Secrecy of information is integral to operations conducted by MI6.
John Sawers, MI6 Chief, 2010, UK: 28 Oct 10 Public Speech:32 Jury Didn’t Hear:
“Secrecy is not a dirty word. Secrecy is not there as a cover-up. Secrecy plays a crucial part in keeping Britain safe and secure.”33
Richard Dearlove, MI6 Director of Operations34, 1994 to 1999, UK: 20 Feb 08: 26.23:
Burnett: Q. Is there a general approach to knowledge within the service that people only know what they need to know?
A. Well, the principle of “need to know” is applied throughout the organisation. Therefore your knowledge is compartmentalised in terms of the activity for which you are responsible, but of course the further up the service you go, the more you need to know what everyone else is doing.
Miss X, MI6 Administrator, UK: 26 Feb 08: 13.18:
Burnett: Q. Is that35 because even though everyone in MI6 has developed vetting and is thus, one hopes, trustworthy, information is only accessible if you need to know it?
A. Absolutely. We operate on a terribly important “need to know” basis. So if I am in one area and somebody else is in another, even socially or anything else, we just don’t discuss each other’s work.
Coroner: The more people who know the information, the greater the risk there is –
A. Absolutely.
Q. That there might just be an inadvertent slip of some sort?
A. Absolutely.
Coroner: And also the risks of perhaps putting two and two together from different places?
A. Yes, precisely, sir.
Comment: MI6 witnesses emphasised the importance of secrecy and restricting information on a “need to know” basis:
Both Dearlove and X are talking about secrecy within MI6 itself – “throughout the organisation”; “each other’s work”.
I suggest that if MI6 apply such secrecy with their colleagues, then it seems likely they would be even less open in dealing with people outside of the MI6 organisation.36
This evidence indicates that if MI6 had any involvement in the Paris crash, then those outside of the organisation – particularly the general public – would not be included amongst those who “needed to know”.
In other words, if MI6 assassinated Princess Diana, they are hardly going to admit it – particularly given their culture of secrecy.
This evidence also shows that if MI6 carried this out, then each person involved would have only known what they “needed to know”.
This would help explain why a person like Henri Paul would carry out his role, even though it led to his death – the point being that he would not have known he was going to die. He may not have believed there was any risk at all to the Mercedes’ occupants, if he had been only given “need to know” information.
It may be that other players – Claude Roulet particularly – had no idea that their actions would assist in bringing about the deaths of Princess Diana and Dodi Fayed.
MI6 carry out operations that they can later deny involvement in.
Richard Tomlinson, Ex-MI6 Officer: 13 Feb 08: 90.2:
Mansfield: Q. Now, was [deniability] a concept that was discussed inside MI6?
A. Frequently, yes, making an operation deniable was always a consideration so that, if things went wrong, you could plausibly demonstrate that the British Government had nothing to do with it.
Q. So it is not just a question of operating under cover, perhaps with a false cover; it is also operating in a way that nobody knows this is what you are doing and then, if it happens, denying that you have done it. That is what it comes to, doesn’t it?
A. Yes.
Richard Dearlove, MI6 Director of Operations, 1994 to 1999, UK: 20 Feb 08: 116.6:
Mansfield: Q. Those concepts, “deniability“, they are not culled out of the blue, are they, deniability?
A. Deniability of an operation carried out by SIS is a common concept which Tomlinson would have learned about on his training.
Q. What that involves – and he has given evidence about this last week – is this not right – is that … the SIS themselves, as it were, don’t dirty their own hands with tasks abroad. They employ an increment, do they not?
A. Can I cut to the quick, Mr Mansfield? I am not going to speculate on SIS’s various operational capabilities. They are many and they are different and the court does not need to know about them. What the court does need to know is that all of these capabilities, every single one of them, were under my personal control as the chief of operations and subject to class 7 authorisations under the Act. So there are not any little offshore liars here that somehow do not fit into this pattern; they do not exist. Anything that is referred to, whether you have heard of it before or whether you have not heard of it before, whether it has a strange name or whether it has not got a strange name, was under the control of the director of operations. Let’s be absolutely crystal clear about that and I think it is important that the jury understands that fact.
Q. Now, just going back to the question of deniability, the concept –
A. Some of these capabilities are, of course, deniable, but they are still under legal control. They still come under the Intelligence Services Act.
….Q. I am asking the question, starting in the tunnel, as to who was capable of causing a crash in the tunnel and then denying they had anything to do with it, which is why I am wanting to ask you about deniability. I want to ask this question, not at the official level but at any level; “deniability” means you can get in and out and deny what has happened, effectively?
A. But deniability is a basic concept of SIS activity –
Q. Yes.
A. – but under operational control and authorisation. It is just like secrecy, clandestinity. I do not think I can explain it any more than that.
At 162.13: Keen: Q. Tomlinson had disclosed that the document existed.37 As Sir Richard said38, there is the issue of deniability. Sometimes things are not capable of denial.
A. Deniability is not practised inside SIS or in SIS in relation to the Government, never, ever. That is a fundamental point of integrity. It is only practised in relation to its operations outside the Governmental context.
At 167.8: Mansfield: Q. Do you remember you gave an answer just before the break: “Deniability is not practised inside SIS or in SIS in relation to the Government, never, ever…. It is only practised in relation to its operations outside the Governmental context.” What that means is you will deny it to everybody save members of your own service and the Government. Is that right?
A. No, that is not true.
Mr H, MI6 Direct Boss of Mr A39, Balkans: 28 Feb 08: 133.16:
Mansfield: Q. Is there a policy of deniability within the department?
A. I think you already know that deniability is one of the techniques that we have as a service.
Q. Within the department?
Coroner: That is not very clearly put, Mr Mansfield. Sir Richard dealt with this. I mentioned the point yesterday. I think his evidence was to the effect that deniability to the world outside was one thing, but deniability inside was totally different and not acceptable.
Q. Quite. And that is why – You were aware of that, were you?
A. Absolutely.
Mr 6,40 MI6 Officer. British Embassy, Paris: 29 Feb 08: 82.25:
Mansfield: Q. Was it part, this letter41, of the culture of deniability?
A. I think deniability – and I know the various senses in which it has been bandied around during the process here – my understanding, what I mean when I talk about deniability, is our ability to act in a way in which other states will not know that we are doing it, but I do not accept that that means deniability in the context of internally, ie that you can deny things to one another or indeed that we deny things within Whitehall. So, the whole process of submissions is that this operation might be deniable, ie, we might want it to appear that we had not done it over here, but that is not the same as saying it would be invisible or deniable within Government. Within the UK Government, it would be seen and it would be recognised. So that is the split. It is an operational term of art, if you like, rather than a state of affairs.
Q. I appreciate that. It is a term of art, which would therefore mean that it would embrace denying it to a foreign Government, is that right?
A. It might.
Q. Yes?
A. And it would have to, if you think about that logically.
Stephen Dorril, Intelligence Consultant and Author: 2000 Book MI6: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“A philosophy that … was a particular hallmark of MI6 planning [is] plausible deniability. The use of third parties lessens the threat of any operation unravelling to reveal the hand of the sponsoring organisation.”42
Comment:The evidence indicates that MI6 uses deniability, but not towards its own government. In other words, the indication is that if MI6 carried out an operation, then the UK government – if they asked – would be told about it.
The various witnesses have said:
None of the witnesses denied that deniability is used by MI6.
There is a possible issue over who MI6 uses deniability against.
Dearlove is specific: “Deniability is not practised inside SIS43 or in SIS in relation to the Government” and: “[Deniability] is only practised in relation to [MI6’s] operations outside the Governmental context”.
Yet when Mansfield restates this: “You will deny it to everybody save members of your own service and the Government”, Dearlove replies: “No, that is not true” – but fails to explain why it is not true.
H confirmed to Mansfield that “deniability to the world outside was one thing, but deniability inside was … not acceptable”.
6 confirmed that deniability “would embrace denying it to a foreign Government”.
The general evidence then is that “deniability is a basic concept of SIS activity” and it involves carrying out operations that are deniable – i.e. difficult to trace to MI6 – then following the operation denying MI6 involvement to anyone outside of the UK government or MI6.
If one supposes for a moment that MI6 did carry out the assassination of Princess Diana, then how could we expect MI6 to conduct it, with regard to deniability?
There are two points:
In the case of Princess Diana: the decision to eliminate Diana in a car crash indicates deniability played a major role. An orchestrated car crash is extremely difficult to carry out – a lot of factors have to come together45 – but it is very deniable.
Every day about 3,300 people die in road traffic accidents worldwide.4647 When a person dies in a car crash, it is automatically presumed – unless proven otherwise – that it is an unfortunate and tragic accident.
Of all the forms of assassination, car crash may even be the most deniable.4849
If MI6 orchestrated the car crash that took out Diana and Dodi, they are hardly going to admit it to the outside world.
Who does MI6 answer to?
Mr 6, MI6 Officer. British Embassy, Paris: 29 Feb 08: 77.9:
Mansfield: Q. You do agree that there is a need for accountability?
A. I do agree that there is a need for accountability, and again I can only talk to the years of experience that I have had within the organisation. The whole business of political submissions … – which was going on long before we had the Intelligence Services Act in 1994, there was always a process by which, if you were undertaking an operation which – and before 1994 this was a political judgment about risk – you had to write it up and then get the Foreign Secretary to sign off on it. That is a process that has been in place for many, many years. Obviously, post the ISA52, we have the statutory responsibilities … we have the Intelligence Services Tribunal; we have the Parliamentary Oversight Committee; we have commissioners – we have a whole range of measures all in there designed to make sure we stay within the remit which we have been granted by the ISA.
Richard Tomlinson, Ex-MI6 Officer: 5 Apr 09 Interview: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“I started to become aware of the substantial leeway for dishonesty that exists in the intelligence service…. Because there’s no overall control at the very top, inevitably when people make a mistake, they’re not held accountable for it – so their only accountability is … how honest they are, if they’re going to own up to making a mistake. That was one of the big faults of MI6. There was no overall accountability at the top. If the chief of MI6 wants to cover up for people below him, no one can go to him and hold him accountable for that. And that’s one of the big … problems at MI6, and that leads to a lot of their problems…. You can’t sue MI6, no one can sue MI6…. It’s like the police were 20 years ago, before the police were held accountable, and all the … injustices the police served upon the general public…. MI6 is still in that position, they’re not held accountable at the very top….53
“If you wish to carry out … a delicate operation … it’s only voluntary to put in a submission [to the foreign secretary]. There’s no compulsion to put in a submission. If MI6 is absolutely convinced that it can carry something out without asking the foreign secretary – there’s no possibility of him ever finding out – there’s no compulsion for them to put it in….
“MI6 cannot be held accountable to the law. I can think of lots of examples of MI6 officers who, one way or another, have breached the law … and they can never be held accountable for that. So that is the greatest failing of MI6.
“They’ve tried to improve the accountability over the last 10, 15, 20 years and there is now what’s called the … Parliamentary Intelligence Security Committee who can make recommendations to the intelligence services but they can’t order [them] to do anything or change anything. They can only recommend that they do so. So there is still a fair amount to go before MI6 is in the same degree of accountability to the government which any other intelligence service in the Western world is. Even the CIA is far more accountable to the American government than Britain’s MI6 – also … the Australian intelligence service, the NZ intelligence service, they’re just streets ahead of MI6 in terms of legal accountability.”54
Richard Tomlinson: 5 Apr 09 Interview: Jury Didn’t Hear:
Regarding the situation if an MI6 officer has to provide evidence under oath at an inquest:
“He would know that he could never be held accountable to what he’d said. He could never be proven wrong or tried for perjury if what he’d said was wrong, because there’s no way that MI6 would ever let him be hauled up in front of a court for perjury.”55
Peter Heap, British Ambassador to Brazil, 1992 to 1995: 2003 Article: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“Only very rarely … is intelligence material subject to the same scrutiny, verification and testing as information governments receive from other sources. Naturally there are, by definition, genuine secrets in obtaining such material, but the whole process is wrapped around in an unnecessary aura of secrecy, mystery and danger that prevents those from outside the security services applying normal and rigorous judgments on what they produce.
It is difficult to see why, for example, Sir Richard Dearlove, chief of MI6, should have given his evidence to the Hutton inquiry56 by telephone. Everyone knows his name and what he does. Even his head office is probably not far behind the Houses of Parliament in its recognition factor. Yet the manner of his appearance merely enhances his mystique rather than protects national security.”57
John Scarlett, MI6 Chief: Aug 09 BBC Interview: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“Our American allies know that we [MI6] are our own service, that we are here to work for the British interests and the United Kingdom. We are an independent service working to our own laws – nobody else’s – and to our own values.”58
Comment: Although Scarlett’s aim is to distance UK methods from the US, he could also be talking about MI6 as an organisation when he says “we are an independent service working to our own laws”.59
There was some focus at the inquest on MI6’s accountability to the government and even the possibility of independent operations undertaken by rogue elements within MI6.
