THE great religious reformers themselves did little to enrich political thought or promote political freedom. Melanchthon declared that rulers have their power from the people and must not act contrary to their will, but this had no further results so far as his political philosophy is concerned. Luther, himself the originator of a revolutionary movement, though demanding freedom of thought and belief, advocated paternalism in political affairs, and turned away from the peasants who applied his principles to temporal matters. The demands of the peasants, as expressed in the famous Twelve Articles, would have changed the entire subsequent development of German history, and would, in many respects, have forestalled the reforms effected by the French Revolution. At times during the Peasants’ War really modern thoughts were put forth. The “prophets” of Zwickau preached the equality and fraternity of all men.1 The view was expressed during the war by some, that since all are children of one father and redeemed by the blood of Christ, there should no longer be an inequality of wealth or condition among men.2 That part of the uprising known as “Poor Conrad” demanded entire freedom and general equality.1 The most radical views of all were uttered by Thomas Münzer. He aimed at a complete transformation of the existing order of things. In many of his views he was centuries in advance of his contemporaries and anticipated the ideas later put forth by the Puritans, by Penn, Rousseau, and others.2 The third of the articles of Heilbronn demands that all cities and communes be reformed according to divine and natural law, agreeably to Christian freedom. The sixth article stipulates that all worldly laws hitherto in force are invalid and superseded by divine and natural law, and that the poor man should have equal right with the highest and wealthiest (1525).3 In the beginning Luther counselled peace and moderation to both princes and peasants. He condemned rebellion and considered it contrary to divine law.4 He believed that the gospel freed the souls of men, but not their bodies and property.5 When the peasants fell into extremes and committed excesses, Luther with harsh words urged the princes to proceed against them. This they did, taking a fearful vengeance. Luther later gave up his views on passive obedience, though reluctantly. Manly love of freedom and respect for justice supplanted the belief that blind submission was due to the demands of authority. He was forced to this position by circumstances. He had asserted his religious opinions in opposition to the powers that existed. They found many adherents. Favorable circumstances contributed to make the new faith a force. But at length the Emperor Charles V. intended to proceed against the Protestant heretics. Their destruction seemed imminent. Should they submit or resist? This was the question agitated by the Protestant theologians, jurists, and princes. Luther, Jonas, Bucer, and Melanchthon drew up an opinion in January, 1539, to the effect that subjects may defend themselves, yes, owe it to God as a duty incumbent upon them, to protect themselves in case the government or any person undertakes to compel them to accept idolatry and forbidden worship. The attempt of a ruler to exercise unjust power over his subjects is to be resisted. As the gospel confirms government, so it also confirms natural and divine rights. Every father is bound to protect wife and children against public murder. There is no difference between a private murderer and the emperor if the latter exercises unlawful power, for public violence puts an end to all duties of the subject to his lord by the right of nature.1 The Protestant princes waged the war of Schmalkalden against the emperor, their lawful sovereign, which shows that they gave up the idea of non-resistance.
While Lutheranism cannot be said to have exerted a great direct influence upon political thought and development, the case was very different with Calvinism. Calvin’s ideal was a republic in which aristocratic and democratic elements were blended. He distinguished theoretically between State and Church, but was under the influence of the theocratic views of the Old Testament. He wished Christ and the Bible to reign in both Church and State. His State has a religious mission. We see this theocratic character of the Calvinistic church manifest itself subsequently in the congregations of the Puritans. The early settlers in New Haven and Massachusetts declare the laws of God to be binding upon them and to be the supreme laws of the colony and hold that the State realizes its purpose only by the intimate union with the Church.
Calvin does not teach the sovereignty of the people. He regards civil government as ordained of God, the source of all power. He does not acknowledge the right of subjects to rise up against authority, even against arbitrary power. It is true he makes an exception in case temporal rulers command what is contrary to the obedience due to God, but, as if he wished to excuse himself for doing so, insists upon obedience to government in all other respects.1
It is more probable that Junius Brutus, Hotman, Poynet, and other writers known as the Monarchomachists were influenced by the works of John Gerson, Pierre d’Ailly, and the other writers on the conciliar movement than by Calvin’s political ideas, as is generally assumed. In France the remembrance of that period and of those famous publicists must still have been fresh at the time the Calvinistic writers put forth their views concerning the murder of tyrants. We shall see presently how the opinions of the great writers on church councils found their way to Scotland and became known to Knox and Buchanan.
