’s own will, political liberty consists in security.2 To Montesquieu the indispensable safeguard against tyranny and guarantee of liberty lies in the separation of the executive, legislative, and judicial powers of government, which he believes exists in England.3 This doctrine of the separation of powers, though based upon a misconception of the English constitution, had great fascination for the Americans. They carried it out in the constitution of both federal and state governments. It is expressed in most of the Bills of Rights of the states. It was likewise put into the Declaration of the Rights of Man drawn up by the Constituent Assembly. Concerning the doctrines of natural liberty and equality and Natural Rights or Rights of Man there is little or nothing in Montesquieu’s book.
Worthy of a place beside Montesquieu as a champion of liberty in France is Voltaire, the famous poet, philosopher, and wit. Voltaire can hardly be called an individualist. Though a bitter opponent of the existing order of things, he favored such reforming sovereigns as Louis XIV., Frederick II., and Catherine II. of Russia. He cared very little for the English system of self-government. As Sorel says: “He expected everything from the State, and, at bottom, worked for the State alone. . . . His political ideal is an enlightened despotism tempered by tolerance and reason.”4 “To whatever side we turn our eyes,” says Voltaire, “we find contrariety, harshness, uncertainty, and arbitrariness. We endeavor in this century to improve everything; let us seek, then, to perfect the laws upon which depend our lives and fortunes.”1 In theory, however, republican sentiments gain the upper hand. He holds that a perfect government never existed, because men have passions, and if they were without passions, government would not be needed. Notwithstanding, he considers the republican form the most tolerable, because it preserves the natural equality of men more nearly than any other. He maintains that every father of a family should be master of his house alone, and not of his neighbor’s, and that, since society is composed of many houses and lands, it is contradictory that a single person be the master of these houses and adjoining lands; and in the nature of things that each master have a voice in the securing of the welfare of society.2 Again, he believes that a republic, being governed in common, should be richer and more populous than if governed by a master, because each citizen, enjoying security of property and person, toils for his own welfare with confidence, and, by bettering his own condition, improves that of the entire society as well.3 According to him, it is because a community of persons lack the courage, or else the ability, of governing themselves, if they are under the rule of one or more masters.4 He defines civil government as the will of all, executed by one or more persons, by virtue of laws which all have made.5
Voltaire often speaks of Natural Right and the Laws of Nature, regarding Natural Right as that which Nature teaches all men. Human laws must be founded upon Natural Right. The grand principle, the universal rule binding all, is : Refrain from doing that which you would not have done unto yourself.1
Voltaire believes in equality, but not in the absolute sense. He holds that all are equally men, having the same needs and desires, but all are not equal as members of society.2 All men have an equal right to liberty, to the possession of their property, and to the protection of the laws, but all are not equal in talents; therefore public dignities, that is, public burdens, should be bestowed upon those best able to bear them.3
As sensible as Voltaire’s views on equality, are his ideas concerning liberty. Liberty is not absolute, but is dependence upon the laws alone.4 Enlightenment and liberty go hand in hand. The more eagerly men search for the truth, the more they will love liberty. “The same force of mind which leads to truth makes us also good citizens. What does it mean, in fact, to be free? It is reasoning justly and knowing the Rights of Man; and being known, they will be defended.”5 The defence of the rights of human reason is to him equivalent to the defence of liberty. The more enlightened men become the greater will be their freedom. For this reason, freedom of speech and of the press are Natural Rights, and the basis of all other liberties. They are the means of mutual enlightenment. They are denied only in tyrannies of the worst sort.1 “It is because of this that the English nation has become a nation truly free. It would not be free were it not enlightened. It would not be enlightened if each citizen had not the right of publishing what he wished.”2 Of course, this liberty may be abused. But it would be as foolish to deny men these rights on pretexts such as this, as it would be to prohibit them from drinking because some men get drunk.3 The import of Voltaire’s contention for freedom of speech and of the press can be fully understood only when one remembers the fact that most of his own books, as well as those of all other leading thinkers of his time, had to be printed in foreign countries because of the iron censorship prevailing in France.