Although there is evidence pointing to a lack of accountability on the part of MI660, the later evidence will point to the majority of high-level assassination plots actually being undertaken with the blessing of – or even under the orders of – the government of the day. In those cases accountability – or actually, lack of accountability – is not an issue, because MI6 is fulfilling the wishes of the government.
The issue that then arises is the accountability of the British authorities – a) the government, and b) the Queen.
The answer to this might be, accountability to the people. In a modern democracy the government is accountable to the people and the judiciary. Parts 1 to 461 have already shown that in this particular case the judiciary have been shown to be corrupt.
The people make their judgement on the government at the next election. But if critical information is withheld from the people – for example, if the government were shown to be complicit in the assassination of Princess Diana – then the people have been prevented from being in a position to judge the government on their actions.
If the royal family is shown to be involved – for example, if Philip, Charles or the Queen gave the order to MI6 – then who are they accountable to?
At the inquest, even though some royals have been named as suspects, they were able to avoid producing any evidence – either by statement or cross-examination. Nor have they ever been required to provide police statements in any of the investigations.
The significance and relevance of these issues will become clearer as this book progresses.
At this stage, I suggest that the issue may not be so much the accountability of MI6, which was addressed at the inquest, but instead the accountability of other organisations – the government, the royal family, the judiciary – and this was not addressed at the inquest.
Richard Tomlinson, Ex-MI6 Officer: 13 Feb 08: 94.4:
Mansfield: Q. In relation to those days – and we are talking about the 1990s as opposed to since 2000 – if an MI5 officer – and if there is an objection, please say – if a MI5 officer or an MI6 officer felt that what was happening in the United Kingdom or elsewhere was [not] in62 the interests of the United Kingdom and was subversive, undermining the state or the Monarchy, that might generate discussion about what to do about it, mightn’t it, then?
A. I think that is possibly the case, yes. I think that is the case, yes.
Does MI6 lie?
Richard Tomlinson, Ex-MI6 Officer: 2001 Book: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“On Tuesday, 30 March 1909, a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence met in a closed session in Whitehall. Colonel James Edmonds was the first speaker. He was the head of MO563, the forerunner of today’s MI5, whose job was to uncover foreign spies in Britain with his staff of two and a budget of £200 per year. Edmonds had ambitious plans and wanted to extend his service to spy abroad, primarily in Russia and Germany. But Lord Esher, the chairman of the committee, disbelieved Edmonds’ tales of German spying successes in England and insisted that Edmonds prepare a detailed list of cases to back his arguments.
“Rather than back down, Edmonds … fabricated evidence to support his case. He provided Esher with a fictional list of spies drawn from a contemporary best-selling novel, Spies of the Kaiser by William LeQueux. When Esher asked for corroboration of his evidence, Edmonds claimed that such revelations would compromise the security of his informants…. It was enough for Edmonds to win his argument and with it the budget to expand MO5 to form the Secret Service Bureau….
“Through both world wars the Secret Service Bureau survived and thrived, eventually being named MI6 in 1948.”6465
Richard Tomlinson: 13 Feb 08: 49.24:
Mansfield: Q. You were given practical tests of how under cover in the United Kingdom you might pretend to be somebody other than you are in order to obtain information; is that right?
A. That is correct, yes.
Q. In other words … you were being authorised to deceive people into providing you with material information, is that right?
A. You could certainly put it in those terms, yes. It was not put to us in those terms when we were training. We, at the time, believed that we were doing it for a good cause, but – yes, I suppose, you could use that word, exact word, yes.
Q. In other words, if it is considered to be in the national interest, it was permissible to deceive?
A. Yes.
Richard Tomlinson: 2001 Book: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“The IONEC66 was designed to train a recruit to a level of proficiency to step into a junior desk job in MI6…. ‘Perfect Stranger’ [was] the first of many increasingly complicated tests that were to form the backbone of the course.
“Our brief was simple…. We were each assigned a pub in downtown Portsmouth in which we had to approach a member of the public and, using whatever cunning ruse we could invent, extract their name, address, date of birth, occupation and passport number. We were given an alias, but had to use our initiative to invent the rest of our fictional personality….
“I fabricated everything on the spot…. It was alarming that the art of deception came so easily and surprising how gullible strangers could be….
“[Afterwards] I climbed [back] into the minibus67…. The others, some a bit tipsy, were elatedly describing how they conned innocent pub-goers into providing personal details….
“For a moment, sitting quietly in the back of the bus, I pondered the morality of my actions…. Was it right to dupe members of the public so casually? As we drove through the … entry to … our main base for the IONEC, I dismissed such concerns. We were lying for Britain and that was sufficient justification. Unwittingly, I took the first step down the long path of indoctrination towards becoming an MI6 officer.”68
Richard Tomlinson: 13 Feb 08: 115.6:
Mansfield: Q. Is there a department within MI6 or MI5 that is concerned with the production and dissemination of disinformation? Don’t answer for the moment. Of course, if the department is here, probably …
Tam:69 There are actually two problems with that question. One is relevance, which is not apparent to us, but there is also an objection because this is going to – well, I can see what the allegation is going to be that follows on from it and it would be exploring a part and a mechanism of how the intelligence agencies do their work, and that is crossing the line there.
Coroner: I am pretty doubtful about its relevance anyway. You might try it again with Sir John Dearlove70 next week.
Q. Well, I give due warning. I will want to try it again. I will not deal with it with this witness.
Miss X, MI6 Administrator, UK: 26 Feb 08: 80.24:
Mansfield: Q. You did approach this with an open mind, did you, this whole matter of research?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Because all sorts of people may be telling taradiddles, mightn’t they?
A. I am sorry, may be telling …?
Q. I am sorry, it is an old-fashioned phrase. Maybe a phrase which I know is familiar in the service, “economic with the truth“. People may do that, may they not?
A. Not to the best of my knowledge.
Gerald Posner, Investigative Writer and Journalist, USA: 28 Feb 08: 182.15:
“In my dealings with intelligence agencies, primarily here in the United States, they will often obfuscate, lie, hold back information, refuse to release it until they are absolutely forced to years or decades down the road. They are their own worst enemies in providing information to the public. They create the fodder and the groundwork for conspiracy theories because they hold on to information and people believe they have something to hold on to because they have a secret or they are lying.”
Coroner: Summing Up: 31 Mar 08: 64.2:
“[Tomlinson] says he finds the idea of a document containing A’s proposal71 being destroyed as completely unbelievable. He thinks it was destroyed when the Stevens inquiry began and MI6 realised they would have to disclose it. Members of the jury, if that were right, then every MI6 witness who gave evidence lied to you.”
Comment:Does MI6 lie?
It seems logical that the self-admitted concept of deniability – which includes MI6 denying they were responsible for events they were responsible for – indicates that MI6 must lie.
I suggest it is no coincidence that the very first test MI6 trainees underwent was one that was focused on each individual being required to explicitly deceive unsuspecting members of the public.72 This could have been designed to set the scene for each recruit’s future in the organisation.
When Mansfield wanted to address the issue of disinformation – information which is intended to mislead73 – he is prevented from doing so, by Tam and Baker.
Both claim lack of relevance – Baker: “I am pretty doubtful about its relevance” – yet I suggest its relevance to this case is obvious. If MI6 carried out the assassination of Diana, the question is: Has MI6 provided post-crash disinformation to distance itself from the crash?
Mansfield expressed a clear interest in addressing this issue: “I give due warning – I will want to try it again”. Yet that did not happen.
Why? Did Baker – “I am pretty doubtful about its relevance” – prevent Mansfield from doing so?
This issue of disinformation was never raised again in the remaining two months of the inquest.
The fact that Tam intervened at that point in the cross-examination appears to indicate that there may be “a department within MI6 or MI5 that is concerned with the production and dissemination of disinformation”.
If no such department existed then I suggest that Tam would have left the question to be answered.
Both past and present officers of MI6 have spoken:
We end up with an organisation, MI6, that is – by its own admission – secretive, deceptive, dishonest and not accountable.
At the inquest, evidence was heard from ten MI6 officers – Dearlove, Spearman, A, E, H, I, X, 1, 4 and 5.75
The above evidence places serious question marks over the validity or honesty of the testimony provided by them.
MI6 have said that they opened up their files fully to the British police.
Miss X, MI6 Administrator, UK: 26 Feb 08: 41.23:
Burnett: Q. Were Lord Stevens‘ officers denied access to anything they wished to see?
A. No, they were not.
…. Q. Within SIS, did anyone else have unrestricted access to the whole of the information, electronic and paper, that is contained there?
A. Yes. Obviously – am I able to answer this in terms of – I can say the three most senior members of our organisation.
….Q. It is called what?
A. “God’s access“.
Q. So there is a very small number of people who have God’s access to information within SIS. To enable proper searches to be made by you and by Paget, what arrangements were made?
A…. Rather unusually – and I do not think it happens very often – my director said, “Okay, fine, no problem, I will give you the accesses and you just show them everything that they would wish to look at”.
Q. So essentially you got God’s access too?
A. I got God’s access and it bypassed the need to clear individual documents.
Paget Report, pp753-4: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“In 2004 Operation Paget contacted the SIS, outlining the areas of interest to the inquiry and sought their assistance in answering specific questions. Claims had been made against the SIS, and individuals allegedly within it, but co-operation would be voluntary. The MPS had no grounds to coerce or force the SIS or individuals working for the organisation to provide information.
“The SIS had a meeting with the Operation Paget team, led by the then Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service, Sir John Stevens (now Lord Stevens.) At this meeting in 2004 the SIS offered full co-operation to Lord Stevens and two senior members of the team. They agreed to identify those individuals referred to in Richard Tomlinson’s claims only by code, pseudonym or description.76 Details of all SIS officers that had worked in Paris at the relevant time were also provided. All, still serving or retired, were subsequently made available for interview. The SIS also agreed to provide access to SIS databases, together with any supporting documentation, for independent search by Operation Paget officers having the necessary security clearance.
“The detail of who was interviewed, how the enquiries were undertaken, the security protocols put in place and the extent of searching SIS databases is held securely by Operation Paget….
“The nominated Operation Paget officers interviewed SIS personnel or examined databases and documentation for a total of 18 working days over a period of two months.
“The arrangements and protocols were also used at the Security Service (MI5). They offered the same assistance to Operation Paget even though there were no specific allegations or claims made against them. The Operation Paget officers undertook those enquiries in six working days over a period of six months.”
Paget Report, p770: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“Operation Paget officers have searched the databases at SIS Headquarters in London, having first acquired a good understanding of the databases and associated operating systems. Full access was enabled. Details of all current and historical databases were provided, including how the systems had developed and changed over time. As a part of this process Operation Paget officers interviewed an SIS IT system controller, focusing on the internal audit set-up of the systems and different databases. The Operation Paget officers are confident about the integrity of the results achieved from their interrogation of the databases.”
Paget Report, p817: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“There is no evidence that any SIS officer of any designation was involved in the events surrounding the crash in the Alma underpass.”
Richard Tomlinson, Ex-MI6 Officer: 5 Apr 09 Interview: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“I was absolutely amazed when the police investigating were … allowed into the MI6 building and were allowed access to some of the files…. I very much doubt that the police were allowed unfettered access to everything they wanted to see. It’s impossible really to know, but I can’t imagine that the police were allowed to walk into any room in the whole of MI6 and walk up to any filing cabinet, open it up, and say ‘I want to read that’. Very unlikely to my view.”77
Comment:The evidence from X and Paget is consistent:
The question is: If MI6 did the assassination, would they be telling Operation Paget?
There would appear to be three main possibilities:
Some of these issues won’t be resolved until the evidence – yet to be covered – can be looked at as a whole.
Later evidence will reveal that neither MI6 nor the MPS78 have been honest in their evidence and activities relating to this case.
Coroner: Summing Up: 31 Mar 08: 11.9:
“One reason, perhaps the reason, why the conspiracy has shifted from the original allegation that the Duke of Edinburgh was its mastermind is the unprecedented manner in which the Secret Intelligence Service and indeed others have been prepared to open their doors and give evidence about their inner workings. No longer can it be said, as Mohamed Al Fayed has frequently complained, that there was a steel wall that it was completely impossible to penetrate.”
Comment: Scott Baker has misled the jury here on two counts:
Further than this, Baker has deftly linked the two points together – he has used the supposed openness of MI6 to remove any focus on Prince Philip as a possible suspect.
In other words, Baker has suggested that because MI6 have been so open, the allegation that Philip masterminded the assassination is no longer being put forward.
Baker is wrong on both points – MI6 was not open at the inquest (see later); Mohamed did not withdraw the allegation regarding Philip.
Mohamed Al Fayed: 18 Feb 08: 55.22:
Q. [In your 2005 statement] you say … I think it is clear already that you would adhere to this view: “I am in no doubt whatsoever that my son and Princess Diana were murdered by the British security services on the orders of Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh.” That remains your view and you have expanded upon it.
