China’s Search for Security

5. On Chinese military power, see, among other sources, Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

6. For instance, see Nicholas R. Lardy, Integrating China Into the Global Economy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002).

7. For instance, see Elizabeth Economy, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Bates Gill, Jennifer Chang, and Sarah Palmer, “China’s HIV Crisis,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 2 (March–April 2002): 96–110; Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor Boas, Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).

8. For instance, see Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 (November–December 2003): 22–35; Evan S. Medeiros, China’s International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2009).

9. For instance, see Rosemary Foot, Rights Beyond Borders: The Global Community and the Struggle Over Human Rights in China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).

10. For instance, see Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2000).

11. Also see, among others, Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China (Boulder: Westview, 1997); Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley, China’s New Rulers, 2nd ed. (New York: New York Review of Books, 2002); and Zhang Liang, comp., The Tiananmen Papers, trans. Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001).

12. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30 (1978): 167–214.

13. For instance, see Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

14. For instance, see Michael Yahuda, “The Limits of Economic Interdependence: Sino–Japanese Relations,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, 162–185 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); Allen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

15. Other works that combine realist and constructivist approaches to China–Japan relations are Ming Wan, Sino–Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation (Washington, D.C., and Stanford: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2006), and Richard C. Bush, The Perils of Proximity: China–Japan Security Relations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010).

16. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001).

17. Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems Without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy,” International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 5–40.

18. Arthur Waldron, The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

19. Last names come first in Chinese, and only a small number of them have two syllables.

2. There are thirty-three states plus the twelve microstates.

3. Alistair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 5–56; Edward S. Steinfeld, Playing Our Game: Why China’s Rise Doesn’t Threaten the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

4. Michael R. Chambers, “Explaining China’s Alliances: Balancing Against Regional and Superpower Threats,” Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2000.

5. On the wedge strategy, see Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).

6. Michael B. Yahuda, China’s Role in World Affairs (New York: St. Martin’s, 1978), 11.

7. Barry Naughton, “The Third Front: Defence Industrialization in the Chinese Interior,” China Quarterly 115 (September 1988): 351–386.

8. J. Du and Y. C. Ma, “Climatic Trend of Rainfall Over Tibetan Plateau from 1971 to 2000,” Acta Geographica Sinica 59 (2004): 375–382, cited in an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_wg2_report_impacts_adaptation_and_vulnerability.htm, accessed June 16, 2010.

9. Wolfram Eberhard, China’s Minorities: Yesterday and Today (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1982): 8–10; Ying-shih Yü, “Minzu yishi yu guojia guannian” (Ethnic Consciousness and the State Concept), Mingbao Yuekan 18, no. 12 (December 1983), 3.

10. Joseph Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia c. 1800,” “Sino–Russian Relations, 1800–62,” and “The Heyday of the Ch’ing Order in Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet,” in John K. Fairbank, ed., The Cambridge History of China, vol. 10 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 35–106, 318–350, 351–408.

11. A recent estimate of Overseas Chinese in the world is 39,089,000 (as of December 31, 2008), from Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission, ROC (Taiwan), Overseas Compatriot Population Distribution (n.d., periodically updated), at http://www.ocac.gov.tw/english/public/public.asp?selno=8889&no=8889&level=B, accessed July 6, 2010. The classic work on the early phase of the PRC’s overseas Chinese policy is Stephen Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Peking’s Changing Policy, 1949–1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). For a discussion of the Overseas Chinese as a liability in PRC diplomacy, see Robert S. Ross, “Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia: Political Liability/Economic Asset,” in Joyce K. Kallgren, Noordin Sopiee, and Soedjati Djiwandono, eds., ASEAN and China: An Evolving Relationship (Berkeley: Institute for East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988), 147–176.

12. Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia,” “Sino–Russian Relations,” and “The Heyday of the Ch’ing Order”; Owen Lattimore, Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia (Boston: Little, Brown, 1950), 103–151.

13. Eberhard, China’s Minorities; Edward Friedman, “Reconstructing China’s National Identity: A Southern Alternative to Mao-Era Anti-imperialist Nationalism,” Journal of Asian Studies 53, no. 1 (February 1994): 67–91; Emily Honig, Creating Chinese Ethnicity: Subei People in Shanghai, 1850–1980 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

14. Thomas S. Mullaney, Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); June Teufel Dreyer, China’s Forty Millions: Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the People’s Republic of China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 141–146; David Yen-ho Wu, “The Construction of Chinese and Non-Chinese Identities,” Daedalus 120, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 159–179; Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1991).

15. Frank A. Kierman Jr. and John K. Fairbank, eds., Chinese Ways in Warfare (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974); Jonathan N. Lipman and Stevan Harrell, eds., Violence in China: Essays in Culture and Counterculture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990); Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

16. John King Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); Mark Mancall, China at the Center: 300 Years of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1984).

17. Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia,” “Sino–Russian Relations,” and “The Heyday of the Ch’ing Order”; Lattimore, Pivot of Asia; Morris Rossabi, China and Inner Asia from 1368 to the Present Day (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975).

18. Morris Rossabi, ed., China Among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th–14th Centuries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Joseph F. Fletcher, “China and Central Asia, 1368–1884,” in Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order, 206–224.

19. David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), chapter 2; and David C. Kang, East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

20. On the origins of the new security concept, see Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 172–173. The quote is from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, “China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept (July 31, 2002),” at http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2612/2614/t15319.htm#, accessed March 19, 2010.

21. On the origins of the peaceful-rise concept, see Peaceful Rise: Speeches of Zheng Bijian, 1997–2005 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005). The quote is from Hu Jintao’s report to the Seventeenth Party Congress, October 15, 2007, translated at http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm#11, accessed February 1, 2009.

22. Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, China’s Peaceful Development (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, September 2011), part III, translated at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-09/06/c_131102329.htm, accessed January 27, 2012.

23. Su Xiaokang and Wang Luxiang, Deathsong of the River: A Reader’s Guide to the Chinese TV Series “Heshang,” introduced, translated, and annotated by Richard W. Bodman and Pin P. Wan (Ithaca: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1991).

24. Now these most-favored-nation clauses are common in world trade and have come to be called “normal trading relations.” What is exceptional today is not granting but withholding most-favored-nation status, as America threatened to do from China during the 1990s because of human rights concerns; see chapter 12.

25. William A. Callahan, China: The Pessoptimist Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

26. Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2006 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, December 2006), translated at http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm, accessed July 6, 2010.

2. Andrew J. Nathan, Chinese Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1985).

3. Dr. Li Zhisui, with Anne F. Thurston, The Private Life of Chairman Mao (New York: Random House, 1994).

4. Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, 2: The Great Leap Forward 1958–1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

5. “On Questions of Party History,” Beijing Review 27 (July 6, 1981), 29.

6. Li, Private Life.

7. Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011); Zhao Ziyang, Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang, trans. and ed. Bao Pu, Renee Chiang, and Adi Ignatius (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009).

8. Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China’s New Elite (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

9. Zong Hairen, “Zhu Rongji in 1999: Visit to the United States,” Chinese Law and Government 35, no. 1 (January–February 2002): 36–52.