Of greater influence than Calvin’s political ideas was his system of church government. From it grew the Presbyterian and Congregational systems. Of the influence of Congregationalism on the growth of democracy we shall treat later. Luther often spoke and wrote concerning the priesthood of all Christians, but the Lutheran system of church polity was not influenced by democratic principles. Calvin made the laity the vital part of his system, theoretically at least. He permitted the congregation of the faithful to choose their ministers, after these had been examined as to their faith, motives, and ability, and had been accepted as candidates by the body of ministers and by the council.1 Calvin says that it is in nowise to be conceded that the Church consists of the assembly of ministers alone. The pastors may not even excommunicate without the knowledge and approbation of the congregation.2 The concentration of his system lies in the consistory or presbytery. This body consists of clergy and laymen. The latter outnumber the former. The consistory represents the union of Church and State. Calvin’s spirit dominated this body and exercised through it that censorship over the citizens of Geneva which transformed the character of that people and left its impress upon them for many generations.
The democratic ideas which manifested themselves at various times during Antiquity and the Middle Ages do not reappear in the writings of the great reformers. Their views were theocratic. They did not apply to temporal affairs the principles which underlay the great movement they inaugurated. But the consequences of these principles did not fail to make their appearance. The Reformation asserted the right of the individual to think for himself. It was a protest against the enslavement of mind and soul. It was an investigation into the claims of spiritual authorities to control the beliefs of men. The demand for freedom to investigate religious truth led of necessity to the demand to inquire into political truth. The inquiry into the title of spiritual authorities could not but result in an examination of the foundations of temporal power.
During the latter half of the sixteenth century a group of writers in Scotland and France of the reformed faith give expression to similar political views. They belong to the class commonly called “Monarchomachists,” because of their views concerning the murder of tyrants. John Knox and George Buchanan in Scotland, Junius Brutus, generally thought to have been Hubert Languet, and Francis Hotman in France, are the most famous of these publicists.1 The teacher of both Knox and Buchanan was John Mair or Major. He had been educated in France, had taught at the University of Paris, and had become an advocate of the views of Gerson, Pierre d’Ailly, and other authors who asserted the authority of church councils to be superior to that of the pope, adopting also their political doctrines. “He taught that the authority of kings and princes was originally derived from the people; that the former are not superior to the latter collectively considered; that if rulers become tyrannical or employ their power for the destruction of their subjects, they may lawfully be controlled by them, and proving incorrigible may be deposed by the community as the superior power, and that tyrants may be judicially proceeded against, even to capital punishment.”1 Knox, the great Scotch reformer, preached these doctrines to Mary Stuart. He spoke to her of the contract between herself and her subjects. Her subjects owed her obedience, he said, but only in God. While she craved service of them, they craved of her protection and defence against evil-doers. If she denied her duty to them, she could not demand full obedience on their part.2
The book of John Poynet, Bishop of Winchester, entitled A Short Treatise of Political Power, which appeared in 1558, declared that kings derive their authority from the people. It affirmed that they who have delegated certain functions as a trust may withdraw what they have given on just motives, especially if the power they have transferred is misused.3
Buchanan, in his De jure regni apud Scotos (1579), expresses related views in form of a dialogue. He believes in a contract between people and prince. When this is broken all power reverts to the people. War against tyrants, that is, against kings whose acts tend to the dissolution of society, whereas they have been instituted for its conservation, he considers the most just of wars. A tyrannical prince may, says Buchanan, be deposed, exiled, or put to death.4
The religious wars in France gave rise to a number of works written by Protestants which in general express the same opinions and of which the Vindiciae contra Tyrannos of Junius Brutus may be regarded as characteristic. This book appeared in 1579, seven years after the Night of St. Bartholomew. The author declares that subjects must not obey kings who command what is forbidden by the law of God. Submission in such a case would be rebellion against Christ. He legitimizes tyrannicide, asserting that in certain cases it becomes a duty. He asks whether that shepherd is clement who allows the wolf to remain in the fold, and whether he is merciful who permits a host of innocent persons to be slaughtered out of respect for the life of a single individual. This is the Huguenot reply to the massacre of St. Bartholomew. With these writers of the reformed faith the practical object of legitimizing resistance to oppression predominates over mere theoretical interest.