A. Definitely.79
Inquest “Housekeeping”: 20 Mar 08: 7.12: Jury Not Present:
Mansfield: The last occasion the jury were here, on 18th March, this week, they came back in to court during the time that there was a question over what was happening in the Administrative Court.
Coroner: Yes.
Mansfield: … There is a passage where you80 say this: “.… Just to deal with this, Mr Mansfield, again so there is no doubt about it. The legal representatives of Mohamed Al Fayed made clear that there is no evidence to support an allegation that (a) the Duke of Edinburgh played any part in the deaths of Princess of Wales and Dodi Al Fayed and (b) that MI6 played any part likewise.” Then I ask to defer the matter. The problem is – because I have the transcript – what had actually been said in court –
Coroner: I was putting to you the matter that the Divisional Court was asking whether that could be said in public and I raised the question that the word “direct” was missing.
Mansfield: I understand that…. The problem is … that when the jury came back, those words were still on the screen and certainly at least one person noticed. They were certainly on our screens, unless it was not on their screens and Mr Smith cannot assure me that that is the case. In other words, that what we could read on our screens was on their screens and it was noticed that they were reading what was on their screens. Now, I am very concerned about that, irrespective of any decisions that you may make today in relation to verdict that they will read what is actually not an accurate … reflection of what had been said…. We appreciate it is not on the website and it is not in the transcripts that they will be given. The problem does not lie there. It lies in the fact that it was on screen.
Coroner: Yes. I think the question is whether you want me to say anything to the jury about it at some point and if so, what.
Mansfield: I think in fact –
Coroner: Least said soonest mended is often the rule in these circumstances.
Mansfield: I would always agree with that. For example, when something is said in the press, you can probably overlook it these days. On the other hand, when it is part of an official transcript, it may have been of interest to them to read what may have just been said before they came back in.
Coroner: Summing Up: 1 Apr 08: 5.22:
“I ruled that … the Duke of Edinburgh should not be called to give oral evidence to you in this court.”81
Comment: At the inquest Mohamed confirmed to Burnett his assertion that “my son and Princess Diana were murdered … on the orders of Prince Philip”.
In fact, it was requested that Philip be subjected to cross-examination – this call was rejected by Baker: “I ruled that … the Duke of Edinburgh should not be called”.82
On the last day that the jury heard evidence – 18 March 2008 – the jury returned from a break to see on their transcript screens the following words spoken by Scott Baker: “The legal representatives of Mohamed Al Fayed made clear that there is no evidence to support an allegation that (a) the Duke of Edinburgh played any part in the deaths … and (b) that MI6 played any part likewise.”
Mansfield’s reaction to this suspicious incident indicates that he did not agree with this – he states: “I am very concerned about that”; “[the jury] will read what is actually not an accurate … reflection of what had been said”.
It may not be a coincidence that Baker appears to resurrect this false perception in his Summing Up – see above – linking the openness of MI6 to a fictitious dropping of claims against Philip.
In doing this, Baker has misled his own jury.
Coroner: Summing Up: 31 Mar 08: 74.22:
“One of the consequences of an organisation operating largely in secret, as does MI6 and the other agencies, MI5 and GCHQ, is that it is inevitable that ill-informed speculation about their activities abounds. Yet, having seen the way in which MI6 works through the evidence of Witness X, Dearlove and others, you will have gathered how far removed the reality is from the myth.”
Comment: Baker admits that MI6 operates “largely in secret”, but goes on to say that X and Dearlove have shown us “the way in which MI6 works”.
But how open was the evidence from the MI6 officers? The excerpt below is an example of how much information Dearlove was prepared to divulge at the inquest.
Richard Dearlove, MI6 Director of Operations, 1994 to 1999, UK: 20 Feb 08: 140.5:
Mansfield: Q. The British security services abroad used paparazzi as a cover for gaining information about the movement of people they are interested in. There is a group – and I am going to give it, since it has been given in public – UK/N, to which such people are attached from time to time. Is there any truth in that?
A. There is no truth in the allegation that SIS use paparazzi and I have – that is, I am afraid, Tomlinson again elaborating. I am not going to talk to the court about what you refer to as “UK/N”. It is another one of the capabilities to which I have made a general reference…. As it happens, in the context of this court, I am quite happy to say categorically that there is no link with paparazzi and that is an invention.
Q. But as far as UK/N is concerned, the group itself, are you prepared to say this – we have had it from another witness – that group does exist?
A. I am not going to confirm its existence or not. That is going down a route which I am not prepared to go down, but I have said to you that there are a variety of capabilities of different types, some of which you have vague references to, some of which you do not know about, and as I have said, all of these come under the control of the operational director.
Comment: Dearlove made comments such as:
These remarks conflict with Baker’s: “the Secret Intelligence Service … have been prepared to open their doors and give evidence about their inner workings”.
If MI6 were genuinely concerned about making information about their role available to the jury – but not the public – why didn’t they give some of this evidence in closed court?
Instead what we see is Dearlove refusing to answer and several other cases – see later – of the MI6 lawyers shutting down potentially critical lines of questioning.
Coroner: 14 Feb 08: 1.4:
“Members of the jury, you may remember, when I opened this case to you last October, that I mentioned that the conclusions of [the] Paget inquiry … were neither here nor there and that the facts are for you on the evidence that you hear in these inquests.”
Comment:Operation Paget has told us that “full access was enabled” by MI6.
But when it comes to the inquest, full access is not enabled.
Baker tells us that the Paget conclusions are “neither here nor there”. In other words it is the conclusions from the inquest that count – not Paget.83
This raises a separate issue: What is the point in holding a three year police inquiry84, if the judge is then allowed to tell the jury to take no notice of it – it is “neither here nor there”? This is addressed in Parts 6 and 7.
The question at the moment is: Why is Paget – which doesn’t count – provided full access to MI6 files, but the inquest – which does count – is not provided full access?
And why does Baker say that MI6 “have been prepared to open their doors and give evidence about their inner workings”, when that is not the case?
This evidence raises the possibility of a cover-up of evidence regarding MI6 at the inquest.
Statements that reveal the inquest was not afforded full access are:
Tomlinson provided the following affidavit to the French investigation.
Richard Tomlinson, Ex-MI6 Officer: 12 May 99 Affidavit: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“I firmly believe that there exist documents held by the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) that would yield important new evidence into the cause and circumstances leading to the deaths of the Princess of Wales, Mr Dodi Al Fayed, and M. Henri Paul in Paris in August 1997.
“I was employed by MI6 between September 1991 and April 1995. During that time, I saw various documents that I believe would provide new evidence and new leads into the investigation into these deaths. I also heard various rumours – which though I was not able to see supporting documents – I am confident were based on solid fact….
“In Paris at the time of M. Paul‘s death, there were two relatively experienced but undeclared MI6 officers. The first was Mr Nicholas John Andrew Langman, born 1960. The second was Mr Richard David Spearman, again born in 1960. I firmly believe that either one or both of these officers will be well acquainted with M. Paul, and most probably also met M. Paul shortly before his death.
“I believe that either or both of these officers will have knowledge that will be of crucial importance in establishing the sequence of events leading up to the deaths of M. Paul, Dodi Al Fayed and the Princess of Wales. Mr Spearman in particular was an extremely well connected and influential officer, because he had been, prior to his appointment in Paris, the personal secretary to the Chief of MI6 Mr David Spedding. As such, he would have been privy to even the most confidential of MI6 operations. I believe that there may well be significance in the fact that Mr Spearman was posted to Paris in the month immediately before the deaths.
“In 1992, as the civil war in the former Yugoslavia became increasingly topical, I started to work primarily on operations in Serbia. During this time, I became acquainted with Dr Nicholas Bernard Frank Fishwick, born 1958, the MI6 officer who at the time was in charge of planning Balkan operations.
“During one meeting with Dr Fishwick, he casually showed to me a three-page document that on closer inspection turned out to be an outline plan to assassinate the Serbian leader President Slobodan Milosevic. The plan was fully typed, and attached to a yellow ‘minute board’….
“Fishwick had annotated that the document be circulated to the following senior MI6 officers: Maurice Kendwrick-Piercey, then head of Balkan operations, John Ridde, then the security officer for Balkan operations, the SAS liaison officer to MI6 (designation MODA/SO, but I have forgotten his name), the head of the Eastern European Controllerate (then Richard Fletcher) and finally Alan Petty, the personal secretary to the then Chief of MI6, Colin McColl.
“This plan contained a political justification for the assassination of Milosevic, followed by three outline proposals on how to achieve this objective. I firmly believe that the third of these scenarios contained information that could be useful in establishing the causes of death of Henri Paul, the Princess of Wales, and Dodi Al Fayed. This third scenario suggested that Milosevic could be assassinated by causing his personal limousine to crash.
“Dr Fishwick proposed to arrange the crash in a tunnel, because the proximity of concrete close to the road would ensure that the crash would be sufficiently violent to cause death or serious injury, and would also reduce the possibility that there might be independent, casual witnesses. Dr Fishwick suggested that one way to cause the crash might be to disorientate the chauffeur using a strobe flash gun, a device which is occasionally deployed by special forces to, for example, disorientate helicopter pilots or terrorists, and about which MI6 officers are briefed about during their training.
“In short, this scenario bore remarkable similarities to the circumstances and witness accounts of the crash that killed the Princess of Wales, Dodi Al Fayed, and Henri Paul.
“I firmly believe that this document should be yielded by MI6 to the Judge investigating these deaths, and would provide further leads that he could follow.… 86
“The lengths which MI6, the CIA and the DST have taken to deter me giving this evidence and subsequently to stop me talking about it, suggests that they have something to hide….
“Whatever MI6’s role in the events leading to the death of the Princess of Wales, Dodi Al Fayed and Henri Paul, I am absolutely certain that there is substantial evidence in their files that would provide crucial evidence in establishing the exact causes of this tragedy. I believe that they have gone to considerable lengths to obstruct the course of justice by interfering with my freedom of speech and travel, and this in my view confirms my belief that they have something to hide.87
“I believe that the protection given to MI6 files under the Official Secrets Act should be set aside in the public interest in uncovering once and for all the truth behind these dramatic and historically momentous events.”
Michael Mansfield, lawyer for Mohamed Al Fayed, canvassed the possibility that the Paris crash was a result of an attempt to frighten.
Mansfield asked E if MI6 would deliberately frighten a target.
Mr E, MI6 Controller of Central and Eastern Europe: 29 Feb 08: 22.21:
Mansfield: Q. If an officer perceives a threat … in other words identifies a potential threat in his area of work and then conceives of a way of nullifying the threat, which may stretch from the ultimate, in other words, annihilation, to nullification, in other words, you nullify not by killing, but by frightening, shocking or doing something else; do you follow? It is that range. That is all entirely appropriate thinking for an operative at that time, isn’t it?
A. Yes, I would have to qualify that by saying one would have to see the detail in such a proposal, but short of saying – asking that as a caveat, my answer, I would say, yes, a broad spread of imaginative ideas.
Coroner: There are lots of ways of getting rid of a threat apart from killing an individual.
A. Indeed, sir.
Coroner: For example, you could stop up the information getting to the threat.
A. Indeed.
Q. Or you could give the threat such a shock that the threat goes away; you could frighten the person –
Coroner: Where is this getting us, Mr Mansfield?
Q. I will put it precisely. One of the possibilities – I have already floated it with another witness – is a plan or proposal that does not intend killing but does intend that the person who is, as it were, the target is frightened into withdrawing from a situation in the tunnel…. These would have been entirely within the scope of the thinking of operatives who were being creative at the time; do you agree?
A. Again, with the caveat that one would have to see the whole proposal. I think to talk in generalities of this nature about operational work is very difficult, to give a generic “yes” or “no” answer. I think when you are dealing with intelligence operations or intelligence planning, the devil is really in the detail, and I would not want to give anybody in this room the idea that there was a sort of – you know, you could have –
Q. A licence?
A. – a licence to do any of these things. Thank you. That is the word I was looking for.
Coroner: Mr Mansfield, are you really suggesting that the collision was a plan to scare that went wrong and it was a plan that could have been orchestrated by somebody in MI6? Is that what you are really getting at? Because I think the witness ought to have a chance of dealing with reality rather than amorphous88 speculation.
Q. I appreciate it is speculation. As you are aware, of course, we were not there. Mr Mohamed Al Fayed was not there. He was not a member of any of these organisations. What the jury will have to consider, looking at events in the tunnel first, is clearly whether it was an accident, and if it was not an accident – I take it in stages – then what was it and how could it have been organised and for what reason. There are a range of questions.
Coroner: They have to work on the basis of evidence, not speculation.89
Comment:The most significant aspect of this exchange between Mansfield, Baker and E might be E’s initial response, apparently given without hesitation.
Mansfield asked: “Frightening, shocking…. That is all entirely appropriate thinking for an operative … isn’t it?” E answers: “Yes, … [but] one would have to see the detail in such a proposal”.