The greatest opponents of freedom of thought and of expression were undoubtedly the French clergy. This is one of the reasons why Voltaire assailed the Church with such bitter animosity. The Church seemed to him the chief antagonist of the reforms he longed for so intensely. It was this conviction which inspired the bitter invective he hurled against the Church as a political institution. “The most absurd of all despotisms,” he said, “the most humiliating to human nature, the most repugnant, the most fatal, is that of the priests.”4 Voltaire pleaded for the abolition of serfdom, which still prevailed upon some of the lands of the Church, branding this institution as a crime against humanity.5 He took up the case of the unfortunate Jean Calas, who was executed at Toulouse, a victim of clerical bigotry, and in his treatise on Toleration spoke of intolerance as absurd and barbarous; as the right of tigers; yes, as even more horrible, since tigers destroy only to eat, while in France the people mutually exterminate themselves for love of paragraphs.1
In other ways, also, Voltaire evinced his love of personal freedom. Thus he demands freedom from arbitrary arrest, regarding it as tolerable, perhaps, to imprison a citizen in time of trouble and of war, without giving previous information, or allowing judicial trial, but maintaining that such treatment in time of peace is tyrannical in the extreme.2 Again, he opposes sumptuary laws of all sorts, not only on economic grounds, but also because they deprive those who possess property of their natural right of enjoying it, and because they interfere with the liberty of the citizen to clothe, nourish, or lodge himself as he pleases.3 Finally, Voltaire opposed feudal dues of all sorts, and thinks there is no possible reason for the distinction between the nobles and the commons, which was in its origin a distinction between lords and slaves. It seems idiotic to him that the larger part of the nation should be degraded for the advantage of a few.4
There is nothing incendiary about these ideas. In fact, it is remarkable that enlightened men of the stamp of Voltaire and Montesquieu, who had seen and suffered so much under the evils of the old order of things, should be so moderate in their views of liberty and equality. They did not intend to prepare men for a revolution, but expected reforms to be carried out by the rulers themselves.
Of essentially the same nature were the doctrines of the writers of the great Encyclopédie, men like Diderot, D’Alembert, Holbach, yes, even of Turgot, Condorcet, and of the physiocrats in general.1 Natural Liberty is defined in the Encyclopédie as the right Nature gives all men to dispose of their person and property as they judge best, being subject to Natural Laws alone. In the state of nature men are independent of each other, but are not independent of Natural Law. By nature men cannot sell, exchange, or destroy themselves; for, naturally, all men are equal, inasmuch as they are not subject to the power of a master and no one has the right of property over them. After entering political society men are entitled to civil liberty, which consists in dependence upon the laws only, and is simply Natural Liberty curtailed by the absence of individual independence and community of property. Most of these ideas are based upon the doctrines of Locke.2
Holbach, the noted materialist and atheist, truly remarks that the Greeks and Romans did not possess civil liberty because they confused liberty with sovereignty. The day when liberty shall rule lies in the future. Holbach holds that it is the duty of the State to secure the happiness of the citizens. This end can be attained only by allowing the just liberty, whereby each may work for his own interest and well-being providing he does not injure the well-being of his fellow citizens. Freedom exists only in a State whose members are subject, not to the will of man, which is likely to change, but to that justice which is invariable.1 Security of person and property seems to him one of the greatest advantages of liberty.2 He demands freedom of thought, because the tyranny over thought is the most cruel, revolting, and useless of all violations of the liberty of man. Freedom of the press is a consequence of liberty of thought. Men have not abrogated their Natural Rights upon entering society, but seek a more assured satisfaction of the needs of nature.3 Every law depriving man of his liberty, security, and property is unjust.
Turgot, the famous writer on political economy, maintains that true morality regards all men with the same eye, recognizing in all an equal right to happiness, which is founded upon the destination of man’s nature. Whoever oppresses another opposes the divine order and abuses his power. Might and right are not identical. The strong have no right over the weak. “Every convention contrary to these natural rights has no other authority than the right of the stronger: it is real tyranny.”4 Turgot does not believe in the equality of men. He believes that inequality of conditions is necessary to the progress of society. But liberty seems to him to be a priceless possession, which cannot be guarded too carefully. It is for this reason that he holds the principle that nothing ought to limit individual liberty except the greater good of society, as false and dangerous. He thinks there is too much of a tendency to sacrifice the happiness of individuals to the presumed rights of society. Every man is born free. The natural liberty of man can be interfered with only when it degenerates into license; that is, when it ceases to be liberty and becomes usurpation. It is only the liberty to destroy which ought to be prohibited. There can be no doubt that Turgot here indicates one of the greatest dangers threatening liberty—that, namely, of sacrificing the principle of liberty to the principle of the public welfare, by which both are generally surrendered. Turgot perceived and cautioned against a tendency to which France was particularly inclined and which was destined to prove fatal to personal liberty in that country. “We forget that society is made for individuals,” writes Turgot, “that it is instituted only to protect the rights of all in assuring the accomplishment of all mutual duties.”1
When Turgot was appointed minister by Louis XVI. it was universally believed that these ideas would be carried into effect and that the day of liberty had at length dawned. It seems that Turgot was less sanguine. The words he had written before his rise to power seem prophetic: “Liberty! I say it with a sigh, men are perhaps not worthy of thee! Equality! they desire thee, but they cannot attain thee.”2 Turgot was removed; reform failed. But the ideas Turgot represented did not perish; the Revolution attempted to apply them to society and government. Doctrines that had hitherto been living in the brains of a few thinkers now became the common property of a great nation—yes, of the entire civilized world. To what was the rapid dissemination of these principles due? It was due to their having been put forth as Rights of Man in a solemn Declaration by the Constituent Assembly. Of such a plan mention had nowhere been made in the writings of any political philosopher, even though the specific principles had long been known. The notion we are speaking of was an American idea. It came to France from the New World, where the Rights of Man were not only proclaimed, but also observed by the government.