10. Andrew J. Nathan, “A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics,” China Quarterly 53 (January–March 1973): 34–66; Andrew J. Nathan and Kellee S. Tsai, “Factionalism: A New Institutionalist Restatement,” China Journal 34 (July 1995): 157–192.

11. Robert S. Ross, “From Lin Biao to Deng Xiaoping: Elite Instability and China’s U.S. Policy,” China Quarterly 118 (June 1989): 265–299.

12. Paul H. Kreisberg, “China’s Negotiating Behavior,” in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 453–477; Richard H. Solomon, Chinese Negotiating Behavior: Pursuing Interests Through “Old Friends” (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999).

13. Gao Wenqian, Zhou Enlai: The Last Perfect Revolutionary (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007).

14. Andrew J. Nathan, “China’s Changing of the Guard: Authoritarian Resilience,” Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1 (January 2003): 6–17.

15. “Lee Teng-hui” is the conventional spelling of this name. Other correct spellings are “Li Teng-hui” (Wade-Giles) and “Li Denghui” (pinyin).

16. Thanks to Zong Hairen for this information. Some of the CLSGs involved in foreign affairs are discussed in Qi Zhou, “Organization, Structure, and Image in the Making of Chinese Foreign Policy Since the Early 1990s,” Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 2008.

17. John W. Garver, China & Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006); Evan S. Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China’s Nonproliferation Policies and Practices, 1980–2004 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).

18. Martin K. Dimitrov, Piracy and the State: The Politics of Intellectual Property Rights in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

19. Public security is a powerful separate domain and also quite federalized, leading to a lack of channels to consider the international impact of arrests. Examples in which the public-security apparatus has apparently overlooked the foreign affairs costs of its actions are the cases of Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo, blind amateur lawyer Chen Guangcheng, AIDS activist Hu Jia, and (in an earlier time) the arrests of U.S.-based scholars Song Yongyi, Li Shaomin, and Wang Fei-ling. Of course, some of these acts may have been approved by the center and intended to send a message. It is hard to know.

20. Scott W. Harold, “Freeing Trade: Negotiating Domestic and International Obstacles on China’s Long Road to the GATT/WTO, 1971–2001,” Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2008.

21. Ann Kent, Beyond Compliance: China, International Organizations, and Global Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).

22. Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

23. A. Doak Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China (Boulder: Westview, 1985); David Shambaugh, “China’s National Security Research Bureaucracy,” China Quarterly 119 (June 1987): 276–304; Carol Lee Hamrin and Suisheng Zhao, eds., Decision-Making in Deng’s China (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995); Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China (Boulder: Westview, 2000); David M. Lampton, ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); David Shambaugh, “China’s International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process,” China Quarterly 171 (September 2002): 575–596; Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, “Chinese Military-Related Think Tanks and Research Institutions,” China Quarterly 171 (September 2002): 617–624.

24. U.S. Defense Security Service, Technology Collection Trends in the U.S. Defense Industry 2007 (Alexandria, Va.: Defense Security Service Counterintelligence Office, 2006).

25. Zhang Liang, comp., Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, eds., The Tiananmen Papers (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001).

26. Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Andrew Scobell, “Military Coups in the People’s Republic of China: Failure, Fabrication, or Fancy?” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 16 (Spring 1995): 25–46.

27. James Mulvenon, “China: Conditional Compliance,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 329–30.

28. According to the memoirs of Admiral Liu Huaqing, it was then party secretary and CMC vice chair Zhao Ziyang who pressed for resolute action in 1988, undoubtedly with Deng’s support. See Liu Huaqing, Liu Huaqing huiyilu (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2004), 535–544.

29. On the issuance of No. 1 Order, see John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), chap. 3; on the events of 1971 and 1976, see Scobell, “Military Coups in the People’s Republic of China.”

30. On the PLA’s rhetoric and actions, see Andrew Scobell, “Is There a Civil–Military Gap in China’s Peaceful Rise?” Parameters (Summer 2009) 39, no. 2: 4–22.

31. On Chinese soldiers’ attitudes and mindsets, see Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force; on the underinstitutionalization of civil–military relations, see Andrew Scobell, “China’s Evolving Civil–Military Relations: Creeping Guojiahua,” Armed Forces & Society (Winter 2005): 228–230.

32. Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley, China’s New Rulers: The Secret Files, 2nd ed. (New York: New York Review Books, 2003).

33. The quotes in this paragraph come from ibid., 137–143.

1. Dean Acheson, “Crisis in China—an Examination of United States Policy,” Department of State Bulletin 22 (January 23, 1950), 116. The speech was delivered on January 12, 1950, before the National Press Club in Washington, D.C.

2. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, 5 vols. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), 4:415.

3. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Patterns in the Dust (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

4. The four Nordic states and Israel recognized the PRC in 1950.

5. “Mao Zedong and Dulles’s ‘Peaceful Evolution’ Strategy: Revelations from Bo Yibo’s Memoirs,” introduction, translation, and annotation by Qiang Zhai, Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6–7 (Winter 1995–1996): 228–231.

6. Deborah A. Kaple, Dream of a Red Factory: The Legacy of High Stalinism in China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Hua-Yu Li, Mao and the Economic Stalinization of China, 1948–1953 (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Little-field, 2006).

7. Zhang Shuguang, Economic Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).

8. Nicholas R. Lardy, “Economic Recovery and the 1st Five-Year Plan,” in Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank, eds., The Cambridge History of China, vol. 14 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 179.

9. Steven I. Levine, Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945–1948 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), chaps. 1–2.

10. Alexander V. Pantsov with Steven I. Levine, Mao: The Real Story (New York: Simon and Schuster, forthcoming).

11. Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).

12. Using the technique of “Pekingology”—that is, close scrutiny of esoteric texts—Donald Zagoria was able to trace the signs of the emerging Sino–Soviet split in the public communiqués of socialist camp meetings starting in 1956; Donald Zagoria, The Sino–Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). Leading recent works are Lorenz M. Lüthi, The Sino–Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), and Sergey Radchenko, Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino–Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962–1967 (Washington, D.C., and Stanford: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2009).

13. The negotiations over nuclear cooperation are discussed in John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).

14. Frank Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe 1958–1962 (New York: Walker, 2010).

15. “Minutes, Conversation Between Mao Zedong and Ambassador Yudin, 22 July 1958,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6–7 (Winter 1995–1996): 155–159.

16. Quoted in Quan Yanchi, Mao Zedong yu Keluxiaofu (Mao Zedong and Khrushchev) (Huhehot, China: Nei Menggu renmin chubanshe, 1998), 139.

17. Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1987), 164; Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1985), 208.

18. In 1969, a Soviet diplomat in Washington asked a State Department official what the U.S. reaction might be if the Soviets bombed the Chinese nuclear test site at Lop Nor. Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall, Six Presidents, and China: An Investigative History (New York: PublicAffairs, 1999), 67.

19. Thomas Robinson, “China Confronts the Soviet Union: Warfare and Diplomacy on China’s Inner Asian Frontiers,” in Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank, eds., The Cambridge History of China, vol. 15 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), chap. 3.