Baker apparently was not comfortable with E’s answer. It does not fit at all with Baker’s Summing Up description of MI6’s activities: “national security, the economic well-being of the United Kingdom and the prevention or detection of serious crime”90 – so he intervenes.
Baker comes up with “[stopping] up the information getting to the threat” to “[get] rid of a threat” – this is despite E already acknowledging that in certain circumstances they would frighten or shock the target.
Mansfield then reintroduces the words “shock” and “frighten”, but instead of letting E answer, Baker again doesn’t even let Mansfield finish the question – Baker: “Where is this getting us, Mr Mansfield?”
Baker next suggests Mansfield is entering into “amorphous speculation”.
The point here is that E – who is a senior MI6 officer – had already answered in the affirmative that MI6 would contemplate “frightening [and] shocking” a target in certain circumstances.
Since MI6 had clearly been alleged to be a prime suspect in the Paris crash, it was then a natural line of inquiry for Mansfield to ask questions to establish if MI6 would have considered frightening or shocking any of the occupants in the Mercedes S280.
The fact that Baker then intervened three times in this short period of cross-examination appeared to indicate he was neither comfortable with E’s initial response nor Mansfield’s subsequent line of questioning.
I suggest that Scott Baker should have left E to answer the questions that were raised.
The evidence from Part 2 – the mistreatment of Princess Diana inside the ambulance – indicates that the perpetrators of the crash were intent on murder, not just an attempt to frighten.
It is significant that Mansfield only introduced frightening the target as “one of the possibilities”.
Later during E’s cross-examination, MPS lawyer Richard Horwell took this scenario on board: “There has been an important statement this morning. We are moving away from a planned assassination, it seems, to a planned scare of occupants in a car.” Horwell continued: “The suggestion now is that the Duke of Edinburgh … orders that MI6 scares the occupants of a car in Paris that night”.9192
Baker reinforced this false perception – that the allegation had changed from assassination to frightening – during his final Summing Up to the jury: “One thing that is not suggested is that Henri Paul was a knowing participant in a plot to kill or, as is now suggested, merely to injure or frighten Diana and Dodi.”9394
Mansfield never did change the allegation – he had only ever introduced an attempt to frighten as “one of the possibilities”.
In suggesting otherwise, both Horwell and Baker lied to the inquest.
John Scarlett, MI6 Chief: Aug 09 BBC Interview: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“Obviously a new recruit is always going to ask the question, ‘Do we blackmail people, do we seek to compromise them, do we seek to put pressure on them?’
“No, is the answer.”95
Coroner: Summing Up: 31 Mar 08: 66.25:
”Do MI6 kill people?… Its concerns are national security, the economic well-being of the United Kingdom and the prevention or detection of serious crime.”
At the inquest MI6 officers claimed that their organisation does not carry out assassinations.
Richard Tomlinson, Ex-MI6 Officer: 13 Feb 08: 74.6:
Coroner: Q. When you were trained by MI697, were you instructed that MI6 agents were required to operate within the restraints of the criminal law?
A. Yes, we were. We were advised that, yes, but at the same time there are various facets to that because when you are overseas, whether that is the case or not, which legal system you come under when you are overseas, and there was definitely, during our training, a sufficient amount of speculation within the group of officers who were training together that we would talk about it amongst ourselves, and we were never entirely sure if what we were being told was always strictly held to and accounted to. I do remember during my training programme another trainee specifically asked a question to a senior officer about whether MI6 do break the law or do kill people. The senior officer – and this was in one of the training talks that we were given – and the senior officer evaded the question and did not answer directly. His entire countenance and bearing towards this question was such that he did not want to answer it in any more detail. This led to a lot of speculation amongst us afterwards: “well, what is the case, do we keep always within the law or do we not?”…. There were other occasions – I can remember talking to another senior officer and asking them about the death of someone in circumstances which were slightly odd. Again the answer was not direct – was not a direct, “Absolutely no way do we get involved in that sort of thing”. It was an obfuscated answer.98 So I think it is fair to say – I am sure now, and we are now in 2008, that MI6 is probably very, very accountable because the laws in accountability have been tightened and that is the case with the American intelligence agencies and other intelligence agencies, but I was there when there was a period of transition and I think there was a lack of clarity at the time.
At 184.21: Hilliard: Q. Do you remember that you said that during the training programme that another trainee, you said, had asked the question about “do we” meaning SIS, “act within the law or kill”, and you said the person that that question was asked of evaded it and did not answer directly. Do you remember telling us that?
A. Yes.
Q. Tell me, was that in the new entrants course?
A. That is correct, yes.
Q. Was the person who was asked a DS; one of the directing staff? Is that what they are called?
A. No, it was – sorry, it was not one of the teaching staff. We had visiting officers from the head office who would come down and give us lectures on all sorts of things, regularly. Look, I cannot remember the name of the person.
Q. It is all right.
A. I remember more discussing it with colleagues in the bar afterwards and we were sort of mildly uncomfortable with the idea that the question had not been answered directly.
Q. As you say, the person evaded it and did not answer it directly. The reason I ask is just that there is a passage in I Spy99 – do you remember, the draft that I was asking you about, it must seem like hours ago, this morning –
A. Indeed, yes.
Q. – in which you explained that you had been on this new entrants’ course. I think it must be the one that you are telling me about, and you said that the question was “Did SIS ever assassinate a peacetime target?” You said, “Nobody quite dared to ask in front of the other students”, but that then one evening at the Fort bar – because you explain in your book this place was called the Fort – when nobody else was listening, you had asked about it. You said that you were given the answer: “‘Absolutely not, never.’ [He] replied.” I will leave the name out: “His face puckered with sincerity and severity.” Now, I do not know, is your memory playing tricks because “Absolutely not, never” is –
A. No. I do remember another officer saying quite definitely that they did not, yes. Yes, so there were two conflicting opinions there.
Q. Did you put anything in your book about the person who evaded the question?
A. I do not think I did, from memory, no.
Richard Tomlinson: 2001 Book: Jury Heard Part Only:
“Has MI6 ever assassinated a peacetime target? It was a question that a few of us sometimes discussed on the IONEC100 but nobody quite dared to ask one of the DS101 in class. It was a taboo subject, left unsaid by the DS and unasked by the students. One evening down in the Fort bar, when nobody else was listening and after several pints of beer, I asked Ball102 about it. ‘Absolutely not, never,’ he replied, his face puckered with sincerity. I was not very sure, however, as he had already proved himself a convincing liar. In any case, if an assassination were plotted, only a tiny handful of officers would know about it and even if Ball were one he would not make a lowly IONEC student privy to such sensitive information.”103104105
Richard Dearlove, MI6 Director of Operations, 1994 to 1999, UK: 20 Feb 08: 19.25:
Burnett: Q. The Secretary of State – that is to say the Foreign Secretary – can personally grant an authorisation so that acts which might otherwise be unlawful can be rendered lawful?
A. That is precisely the case, yes.
At 27.20: Q. During the whole of your time, Sir Richard, with SIS, 1966 through to 2004, were you ever aware of the service assassinating anyone?
A. No, I was not.
At 70.7: Mansfield: Q. So are you saying that during their training, officers are clearly told that thoughts of assassination on behalf of the British Government are out of the question?
A. They are told that assassination is not part of the service’s activities.
Q. I want to be clear: out of the question?
A. Not part of – well, that is your choice of words. I used a slightly different formulation.
Q. I am being very careful because, as we shall see when I come to various letters, the way things are worded in public is very careful, and if I may put it to you, sometimes weasel words are used so that unless you ask the right question, you don’t get the answer. Do you follow what I am saying here? Do you follow that?
A. Yes.
Q. Right. Are the officers told that under no circumstances must assassination be considered, let alone carried out?
A. Again, those are your words, not mine.
Q. What is the answer?
A. That phrase might be used, yes.
Q. I am sorry? Might be used? Sir Richard, this is a very simple and initial question. The follow-up question is this: if you don’t remember what they are told, is there a training manual for officers in the SIS?
A. I am not going to start answering questions about SIS training, which is rather specific.
Q. No, I have not even got to that and I am not even asking about method. I said that at the beginning. Is there a training manual? That is a very simple question.
A. There are training manuals, obviously.
Q. Given that it is not Government policy to even consider it106, let alone carry it out, do any of the training manuals make that clear?
A. This would be made clear orally to trainee officers.
Q. So what is the answer to the question?
A. The answer that I have given you, that this would be made clear orally.
Q. You see, I am going to ask you the question again so that we may get a direct answer from you, Sir Richard. I will make it easier for you by actually indicating the answer in the question. Is it right to say that there is no training manual that indicates clearly in writing that contemplation or consideration of assassination, let alone its execution, is to be considered or whatever? Is that right?
A. I do not think there is a training manual in which this is written down, if that is what you are driving at.
….Q. What is in writing about the policies of assassination or no assassination that they will receive in writing? At the moment, the position is they get nothing in writing, is that right?
A. I think that is probably true, but I have been retired for four years.
Q. In your time, I mean.
A. In my time, I think I can say that they received nothing in writing.
Q. The reason I am asking you this is very particularly that Mr Tomlinson indicated that, in fact, when questions like this were raised during training, there was obfuscation and no real answer was given; in other words, they were not told that it was out of the question. Do you follow?
Coroner: Well, I think that is not precisely accurate of what his evidence was. I think he said that there were two occasions when this was raised, not perhaps in the training session itself but in the bar afterwards, and that on two occasions, he got a blank stare rather than an answer, or at least no answer, but there was another occasion when he said that he did ask the question and he got the firm answer that it was not on.
Q. He also used the word “obfuscation“, so …
Coroner: We can get the detail off the LiveNote transcript if necessary.
Q. Yes, I have them here. What I want to ask you is this: is that your recollection of the oral position, namely that there were no clear instructions being given during the oral training?
A. There are clear instructions given orally.
Q. That is your understanding, is it?
A. That is certainly my memory and understanding.
Q. How long is the training normally? How long was it at that time, just roughly speaking?
A. Months.
Q. A month?
A. Months, several months.
Miss X, MI6 Administrator, UK: 26 Feb 08: 80.4:
Mansfield: Q. When you typed in “Milosevic” and you got a fair amount of material, did any of the material relate to assassination?
A. I honestly – I hope this is not a difficult answer here – I honestly don’t remember.
At 82.25: Q. Did you look, within the material headed “Milosevic“, for anything that could be associated with the word “assassination”?
A. I do not believe I did, no.
Q. Why not?
A. Just speaking quite carefully here, but the – it became very apparent very early on that the name in question in connection with this particular idea was not Milosevic. So frankly I had an awful lot of other searches to do, so I concentrated my searches on the area surrounding not only the name of the person that did figure in the idea, but the other researches that the Paget team were going to need.
Coroner: But did you look at the material that was thrown up by the request “Milosevic“?
A. I looked at it as far as the carding of the name went and any hits that brought up, but I did not take it any further to carry out a file search, sir.
Coroner: When did you107 look at it, to the extent that you did, what were you actually looking for?
A. In that instance, yes, I was looking for anything which might associate Milosevic with assassination or anything like that or anything that might have been – might have thrown up any information about that idea, yes. But I have to stress that that was a narrower search than it would have been if I had done a very big, full research job on it.
Q. Did the Paget team ever engage in this exercise that I am now asking about in relation to the name “Milosevic” and any connection with assassination of any kind? Did the Paget team, in your presence, that you are aware of, ever do that?
A. Yes, we certainly discussed it.
Q. No. Sorry, the question was: did they ever do it, as far as you are aware?
A. I am wanting to be absolutely precise. I do recall that I had a card on that individual and I am pretty certain that we may have checked something, but I might have got that wrong. I definitely know that we had discussions about it and the way of looking into it and so on.
Q. You see we have a report. I do not have every document that they have. At the moment – I will be corrected – there does not appear to be a reference to a search under the name “Milosevic” and whether it did or did not produce anything. You see, I do not have a document to that effect so I am having to ask you obviously for your memory and I am sorry about that. So is the position really that you now don’t know whether the search under the name “Milosevic” produced any reference to assassination or not? Is that fair?
A. As far as the initial carding papers, the papers related to the card that I searched, they had no reference to assassination.
Q. You know that, do you?
A. Yes, because I looked at those.
Q. You did? Because I started off with this question. You now say they did not. Is that what you are saying; that the Milosevic material you looked at on the cards did not have any reference to assassination?
A. No, it did not, but those are – as I am just wanting to absolutely make clear for the jury and you, sir, I did not do the widest possible search on that. I did not put them into our filing system, for example, and then go and physically check any files we might hold. I would not want anyone to think that it was that detailed.
At 138.6: Q. In 1997 and going back to 1993 and 1992, the time when Mr Tomlinson, as you have indicated, had his original training, was there a training manual?
A. We did not tend to have a composite manual as such, but we had lots of sort of – I do not know what you would call them, but just things on subjects. Do you know what I mean? So different lectures would be given and different booklets would be handed out, papers and so on.
