by Dr. Antoon De Baets
INTRODUCTION: TRACING CENSORSHIP
The question of how we know when censorship occurred has several sides. Problems of evidence of censorship do not only arise from practical obstacles, but also from its very nature as a knowledge-related phenomenon. Three epistemological paradoxes are worth mentioning.
First, many forms of censorship are invisible and difficult to trace, since censorship normally takes place in an atmosphere of secrecy. Michael Scammell wrote that censorship hides itself: “One of the first words to be censored by the censors is the word ‘censorship.”’2 Clive Ponting made a similar remark: “In a secretive country, the extent of secrecy is itself a well-kept secret.”3 The less visible the censorship, the more effective it is.4
Second, in repressive societies there is less information about more censorship, whereas in a democratic society there is more information about less censorship. Under dictatorial regimes, insiders (or outsiders allowed to visit the country) who are aware of censorship mostly do not report it because they fear research or career troubles or backlash effects on themselves or their wider circle. The result is wide underreporting. Authors who do mention the subject typically do so in passing. Sometimes they treat it more extensively, as they write under the vivid impression of a recent famous case. If they systematically research and report it, and become whistleblowers, they may encounter disbelief. Data from the censors themselves are generally lacking, at least until the moment when a post-conflict transition arrives. Several exceptional but most important moments of repression, and moments of large operations in particular, are ill-suited for recording. Active recording of repression of scholars typically requires stability and routine. In more democratic regimes, censorship is certainly not absent, but it is usually less unobserved and less uncriticized.
These twin paradoxes entail a third one that comes to light when censorship is seen as problematic: studying censorship is the beginning of its suspension. Censorship has a backfire effect and the study of censorship is itself one of the manifestations of that effect. In this chapter, we limit our attention to one particular field of censorship study: the censorship of history. Although the censorship of history is a well-known and obvious area of interest, it has also been, until recently, a relatively underestimated and neglected field of systematic historical research. Scarcity and abundance of information about the censorship of history may be determined not only by the extent of the censors’ success (see paradoxes one and two), but also by very uneven research efforts (see paradox three). They make it often difficult to distinguish important and typical information about censorship from surrounding data and, hence, to identify patterns and trends in the relationships between history, power, and freedom.
The question of how we know when censorship occurred, therefore, presupposes transparent definitions of the set of concepts surrounding censorship and secrecy. The term censorship, the leading specialist in media law Eric Barendt wrote, is emptied of real meaning if it is applied to any social convention or practice that makes communication for some individuals more difficult.5 Therefore, the emphasis here lies on the coercive and the tutelary practices of the state or other authorities. Even with this fundamental caveat, and whatever the regime, it is often difficult to distinguish the censorship of history from similar restrictions on the activities of historians and thus to demarcate it from surrounding concepts. Bearing that in mind, I have attempted to give interrelated definitions of some key concepts in the following mini-dictionary.6
Preliminary notes
Legal experts make a basic distinction between facts and opinions.7 They use “information” as a synonym of facts, and “thoughts,” “ideas,” “beliefs,” “comments,” “views,” or “value judgments” as synonyms of opinions. Historians prefer to call opinions “interpretations.” Silence, omission, and secrecy are general terms. Silence covers all types of omission. Omission can be deliberate; when it is, it is the result of (responsible or irresponsible) selection. Secrecy covers all types of intentional concealment.8
CONCEPTS RELATED TO CENSORSHIP
CENSORSHIP OF HISTORY:the systematic control over historical facts or opinions and their exchange—often by suppression—imposed by or with the connivance of the government or other powers.9
Types. Pre-censorship (prior restraint) or post-censorship, direct or indirect, formal or informal, official or unofficial, public or private.
Often accompanied by self-censorship and propaganda. “Other powers” include superiors, institutions, sponsors, source providers, and pressure groups.