20. Alexey D. Muraviev, The Russian Pacific Fleet: From Crimean War to Perestroika, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs no. 20 (Canberra: Department of Defence Seapower Center, 2007), 28, table 1.

21. Chang, Friends and Enemies, chap. 8.

22. Evelyn Goh, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Michael Lumbers, Piercing the Bamboo Curtain: Tentative Bridge-Building to China During the Johnson Years (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008).

23. Robert S. Ross, ed., China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making During the Cold War (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993); Lowell Dittmer, “The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretical Analysis,” World Politics 33, no. 4 (July 1981): 485–515.

24. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 233.

25. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 412.

26. On Chinese views of Gorbachev’s mistakes, see David L. Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), chap. 4.

27. These figures are from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms Transfers Database, updated March 31, 2009, at http://www.sipri.org/contents/amstrad/at-db.htm, accessed April 1, 2009.

28. Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Global Politics (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), chap. 8.

2. Andrew Scobell, China and Strategic Culture (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002), 2. This conception was derived from Allen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

3. Scobell, China and Strategic Culture; Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chap. 2.

4. See, for example, Zhang Liang, comp., Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, eds., The Tiananmen Papers (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001), 338–348.

5. See the quotations and analysis of the views of China’s fourth generation of leaders in Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley, China’s New Rulers: The Secret Files (New York: New York Review Books, 2002), chap. 8.

6. John Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism has attracted even greater attention in China than it has in the U.S. He has been invited to China, and his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001) has been translated into Chinese. Western realism is compatible with premodern Chinese understandings of political behavior. See Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

7. See, for example, “China Condemns US Two-Faced Human Rights Report,” People’s Daily Online, May 20, 2004, at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200405/20/eng20040520_143933.html, accessed December 10, 2008; and “Opinion: US Two-Faced Stance on Taiwan Damaging,” China Daily, December 5, 2003, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003–12/05/content_287410.htm, accessed December 10, 2008.

8. See Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2000).

9. Except when there is an active war going on within the territory of another combatant command.

10. U.S. Department of Defense, Base Structure Report Fiscal Year 2007 Baseline (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2007), 6, at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/BSR_2007_Baseline.pdf, accessed November 8, 2008.

11. Official figures from U.S. Pacific Command, at http://www.pacom.mil/about/pacom/shtml, accessed September 19, 2010.

12. Qian Wenrong, “What Has Influenced Bush?” Shijie zhishi (World Knowledge) (September 2005), 43, cited in Susan L. Craig, Chinese Perceptions of Traditional and Nontraditional Security Threats (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007), 49.

13. Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, “Nuclear Insecurity,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 5 (September–October 2007): 109–118; Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press. “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy.” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (March–April 2006): 42–54. Another five thousand nuclear weapons are in reserve.

14. Harold James, “The Enduring International Preeminence of the Dollar,” in Eric Helleiner and Jonathan Kirshner, eds., The Future of the Dollar (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), chap. 2.

15. Daniel W. Drezner, “Bad Debts: Assessing China’s Financial Influence in Great Power Politics,” International Security 34, no. 2 (Fall 2009): 7–45.

16. Key treaties to which the U.S. has not acceded include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Rome Statute that created the International Criminal Court.

17. Zhang Baijia and Jia Qingguo, “Steering Wheel, Shock Absorber, and Diplomatic Probe in Confrontation: Sino–American Ambassadorial Talks Seen from the Chinese Perspective,” in Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin, eds., Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.–China Diplomacy, 1954–1973 (Cambridge, Mass.: Asia Center, Harvard University, 2001), 173–199.

18. Evan S. Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China’s Nonproliferation Policies and Practices,1980–2004 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).

19. For authoritative discussion of these texts, see Richard C. Bush, At Cross Purposes: U.S.–Taiwan Relations Since 1942 (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2004). Quotations relating to Taiwan in this paragraph and the following paragraphs are drawn from this work.

20. Some specialists have argued that “recognizing” the Chinese government as the sole legal government of China and then “acknowledging” its position that Taiwan is a part of China were not necessarily the same as recognizing Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. However, there has been no exploitation of this ambiguity in U.S. diplomacy, so it is a nonissue for practical purposes.

21. Under this framework, the U.S. government’s interests are handled by an ostensible NGO that is government funded, staffed, and directed, the American Institute in Taiwan. Taiwan created a counterpart entity—which, after subsequent renaming, became the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office—to perform the duties of the ROC’s former embassy and consulates in the U.S.

22. Zhu Chenghu, ed., ZhongMei guanxi de fazhan bianhua ji qi qushi (Changes in the Development of China–U.S. Relations and Their Trends) (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1998), 194.

23. Yong Deng makes this point in China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), chap. 4.

24. Because China was a “nonmarket economy,” under U.S. law most-favored-nation status was extended on an annual basis and subject to congressional review until China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 gave it “permanent normal trade relations” with the U.S.

25. James Mann, The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain Away Chinese Repression (New York: Viking, 2007).

26. Analysts’ views were obtained in interviews by Andrew Scobell, Shanghai and Beijing, May–June 2008; Beijing, October 2008 and October 2009.

27. Robert D. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility? Remarks to National Committee on U.S.–China Relations,” September 21, 2005, at http://www.ncuscr.org/files/2005Gala_RobertZoellick_Whither_China1.pdf, accessed August 10, 2010.

28. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, February 6, 2006), 29–30, at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf, accessed August 11, 2010.

29. White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: White House, March 2006), at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/sectionVIII.html, accessed August 11, 2010.

30. For analyses of the consistency between the Bush and Obama administration policies, see Zhu Feng, A Return of Chinese Pragmatism, PACNET no. 16 (Honolulu: Center for Strategic and International Studies Pacific Forum, April 5, 2010); Zhao Yang, “China Is More Confident, but by No Means ‘Arrogant,’” Nanfang ribao (Southern Daily), online edition, May 13, 2010, at http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn, accessed May 20, 2010; “The US Pursuit of Hegemony Unchanged,” Study Times, June 7, 2010, at http://www/studytimes.com.cn:9999/epaper/xxsb/html/2010/06/07/07/07_46htm, accessed June 20, 2010.

31. James B. Steinberg, “China’s Arrival: The Long March to Global Power,” speech at the Center for a New American Security, Washington, D.C., September 24, 2009, at http://www.cnas.org/node/3415, accessed January 16, 2012.

32. White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: White House, May 2010), 43, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf, accessed August 11, 2010.

33. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2010), 60, at http://www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2029jan10%201600.pdf, accessed August 11, 2010.

34. Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino–American Conflict, 1947–1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).

35. Feng Changhong, “How to View U.S. Strategic Thinking,” in McGiffert, ed., Chinese Images of the United States, 40.

36. Li Qun, a prominent official on the Shandong Provincial Party Committee, quoted in Andrew J. Nathan, “Medals and Rights: What the Olympics Reveal, and Conceal, about China,” The New Republic, July 9, 2008, 46.

37. Scobell, China and Strategic Culture, 16–18.

38. Quotations from Chinese leaders here and in the next paragraph are drawn from Nathan and Gilley, China’s New Rulers, 235–238.