Q. Was there one on the use of force or the threat of force abroad in pursuit of certain objectives?
A. I have never come across anything like that.
Q. No. So nothing was ever said in a document to anyone about the use of force?
A. No. Certainly to the best of my knowledge that is something we have always kind of soaked up as a kind of – I cannot think of the word I am looking for now, but, you know – I do not recall there being a lecture, “You will not go around killing people”, but at the same time there were always discussions about that from a kind of morality/ethics point of view.
Q. So there were discussions about that between the person giving the lecture or the training session and those on the course?
A. Yes, and I think anybody else that students would care to ask. They come across a great many senior and junior people and anybody – they are quite at liberty to ask what people’s views are on that.
Q. Were the views actually rather blurred – do you follow what I am putting – in other words there was not any clear line being put out on this issue?
A. You mean other than those laid down by Parliament and everything like that?
Q. Oh yes. I am talking about the soaking up. It is not in any written training document; you said that you soak it up. What did you soak up in these sessions?
A. Well, just the fact that we don’t go around killing people. It is simply not done.
Q. It is simply not done?
A. No.
Q. So if somebody starts to think about it and suggests that it goes to the controllerate, that really would be exceptional, would it?
A. You know, it has never happened in my time, other than hearing about this.108 It is an unusual way of doing things – you know, putting something forward like that would be unusual, highly, highly unusual, within the service. However, people are taught to think a little bit outside the box rather than –
Q. Right. “Thinking laterally” it has been called.
A. Thinking laterally, okay.
At 146.20: Keen: Q. Has that other person109 since been assassinated, Miss X?
A. I think that is probably edging closer to the area –
Tam: Sir, I have thought about that for a moment because the “neither confirm nor deny” principle would apply there as well.
Coroner: Yes.
Tam: The name itself is sensitive. I think everyone here recognises that. If questions are asked about what has happened to that individual since, it could tend to identify him.
Coroner: Yes.
At 151.8: Q. An alleged plot to assassinate Colonel Gaddafi…. If there was a P file for that individual and a proposal for an assassination, presumably the P file would contain a record of that proposal?
A. If something like that had ever existed, yes, it would be on that file.
Q. So, again, that would be a simple way of checking whether or not, in fact, at the relevant time, the Secret Intelligence Service did advance such proposals beyond the wild imaginings of Mr A?
Coroner: This is not an issue in these inquests.
Mr A, aka Nicholas Fishwick110, MI6 Head of Balkan Target Team: 26 Feb 08: 189.4:
Burnett: Q. If the whole ethos of SIS was against using assassination, how on earth did you come to make the proposal111 in the first place?
A. It is true that the ethos of the service was against assassination, it is true that whenever you spoke to an experienced officer, then they would say that that is against the service’s policy. The reason why I considered it was because I had been brought up and trained in a service that dealt with peaceful cold war, if I can use the phrase, spy games. Suddenly here I am confronted by a situation where we are dealing with a bloody civil war in the centre of Europe, where tens of thousands of innocent people are being killed. So it seemed to me appropriate that we should at least revisit that dictum of the services and see if we felt obliged to revise it in an exceptional case.
At 208.15: Mansfield: Q. Now, in relation to this proposal, would it be right that it is perfectly proper for you and for others working in a similar way in MI6, in the mid-1990s, to think – and the way it has been described – either laterally, creatively or outside the box. I think you understand all those phrases?
A. I do.
Q. You were expected to do that, weren’t you?
A. Within obvious parameters, yes.
Q. Yes, but the parameters permitted you to think, where it was considered necessary by you, about the possible employment of force. Correct?
A. That was what I thought about, yes.
….Q. When you went on training, you had various training manuals given to you, didn’t you?
A. No, we did not.
Q. You did not?
A. No.112
Q. Oh right. Well what were you told then – leaving aside the absence of written manuals, what were you told about the use of force on the training that you had?
A. Virtually nothing because the use of force did not figure in the training.
Q. But there were discussions, were there not, informally about whether in fact the use of force could be contemplated in some circumstances?
A. You are asking me, sir, about conversations that took place during my training course?
Q. That is right. At a very early stage. The witness this morning – so you understand the context here – was talking about this sort of thing not being written down – you say there were not any manuals anyway – but that she “soaked it up” during discussions, what the ambiance or the feeling of the service was towards certain concepts. So what I am suggesting is that although nothing was said formally, informally the parameters were blurred a bit about whether in fact force would be used when it was thought to be necessary. Is that a fair observation?
A. I do not think it is completely fair, sir…. I actually do not recollect any conversations about the use of force that I had during my training course, which actually was about 25 years ago.
At 214.7: Q. When you first approached E before you wrote it113 down for him for action, can you recall, what is it that you told him which prompted him to say, “Write it down”?
A. It is very difficult to recollect what it was that I said to him, but I think I said that I was worried about the possibility of this man taking power in Serbia or Yugoslavia and I think that we ought to think about having a contingency plan to assassinate this guy.
….Q. The one thing he does not do is say, “What a load of nonsense, you know that is against policy, don’t even bother to think about it”. He doesn’t say any of that, does he?
A. He did not say that, no.
Mr H, aka Maurice Kendwrick-Piercey114, MI6 Direct Boss of Nicholas Fishwick (Mr A), Balkans: 28 Feb 08: 115.7:
Burnett: Q. You were able to see that it was a proposal for a contingency plan for an assassination?
A. Yes.
Q. Was it obvious to you, without whatever E might have said, that such a thing was not to be countenanced?
A. Yes, absolutely.
Q. And why was it obvious to you?
A. It is against the ethos of the service. And I had grown up throughout my time in the service knowing, if you like, that this is the sort of thing we don’t do. I do not even think I remembered the fact that we had had the House of Lords discussion about it. It was simply not done. So it was straightforward to me. There is one point in addition I might make which is, about three or four years earlier, I remember being in touch with our training department and going over and attending one of the lectures given by our head of training department to new entrants. This was very early on in the course. It must have been the first week. And he made it absolutely clear, clear to the new entrants, that assassination was something that we did not countenance. It was done in one sentence and moved on very quickly from there, we didn’t hang around on it, it was not a matter for discussion or debate. It was just stated.
Q. When did you join SIS?
A. In the 1970s.
Q. And in that time, since you joined in the 1970s, had you ever seen or heard of any other proposal that involved assassination?
A. Neither before nor, I know you haven’t yet asked me – nor since.
At 137.20: Mansfield: Q. Now, on the training course, do you know what [Mr A] said about what was being said in relation to the “use of force”, is how I put it to him?
A. Sorry, could you repeat that? On the training course –
Q. Yes. You have indicated in your statement and today that in fact assassination or the use of lethal force, however you put it, was explained from day one and everybody is very clear about it. Is that right?
A. I can only say about the time that I was there. I was there on a couple of occasions, in 1987 I think it was.
Q. Well, we have had two witnesses dealing with this. Tomlinson is one but I will leave him out of it. I am dealing with A, one of your staff. He told us that on the training course, one, he did not get a training manual but I leave that to one side; and when asked about the advice that he got on the use of force, he said “virtually nothing”. Is he right?
A. Who said “virtually nothing”?
Q. A has said that on the training course virtually nothing was said about the use of force?
A. Are you asking me about my training course back in the 1970s?
Q. No. Not yours. He obviously went on one, I can’t put to you exactly when he went on one, we have the dates, but it was later than that.
A. Sorry, I went on a training course in the 1970s.
Q. All right. It is obvious that you are not familiar with what training courses that he went on might have said?
A. That Witness A went on?
Q. Yes.
A. I was not there. It was his course, I am sorry.
At 156.18: Burnett: Q. My learned friend Mr Mansfield put to you an observation by Witness A that on his training course he was told virtually nothing about the use of force. You remember Mr Mansfield putting that to you?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember what Witness A went on to say, to explain the use of the words “virtually nothing”?
A. No, I do not, I am sorry.
Q. Let me see if I can jog your memory. He added: “Because the use of force did not figure in the training.” Does that sound right, even at the time you were trained?
A. Most certainly, most certainly.
Mr E, aka Richard Fletcher115, MI6 Controller of Central and Eastern Europe, 1992-94: 29 Feb 08: 7.13:
Burnett: Q. If Witness A had said to you orally, face to face, that he had a plan that involved assassinating somebody, would you have asked him to write it down?
A. If the word “assassination” had been used to me in those terms, absolutely not…. The whole idea of SIS being involved in targeted assassinations is repugnant to the ethos of the service and certainly repugnant to me personally.
…. Q. Now you have said that assassination is no part of the ethos of SIS and we have heard that from others. When did you join SIS, E?
A. 1968.
Q. In the time that you have been there, so, however long your service was – I do not need to ask you whether you are still there or not – but during your time there, are you aware of any assassination having been carried out?
A. Categorically no.
Q. Or any proposal that there be an assassination?
A. Categorically no.
Q. That being the case, it might be thought surprising that you have no memory of such a unique proposal having crossed your desk.
A. I cannot give an answer to that, other than to say it is probably surprising, but the fact is that I do not – I did not recall this. When I gave the statement to Lord Stevens‘ police inquiry, I did not recall the incident having happened then and I still don’t. Of course, subsequently, all these different pieces of testimony have arrived, which puts in doubt the calibre of my memory, but it would be untruthful to say that what I have said on the record is anything other than the whole truth.
At 10.12: Mansfield: Q. Would you have a look at your statement, please?….: “Furthermore, I can say that I have never seen any proposal relating to any targeted assassination.” That is put in very clear terms, isn’t it?
A. Yes.
Q. And it is wrong.
A. In what way is it wrong?
….Q. It is one thing to say “I do not remember”; it is quite another to say “I have never seen”. There is a difference, you will appreciate, isn’t there?
A. Yes, but I have – I still have never seen – this was in relation to the time of the inquiry and I have not seen anything put in front of me related to flashing lights and everything of that nature.
Mr I, aka Alan Petty116, MI6 Chief Colin McColl’s Private Secretary117, 1992-93: 29 Feb 08: 30.2:
Burnett: Q. In your time in SIS, have you ever seen a proposal that involves assassination?
A. Never.
Q. To your knowledge, has any assassination during your period been carried out by SIS?
A. No.
Richard Tomlinson, Ex-MI6 Officer: 5 Apr 09 Interview: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“The fact remains that they did actually put out a plan to assassinate this particular target118…. I don’t know everything that went on at MI6…. It does seem very likely that they’ve been involved in torturing as well…. It could well be that they are involved in assassinations and I wouldn’t necessarily know about it.”119
John Stevens, MPS Commissioner: 17 Apr 03 Stevens Enquiry Report on Northern Ireland: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“I conclude there was collusion in both murders and the circumstances surrounding them. Collusion is evidenced in many ways. This ranges from the wilful failure to keep records, the absence of accountability, the withholding of intelligence and evidence through to the extreme of agents being involved in murder.
“The failure to keep records or the existence of contradictory accounts can often be perceived as evidence of concealment or malpractice. It limits the opportunity to rebut serious allegations. The absence of accountability allows the act or omissions of individuals to go undetected. The withholding of information impedes the prevention of crime and the arrest of suspects. The unlawful involvement of agents in murder implies that the security forces sanction killings.”120
Gordon Thomas, Intelligence Author: 2010 Book Inside British Intelligence: Jury Didn’t Hear:
In the 1950s, inside “the MI6 Registry was a copy of a CIA manual written by Dr Sidney Gottlieb, the director of the agency’s Technical Services Division. Its 88 pages were titled ‘Assassination Methods’, and it was the first handbook for state-sponsored murder. It included a warning: ‘Decisions and instructions should be confined to an absolute minimum of persons and ideally only one person will be involved, whose death provides positive advantages.’”121122
David Cornwell123, Ex-MI6 Officer: Sunday Telegraph Seven Interview: 29 Aug 10: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“Certainly, we did very bad things. We did a lot of direct action. Assassinations. Although I was never involved. But there is a big difference in working for the West and working for a totalitarian state. I promise you that even when quite ruthless operations are being contemplated, the process of democratic consultation was still relatively intact and decent humanitarian instincts came into play.”124
Nicholas Anderson125, Former MI6 Officer: 2009 Book NOC: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“I first joined SIS … from the Royal Navy in 1973 following extensive training, I was originally assigned to the Special Political Action section … [and was later] integrated into a … secret sub-division … externally known as “Operational Support Branch” … which specialised in sabotage….
“We were institutional killers that undertook disruptive actions…. We made illegal entries across borders to perform dirty work….
“A licence to kill is known at SIS as ‘supreme breach of law’ [and] was written in the employment contract126 as: ‘In extreme situations … laws may be disobeyed if said disobedience is deemed legitimate and in furtherance to the cause’….