SELF-CENSORSHIP OF HISTORIANS: irresponsible omission by historians, often after pressure, of historical facts or opinions—or avoidance of investigating them in the first place—for fear of negative consequences.
Also called the Schere im Kopf (scissors in the head) in German-speaking countries. Most efficient, widest spread, least visible form of censorship. Often due to the chilling effect produced by censorship instilling a climate of threat and fear. It restricts the public’s access to information.
HISTORICAL PROPAGANDA: systematic manipulation of historical facts or opinions by or with the connivance of the government or other powers.
Types. By commission (i.e., by falsification or lie), by omission, by denial.
Also called “positive censorship.”10 Second and third types close to censorship and self-censorship. Censorship is often part of propaganda campaigns, but propaganda, being broader, does not necessarily imply censorship.
CONCEPTS LARGER THAN CENSORSHIP
ABUSE OF HISTORY: the use of history with an intent to deceive.11
Part of irresponsible history. Censorship is the abuse of history committed under the control of others. Propaganda is often an abuse of history. The result of abuse can be termed “pseudoscientific history,” “pseudo-history,” or “bogus history.”12
IRRESPONSIBLE HISTORY: the abusive or negligent use of history. Part of the misconduct by historians.
MISCONDUCT BY HISTORIANS: violations of legal, professional, or moral norms, which are either general or specifically related to history (the latter being called irresponsible history).
General misconduct includes, for example, the use of offensive language in classrooms or the intimidating and discriminatory treatment of colleagues and students.
CONCEPTS DIFFERENT FROM CENSORSHIP
Diffuse Collective Agency
SOCIAL FORGETTING (AMNESIA, OBLIVION): situation in which specific historical facts or opinions are or seem generally forgotten.
One special type is traumatic social forgetting in post-conflict situations. Reasons for social forgetting vary with agents (victims of crime, survivors of crime, perpetrators, new regimes . . .). In its pure form, “social forgetting” is rare and it has a self-defeating quality (nobody remembers something that is generally forgotten). It is often an incorrect label: social forgetting can be an involuntary result, but it can also be the result of suppression, including self-censorship or censorship. “Social forgetting” is close to censorship when induced. It is the same as censorship when enforced. Thus, “selective amnesia” or “taboo” is an often more correct label.
HISTORICAL TABOOS (BLANK SPOTS, BLACK HOLES, MEMORY HOLES, ZONES OF SILENCE): historical facts or opinions that cannot be mentioned, especially when they are embarrassing for reasons of privacy, reputation, or legitimation of power and status.13
Because taboo facts or opinions are embarrassing, they are either falsified, omitted, or denied. They may result in social forgetting, with which they are often confused. Taboos are related to irresponsible omission. They are often part of propaganda (when facts are falsified), censorship (when facts are omitted), or both (when facts or opinions are denied). Taboos are close to censorship when induced. They are the same as censorship when enforced. Frequently accompanied by self-censorship.
HISTORICAL MYTHS: uncorroborated historical facts or unsubstantiated historical opinions. All myths have authors, although the latter’s identification is typically difficult.
Sometimes historical myths amount to lies. High risk of propaganda.14
DENIAL OF HISTORICAL FACTS: opinion that events underlying corroborated historical facts did not take place.
Synonym of negation (especially in French). Sometimes confusingly called “historical revisionism.” If historical revisionism means replacing less accurate historical facts and less plausible opinions with more accurate and plausible ones, it is a normal feature of scholarly procedure. Denial is often negation with intent to deceive. It is censorship if the denialist view is imposed by authority. In the latter case, it is often accompanied by historical taboos and social forgetting. Minimization of the importance of corroborated historical facts is often a disguised form of denial. Denialism or negationism is frequent in debates about genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Denial of historical facts can be a form of hate speech, which is the advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence.15
Unofficial (Private or Nongovernmental) Agency
CHARGE OF (1) INVASION OF PRIVACY OR (2) DEFAMATION AND INSULT: charge (or threat of charge) that historian (1) invades the private life or correspondence or (2) harms the reputation, or insults the honor, of living or deceased historical subjects.