39. Wang Jisi, “Building a Constructive Relationship,” in Morton Abramowitz, Yoichi Funabashi, and Wang Jisi, eds., China–Japan–U.S.: Managing Trilateral Relations (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998), 22.

40. Zhou Mei, “Chinese Views of America: A Survey,” in McGiffert, ed., Chinese Images of the United States, 65.

1. Saadia M. Pekkanen and Paul Kallender-Umezu, In Defense of Japan: From the Market to the Military in Space Policy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010); Andrew L. Oros and Yuki Tatsumi, Global Security Watch: Japan (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010).

2. Many Western scholars have asked this question. Among them are Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), chap. 6; Ming Wan, Sino–Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); Alan Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Michael Yahuda, “The Limits of Economic Interdependence: Sino–Japanese Relations,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, 162–185 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006). All argue that the Sino–Japanese relationship is essentially determined by elite or popular attitudes or both to the extent that popular dislike of each other, especially China’s of Japan, limits development of the relationship in defiance of national interest.

3. Richard C. Bush, The Perils of Proximity: China–Japan Security Relations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010).

4. The Japanese “side” refers to its side of a line drawn down the middle of the East China Sea, which Japan says should be honored by both countries because the EEZs that each can claim in that sea under the UNCLOS overlap.

5. On the Japanese grand strategy, see Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).

6. Article 9 continues: “[L]and, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” It is in keeping with this provision that the Japanese military forces are called the Self-Defense Forces.

7. The U.S. has not taken sides in Japan’s territorial disputes with China, Russia, and Korea but takes the position that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security creates an obligation for the U.S. to help defend any territories held by Japan, which include the Senkaku Islands.

8. See, for example, Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).

9. See, for instance, Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation (New York: Routledge, 2009).

10. Richard Samuels, “‘New Fighting Power!’ Japan’s Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security,” International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007–2008): 84–112.

11. Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.–Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 49–80; Wu Xinbo, “The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.–Japanese Alliance,” Washington Quarterly 20, no. 1 (Winter 2005–2006): 119–130.

12. Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

13. Wan, Sino–Japanese Relations, chaps. 2–3.

14. This point is well developed in Wan, Sino–Japanese Relations, chap. 3.

15. Here we differ with Susan L. Shirk’s China: Fragile Superpower, chap. 6, which sees the government’s policies as driven by popular sentiment.

16. Chae-Jin Lee, China and Japan: New Economic Diplomacy (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), 35.

17. Andrew Scobell and John M. Sanford, North Korea’s Military Threat: Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007). Pyongyang also developed chemical and biological weapons programs. Discerning Pyongyang’s intentions and strategy is an inherently speculative exercise. See, for example, Andrew Scobell, North Korea’s Strategic Intentions (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005).

18. For a firsthand account of this episode, see Charles L. Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), chap. 2. North Korea denied that its official made this statement, but in 2009 Pyongyang asserted that it did possess an experimental program in highly enriched uranium.

19. Andrew Scobell, China and North Korea: From Comrades-in-Arms to Allies at Arm’s Length (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004), 11–13; Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 266, 271.

20. On China’s interests and priorities, see Avery Goldstein, “Across the Yalu: China’s Interests and the Korean Peninsula in a Changing World,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 131–161; David Shambaugh, “China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term,” Washington Quarterly 26, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 43–56.

21. Scott Snyder, China’s Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2009), 9, 98, 112. For more in Chinese investments, see Jae Cheol Kim, “The Political Economy of Chinese Investment in North Korea: A Preliminary Assessment,” Asian Survey 46, no. 6 (December 2006): 898–916.

22. Daniel Gomà, “The Chinese–Korean Border Issue: An Analysis of a Contested Frontier,” Asian Survey 46, no. 6 (November–December 2006): 867–880.

1. Microstates are those with a population of five hundred thousand or less. The twelve microstates of Oceania are the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Tuvalu, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Niue, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu.

2. Steven I. Levine, “China in Asia: The PRC as a Regional Power,” in Harry Harding, ed., China’s Foreign Relations in the 1980s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 107.

3. Zhang Qingmin and Liu Bing, “Shounao chufang yu Zhongguo waijiao” (Summit trips abroad and Chinese diplomacy), Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu (International politics research), no. 2 (2008): 1–20.

4. David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Evan S. Medeiros, Keith Crane, Eric Heginbotham, Norman D. Levine, Julia F. Lowell, Angel Rabasa, and Somi Seong, Pacific Currents: The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to China’s Rise (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2008). We therefore disagree with those who see China as able to drive the U.S. out of Asia, such as Aaron L. Friedberg in A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: Norton, 2011).

5. So does Taiwan, which occupies the Pratas Islands. However, so long as both China and Taiwan adhere to the “one China principle,” discussed in chapter 8, their claims reinforce rather than conflict with one another.

6. For a guide to who claims what, see http://www.southchinasea.org/maps/US%20EIA,%20South%20China%20Sea%20Tables%20and%20Maps.htm, accessed October 8, 2010.

7. Andrew Scobell, “China’s Strategy Toward the South China Sea,” in Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai, eds., Taiwan’s Maritime Security (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 42–43; and Andrew Scobell, “Slow Intensity Conflict in the South China Sea,” e-note distributed by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, August 16, 2000.

8. Allen S. Whiting, “ASEAN Eyes China: The Security Dimension,” Asian Survey 37, no. 4 (April 1997): 299–322.

9. Bates Gill, Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 4–5.

10. Geoffrey Till, Asia Rising and the Maritime Decline of the West: A Review of the Issues: IQPC/Asia Rising, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) Working Paper no. 205 (Singapore: RSIS, July 29, 2010).

11. For this and several other details on economic relations, see Tamara Renee Shie, “Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific: Beijing’s Island Fever,” Asian Survey 47, no. 2 (March–April 2008), 315.

12. Fergus Hanson, China: Stumbling Through the Pacific (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy Brief, July 2009), 3–4.

13. Anthony Van Fossen, “The Struggle for Recognition: Diplomatic Competition Between China and Taiwan in Oceania,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 12, no. 2 (2007), 135.

14. Jian Yang, “China in the South Pacific: Hegemon on the Horizon?” Pacific Review 22, no. 2 (May 2009): 139–158.

15. Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

16. Nicholas Khoo, Collateral Damage: Sino–Soviet Rivalry and the Termination of the Sino–Vietnamese Alliance (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

17. King Chen, China’s War with Vietnam (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987); Robert S. Ross, Indochina Tangle: China’s Vietnam Policy, 1975–1979 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

18. For an alternative interpretation emphasizing Asian leaders’ preferences as the chief determinant of regional security relationships, see Amitav Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).

19. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).

20. Donald K. Emmerson, ed., Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Stanford: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2008).

21. Wu Xinbo, “Chinese Perspectives on Building an East Asia Community in the Twenty-First Century,” in Michael J. Green and Bates Gill, eds., Cooperation, Competition, and the Search for Community: Asia’s New Multilateralism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

22. Zou Keyuan, “The Sino–Vietnamese Agreement on Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin,” Ocean Development and International Law 36 (January–March 2005): 13–24.