“It slowly dawned on me that I was being employed by a criminal organisation – they believe they had the right to be above the law.”127
Daphne Park, Ex-MI6 Officer:128 10 Aug 09 BBC Documentary Interview: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“Well, there have been other times in my life where I have been involved in death, yes, but I can’t talk about that.”129
John Scarlett, MI6 Chief 2004 to 2009: Aug 09 BBC Interview: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“This, the ‘license to kill’ issue. No, we do not. We do not have license to kill.”130
Stephen Dorril, Intelligence Consultant and Author: 2000 Book MI6: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“The modern conception of the world of the secret intelligence services and assassinations derives partly from the fictionalised activities of James Bond. The licensed-to-kill operative is the model for the secret service agent of the public’s imagination. While this is a fantasy, the former naval intelligence and one-time MI6 asset Ian Fleming based the plots and details for his 007 books on incidents in his own life and information he picked up during his career in the secret world. However fantastic the story, there is always an element of truth in Bond….131
“Just before the CIA’s William Harvey, who had been presented to President Kennedy as the agency’s own ‘James Bond’, began recruiting members of the Mafia to help organise assassination plots against Fidel Castro, Harvey queried MI5’s technical officer, Peter Wright, on ideas. ‘Have you thought of approaching [William] Stephenson132?’ Wright enquired, ‘A lot of the old-timers say he ran this kind of thing in New York during the war. Used some Italian, apparently, when there was no other way of sorting a German spy. Probably the Mafia.’ It turns out that Wright was correct. Before he died in 1990, former BSC133 officer H. Montgomery Hyde revealed on Channel Four’s After Dark programme that the BSC had assassinated a German seaman who was operating as a spy in New York….
“The Special Operations Executive134 (SOE) had an assassination capability that to some extent did correspond with a James Bond world. According to historian, M.R.D. Foot, ‘SOE was the only body competent enough to fake an accident’. SOE operational head, Colin Gubbins, appears to ‘have seen no particular objection to SOE being implicated in a political assassination’…. When SOE proposed assassinating an important German figure in the Middle East, Gubbins told the minister controlling SOE that there was ‘really no need for him to know about such things’….
“According to Kenneth Younger, a minister of state for foreign affairs under Ernest Bevin in the late forties and a senior MI5 officer during the war, serious thought was given to the assassination of the Mufti of Jerusalem, the Indian nationalist leader Chandra Bose, and an unnamed Balkan monarch. These thoughts never proceeded beyond the planning stage because it was concluded that ‘nothing would be gained by making martyrs of such people’.
“SOE’s assassination capability was, apparently, officially closed down at the end of hostilities135, but since elements of SOE were later subsumed within MI6 into the Special Operations Branch it is clearly possible that the relevant expertise did not go to waste. Assassination as a policy was openly discussed in the post-war years. Sponsored murder gangs operated among the exiles in the DP136 camps in Germany and Austria. Many of these operatives, known as ‘mechanics’, were sponsored by the Allied intelligence services but their activities were always arm’s-length operations. By 1950, the idea of assassination as a serious policy had been shelved, though within MI6 … the concept was not dead. It was in the Middle East that MI6 seriously considered using it as an option.”137
William Stephenson, Head of SOE: Quoted in 1966 Book: Jury Didn’t Hear:
Describing an SOE training procedure: “One of the instructors I’d recruited was this top armed combat man with the Shanghai police…. We used to book him a room in a cheap downtown hotel in Toronto – nothing but a table and a chair and a single light bulb – and then we’d give the trainee the name of this hotel and the room number and say that the man staying there was a dangerous enemy agent who had to be destroyed. It would all be as realistic as possible – after all, this was exactly the sort of mission an agent might be called on to perform in the field – and we’d try to pressure him into thinking that it was a genuine killing. It was a test of nerve really, a test to decide whether he really was ruthless enough to kill a man when it came down to it…. The trainee would have his instructions and a normal police .38 revolver which he’d load himself. From then on we’d watch him to see exactly what he did – we even had a peep-hole through the wall into the hotel bedroom where the instructor was waiting. Now one of the tricks this instructor had picked up was the ability to dodge a bullet…. If you fired at him from five yards he knew how to divert you sufficiently for the shot to go wide. Extraordinary man.”138
Annie Machon, ex-MI5 Officer: 2005 Book: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“Under the 1994 Intelligence Services Act, the real James Bonds do have a licence to kill or immunity for criminal acts carried out abroad in the course of their work, provided they gain the permission of the Foreign Secretary.”139
Intelligence Services Act 1994, s7: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“Authorisation of Acts Outside the British Islands.
“If … a person would be liable in the United Kingdom for any act done outside the British islands, he shall not be so liable if the act is one which is authorised to be done by … the Secretary of State140….”
Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998, s5: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“England and Wales….
“Conspiracy to Commit Offences Outside the United Kingdom….
“Nothing in this section … imposes criminal liability on any person acting on behalf of, or holding office under, the Crown.”
Comment: At the inquest the issue wasn’t just whether MI6 were involved in the assassination of Princess Diana and Dodi Fayed. MI6 officers actually claimed that they would never consider targeted killing of anyone under any circumstances.
Two issues are covered in the evidence:
During the cross-examinations a significant issue cropped up: Does MI6 give training manuals out to students? This is important because there is a critical difference between something in writing as opposed to verbal. A written training manual – if made available – could be used as documentary evidence. If the training is just oral then it can come down to just one witness’ word against another’s.
However, there was conflict on even this – whether MI6 has training manuals.
The witness evidence is:
So three witnesses and three completely different answers: Dearlove – manuals; X – booklets and papers; A – no manuals.
Why?
Is someone lying?
The subject was initially broached by Mansfield to Dearlove: “Is there a training manual for officers in the SIS?” Dearlove’s response is fascinating: “I am not going to start answering questions about SIS training”.
That type of answer indicates that this could be a sensitive question.
When Mansfield challenged this, Dearlove immediately submitted: “There are training manuals, obviously”.
Well, no, it’s apparently not obvious to X or A: “we did not … have a … manual”; “we did not” have manuals.
Although both X and A have conflicted with Dearlove’s evidence, it is significant that Dearlove’s first response was not to answer the question: “I am not going to start answering questions about SIS training”.
Neither Tam – the MI6 lawyer – nor Baker came to Dearlove’s defence. It may be that they didn’t see the significance of the question. Mansfield applied pressure: “That is a very simple question”. And Dearlove capitulated: “There are training manuals, obviously”.
Back to the issue which led to the discussion on manuals: What are MI6 trainees told about the policy on assassination?
The general evidence – including Tomlinson – is that there was nothing on this subject in writing. When Tomlinson addresses this issue – on 3 occasions – each one is verbal, whether in a lecture session or in private (see below).
Tomlinson has indicated that there were conflicting answers from the MI6 trainers:
So, three different senior officers or trainers – two are evasive with indirect answers regarding whether MI6 kill people and the third gives a direct response that MI6 never “assassinate a peacetime target”.
When Dearlove is asked by Mansfield if MI6 trainees “are clearly told that thoughts of assassination … are out of the question”, Dearlove himself answers evasively.
Mansfield never actually gets an answer – instead he is told:
Then this: “I am not going to start answering questions about SIS training”, when asked: “Is there a training manual?” Then Dearlove does an about-flip: “There are training manuals, obviously”.
After more of Dearlove’s evasive to-ing and fro-ing – see above – Dearlove’s position ends up as:
Reading through the cross-examination, one could argue that by that stage the jury may have been confused as to precisely what Dearlove’s position was on this – and that may be how he wanted it.
The MI6 witnesses have said:
Dearlove: “they are told that assassination is not part of the service’s activities”
Dearlove: “there are clear instructions given orally”
Miss X: “I do not recall there being a lecture [saying] ‘You will not go around killing people’”
Miss X: “there were always discussions about that from a kind of morality/ethics point of view”
Miss X: I “soaked up … that we don’t go around killing people”
Mr A: “the use of force did not figure in the training”
Mr A: “I actually do not recollect any conversations about the use of force”
Mr H: “our head of training department to new entrants … made it absolutely clear … that assassination was something that we did not countenance…. It was not a matter for discussion or debate”.
All witnesses – including Tomlinson – appear to agree that there is nothing put down in writing. I suggest that that in itself is a concern – if MI6 has such a clear policy against the use of force or assassination, why is it not prepared to put it in writing – so that new entrants would have that to refer to when familiarising themselves with MI6 policy?
The lack of a written document then leaves us with a comparison of witness evidence on what was verbally stated on this in training.
And again – as with the existence of training manuals (see above) – we see substantial conflict.
H and Dearlove tell of a clear instruction – H: “absolutely clear”, “not a matter for discussion”; Dearlove: “clear instructions”.
X says: “there were always discussions about that”; information was “soaked up”.
A states that not only was there no mention of assassinations, but even “the use of force did not figure”.
X has stated the opposite to both H and A – she says “there were always discussions”, but H says it was “not a matter for discussion” and A did “not recollect any conversations”.
When there are conflicts on very basic issues like this – as with the training manual accounts – it indicates there are people lying.
Is there an issue with the timing of witness experiences? In other words, did MI6’s teaching techniques change over time?141
Dearlove’s training would have been when he joined MI6 in 1966. From 1984 to 1987, he was deputy head of MI6’s personnel department and in 1993 he was promoted to become the director of personnel and administration. The following year, 1994, Dearlove became Director of Operations until 1999, when he took over as MI6 Chief. He retired in 2004. From 1993 to 2004 Dearlove was a member of the MI6 board.142
This evidence indicates that Dearlove would have been aware of MI6’s training policies – I suggest particularly issues like training regarding assassinations – around 1966, but also when he was involved with personnel from 1984 and later moved into very senior roles.
X joined MI6 in 1982 and had worked in administration for 25 years143, initially as a personal assistant.144 She may have undergone training in 1982 and possibly has had a broad knowledge of MI6 operations throughout her period of employment.145146
A stated that his training took place “about 25 years ago” – around 1983.
H said that he joined MI6 “in the 1970s”, but also remembered “about three or four years earlier [than 1992147] I remember … attending one of the lectures given by our head of training department to new entrants … very early on in the course.” H later clarified that this occurred in 1987.148
Dearlove and X are the two witnesses who would appear to have a more general knowledge of the training spanning over decades – Dearlove, initially in 1966 but later from 1984 to 2004; X, from 1982 to 2008.
H’s knowledge relates to “the 1970s” and 1987. A’s experience is limited to around 1983.
Neither Dearlove nor X have ever suggested that there were any changes at any point in the MI6 training on this issue. If there had been, considering the importance and relevance of the subject – assassination – one would have expected they should have said.
Given that Dearlove and X are referring to a similar period – the 80s through to the 00s – their evidence should be directly comparable.
They conflict.
Dearlove says there were “clear instructions”. X says “there were always discussions about that” and information was “soaked up” – so not “clear instructions”.
H and A also refer to a similar period – H refers to the 1970s, A to 1983, then H again to 1987. They also conflict with each other.
H specifically recounts that in 1987 “our head of training department to new entrants … made it absolutely clear … that assassination was something that we did not countenance. It was done in one sentence and … it was not a matter for discussion”.
A says that around 1983 there was “virtually nothing” about the use of force “because the use of force did not figure in the training”.
So, H recounts an “absolutely clear” statement on assassination, whereas A says that even “the use of force did not figure”.
Either MI6 have regularly changed their policy on what they teach recruits, or we have MI6 witnesses lying under oath.
The general evidence from Dearlove and X indicates that the training policy is not something that changes on such a critical issue – otherwise one presumes they would have said.149
When this evidence is put together with the conflicting evidence on the training manuals, a picture is emerging of extremely inconsistent evidence between MI6 officers.
During Mansfield’s cross-examination of Dearlove he stated that “Tomlinson indicated that … when questions like this were raised during training, there was obfuscation and no real answer was given; in other words, they were not told that it was out of the question”.
Baker immediately intervened saying: “Well, I think that is not precisely accurate of what [Tomlinson’s] evidence was. I think he said that there were two occasions when this was raised, not perhaps in the training session itself but in the bar afterwards, and that on two occasions, he got a blank stare rather than an answer, or at least no answer, but there was another occasion when he said that he did ask the question and he got the firm answer that it was not on.”
There are problems associated with Baker’s intervention on this.
Tomlinson related three instances:
There are several issues:
Mansfield has specifically referred to Tomlinson’s evidence regarding “when questions like this” – about assassination – “were raised during training”. Mansfield doesn’t specify whether this was actually in training sessions or after a class.
Baker has stated that the “two occasions when this was raised [were] not perhaps in the training session itself but in the bar afterwards” and then “another occasion” where Baker doesn’t specify the circumstances, where Tomlinson “got the firm answer that [assassination] was not on”.
This shows that Baker has switched the circumstances.
Tomlinson says the circumstances for instance 1 (above) was “this was in one of the training talks”. For instance 2 he doesn’t specify. Then instance 3 – where the answer was “Absolutely not, never.” – was “at the Fort bar”.