The views of Junius Brutus are associated with the theory of Natural Law. It is the prime Law of Nature, he declares, to preserve life and liberty against violence and injury. Nature implanted this law not only in dogs, to be asserted against wolves, but also, and more especially, in man against him who has become a wolf to his fellows.1 According to him there is a mutual obligation between a king and his people which, whether civil or natural, tacit or express, can be invalidated by no agreement, violated by no right, rescinded by no force. If the prince violates it contumaciously he becomes a tyrant. If the people break it voluntarily they may truly be called seditious.2 It is the people who create kings and give them their realms.3 The individual subject is inferior to the prince, but the people as a whole, and those who represent them, are superior to him. He holds it to be plain that “men are by nature free, impatient of servitude, and born to command rather than to obey, and that they have voluntarily chosen foreign rule only because of the great utility to result.” For no other reason have they renounced the law of their nature, as it were, to obey another Kings were not elected to convert to their own use the property which was collected by the sweat of many, for each individual seeks his own advantage and loves his own possessions.1 Junius Brutus likens the State to a ship. The king is only the pilot; the people are the real owners. A king who is concerned for the public good will be obeyed. He is but the servant of the State. He does not differ from a judge or tribune except in that his burdens are greater.2 “To rule is but to counsel; the sole end of empire is the public welfare. The only duty of emperors and kings is to advise the people. Royal dignity is not property or one’s own glory, but a burden; not an immunity, but a charge; not a remission, but a commission; not license, but public servitude.”3 No one would care to bear the burdens incident to royalty unless they were seasoned with the honor that attaches to the office.
The work of Junius Brutus had been preceded by the Franco-Gallia of Hotman, which was written at Geneva in 1573 by one of the most famous French lawyers of the time. The author investigates the nature of royal power and collects statements from early historians to prove that the people had a share in government, maintaining that the early kings of France held their position by suffrage rather than by heredity. The right of electing kings, he holds, implies the right of deposing them.1 If royalty can be revoked, it is not absolute. “Under some form or other, whether field of March or May, parliaments of barons or states-general, the sovereignty has in last resort always belonged of right and fact to the suffrage of all, or at least to that of the most illustrious of the nation.”2 When Henry of Navarre became a candidate for the throne of France, Hotman forgot the views he had put forth in favor of election and maintained that nothing was more conducive to the stability of the State than the right of heredity. The accession of Henry IV. put an end to the warfare between the League, and, by removing the cause, to further political productions of the Calvinists.
A number of Jesuits arrived at the same views as the French Protestants, but their purpose in publishing them was a different one. While the latter employed the idea of the sovereignty of the people in a war of self-defence, the Jesuits used it to debase the State, in contrasting it with the divinely instituted Church. Their purpose was the same as that of Hildebrand had been when he declared the State the work of Satan. They wished to show that what men have instituted must eo ipso be inferior to what God has instituted—that is, that the Church, which is of divine origin, is superior to the State. Lainez had contrasted State and Church at the Council of Trent in 1562, setting the Church of God, which did not create itself or its institutions, but was given its laws by Christ, over against human States which freely institute their own government. Originally all power is in the community by whom it is delegated to the rulers. By this transfer, Lainez holds, the community does not divest itself of its power.
Bellarmine, another famous Jesuit, asserted that no ruler reigns by divine right as does the pope. Power belongs to the entire multitude, who may transfer it by Natural Right to one or more, as they choose. It depends upon the multitude to select a king, consuls, or other magistrates. If there is a legitimate cause the multitude may change a kingdom to an aristocracy or to a democracy.1
Mariana, a Spanish Jesuit of great learning, born in 1537, wrote a book, De Rege et regis Institutione, which he dedicated to Philip III., even though his object was to debase the State. He desires a State torn by internal dissensions. He wishes, however, an immutable, independent, and all-powerful Church.
He believes in a state of nature. In the beginning, he holds, men wandered about from place to place after the manner of wild animals, bound by no law, subject to no authority. Their number increasing, they seemed to represent the rude form of a people. They selected father or grandfather as leader. They lived in happiness and simplicity. There was no fraud, no falsehood, no inequality. But rabid avarice soon brought robbery, deception, and slaughter into this state. Crime went unpunished. To escape violence and discord men agreed to bind themselves mutually by a compact, and began to look to an individual of superior qualities for justice and faith. He was chosen to prevent domestic and foreign injuries, to institute equity, and to bind all by equal right. Thus arose the State and royal majesty.2 But the citizens did not wish to deprive themselves of all authority. They kept for themselves the greater part of their power.1 Nothing is better, according to the views of Mariana, than authority limited by laws; nothing worse than absolute power. The people are more powerful than the prince. Ought the offspring be more powerful than the parent, the brook better than its source?2 The king cannot change the laws without the consent of the people. He is himself subject to the laws. Absolute power is a usurpation. A usurper may be slain by the first comer without process of law. If a legitimate king persists in ruling arbitrarily and disregarding the popular will, he becomes a public enemy and should be treated as such.3
The same views were expressed by Suarez in his Tractatus de Legibus ac Deo Legislatore.