23. Hideo Ohashi, “China’s Regional Trade and Investment Profile,” in Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift, 71–95.

24. Richard Cronin and Timothy Hamlin, Mekong Tipping Point (Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, 2010), at http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Mekong_Tipping_Point-Complete.pdf, accessed May 18, 2011.

25. John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino–Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001).

26. George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 196–197.

27. Shirley A. Kan. China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, May 2011).

28. Mathieu Duchâtel, “The Terrorist Risk and China’s Policy Toward Pakistan: Strategic Reassurance and the ‘United Front,’” Journal of Contemporary China 20, no. 71 (September 2011): 543–561.

29. Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power (New York: Random House, 2010); Christopher J. Pehrson, String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006).

30. Jonathan Holslag, China and India: Prospects for Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

31. On “great-power dreams,” see Andrew Scobell, “‘Cult of Defense’ and ‘Great Power Dreams,’” in Michael R. Chambers, ed., South Asia 2020: Strategic Balances and Alliances, 342–348 (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002); on views of analysts, see Jing-dong Yuan, “India’s Rise After Pokhran-II: Chinese Analyses and Assessments,” Asian Survey 41, no. 6 (November–December 2001), 992–993, 998.

32. Mohan Malik, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” in Sumit Ganguly, Joseph Liow, and Andrew Scobell, eds., The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies, 72–86 (New York: Routledge, 2010).

33. Human Rights in China, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights: The Impact of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Human Rights in China Whitepaper (New York: Human Rights in China, March 2011), at http://www.hrichina.org/content/5199#IVDii, accessed May 19, 2011.

34. Gardner Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 140.

35. Kevin Sheives, “China Turns West: Beijing’s Contemporary Strategy Towards Central Asia,” Pacific Affairs 79, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 219–222; Hasan H. Karrar, The New Silk Road Diplomacy: China’s Central Asian Foreign Policy Since the Cold War (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009), 58–66.

1. Gabriel B. Collins, Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and William S. Murray, eds., China’s Energy Strategy: The Impact on Beijing’s Maritime Policies (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008); Erica S. Downs, “The Chinese Energy Security Debate,” China Quarterly 177 (March 2004): 21–41; Bo Kong, China’s International Petroleum Policy (Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2010); China’s Thirst for Oil, Asia Report no. 153 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, June 9, 2008), at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/153_china_s_thirst_for_oil.ashx, accessed July 21, 2011; Daniel H. Rosen and Trevor Houser, China Energy: A Guide for the Perplexed (Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 2007), at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/rosen0507.pdf, accessed August 3, 2011.

2. John W. Garver, China & Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-imperial World (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006); International Crisis Group, “The Iran Nuclear Issue: The View from Beijing,” Asia Briefing no. 100, February 17, 2010, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6536&l=1, accessed March 23, 2010.

3. Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong. “Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with Africa,” African Studies Review 50, no. 3 (December 2007): 75–114.

4. Quoted in Robyn Dixon, “Africa Holds Attractions for China Leaders; Beijing’s Hunger for Raw Materials and Political Recognition Has Its Top Officials Crisscrossing the Continent Like No One Else to Cement Ties,” Los Angeles Times, January 31, 2007.

5. Thomas Lum, Hannah Fischer, Julissa Gomez-Granger, and Anne Leland, China’s Foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, February 25, 2009).

6. Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

7. Joel Wuthnow, “Beyond the Veto: Chinese Diplomacy in the United Nations Security Council,” Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2011.

8. Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2010 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, March 2011); Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, “China’s Expanding Presence in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, eds., Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan, 99–125 (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009).

9. Sam Sheringham, “Chinese Invade the Caribbean in an Attempt to Isolate Taiwan,” Bloomberg News Service, March 11, 2007.

10. Wuthnow, “Beyond the Veto,” 43–45.

11. For examples, see Ann Kent, Beyond Compliance: China, International Organizations, and Global Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), and Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, China, the United States, and Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

2. Katherine Palmer Kaup, Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000), chap. 8.

3. Uradyn E. Bulag, Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).

4. Thierry Mathou, “Tibet and Its Neighbors: Moving Toward a New Chinese Strategy in the Himalayan Region,” Asian Survey 45, no. 4 (July–August 2005): 507–509.

5. Melvyn C. Goldstein, with the help of Gelek Rimpoche, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Melvyn C. Goldstein, Tibet, China, and the United States: Reflections on the Tibet Question (Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council, 1995); Elliot Sperling, The Tibet–China Conflict: History and Polemics (Washington, D.C.: East–West Center, 2004).

6. In international law, an “association” is a union of two sovereign states in which one of them agrees to yield certain attributes of sovereignty to the other.

7. The Dalai Lama’s speech can be found at http://www.dalailama.com/messages/tibet/strasbourg-proposal-1988, accessed August 15, 2010.

8. The memorandum can be found at http://www.savetibet.org/policy-center/topics-fact-sheets/memorandum-genuine-autonomy-tibetan-people, accessed August 15, 2010.

9. Tashi Rabgey and Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho, Sino–Tibetan Dialogue in the Post-Mao Era: Lessons and Prospects, Policy Studies no. 12 (Washington, D.C.: East–West Center, 2004), 6.

10. President Bill Clinton, “Conditions for Renewal of Most-Favored-Nation Status for the People’s Republic of China in 1994,” Executive Order 12850 of May 28, 1993, Federal Register, vol. 58, no. 103, June 1, 1993, at http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/12850.pdf, accessed January 19, 2012.

11. Melvyn C. Goldstein, “The Dalai Lama’s Dilemma,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 1 (January–February 1998): 83–97.

12. The speaker was Zhang Qingli, and his statement can be found at http://www.chinatibetnews.com/GB/channel4/31/200803/19/78973.html, accessed August 15, 2010.

13. “Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation Between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India,” June 25, 2003, at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t22852.htm, accessed January 12, 2012.

14. S. Frederick Starr, ed., Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2004).

15. James A. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).

16. A vivid account is given in Rebiya Kadeer, with Alexandra Cavelius, Dragon Fighter: One Women’s Epic Struggle for Peace with China (Carlsbad, Calif.: Kales Press, 2009).

17. Arienne M. Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse, Policy Studies no. 15 (Washington, D.C.: East–West Center, 2005), 39.

18. Gardner Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent, Policy Studies no. 11 (Washington, D.C.: East–West Center, 2004).

19. See the careful study by James Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment, Policy Studies no. 6 (Washington, D.C.: East–West Center, 2004).

20. Gardner Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

21. Rémi Castets, “The Uyghurs in Xinjiang: The Malaise Grows,” China Perspectives 49 (September–October 2003), 39.

22. Andrew Scobell, “Terrorism and Chinese Foreign Policy,” in Yong Deng and Feiling Wang, eds., China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 317; Dru C. Gladney, “China’s Minorities: The Case of Xinjiang and the Uyghur People,” paper prepared for the UN Commission on Human Rights, Subcommission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Working Group on Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2003/WP.16, May 5, 2003, p. 11. J. Todd Reed and Diana Raschke review the available evidence in minute detail in ETIM: China’s Islamic Militants and the Global Terrorist Threat (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010) and conclude that the ETIM is in fact a terrorist organization with links to al-Qaeda.