Privacy and reputation of the living are universal human rights.16 Posthumous privacy and posthumous reputation are partially moral, partially legal concepts. Privacy invasion or defamation charges are frequently disguised censorship attempts. Their chilling effect often induces self-censorship.
COMMISSIONED HISTORY: historical genre produced when a person or institution gives a time-limited assignment, optionally including contracts and funding, to historians or others to write a specified historical work.
Called official history when the institution is official. High risk of censorship and propaganda by commissioning entities; high risk of self-censorship by historians.
Official Agency
LEGAL FORGETTING (INCLUDING PRESCRIPTION, PARDON, AND AMNESTY): annulment of prosecution, judgment, and/or sentence for a criminal act.
Legal forgetting transforms into censorship if the act that became statute-barred, pardoned, or amnestied cannot be mentioned in historical works.
OFFICIAL HISTORY: history commissioned and/or controlled by an official institution.
High risk of censorship and propaganda by official institutions; high risk of self-censorship by historians.17
OFFICIAL SECRECY OF CURRENT AND ARCHIVAL RECORDS: official restriction on access to current and archival records deemed necessary for one of six purposes: respect of the rights or reputations of others, for the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals.18
Official secrecy of records is censorship if the restriction is unlawful (not provided by law), involving purposes not mentioned in the list, and/or unnecessary in a democratic society (e.g., if a restriction on archival access is disproportional). When it is illegitimate, secrecy conceals sensitive information, protects arbitrariness, evades control and criticism, impoverishes debate, and reduces accountability.
SELECTION OF ARCHIVES: selection (including destruction) of records by archivists.
Censorship if the selection is not part of a lawful and transparent procedure in which archivists assess content of records carefully.
Historians’ Agency
REJECTION OF HISTORICAL WORK BY PEERS: rejection, after peer review, of historical manuscripts, books, research proposals, and historical courses.
Rejection of historical work can occur in different contexts: publication, employment, tenure, promotion, grants, congresses, and prizes. No censorship if part of a transparent quality control procedure in which peers assess content carefully. May be censorship if carried out by peers, anonymous or not, whose interests conflict, or appear to conflict, with the historians under review.
COPYRIGHT: part of intellectual property; consists of a moral right (of authors to be recognized as creators of their works and to object to any defamatory distortion or mutilation of these works) and an economic right—constituting an incentive for intellectual creation—until (in general) 50 years after the historian’s death.
No censorship if fair practice clauses allow free use of excerpts in historical teaching and research (provided that the work and its author are acknowledged). The violation of the moral right may induce a chilling effect on authors.
PLAGIARISM: Deliberate presentation of historical facts or opinions expressed originally by others as own work (that is, without due acknowledgement of original authors).
Copyright violation. May induce chilling effect on original authors.
THEFT OF MANUSCRIPTS
Copyright violation. Form of censorship.
PIRACY OF MANUSCRIPTS: illegal reproduction or distribution of copyrighted work of others.
Copyright violation. Censorship if name of author is omitted.
OMISSION BY HISTORIANS OF OWN HISTORICAL OPINIONS: absolute right not to mention own historical opinions.
Part of the right to silence (the right not to speak), itself derived from the universal right of freedom of expression.19 Applied principally in cases where historians refuse to make explicit their own moral evaluations about the past. Omission by historians of own historical opinions is no self-censorship.
OMISSION BY HISTORIANS OF HISTORICAL FACTS: exceptionalright not to mention historical facts affecting the privacy and reputation of persons, either living or dead, in cases where informed consent by the latter or their authorized representatives cannot be obtained, after a fair balancing test in which the omission is weighed against the public interest.
Part of right to silence. No self-censorship if applied properly. Censorship or self-censorship if applied outside the narrow exceptional-right formula.