Baker has falsely stated that the first two were “in the bar afterwards” – even though the first was in a training session and the second is not specified – and Baker has then gone on to fail to specify the circumstances of the third instance, even though Tomlinson had stipulated it was in the bar.
In doing this, Baker has made out that the two cases when Tomlinson heard indefinite answers were in the bar – whereas the opposite is the case: only the time Tomlinson heard a definitive answer was in the bar.
Tomlinson has described the answers on the three occasions as follows:
Baker has said “that on two occasions, [Tomlinson] got a blank stare rather than an answer, or at least no answer, but there was another occasion when he said that he did ask the question and he got the firm answer that it was not on”.
Tomlinson has said that on the first two occasions the answer was not direct – “the senior officer … did not answer directly”; “the answer was not direct”.
Baker has said the first two occasions were in a bar (see above) and there was “no answer” – this implies silence.
Baker’s description is again completely false – he says “no answer”, when clearly Tomlinson described indirect answers on both occasions.
Baker correctly states that Tomlinson “got the firm answer that it was not on” on the third occasion, but he fails to state it was in the bar.
So Baker presents the jury with a situation where there was silence for the first two answers in the bar, then an unequivocal disowning of assassination on the third occasion, not in a bar.
The point here is that silence is completely different to an indirect, evasive or obfuscated answer. The latter indicates that there could be something being covered up – that assassinations could occur but the senior officer is not prepared to say so.
Silence, on the other hand, could mean anything. It is like the saying “It is better to remain silent and be thought a fool, than to open one’s mouth and remove all doubt”. No one knows what a person is thinking if they remain silent.
But whatever the silence in the bar meant, Baker then brings in the third occasion – by implication, not in a bar – to show that there was “the firm answer that it was not on”.
Out of the three occasions Baker states there was only one answer: assassination is “not on”.
But that is a fictional account of what Tomlinson actually said.
Baker’s account of a “blank stare” from the senior officer on the first two occasions is also fictional. On the first occasion Tomlinson describes: “His entire countenance and bearing towards this question was such that he did not want to answer it in any more detail”. Tomlinson does not describe facial features on the second occasion. On the third occasion – in the bar – Tomlinson recounts: “His face puckered with sincerity and severity”.
Mansfield stated that he was addressing the occasions when the “questions … were raised during training” – he doesn’t deal with the incident in the bar.150 Tomlinson doesn’t specify the precise circumstances of the second occasion, but the context indicates it was a conversation he had with a senior officer around the time of his training. There is no mention of a bar.
Mansfield went on to describe the answers: “there was obfuscation and no real answer was given; in other words, they were not told that it was out of the question”.
Tomlinson only uses the term “obfuscated” to describe the second occasion, but he said the answer on the first occasion was evasive and indirect. The word meanings are similar.151
Mansfield appears to have basically presented a truthful – albeit paraphrased and summarised – account of Tomlinson’s evidence.
This raises the question: Why has Baker intervened – making out that Mansfield had misrepresented Tomlinson’s evidence152 – when Mansfield had not misrepresented it?
After falsely stating what Tomlinson “said”, and Mansfield correctly insists Tomlinson “used the word ‘obfuscation’”153, Baker then goes on to say: “We can get the detail off the LiveNote154 transcript if necessary”.
Why didn’t Baker look at the LiveNote before he recounted what Tomlinson had said, falsely contradicting Mansfield’s account?
Mansfield indicates that he was already using the LiveNote transcripts – “Yes, I have them here”.
H was asked by Burnett: “Why was it obvious to you” that assassination “was not to be countenanced?”
H answered the question: “it is against the ethos of the service” and “it was simply not done – so it was straightforward to me”. But then H continued with unsolicited information that was not directly connected to the question: “There is one point in addition I might make which is, about three or four years earlier, I remember being in touch with our training department….”
This is where H provides his evidence – addressed above – about what was taught to new recruits about assassination: “assassination was something that we did not countenance – it was done in one sentence”.
Why did H provide this unsolicited account?
It may be significant that H was the final MI6 witness to provide an account of what was taught during training – Dearlove was first on Wednesday, 20 February 2008; X was next on Tuesday, February 26; then A later on the same day, the 26th. H was heard two days later on Thursday, February 28.
The inquest was closed on Wednesday, 27 February 2008 – according to Baker this was because a jury member had to attend a family funeral.155 It is possible that MI6 used this day off to review their evidence – if they did, they would have found that there were three conflicting accounts on what MI6 told trainees about assassination: Dearlove, X and A (see above).
I suggest that it is possible that H was given the job of “fixing” this by providing evidence that directly supported Dearlove’s account – it also is the account that could be seen to show MI6 in the best light: trainees are told “assassination was something that we did not countenance”, or as Dearlove put it, “they are told that assassination is not part of the service’s activities”.
What’s possibly more significant is that this evidence from H supporting Dearlove’s version is also directly contrary to the account put forward by Tomlinson:
H’s account is that in “the first week [the head trainer] made it absolutely clear … to the new entrants” about assassination. “It was done in one sentence and moved on very quickly…. It was just stated.”
Tomlinson says the subject was broached by the trainee, whereas H says MI6 make it very clear very early on – therefore there would be no opening or need for a trainee to raise the subject.
In contrast, H presents a picture of no hesitation at all – and he emphasises this in 6 different phrases:
Considering that this response was unsolicited (see above), such a degree of emphasis by H on this point is quite incredible. It runs directly counter to the evidence of Tomlinson.
Later Mansfield recounted to H the evidence A had provided about his MI6 training – “when asked about the advice that [A] got on the use of force, he said ‘virtually nothing’”. This directly conflicted with H’s above evidence.
H – who was A’s MI6 boss – then became evasive. H suddenly showed signs of either severe deafness, or acute distraction.
Initially Mansfield simply asked if H knew what A had testified about what was said in training regarding the use of force. H replied: “Sorry, could you repeat that?”
Before repeating it, Mansfield seeks to reclarify H’s position: “You have indicated … that … assassination … was explained from day one and everybody is very clear about it. Is that right?”
H now qualifies his earlier evidence: “I can only say about the time that I was there [at the training]. I was there on a couple of occasions, in 1987 I think it was.”
H appears to have introduced this qualification – “I can only say about the time that I was there” – in direct response to Mansfield challenging him with A’s account.
There is one problem with this: up to this point in the cross-examination Mansfield hasn’t put A’s account. All that’s happened is that Mansfield has asked: “do you know what [A] said about … use of force”?
And H had indicated he didn’t hear that anyway: “Sorry, could you repeat that?”
H’s qualification of his training account – “I can only say about the time that I was there” – indicates that not only did H actually hear Mansfield’s question, but he also knew what A’s training evidence was.
Mansfield then goes on to explain to H what A had testified – “when asked about the advice that he got on the use of force, he said ‘virtually nothing’”.
This time H again feigns deafness or distraction: “Who said ‘virtually nothing’?”
Mansfield repeats the evidence from A.
Now H completely changes tack – it may be that he has suddenly realised that A’s training may have been relatively close timewise to his own stated 1987 encounter.156 H no longer talks about his 1987 experience – he asks Mansfield: “Are you asking me about my training course back in the 1970s?”
Mansfield replies: “No. Not yours.” Mansfield is asking about A’s course in the 1980s.
But H has found his way out of answering the question, so he now sticks to it: “Sorry, I went on a training course in the 1970s.”
It’s like H’s evidence about attending training course lectures in 1987 has now evaporated into thin air. H’s only experience now is “back in the 1970s”.
Then H finishes off the issue with: “I was not there. It was [A’s] course, I am sorry.”
The next question was: What happens regarding assassination out in the field? This question is fully addressed in the remaining part of this chapter.
This issue is central to MI6’s defence. They have said time and again at the inquest – see earlier – that MI6 has never gotten involved in, or contemplated, assassinations. That, in turn, leads to the natural conclusion that MI6 could not have been involved in the assassination of Princess Diana.
The following evidence of British intelligence assassination plots tells a different story. The events are shown in time order.
William Stevenson157, Author: 1976 Book A Man Called Intrepid: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“Plans for the assassination of … [Reinhard] Heydrich were begun in New York at the beginning of August 1941….
“An order by Reich Commissioner for Jewish Affairs, Hermann Göring … instructed Heydrich ‘to … make all … preparations for a comprehensive solution of the Jewish question’….
“The specialists called to a [BSC158] conference in Room 3553 knew nothing of the order…. Papers and drawings were distributed singly…. It was the job of … Captain Herbert Rowland to make sure they did not compare notes….
“Josef Gabcik and Jan Kubris were two of the agents selected to kill Heydrich….. Gabcik carried a Sten under the raincoat draped over his arm as he stood waiting at the hairpin bend outside Prague on the morning of May 27 [1942]. Kubris had a grenade in the deep poacher’s pocket of his jacket. One hundred yards away … stood a third man known as Valcik. And another two hundred yards farther on, the man called Jemelik waited on the opposite side of the road. He would be the first to see the open green Mercedes in which the Protector [Heydrich] rode to his office…. The four agents had parachuted [in] near the Polish border….
“At 10.25 [a.m.] Gabcik heard four sharp whistles – H in Morse code – the signal. A moment later an open Mercedes swept down the hill…. Gabcik dropped his coat…. He brought up the Sten and squeezed the trigger. Nothing happened…. The … streetcar rattled into the bend. Kubris, seeing his companion trying to clear the Sten, tossed his grenade against the side of the … car. There was an explosion. Out of the billowing smoke emerged Heydrich, vaulting over the stuck door, firing at the assassins…. They began to run.
“Heydrich staggered to the sidewalk…. An hour later, Heydrich was delivered in a commandeered baker’s van to Bulovka Hospital….
“Hitler telegraphed around Europe for the best physicians. Specialists flew in from a half-dozen capitals…. Heydrich … died a full week after the attack on him….
“The assassins’ … escape plan was never completed.”159
Nigel West, Military Historian: 1990 Book The Friends: Jury Didn’t Hear:
In late 1944 “the Colonial Office requested SIS assistance [in Palestine]. Stewart Menzies160 was asked to help achieve … the formation of a counter-terrorist intelligence group to operate within Palestine…. The plan had the support of the … Foreign Secretary, [Ernest] Bevin, who approved the creation of a small unit headed by General Sir Bernard Fergusson…. He was given carte blanche to identify and eliminate the fanatics….
“[Roy] Farran [was] recruited by Fergusson….
“In October 1947 [Farran] was charged with the torture and murder of an Irgun161 suspect named Alexander Rubowitz….
“[Farran] was acquitted, but a price was put on his head by the Irgun. A year after these events, his younger brother Rex was killed when he opened a parcel-bomb addressed to ‘R. Farran’.”162
British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and MI6 joined forces in several attempts to eliminate the Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser.
Gordon Thomas, Intelligence Author: 2010 Book Inside British Intelligence: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“In the summer of 1956 the issue of what to do with Nasser had become a renewed matter of urgency….
“In London the idea that Nasser should be assassinated was increasingly a matter of discussion. MI6’s legal department concluded that under its royal prerogative to defend the realm, it would be permissible to murder a head of state when the very security of Britain was under threat. The CIA assassination manual was consulted, and George Young met with CIA officer James Eichelberger…. Afterward the CIA officer hurried to his office in the American Embassy and sent a coded cable to Allen Dulles163. ‘[Young] talked openly of assassinating Nasser instead of using a euphemism like liquidating. He said his people had been in contact with suitable elements in Egypt….’”164
Stephen Dorril, Intelligence Consultant and Author: 2000 Book MI6: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“On 26 July [1956] in Alexandria … Nasser made his nationalisation [of the Suez Canal Company] announcement…. The Iraqi PM’s165 advice [to Anthony Eden166] was ‘You have only one course of action open and that is to hit, hit hard and hit now. Otherwise it will be too late.’ Once his guests had left, Eden summoned a council of war…. An emotional Prime Minister told his colleagues that … the ‘muslim Mussolini’ must be ‘destroyed’. Eden added: ‘I want him removed and I don’t give a damn if there’s anarchy and chaos in Egypt.’167 …
“Eden immediately established the ‘Egypt committee’ to supervise a response….
“It was agreed that the more formidable a response, the better the chance that Nasser could be overthrown or even murdered by his own countrymen, if his nerve broke….
“During the spring of 1956, at the request of Eden, the IRD168 had stepped up its propaganda efforts in the Middle East with a special emphasis given to radio broadcasting…. The IRD … had arranged for more ‘black’ propaganda….
“One of the black radio stations set up in Aden, masquerading as the ‘Voice of Free Egypt’, began broadcasting on 28 July…. An Iraqi announcer made vituperative attacks on Nasser, called for his assassination, and gave out a series of cryptic messages to alleged agents inside Egypt….
“MI6’s new chief, Dick White, was … briefed by George Young, who informed him that he and the SPA169 branch had been personally chosen by the Prime Minister to ‘bump Nasser off’….