23. Christine Loh, Underground Front: The Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010).

24. Andrew Scobell, “China and Taiwan: Balance of Rivalry with Weapons of Mass Democratization,” in Sumit Ganguly and William R. Thompson, eds., Asian Rivalries: Conflict, Escalation, and Limitations on Two-Level Games (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 26–43.

25. As we pointed out in chapter 4, the U.S. “acknowledges” the Chinese view rather than “recognizes” that Taiwan is part of China. But having deliberately created and maintained this ambiguity, it has done nothing to promote Taiwan independence.

26. Among other places, MacArthur used this phrase in “Memorandum on Formosa,” June 14, 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, vol. 7: Korea (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 162. His argument was that if access to Formosa was not denied to the Soviets, they could use it to threaten U.S. positions in Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines. But the logic applies equally to the use of Taiwan by American or other forces to threaten China.

27. Quote given in Shirley A. Kan, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, RL30341 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, June 3, 2011), 7.

1. Andrew J. Nathan and Yangsun Chou, “Democratizing Transition in Taiwan,” Asian Survey 27, no. 3 (March 1987): 277–299; Andrew J. Nathan, “The Effect of Taiwan’s Political Reform on Taiwan–Mainland Relations,” in Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, eds., Political Change in Taiwan (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1992), 207–219; Andrew J. Nathan and Helena Ho, “Chiang Ching-kuo’s Decision for Political Reform,” in Shao-chuan Leng, ed., Chiang Ching-kuo’s Leadership in the Development of the Republic of China on Taiwan (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1993), 31–61.

2. The poll numbers in these paragraphs were provided by Shiau-chi Shen. They come from surveys conducted by the ROC Mainland Affairs Council, at http://www.mac.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=3, and by the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University, at http://units.nccu.edu.tw/server/publichtmut/html/wS00/ewS00.html (access dates not available).

3. The overall thrust and key facts in what follows, except where noted otherwise, come from Su Chi, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China: A Tail Wagging Two Dogs (London: Routledge, 2009).

4. Richard C. Kagan, Taiwan’s Statesman: Lee Teng-hui and Democracy in Asia (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007).

5. Chiang Ching-kuo said in his statement of December 29, 1978, “The Republic of China is an independent sovereign state with a legitimately established government based on the Constitution of the Republic of China. It is an effective government, which has the wholehearted support of her people. The international status and personality of the Republic of China cannot be changed merely because of the recognition of the Chinese Communist regime by any country of the world. The legal status and international personality of the Republic of China is a simple reality which the United States must recognize and respect.” Quoted in Martin L. Lasater, The Taiwan Issue in Sino–American Strategic Relations (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 258–259.

6. The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China can be found at http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/taiwan/index.htm, accessed August 16, 2010, official translation. We silently correct “straits” to “strait” here and in other quotations.

7. In addition to the phrase two political entities, the official English translation contained the term two governments. But the relevant part of the Chinese text says only that the two sides are “separately governed” (fenzhi). The term two governments does not appear in the Chinese text.

8. Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, 56–58.

9. Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office of the State Council, “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,” February 2000, at http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-07/27/content_17613.htm, accessed January 20, 2012, official translation.

10. On the history of U.S. dealings with Taiwan, see Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States–Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009).

11. From http://www.taiwandc.org/nws-9920.htm, accessed September 8, 2011.

12. “Premier Zhu Rongji Takes Questions About China’s Focal Issues (2000),” March 15, 2000, at http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/25/content_17144.htm, accessed August 12, 2009.

13. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker and Bonnie Glaser, “Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?” Washington Quarterly 34, no. 4 (Fall 2011): 23–37.

2. Nicholas R. Lardy, Foreign Trade and Economic Reform in China, 1978–1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

3. Even though China claimed political sovereignty over Hong Kong and Taiwan, it treated them as separate entities for the purposes of trade and investment policy and statistics, and we do the same in this chapter.

4. “Chairman of Delegation of People’s Republic of China Deng Xiaoping’s Speech at Special Session of U.N. General Assembly,” Peking Review, Supplement, April 12, 1974, iv.

5. Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (Boston: MIT Press, 2007), 377–378.

6. Hong Kong stood so far in the lead in part because it served as a conduit for investment from Taiwan and elsewhere and as a pass-through for money sent out of China and then back again in order to gain the concessionary benefits available for investments originating abroad.

7. China was a founding member of both organizations, but the China seat had previously been held by the ROC.

8. Many of the data cited here and elsewhere follow Naughton, The Chinese Economy.

9. On these struggles, see Zhao Ziyang, Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang, trans. and ed. Bao Pu, Renee Chiang, and Adi Ignatius (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009).

10. Juntao Wang, “Reverse Course: Political Neo-conservatism and Regime Stability in Post-Tiananmen China,” Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2006.

11. Lardy, Foreign Trade, chaps. 2 and 3.

12. The Chinese government disputes the U.S. calculation of the deficit, saying it unfairly includes goods shipped from China to the U.S. through Hong Kong, which should be listed in Hong Kong’s export statistics, and that it excludes goods shipped from the U.S. to China through Hong Kong. However, even with these corrections, the U.S. would still have run a large trade deficit with China in the years we are talking about.

13. Martin K. Dimitrov, Piracy and the State: The Politics of Intellectual Property Rights in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

14. Much of the material in this section derives from Scott Harold, “Freeing Trade: Negotiating Domestic and International Obstacles on China’s Long Road to the GATT/WTO, 1971–2001,” Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2007.

15. Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2004); Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century (New York: Basic Books, 2010).

16. Richard MacGregor, The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers (New York: HarperCollins, 2010).

17. Vikram Nehru, Aart Kraay, and Xiaoqing Yu, China 2020: Development Challenges in the New Century (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997), 29–30.

18. The datum is from Dong Tao, a Credit Suisse economist, quoted in David Barboza, “Some Assembly Needed: China as Asia Factory,” New York Times, February 9, 2006, at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/09/business/worldbusiness/09asia.html, accessed August 8, 2008. Another report said the value of exports to the Chinese economy was as little as 20 percent of the face value of the exported products; see David D. Hale and Lyric Hughes Hale, “Reconsidering Revaluation: The Wrong Approach to the U.S.–China Trade Imbalance,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 1 (January–February 2008): 57–66.

19. The subhead for this section borrows a phrase from Jonathan Holslag, “China’s Regional Dilemma: An Inquiry Into the Limits of China’s Economic and Military Power,” Ph.D. diss., Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 2011.

20. Ka Zeng, Trade Threats, Trade Wars: Bargaining, Retaliation, and American Coercive Diplomacy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004).

21. Hideo Ohashi, “China’s Regional Trade and Investment Profile,” in David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 71–95; Deng Ziliang and Zheng Yongnian, “China Reshapes the World Economy,” in Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian, eds., China and the New International Order (London: Routledge, 2008), 127–148.

