Conclusion

DOI: 10.4324/b22838-7

The radical changes that occurred in China during the late 1970s and early 1980s were undoubtedly quite shocking to those who were involved. People were emerging out of the whirlpool of class straggle that had destroyed people’s sense of humanity. This intense atmosphere, defined by calls to fight against selfishness and revisionism, as well as violent battles between classes, had not yet fully dissipated. However, it seemed as though, in an instant, various media began to advocate for economic construction as the central task. Many sources started preaching the necessity of the rejuvenation of China, the realization of tire Four Modernizations, and the construction of a prosperous society. Before the gloomy and tense atmosphere of class straggle had even been completely dispersed, the streets and alleys had already filled with the sweet melodies of people singing “Our Life Is Full of Sunshine” and “Joyful Songs Are Swirling in the Waves.” Given the rapid historical changes and geographic displacement, not everyone could find their place in this era marked by the rapid transformation of mainstream discourse. In this era of reforms. the country at first took cautious steps towards development while also seeking repaid growth. The soaring trend of Reform and Opening Up concealed many deep-rooted social contradictions, but these kept accumulating in a society where new and old values had not yet been fully and effectively integrated together. As a result of rapid development in the post-Cultural Revolution era, social groups were rapidly divided. Some people followed the rhythms of the times while chasing their visions of the sweet life, but others stood by and judged. Yet another group of people argued that some new aspects of this more open China contradicted the goals of revolution. They wondered whether the future of the People’s Republic was being derailed, and if someone should speak out to help the country get back on track. Deng Xiaoping’s idea of seeking pragmatic economic development, instead of arguing about the choice between socialism and capitalism, concealed these accumulated contradictions. However, people at that time might not have anticipated that these issues, which were not fully discussed and on which a consensus was never formed, would become a huge political storm in the following years.

Literary works are natural cultural barometers. Because of their enormous imaginative space and fictional power, they often incorporate the trajectories of social change into their narratives, both consciously and unconsciously. In his 1986 Reading (Dushu) article titled “Political Sociological Analysis of Nova [Xinxing] and Night and Day [Ye yu Zhou]” He Xin lamented the state of Reform and Opening Up:

This situation is more powerful than people. This peculiar characteristic of contemporary reform has caused numerous historical misunderstandings, conflicts, and tragedies. A person who is a good observer of the cultural atmosphere of our times can easily view this ludicrous tragicomedy from time to time. This will inevitably produce Hamlet’s feeling that—“time is out of joint!” The changes that have taken place in Chinese society in the last decade are more significant in their breadth and depth than any others of the past hundred years. Among such changes, there is nothing more shocking than the fractures and radical changes to contemporary value structures. Ours is indeed an era in which all values need to be reevaluated.1

Embracing this idea of reevaluation, in 1986 He Xin analyzed the popular novels Nova and Night and Day written by the then-popular writer Ke Yunlu. Li Xiangnan, the reform-oriented character in Nova, also appears in the narrative of Night and Day. However, He Xin felt that the character of Li Xiangnan underwent essential changes across these two different books by the same author. He believed these changes in the character’s activities paralleled the real changes in time and space during the period and were a product of changes in the writer’s mentality. He argued,

if the Li Xiangnan in the TV series Nova was still a heroic character, then in Night and Day his demeanor has shifted to be rather lewd and pretentious. Not only that, Lin Hong, who was still so plain and generous at Guling Middle School, is stimulated by urban civilization after returning to Beijing, suddenly resolving to claim the rewards of her beauty and talents.2

He Xin also criticized Fan Danlin, who is portrayed as an urban reformer in Night and Day, for his dalliances with women. He additionally analyzed Kang Xiaona, an actress who comes from a lower-class background but aspires to an upwardly mobile life, as a character who possesses a beautiful appearance but a vile heart. Finally, He Xin commented on the young people in Night and Day:

The generation of young people seen on the stage of Night and Day includes many talented and outstanding people with enterprising spirits. Yet, in terms of their fundamental characters, all of them are absolutely self-centered in their pursuits of fame and fortune.