Richard Hooker believes “that every independent multitude” has, before a particular form of government is established, “full dominion over itself.” God has endued mankind naturally with the power to choose whatever kind of society it wishes. “That power which naturally whole societies have may be derived into many, few, or one, under whom the rest shall live in subjection.” Kings hold their right in dependence “upon the whole body politic over which they have rule as kings.” Hooker speaks of the “first original conveyance when power was derived from the whole into one,” that is, of the contract between king and people. When there is no one to inherit dominion it reverts to the people. Power resides in both body politic and ruler; in the one “fundamentally and radically,” in the other “derivatively.”1
A Frenchman, Jean Bodin, is the first person in Modern Times who undertook to define and inquire into the nature of sovereignty.2 The word itself is of French origin. Bodin considers sovereignty to be one of the characteristics of the State. He regards sovereignty as the unity of political power. It is absolute power and is irrevocable. He alone is sovereign who possesses the supreme power in the State.3 But Bodin commits the mistake of confounding the power of the State with that of the supreme organ in the State.4
Unlike Bodin, Althusius ascribes sovereignty to the people, not to the ruler. Althusius was a German professor, born in 1557, syndic of the free city of Emden, and a man of great learning and ability. He had studied at Geneva and was imbued with the Calvinistic spirit. His work on politics appeared in 1603 and has the avowed purpose of applying the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people to all parts of the social body. Sovereignty is, according to his view, the necessary attribute of the social body, without which it has no right to the name of State. The property and use of the sovereign rights are inalienably associated with the people in their entirety. Even if the people wished to renounce them and transfer sovereignty to another, they cannot do so any more than an individual can transfer his life to another.1 “The people,” says Althusius, “are by nature and in time prior and superior to their governors and more powerful than they.”2 He enters into a consideration of the various social groups or associations (consociationes) ; namely, family, corporation, community, province, and State. He holds that historically the higher forms of association have developed from the lower. The State is the result of development. Necessity impels men to unite. Each association is formed by a compact. It rests upon the consent of its members and has for its end the common good.3 He defines the State as “the universal public association by which cities and provinces bind themselves, by mutual communication of things and services, to hold, constitute, exercise, and defend the rights and powers of a kingdom by mutual strength.”4 He conceived the State to be formed by the contract of cities and provinces, not of individuals. His view of the State is federal. The sovereign power of the State he holds to be “the preeminent power and universal sum of powers giving control over those things which pertain to the welfare and care of both body and soul of the members of the kingdom or republic.”5 “That is a just, legitimate, and beneficial administration,” says Althusius, “which seeks and procures the things that are salutary and appropriate to the members of the kingdom singly and collectively, averts all evils and inconveniences, defends the State from injury and violence, and regulates the actions of the administration according to the laws.”6 Magistrates are divided by Althusius into two classes: the ephors and the chief magistrates. The former administer the rights of the people against the latter. The ephors form a college, which is the representative body of the people. They elect the chief magistrate in the name of the people. They give him advice and correction. When he cannot perform his duties they appoint a regent. They may offer resistance to tyrannical power and in case of utmost necessity depose the tyrant. The chief magistrate is at the head of the State. There is a compact between him and the people by which he binds himself to administer the kingdom according to the laws of God, of right reason, and of the State, while the people swear obedience to him.1 This contract is binding until broken by one of the parties. If the people break it, the ruler is relieved of his duties. If the chief magistrate violates it, the people may depose him and select a new ruler or form of government.2
Grotius defines sovereignty, which he calls summa potestas or summum imperium, as the power which is not subject to any other authority, and which cannot be overridden by the judgment of any other human will. This power, he says, belongs to the State in general, and to the person or persons who form the supreme authority in the State, in particular.3 “The imperium, which is in the king as in the head,” says Grotius, “remains also in the people, as in the body, of which the head is a member.”4 He denies that sovereignty is always actually with the people, so that they may correct and punish kings who misuse their power. As any man may sell himself and become a slave, so a people may prefer to relinquish all power to the ruler.5 But this amounts to saying that the power is originally in the people. The people, Grotius holds, may select any form of government they please.1 When an elected king dies or the royal family becomes extinct, sovereignty reverts to the people.2 Grotius developed the theory of contract in his Prolegomena. Though he himself does not say explicitly that the State arose from compact, he was instrumental in bringing about the predominance of the contract theory in political philosophy.