22. Jonathan Holslag, “China’s Roads to Influence,” Asian Survey 50, no. 4 (July–August 2010): 641–662.

23. Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

25. Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

26. The number of jobs created by township and village enterprises is taken from Naughton, The Chinese Economy, 286, fig. 12.2; the number of new entrants into the workforce is calculated using Naughton, The Chinese Economy, 175, table 7.3.

27. James Kynge, China Shakes the World (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2006).

28. See, for instance, Peter Navarro, “The Economics of the ‘China Price,’” China Perspectives (November–December 2006): 13–27.

29. David Hale, “China’s Growing Appetites,” The National Interest (Summer 2004): 137–147.

30. Lester R. Brown, Who Will Feed China? Wake-Up Call for a Small Planet (New York: Norton, 1995).

31. Jonathan Watts, When a Billion Chinese Jump: How China Will Save Mankind—or Destroy It (New York: Scribner, 2010).

32. Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, China, the United States, and Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), chap. 5.

33. Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, eds., China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999).

34. Other factors included American lobbying and China’s “social learning” from other states. Evan S. Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China’s Nonproliferation Policies and Practices, 1980–2004 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Relations, 1980–2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

35. Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint; Dimitrov, Piracy and the State.

36. Ann Kent, Beyond Compliance: China, International Organizations, and Global Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); Foot and Walter, China, the United States, and Global Order.

37. Rosemary Foot, Rights Beyond Borders: The Global Community and the Struggle Over Human Rights in China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Ann Kent, China, the United Nations, and Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999).

38. The subhead for this section adapts the title of Ezra F. Vogel’s book Japan as Number One: Lessons for America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979).

39. Michael Beckley, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” International Security 36, no. 3 (Winter 2011–2012): 41–78.

2. Particularly useful and comprehensive treatments of Chinese military matters are Dennis Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2012); Richard P. Hallion, Roger Cliff, and Phillip C. Saunders, eds., The People’s Liberation Army Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2012); Bernard Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 2nd ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010); and David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). For more detailed and specialized writings, see the publications of the RAND Corporation and the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, available online at http://www.rand.org and http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil, respectively.

3. Mao Tsetung, “The Chinese People Cannot Be Cowed by the Atom Bomb,” in Selected Works of Mao Tsetung, 5 vols. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), 5:153.

4. The text of Hu Jintao’s speech has never been made public, but it has been widely cited. See, for example, Daniel Hartnett, China Military and Security Activities, Hearings Before the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 111th Cong. 1st sess., March 4, 2009 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 2009), 45–55.

5. Figures from Cheng Li, “The New Military Elite,” in David M. Finkelstein and Kristen Gunness, eds., Civil–Military Relations in Today’s China (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2007), 55, 57; and James C. Mulvenon, Professionalization of the Senior Chinese Officer Corps (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1997), 42.

6. Combined arms training involves cooperation among different branches (e.g., infantry, artillery, armor); “joint operations” refers to coordination among different services (i.e., ground, air force, navy, Second Artillery).

7. The increases are calculated using figures for the defense budgets found in the Chinese defense white papers from 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010 and from Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, table 4, 188–189. The 2010 figure can be found in Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2010 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, March 2011).

8. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2010 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2010), 42–43.

9. Tai Ming Cheung, Fortifying China: The Struggle to Build a Modern Defense Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); Evan Feigenbaum, China’s Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to the Information Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).

10. Carla Hills and Dennis Blair, chairs, U.S.–China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, a Responsible Course, Task Force Report (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, April 2007), 47–54.

11. On CMC as a “lobbying group,” see Nan Li, “The Central Military Commission and Military Policy in China,” in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation Army as Organization (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2002), 82. On the paramount leader as the key mechanism, see Andrew Scobell, “China’s Evolving Civil–Military Relations: Creeping Guojiahua,” Armed Forces and Society 31, no. 2 (Winter 2005), 229.

12. The U.S. ratio was calculated using FBI statistics on law enforcement personnel for 2004 (970,588 for a population of 278,433,063). For the Chinese ratio calculated for 2005, see Murray Scot Tanner and Eric Green, “Principals and Secret Agents: Central Control Versus Local Control Over Policing and Obstacles to ‘Rule of Law’ in China,” China Quarterly, no. 191 (September 2007), 664.

13. Xuezhi Guo, China’s Security State: Philosophy, Evolution, and Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

14. Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chap. 5.

15. China’s 1969 action likely had multiple motivations. See Thomas Robinson, “The Sino–Soviet Border Conflicts in 1969: New Evidence Three Decades Later,” in Mark Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt, eds., Chinese War-fighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949 (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), 198–216.

16. Jonathan Holslag, China and India: Prospects for Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), chap. 5.

17. Richard C. Bush, The Perils of Proximity: China–Japan Security Relations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 64; Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 22–23.

18. Michael D. Swaine and Roy D. Kamphausen, “Military Modernization in Taiwan,” in Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, eds. , Strategic Asia, 2005–06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005), 420; Bernard D. Cole, Taiwan’s Security: History and Prospects (New York: Routledge, 2006).

19. These four options are drawn from Military and Security Developments, 51–52.

20. Richard C. Bush and Michael E. O’Hanlon, A War Like No Other: The Truth About China’s Challenge to America (Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2007), 135–136.

21. Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems Without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy,” International Security 35, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 5–40.

22. John Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).

23. Jeffrey Lewis, The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search for Security in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007); M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of China’s Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,” International Security 35, no. 2 (Fall 2010): 48–87.

24. Evan S. Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China’s Nonproliferation Policies and Practices, 1980–2004 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).

25. Shirley A. Kan, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, May 2011).

26. The phrase beyond Taiwan comes from Pentagon analyses. For detailed discussion, see Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, eds., Beyond the Strait: Chinese Military Missions Other Than Taiwan (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009). This section draws from Scobell’s contribution to this volume.

27. Andrew Scobell and Gregory Stevenson, “The PLA (Re)Discovers Nontraditional Security,” in Lyle Goldstein, ed., China and the Challenge of Non-traditional Security Threats (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, forthcoming).

28. Christopher J. Pehrson, String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenges of China’s Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006).

29. Donald Rumsfeld, “Remarks to the International Institute for Strategic Studies,” delivered in Singapore, June 4, 2005, at http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3216, accessed November 1, 2011.

30. Saadia M. Pekkanen and Paul Kallender-Umezu, In Defense of Japan: From the Market to the Military in Space Policy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).

31. The Panetta quote comes from a speech given in Japan: “Town Hall Meeting with Secretary Panetta with US Military and Japanese Defense Force Personnel at Yakota Air Base,” October 24, 2011, at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4911, accessed November 20, 2011. The Obama quote comes from a speech to the Australian Parliament: “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” November 16, 2011, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament, accessed November 20, 2011. The third quote and related information comes from Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2010), 62. The AirSea Battle and unmanned-aircraft systems are discussed in ibid., 22, 32–33. This section also draws on Roy D. Kamphausen, “America’s Security Commitment to Asia: A Twenty Year Outlook,” presentation to the International Institute for Strategic Studies Dialogue, Singapore, April 13–14, 2010.

1. Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004); Joshua Kurlantzick, China’s Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).