He continued, “in Night and Day, we can see a group of contemporary youth composed of many realistic characters. But, amongst them, we can hardly see and characters or personalities who are inspiring or admirable." Based on this analysis of Night and Day, He Xin put forward his assessment of the cultural phenomena of the mid-1980s:

Those who think deeply about contemporary society and culture will find there are crucial social and spiritual problems in contemporary reality. That is, why is there a lack of noble idealism and heroism in the literature of our time? Why is there a lack of spiritual motivation in the literature of our time, a lack of moral goals regardless of benefits? Why does this literature also lack a sense of selflessness and characters that are dedicated to social progress and the cause of humanity as the highest goal?3

He Xin’s understanding of Night and Day reveals that tire cultural crux of the 1980s is the transformation of the “spiritual problem.” Reading his words, it is apparent that idealism and heroism are at the core of the values He Xin advocated. Or, more specifically, he argued for dedication to the goals of “prioritizing morality regardless of its benefits” and “making social progress and the cause of humanity the loftiest goal.”

The 1980s were an era of active thinking. Through independent thinking, the public did not just agree to He Xin’s views, but also responded from a number of different angles. For example, in 1986, the magazine Reading published an essay titled “The Negative Side of Idealism” signed by one “Victory” in the “ReaderAuthor-Editor” section. It is a response to He Xin’s article “Political Sociological Analysis of Nova and Night and Day,” published in an earlier issue of the same year. In response to He Xin’s critique of the lack of idealism and heroism in society, the article argues:

This question is raised in a way that is out of touch with the needs of real social life. At present, the general idea that China must reform has been comprehended by hundreds of millions of people. The real difficulty is what to change and how to change it. What the times need is neither urgent appeals, nor being put through the fire, nor people sacrificing their lives for righteousness, but people thinking calmly and acting cautiously.4

The essay acknowledges the role of idealism in advancing history, but also recognizes that, “when considering history, it is not difficult to discover that idealists, despite their so-called pure ideals, were often unscrupulous. They thus often became the source of many evils that stalled the progress of society.” The author continues,

Were not the political disasters of the past fueled by pious idealism, among other factors? People had learned the lessons of history and finally abandoned that type of paranoid idealism that never had a second thought, even after being struck by reality.

Furthermore, according to “Victory’s” essay, the impact of history on “people who were motivated by moral goals without regard to material benefits” always cut both ways. “A nation of great men may be a nation whose people are far from mature. A society in which idealistic literature is constantly emerging may be a society in chaos.” The article also argues that the Hundred Days Reforms could be described as idealistic and romantic, but ultimately led to failure. The essay argues:

If our reforms succeed, it would be a magnificent epic in itself. However, if they are only written in words, they might turn out to be just a big pile of boring statistics. On the contrary, if the reforms fail, with many ups and downs, with all sorts of twists and turns intensifying all sorts of contradictions, there will be many influential people who emerge. That type of social life can provide idealistic and heroic material for literary creation, and perhaps leave several outstanding literary works full of ideals and passion for future generations. However, the cost of the failure will be stagnant social development and greater frustration for the people.5

Choosing Li Xiangnan, a fictional character, as a case study of changing behavioral patterns in narrative space is to reiterate the cultural complexity of the 1980s. On the one hand, this period was characterized by rapid economic reforms implemented by taking cautious steps and advancing in a pragmatic spirit. On the other hand, it saw a certain degree of freedom and openness in the cultural field. This laid the ground for the emergence of a plurality of ideas and a multiplicity of perspectives. When considering possibilities for the future direction of China, various factions and political positions advanced their own plans. If the debates between them were restricted to the academic level, then they would only belong to narratives of academic freedom. But, when it comes to major decisions about national development and political choices made at the level of policy, a wide range of divergent views may lead to explosive social turbulence. Deng Xiaoping, the chief designer of Reform and Opening Up, understood the difficulties and dangers of these issues. He thus chose, “seeking pragmatic economic development instead of arguing about the choice between socialism and capitalism” as a political move to develop China under his rule. He directed the parallel agendas of Reform and Opening Up and the Four Cardinal Principles to form a political platform that could drive social development. Tins required that there also be a platform for the formation of social consensus at the cultural level.