CONFIDENTIALITY OF HISTORICAL FACTS OR OPINIONS AFTER CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY ARCHIVE HOLDERS: duty of historians, under a legal embargo or after a confidentiality pledge, not to publish or publicly mention historical facts or opinions (nor their authors’ names) accessed by them.
High censorship risk if legal embargo or confidentiality requirement is excessive.
NONDISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION SOURCES BY HISTORIANS:exceptional right of historians.20
Here “information sources” mean the names of those possessing the information; given that historians possess countervailing scholarly duties of transparency and accountability, nondisclosure should be balanced against disclosure with a presumption in favor of the latter. Censorship risk if the use of the right is not (sufficiently) justified.
CODE OF ETHICS FOR HISTORIANS: set of principles clarifying the legal, professional, and moral accountability and autonomy of historians.21
Codes of ethics do not restrict freedom of expression, but clarify its limits. They are more concerned with the intention and conditions accompanying the conduct of historians, rather than with its content.22 Censorship risk if applied or enforced when not emanating from a recognized, democratically organized association of historians. Codes of ethics should conform to academic freedom, which, according to the UNESCO, is “[T]he right [of higher-education teaching personnel], without constriction by prescribed doctrine, to freedom of teaching and discussion, freedom in carrying out research and disseminating and publishing the results thereof, freedom to express freely their opinion about the institution or system in which they work, freedom from institutional censorship and freedom to participate in professional or representative academic bodies.”23
EPILOGUE: THE BACKFIRE
Effect of Censorship
The results of censorship are often ambiguous. In 213 BCE, the Chinese emperor Qin Shi Huang ordered a large-scale book burning of historical works and had possibly hundreds of intellectuals executed in an attempt to eliminate tradition and its guardians. This major censorship operation hampered the development of historical writing, not only because much information was destroyed, but also because it provided an excuse to future scholars to falsify ancient texts. At the same time, however, it caused an immense arousal of historical consciousness: Han scholars tried to recover and edit whatever texts remained and a cult of books developed. Thus the aim of censorship defeated itself.
Censorship may have unintended positive effects. Alberto Manguel spoke of “the paradoxical ability of censorship that, in its efforts to suppress, it highlights that which it wishes to condemn.”24 Hermann Weber recognized this effect after the dictatorship had withered away: “For decades the exclusion of ‘blank spots’ had been ordered . . . only to provoke a stronger and almost obsessive interest in these issues nowadays.”25
If it is not all-pervading, censorship provides an indirect incentive for creativity and criticism. Taboos always attract curiosity. Repression may discourage that curiosity for decades. But when history as a classical vehicle of the past is silenced and compromised, every utterance—graffiti, literature, theater, film—becomes its potential vehicle. Thus, the censorship of history generates the emergence of substitutes: whenever the silenced and silent historians are not able to refute the heralded truths of official historical propaganda, philosophers, poets, novelists, playwrights, filmmakers, journalists, storytellers, and singers take care of the historical truth and keep it alive. Paradoxically, the ostensible vulnerability of many of these substitutes is their power: writing, for example, is a solitary act requiring little institutional support. Sometimes, fictional genres are not taken seriously by the authorities and hence escape their attention. Thus, censorship may not suppress alternative views but rather generate them, and, by doing so, become counterproductive.26 Censorship backfires.
Notes
1. An earlier version of this article appeared under the title “Taxonomy of Concepts Related to the Censorship of History,” in Susan Maret, ed., Research in Social Problems and Public Policy 19, Government Secrecy (Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2011), 53–65, doi:10.1108/S0196-1152(2011)0000019007.
2. Michael Scammell, “Censorship and Its History: A Personal View” in Information, Freedom and Censorship: World Report 1988, article 19 (London: Times Books, 1988), 1–18.