2. Portions of this section are drawn from Andrew Scobell, “China’s Soft Sell: Is the World Buying?” China Brief 7, no. 2 (January 24, 2007): 7–10, and from Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, “Human Rights and China’s Soft Power Expansion,” China Rights Forum, no. 4 (2009): 10–23.

3. George H. W. Bush, The China Diary of George H. W. Bush: The Making of a Global President, ed. Jeffrey Engel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 341.

4. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 1056; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 213.

5. Bonnie S. Glaser and Melissa E. Murphy, “Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics: The Ongoing Debate,” in Carola McGiffert, ed., Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States: Competition and Cooperation in the Developing World (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), 10–26, at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090305_mcgiffert_chinesesoftpower_web.pdf, accessed December 9, 2010; Joel Wuthnow, “The Concept of Soft Power in China’s Strategic Discourse,” Issues & Studies 44, no. 2 (June 2008): 1–28.

6. Hu Jintao, Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects: Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (October 15, 2007), at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007–10/24/content_6938749_6.htm, accessed December 10, 2010.

7. “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu shenhua wenhua tizhi gaige tuidong shehuizhuyi wenhua dafazhan dafanrong ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding” (Decision of the CCP Central Committee on some important questions concerning deepening the reform of the cultural system and promoting the great development and great flourishing of socialist culture), October 18, 2011, at http://economy.caijing.com.cn/2011-10-26/110933747.html, accessed January 22, 2012; an official English translation was not available at the time this document was consulted.

8. Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007).

9. Victor D. Cha, Beyond the Final Score: The Politics of Sport in Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

10. Susan Brownell, Beijing’s Games: What The Olympics Mean to China (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008); Xu Guoqi, Olympic Dreams: China and Sports, 1895–2008 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008).

11. Karl Gerth, As China Goes, so Goes the World: How Chinese Consumers Are Transforming Everything (New York: Hill and Wang, 2010).

12. For example, Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World (London: Allen Lane, 2009).

13. Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small, “China’s New Dictatorship Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 1 (January–February 2008): 38–56.

14. The remainder of this chapter is a condensed and updated version of Andrew J. Nathan, “China and International Human Rights: Tiananmen’s Paradoxical Impact,” in Jean-Philippe Béja, ed., The Impact of China’s 1989 Tiananmen Massacre (London: Routledge, 2010), 206–220.

15. Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998).

16. Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

17. Ronald Reagan, “Promoting Democracy and Peace,” speech before the British Parliament, London, June 8, 1982, in U.S. Department of State, Current Policy, no. 399 (June 1982), 4.

18. Among other sources, see Julie A. Mertus, Bait and Switch: Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2008).

19. European Commission, EU–China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities (n.d.), at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006_0631en01.pdf, accessed January 22, 2012.

20. Larry Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy (New York: Times Books, 2008), appendix, table 2.

21. Ann Marie Clark, Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Amnesty International, Political Imprisonment in the People’s Republic of China: An Amnesty International Report (London: Amnesty International, 1978).

22. This number is provided by the Human Rights Organizations Database of Human Rights Internet, at http://www.hri.ca/organizations.aspx, accessed January 22, 2012.

23. The UDHR is not a treaty, but most international lawyers consider it to be part of customary international law. Covenants—such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights—are treaties.

24. Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 43. Additional humanitarian interventions were undertaken during the same decade with the approval of bodies other than the UN, such as the intervention in Liberia authorized by Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group and the intervention in Kosovo authorized by NATO.

25. Quoted in Jeremy T. Paltiel, The Empire’s New Clothes: Cultural Particularism and Universal Value in China’s Quest for Global Status (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 144.

26. Aryeh Neier, “Economic Sanctions and Human Rights,” in Samantha Power and Graham Allison, eds., Realizing Human Rights: Moving from Inspiration to Impact, 291–308 (New York: St. Martin’s, 2000).

27. Human Rights Watch, “Chinese Diplomacy, Western Hypocrisy, and the U.N. Human Rights Commission,” March 1, 1997, at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a7d94.html, accessed June 11, 2009.

28. Chinese delegate Wu Jianmin at the UN Human Rights Commission in April 1996, quoted in “Loss for U.S. on Rights,” New York Times, April 24, 1996.

29. From a document included in Zhang Liang, comp., Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, eds., The Tiananmen Papers (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001), 338.

30. National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009–2010), at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009–04/13/content_11177126.htm, accessed June 11, 2009; “Human Rights Watch Statement on UPR Outcome Report of China,” June 11, 2009, at http://www.hrw.org:80/node/83727, accessed June 11, 2009.

31. As listed in “Country Visits by Special Procedures Mandate Holders Since 1998,” n.d., at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/special/countryvisitsa-e.htm#china, accessed June 11, 2009.

32. See various diplomatically worded press releases, reports, and position papers issued by the International Federation for Human Rights at http://www.fidh.org/-Human-Rights-Council-, accessed June 11, 2009.

33. See James Mann, The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain Away Chinese Repression (New York: Viking, 2007).

34. U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, “The Many Faces of China’s Repression: Human Rights, Religious Freedom, and U.S. Diplomacy in China,” January 31, 2007, at http://www.uscirf.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1785&Itemid=1, accessed August 25, 2008.

35. For example, see Human Rights in China’s submissions to UN treaty bodies and special mechanisms at http://hrichina.org/public/contents/category?cid=22042&lang=iso%2d8859%2d1, accessed June 11, 2009.

36. “An Introduction to CLB’s Labour Rights Litigation Work,” n.d., http://www.china-labour.org.hk/en/node/100020, accessed June 11, 2009.

37. For more on the Committee to Support Chinese Lawyers, see http://law.fordham.edu/ihtml/center3.ihtml?imac=1658, accessed May 27, 2009.

38. For an overview of developments in the link between business and human rights, see the Web site of the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre at http://www.business-humanrights.org/Home, accessed January 22, 2012.

39. For an overview of the Global Network Initiative, see http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/index.php, accessed January 22, 2012.

40. Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, Andrew J. Nathan, and Doh Chull Shin, eds., How East Asians View Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).

2. Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: Norton, 2011); Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World (London: Allen Lane, 2009); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001); Arvind Subramanian, Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance (Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2011).

3. Yu Liu and Dingding Chen, “Why China Will Democratize,” Washington Quarterly 35, no. 1 (Winter 2012): 41–63.

4. Andrew J. Nathan, Chinese Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1985); Andrew J. Nathan, “China’s Changing of the Guard: Authoritarian Resilience,” Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1 (January 2003): 6–17; Andrew J. Nathan, “China’s Political Trajectory: What Are the Chinese Saying?” in Cheng Li, ed., China’s Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 25–43; Andrew J. Nathan, “China Since Tiananmen: Authoritarian Impermanence,” Journal of Democracy 20, no. 3 (July 2009): 37–40.

5. Salvatore Babones, “The Middling Kingdom: The Hype and the Reality of China’s Rise,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 5 (September–October 2011): 79–88.

6. For example, see Robert S. Ross, “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century,” International Security 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 81–118; Michael D. Swaine, America’s Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011).

7. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “From Hope to Audacity: Appraising Obama’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 1 (January–February 2010): 16–30; Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Press, 2011); Jacques, When China Rules the World.