Nor had the Americans originally imported these ideas from France. They had learned them from English authors, such as Milton, Locke, Harrington, and others, primarily. It must be remembered that these English authors had exerted a wonderful influence upon such French writers as Voltaire, Montesquieu, Holbach, and Turgot.
Another English writer must be mentioned whose work was widely read in America and England, and who represents, as it were, the views on Natural Right and individual liberty, which had come to prevail at the outbreak of the American Revolution. This writer is Blackstone, whose famous Commentaries on the Laws of England first appeared in 1765. Burke says that as many copies of this work were sold in America as in England. An American edition was published in 1771, and of this edition 1400 copies were sold in advance, the name of John Adams heading the list of subscribers.1
Blackstone divides individual rights into absolute and relative rights, regarding the former as rights belonging to men in a state of nature, “which every man is entitled to enjoy, whether out of society or in it.”2 The chief aim of society is the protection of individuals “in the enjoyment of those absolute rights which were vested in them by the immutable Laws of Nature, but which could not be preserved in peace without that mutual assistance and intercourse which is gained by the institution of friendly and social communities. Hence it follows that the first and primary end of human laws is to maintain and regulate these absolute rights of individuals. Such rights as are social and relative result from, and are posterior to, the formation of States and societies.”1 Blackstone regards the absolute Rights of Man as being summed up in the general term Natural Liberty. “This Natural Liberty consists properly in a power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the Law of Nature; being a right inherent in us by birth, and one of the gifts of God to man at his creation, when He endued him with the faculty of free will. But every man, when he enters into society, gives up a part of his Natural Liberty, as the price of so valuable a purchase; and, in consideration of receiving the advantages of mutual commerce, obliges himself to conform to those laws which the community has thought proper to establish.”2 “This species of legal obedience and conformity,” Blackstone proceeds, “is infinitely more desirable than that wild and savage liberty which is sacrificed to obtain it. For no man that considers a moment would wish to retain the absolute and uncontrolled power of doing whatever he pleases; the consequence of which is that every other man would also have the same power; and then there would be no security to individuals in any of the enjoyments of life.”3 Blackstone considers the absolute rights of every Englishman to be founded in nature and reason, and regards them as coeval with the English form of government. According to him English rights consist in a number of private immunities which are either the residuum of Natural Liberty left to individuals, or the civil privileges granted by the State in place of the natural liberties given up by individuals. These liberties he considers to have once been the rights of all mankind. They have been debased in other parts of the world, he thinks, and at his time were in a peculiar and emphatical manner the rights of the English people. These absolute rights he considers to be the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of private property.1 The right of personal security consists in the enjoyment of life, limbs, body, health, and reputation. Life, being the immediate gift of God, is a right inherent by nature in every individual.2 Likewise man has a natural inherent right to his limbs.3 Personal liberty consists in the right of changing one’s situation or habitation according to will.4 The right of property, inherent in every Englishman, consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all acquisitions, without control or diminution, save by the laws of the land.5 The right of private property is sacred and inviolable. “No subject of England can be constrained to pay any aids or taxes, even for the defence of the realm or the support of government, but such as are imposed by his own consent, or that of his representatives in Parliament.”6
Blackstone gives as subordinate rights, which protect and maintain inviolate the great and primary rights : 1. The constitution, powers, and privileges of Parliament; 2. The limitation of the king’s prerogative by bounds so certain and notorious that it is impossible he should exceed them without the consent of the people ; 3. The right to apply to the courts of justice for redress of injuries; 4. The right of petition for redress of grievances; 5. The right of bearing arms.1 These subordinate rights constitute the check upon the government by which individual liberty is rendered secure.