3. Clive Ponting, Secrecy in Britain (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990). This characteristic of censorship is similar to that of falsification, see Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Assassins of Memory: Essays on the Denial of the Holocaust (1987; repr., New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 51: “It is the distinguishing feature of a lie to want to pass itself off as the truth.”
4. See also Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 331: “With respect to the consequences of repression, one confronts the paradox that the measure of its effectiveness is the scarcity of overt instances.”
5. Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
6. The introduction and epilogue of this chapter owe much to Antoon De Baets, “Censorship and History (1945–Present)” in The Oxford History of Historical Writing, Volume 5: 1945 to Present, eds. Axel Schneider and Daniel Woolf (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 52–73.
7. Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Inquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); and Barendt, Freedom of Speech. The nongovernmental organization Article 19 defines opinions as statements “which either do not contain a factual connotation which could be proved to be false, or cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts given all the circumstances, including the language used (such as rhetoric, hyperbole, satire, or jest).” See Article 19, Defining Defamation: Principles on Freedom of Expression and Protection of Reputation (London: Article 19, 2000), principle 10 (“expressions of opinion”).
8. Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (New York: Vintage Books, 1983).
9. Compare Stuart Hampshire and Louis Blom-Cooper, “Censorship?” Index on Censorship 6, no. 4 (1977): 55–63; and Scammell, “Censorship and Its History.”
10. Stephen Spender, “Thoughts on Censorship in the World of 1984” in Censorship: 500 Years of Conflict, ed. Vartan Gregorian (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 116–127.
11. Antoon De Baets, Responsible History (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009).
12. For surveys of pseudohistorical theories, see Robert Carroll, The Skeptic’s Dictionary (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2003); Karl Corino, ed., Gefälscht! Betrug in Politik, Literatur, Wissenschaft, Kunst und Musik (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1992); Kenneth L. Feder, Frauds, Myths, and Mysteries: Science and Pseudoscience in Archaeology (Mountain View, CA: Mayfield, 1999); Werner Fuld, Das Lexikon der Fälschungen (Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn, 1999); and William F. Williams, ed., Encyclopedia of Pseudoscience (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2000).
13. For typologies of taboo topics that are potentially subject to censorship, see Hampshire and Blom-Cooper, “Censorship?”; and Marc Ferro, L’Histoire sous surveillance: Science et conscience de l’histoire (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1985), 52–60. A frequently used synonym for taboos is blank spots. According to Thomas S. Szayna, “Addressing ‘Blank Spots’ in Polish–Soviet Relations,” Problems of Communism 37, no. 6 (1988): 37–38, the concept was apparently first used in Poland by Solidarity to indicate the topics too embarrassing to discuss openly and honestly. They were either ignored (such as the deportations of 1939) or falsified (such as the 1940 Katyn massacre), but they did not necessarily imply that the scholars or the public had no knowledge of them. Also see Vera Tolz, “‘Blank Spots’ in Soviet History,” Radio Liberty Research (1988): 1–3. For the synonymous term black holes, see Milan Šimečka, “Black Holes,” Index on Censorship 5 (1988): 52–54, who defines them as “segments of history cloaked in total darkness, devoid of life, of persons, of ideas.” Another synonymous term, memory holes, was invented by George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (London: Secker & Warburg, 1949), 40.
14. Myths may provide meaning for those who hold them. As conjecture, they may anticipate or inspire future scientific theories. The power of myths to give meaning is clear from George Schöpflin’s taxonomy, which distinguishes eight motifs in myths: territory, redemption and suffering, unjust treatment, election and civilizing mission, military valor, rebirth and renewal, ethnogenesis and antiquity, and kinship and shared descent. See his “The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths,” in Myths and Nationhood, eds. Geoffrey Hosking and George Schöpflin (London: Hurst, 1997), 28–35. For reflections on the excusability of the use of historical myths, see Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt, eds., Historians of the Middle East (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 451–502; J. H. Plumb, The Death of the Past (London: Macmillan; Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 19–61; David C. Gordon, Self-Determination and History in the Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), 177–192; Jan Vansina, Oral Tradition as History (London: James Currey, 1985), 91–108; William Hardy McNeill, “Mythstory, or Truth, Myth, History, and Historians,” American Historical Review 91, no. 1 (1986): 1–10, 6–9; and Bernard Lewis, History Remembered, Recovered, Invented (1975; repr., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), passim.