The most important platform of social consensus in the culture of the 1980s was built between old cadres and the mainstream intellectuals. The degree of both agreement and divisions in “imaginations of China” shaped the fate of China and the direction of Chinese culture. Both groups paid a heavy price during the Cultural Revolution and returned to mainstream society after its conclusion. In the early 1980s. these two groups reached a high degree of consensus over the resolution of the Cultural Revolution. This is evidenced by the heartwarming slogan, "Hello, Xiaoping,” for the parade for the 35th anniversary of the founding of the PRC in 1984. However, in the mid-to-late 1980s, as Reform and Opening Up deepened, it became increasingly difficult to reach a consensus about what type of "China in the new era” would be constructed in the future. The old cadres used the state apparatus at their disposal to advance their own imagination of China at the policy level. For their part, intellectuals used the discourses of public opinion at their disposal to try to influence the formulation and implementation of policies, attempting to put their own stamp on political developments. Looking at the social trajectory of the 1980s, when these two imaginations of China approximately overlapped, social development was harmonious. But, when the gaps became too wide, or threatened the fundamental interests cherished by either side, political storms like the one seen at the end of the 1980s emerged.

Intellectuals rapidly rose in status during the 1980s. Specifically, they held a certain degree of power at the level of public opinion and discourse. However, intellectuals have always belonged to a class of people who might discuss their ideas in articles and seminars but lack political and economic foundations for their ideas. At the political level, intellectuals’ discourse is always in a position to be scrutinized. When their views are consistent with policies, their ideas are easily adopted. But, when they put forward so-called democratic and liberal views that endanger existing interest groups, they are often ignored. In the past, campaigns against spiritual pollution and bourgeois liberalization have attached such liberal intellectuals. From an economic perspective, the 1980s represented a time of declining economic status for intellectuals, even as they preached the necessity of Reform and Opening Up. As a result of the development of reforms, the situation in the countryside improved, enterprises were revitalized, the individual economy flourished, and some people did get rich first. Some of both the old and new cadres, as well as these accomplished high cadres’ sons and daughters, became the new wealthy elites owing to their singular business strategies that made huge profits. In contrast, the economic status of intellectuals did not advance, but retreated. They strongly supported Reform and Opening Up, but, ultimately, they did not become beneficiaries as their economic status lagged behind. At the time, common sayings such as “selling missiles is worse than selling tea eggs" and “picking up a barber’s razor is better than picking up a doctor’s scalpel” captured social phenomena of the period. More importantly, such sentiments reflected a widespread social mentality.

In the introduction to the first edition of From Caligari to Hitler, written in 1946, Siegfried Kracauer states that a country’s cinema is a better reflection of its spiritual and intellectual condition than any other art form for two reasons. First, cinema is never an individual work. It is a collaborative effort, which allows it to earn more social ideas. Second, cinema’s self-positioning to appeal to a large audience naturally means it embraces a sense of the masses. In China during the 1980s, official censorship, studio decisions, and audience trends all impacted the creation of films. A film that went through the creation and censorship process had to find a balance between official narratives and the individual creativity of the artist before meeting an audience. Many of the characters portrayed in Chinese cinema of the 1980s were the result of a consensus being reached between the mainstream values of old cadres and the cultural imagination of intellectuals. The public, in turn, accepted films as representing social expectations.

From this perspective, the analysis in this book reveals cinema’s efforts to construct ideal new socialist humans with Chinese characteristics. Both the films and the characters they portrayed all accorded with mainstream values of the time and gained wide social acceptance. However, after careful study, it is revealed that the artistic images formed through consensus were significantly different from the political images of these classes in real society. The old cadres in the film, such as Liu Lixing in Neighbors, are generous and tolerant and dare to take risks to delegate power. But, in reality, the old cadres gathered in the Party’s advisory committee exercised the responsibility of controlling and guiding China’s political situation. Intellectuals in films, such as Lu Wenting or Zhao Shuxin, endured humiliations. But, in reality, intellectuals of the 1980s, as Mao Zedong had earlier warned, possessed a strong urge to intervene in political realities. In “imaginations of China” during the 1980s, there was a considerable gap between literary and artistic images and the real image. The literary image is a fictional imagination based on social consensus and representing social expectations. If these social expectations are implemented in reality, they will enable this consensus to materialize and allow it to move from narrative to reality, which will eventually strengthen social consensus. This would surely promote the stable development of society. Unfortunately, the political and social groups of the 1980s did not construct their own images after those portrayed in films. Consensus between intellectuals and old cadres about the construction of China ultimately broke down. As a result, characters such as Liu Lixing, Liao Xingming. and Niu Baisui, who reflected trends in the development of China’s image, only came to be immortalized in films and could find no place in reality. China in reality is far more complex and treacherous than China as narrated in films.

Notes