15. UN General Assembly, Resolution 2200A, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, http://www2.ohchr.org/English/law/ccpr.htm.
16. UN General Assembly, Resolution 217A, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” December 10, 1948, http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr. Privacy, honor, and reputation be-long to the group of so-called “personality rights.” They are enshrined in article 12 of the Uni-versal Declaration of Human Rights. Privacy is the right to respect for one’s private life, home, and correspondence. Honor is a person’s self-esteem. Reputation is the appraisal of a person by others, a person’s good name or fame. Defamation is usually defined as the act of damaging another’s reputation (“fame”), in oral (slander) or written (libel) form. For the distinction between honor and reputation, and between defamation, insult, hate speech, blasphemy, and privacy invasion, see article 19, Defamation ABC: A Simple Introduction to Key Concepts of Defamation Law, November 2006, http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/tools/defamation-abc.pdf, 1–3, 5, 9–10; and Barendt, Freedom of Speech, 170–92, 227–46, 295–302.
17. Herbert Butterfield, “Official History: Its Pitfalls and Criteria,” in History and Human Relations (London: Collins, 1951), 182–224; and Susan L. Maret, On Their Own Terms: A Lexicon with an Emphasis on Information-Related Terms Produced by the U.S. Federal Government, Federation of American Scientists, 2009, accessed March 10, 2010, http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/maret.pdf.
18. UN General Assembly, International Covenant.
19. Ibid.
20. Council of Europe, Recommendation No. R, Of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Right of Journalists not to Disclose Their Sources of Information, March 8, 2000, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/doc/cm/rec(2000)007&expmem_EN.asp. The European Court of Human Rights has confirmed the right to nondisclosure of sources, most notably in Goodwin v. the United Kingdom at Strasbourg in 1996.
21. For a worldwide catalog of codes of ethics for historians, archivists, and archaeologists, see Ethics section of the Network of Concerned Historians website (ConcernedHistorians.org).
22. De Baets, Responsible History.
23. UNESCO, Recommendation Concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel, November 11, 1997, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13144&URL_DO=DO_ TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.
24. Alberto Manguel, “Daring to Speak One’s Name,” Index on Censorship 24, no. 1 (1995): 16–29.
25. Hermann Weber, “‘Weisse Flecken’ in der DDR-Geschichtsschreibung,” in ed. Rainer Eckert et al., Krise-Umbruch-Neubeginn: Eine kritische und selbstkritische Dokumentation der DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft 1989/90 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992), 369–91.
26. See Leszek Kolakowski, “Totalitarianism and the Virtue of the Lie,” in ed. Irving Howe, 1984 Revisited: Totalitarianism in Our Century (New York: Harper & Row, 1983), 135; and Yuri Afanasev, “Return History to the People,” Index on Censorship 3 (1995): 56–60. Also see Marc Bloch’s remarks on the wary reception of propaganda and censorship in the trenches of World War I, which resulted in a revival of oral tradition, Marc Bloch, Apologie pour l’histoire ou métier d’historien (written 1941; published 1949, repr., Paris: Colin, 1967), 50–51
ANTOON DE BAETS, PHD, is a historian working at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands. He has more than 125 publications to his name, most recently on the censorship of history and the ethics of historians. His work includes several books, such as Censorship of Historical Thought: A World Guide, 1945–2000 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002) and Responsible History (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009). Since 1995, he has coordinated the Network of Concerned Historians. He is currently writing his new book History of the Censorship of History (1945–2010).