“Although the Queen did see all the ‘special bulletins’, only a few senior Cabinet ministers and Foreign Office officials were let into the inner ring of secrecy…. Geoffrey McDermott was … part of a three man team with Dean and Kirkpatrick in receipt of ‘clear and unusual’ orders from Eden, involved in intelligence and military contingency planning for Egypt. The first plan was called ‘Hamilcar’ and was based on a landing at Alexandria which McDermott saw as clear proof that the real intention was to topple Nasser….
“An angry Eden told Conservative MP Robert Boothby that ‘we must crush this man at all costs’…. According to one Cabinet colleague, Eden was now ‘intoxicated with drugs’.
“MI6’s main task was to ‘support any armed forces intervention with internal action against Nasser’…. In early August, CIA liaison officer Chester Cooper had a meeting with Young … at which the MI6 director had a go at the Americans for knocking down ‘every proposal for bashing the Gyppos’. At another meeting, Young told Eveland170 that Britain and Iraq would proceed with plans for a coup in Syria….
“Under the general mandate given by Eden, MI6 began to construct a ‘shadow government’ for Egypt without consulting the Foreign Office….
“It was said the Gen. Mohammed Neguib would … take the presidency and that dissident officers were conferring with civilians about the assassination of Nasser and his ministers….
“At a meeting with … Patrick Reilly171, White confided, ‘We’ve got a group of dissident military officers who will go against Nasser’. He further explained that the MI6 plan was for that group to murder the Egyptian leader….
“MI6 did not believe … that it was necessary to have an alternative [government] in place. The Service was confident that once Nasser was overthrown suitable candidates would emerge….
“There was little the Foreign Office could do to control events, since MI6 was working via back channels to Eden….
“In late August, MI6 suffered a setback when the Egyptian secret police, the Mukhabarat, raided the offices of its front, the ANA172. On the 27th the Egyptians announced at a press conference that a British espionage ring had been rolled up and … James Swinburn, the business manager of ANA, had been arrested and had promptly confessed to being in charge of the ring…. Also arrested were Charles Pittuck … and James Zarb….
“Other Britons [were] accused and tried in absentia…. Eleven Egyptians were accused of espionage…. Two British diplomats involved in intelligence-gathering were expelled…. Swinburn confessed that they were planning a coup d’état….
“On 30 August, CIA director Allen Dulles reported to his brother at the State Department on his talks with MI6 officers, who were persisting in their plans to overthrow Nasser….
“With no assets left in the country, MI6 had to use outside agents for its assassination plans. [Journalist] James Mossman … who had worked for MI6 during the war, was posted to Egypt as the Daily Telegraph correspondent in 1956. In Cairo he was approached by an MI6 officer in the local embassy…. Although Mossman said he had finished with intelligence work, the officer appealed to his patriotism, telling him that ‘you must do this because we are just about to go to war with Egypt’. Agreeing to cooperate, Mossman was asked to drop off a package from the boot of his Morris Minor at the twelve-mile post outside Cairo. Given a telephone on which to confirm safe delivery, Mossman discovered that he had contacted the wrong man. The package had contained £20,000 in English banknotes which was intended as a bribe to Nasser’s doctor to poison Nasser.
“The poison was organised by the head of the Service’s ‘Q’ Ops Department, Major Frank Quinn…. On one occasion Quinn was asked to inject lethal poison into some popular Egyptian Kropje chocolates. A dozen boxes were obtained from Cairo…. After trial and error, in which six boxes were destroyed, Quinn found the correct formula…. The chocolates were handed over, though it appears they never reached their intended destination.
“One plan was drawn up … [involving] nerve gas173….
“By [October 1956] … it was decided that a three-man hit team would be sent by the SPA group from London as ‘a Special Service to assassinate Nasser’. They apparently did enter Egypt but got ‘cold feet and left’. At the same time, the Egyptian security service had been tipped off about the presence in Cairo of a German mercenary who had been hired by MI6 for a ‘wet job’. He disappeared before the security net was closed and was believed to have been smuggled out of the country under diplomatic cover. There was also a British plan to use SAS troops in the run-up to the invasion to kill or capture Nasser….”174175
Peter Wright, ex-MI5 Officer: 1987 Book Spycatcher: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“At the beginning of the Suez crisis, MI6 developed a plan, through the London station, to assassinate Nasser using nerve gas. [Anthony] Eden initially gave his approval, but later rescinded it…. Eden [later] reactivated the assassination option a second time. By this time virtually all MI6 assets in Egypt had been rounded up by Nasser, and a new operation, using renegade Egyptian officers, was drawn up, but it failed lamentably, principally because the cache of weapons which had been hidden on the outskirts of Cairo was found to be defective….
“I was consulted about the plan by John Henry and Peter Dixon, the two MI6 Technical Services officers from the London Station responsible for drawing it up….
“Both MI5 and MI6 … wanted to know a lot more about the poisons being developed at Porton176, though for different reasons. I177 wanted the antidotes, in case the Russians used a poison on a defector in Britain, while MI6 wanted to use the poisons for operations abroad.
“Henry and Dixon both discussed with me the use of poisons against Nasser, and asked my advice. Nerve gas obviously presented the best possibility, since it was easily administered. They told me that the London Station had an agent in Egypt with limited access to one of Nasser’s headquarters. Their plan was to place canisters of nerve gas inside the ventilation system, but I pointed out this would require large quantities of the gas and would result in massive loss of life among Nasser’s staff…. Henry told me later that Eden had backed away from the operation….
“After the gas canisters plan fell through, MI6 looked at some new weapons. On one occasion I went down to Porton to see a demonstration of a cigarette packet which had been modified by the Explosives Research and Development Establishment to fire a dart tipped with poison.”178
Comment: None of MI6’s attempts to assassinate Nasser succeeded – he finally died from a heart attack in Cairo 14 years later.
Georgios Grivas, formerly a general in the Greek army, led a guerrilla campaign in the 1950s aimed at ending British rule in Cyprus.
Peter Wright, ex-MI5 Officer: 1987 Book Spycatcher: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“In 1958, [Colonel Georgios] Grivas stepped up his guerrilla campaign [in Cyprus] in an effort to thwart the determined efforts to achieve a political solution being made by the new Governor, Sir Hugh Foot….
“Grivas needed to be located, isolated and neutralised before political negotiations stood a chance….
“Foot … agreed to call in MI5 as the situation was rapidly deteriorating. From the start we were in a race: Could we find Grivas before the Colonial Office stitched up a ramshackle [peace] deal?
“I was to … plan and execute the technical side of the operation, which was given the code name ‘Sunshine’.
“It would be too crude to say that Sunshine was an assassination operation. But it amounted to the same thing. The plan was simple: to locate Grivas and bring up a massive concentration of soldiers. We knew he would never surrender and … he would die in the shoot-out….
“We estimated that Sunshine would take six months to complete, but just as we moved into top gear, in late February 1959, the Colonial Office hurriedly settled the Cyprus problem at a Constitutional Conference at Lancaster House. The carpet was roughly pulled out from under our feet, and the entire Sunshine plan aborted overnight….
“Looking back, I am certain that, had we been allowed to implement Operation Sunshine when we first lobbied for it, in 1956, we could have neutralised Grivas at the outset.”179
Nigel West, Military Historian: 1990 Book The Friends: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“It was Gamal Abdel Nasser’s [1954] demand for the return of Britain’s base in the Suez Canal Zone that transformed Cyprus’s rather dubious strategic value….
“From the intelligence viewpoint, Cyprus [was] designated the new home for SIS’s regional base….
“By 1958, the level of violence [in Cyprus] had reached a peak…. The British response was a reorganisation of the security apparatus, with Sir John Prendergast brought in from Kenya … to take over a new coordinating post of Chief of Intelligence…. Supporting Prendergast was Philip Kirby Green (known as ‘K-G’), one of Britain’s most remarkable secret warriors….
“Prendergast and K-G were a formidable team and, with Magan’s180 support, they devised a joint MI5-SIS scheme code-named Operation Sunshine to trace Grivas to his hiding place and eliminate him. John Wyke and Peter Wright made all the technical arrangements… while Sir Stephen Hastings181 was transferred from the Paris station to be ‘in at the kill’….
“Before Sunshine could be executed, it was scrapped because, against all the odds, the politicians began to make progress.”182
Ian Black, Journalist: 28 Jun 01 Guardian Article: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“Britain backed Belgium and the US in their desire to eliminate Patrice Lumumba, the radical prime minister of Congo who was murdered in 1961, according to newly-discovered documents.
“Ludo de Witte, a Flemish historian, reveals that while the US and Belgium actively plotted to murder the African nationalist leader, the British government secretly believed that Lumumba posed a serious threat to western interests and wanted him ‘got rid of’.
“Within days of its independence in June 1960, Congo was in chaos….
“On September 19 1960, President Dwight Eisenhower discussed the Congo crisis with Lord Home, the then foreign secretary. ‘The president expressed his wish that Lumumba would fall into a river full of crocodiles,’ a declassified US document records….
“The minutes suggest that the British government could have known of the CIA‘s plans to kill Lumumba, Mr De Witte says.
“Just a week later, Eisenhower met the Conservative prime minister, Harold Macmillan, with the foreign secretary again in attendance.
“‘Lord Home raised the question why we are not getting rid of Lumumba,’ the US account of the talks reports. ‘He stressed that now is the time to get rid of Lumumba.’
“The Congolese leader’s public denunciation of racism and exploitation under 80 years of colonial rule and his overtures to the Soviet Union in the midst of the cold war had made him powerful enemies.
“At the end of September 1960, when Lumumba had already been dismissed by the Congo‘s president and the army commander moved to arrest him, Howard Smith, a senior Foreign Office official who was later to become the head of MI5, led a discussion recorded in a document released by the Public Record Office last year.
“‘I can see only two possible solutions to the problem,’ Mr Smith said. ‘The first is the simple one of ensuring Lumumba‘s removal from the scene by killing him. This should solve the problem…’”183
Richard Belfield, Investigative Author: 2008 Book: Jury Didn’t Hear:184
“A senior official, career diplomat H.F.T. Howard Smith sent a memo … dated 28 September 1960, with the word ‘Secret’ written by hand … simply entitled ‘The Congo’….
“[It read] ‘I see only two possible solutions to the problem. The first is the simple one of ensuring [Patrice] Lumumba’s removal from the scene by killing him. This should in fact solve the problem since, so far as we can tell, Lumumba is not a leader of a movement within which there are potential successors of his quality and influence. His supporters are much less dangerous material.’ Smith made it very clear that this was his preferred option. He wanted ‘Lumumba to be removed from the scene altogether, because I fear that as long as he is about his power to do damage can only slightly be modified.’185…
“Smith’s memo was circulated around Whitehall…. There is no evidence on the memo that [anyone who read it] raised any objections, moral, ethical or legal to Smith’s preferred wish to kill a democratically elected prime minister of a sovereign state.”186187
Richard Bennett, Intelligence Analyst, AFI Research: 13 Jun 03 Asia Times Article188: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“The Littlejohn brothers [Keith and Kenneth] were recruited in 1972 by John Wyman of MI6, who handled a number of agents in Northern Ireland and paid them substantial sums of taxpayers’ money to infiltrate the IRA and to act as agent provocateurs, organizing and conducting bank robberies and bomb attacks in the Republic of Ireland. Wyman told them that there was ‘going to be a policy of political assassination’ for which they were to make themselves available. ‘If I was told about any illegal act before it happened, I would always discuss it with London. I was always told to go ahead,’ said Kenneth Littlejohn, who went on to claim that the MI6 officer told him, ‘If there is any shooting, do what you’ve got to do.’
“Wyman … gave the Littlejohns a list of IRA leaders to assassinate; these included Seamus Costello189, Sean Garland190 and Sean MacStiofain191. After Littlejohn passed on the name of Joe McCann, a leading Republican, to his MI6 handler, McCann was shot dead by British paratroopers a few days later as he walked, apparently unarmed, through the Belfast market area192.”193
Ireland’s Own: 27 Dec 01 History Article: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“[John] Wyman, who used various aliases, was [a] member of the British secret service agency, MI6, and was … important … in the British intelligence network in Ireland….
“Included in … Wyman’s spy network were the Littlejohn brothers, Keith and Kenneth. These were two English criminals on the run in Ireland during 1969, with whom British intelligence made contact….
“The Littlejohns were told to infiltrate Republican circles [and] kill Republican leaders….
“In November 1972, Fianna Fail Justice Minister Dessie O’Malley brought the draconian Offences Against the State (Amendment) Bill before Leinster House deputies. In the early hours of 2 December, as the bill was being debated in the Dail chamber, British military intelligence agents exploded a number of bombs in Dublin City, killing two people and seriously injuring 127 others. Within hours of news that bombs were exploding on the streets outside, the bill was passed by a large majority.
“The Littlejohns were arrested in London on December 20th. The following day Wyman and Crinnion194 were arrested in London…. The 26 authorities acted, it appears, out of knowledge that … the British agents were planning a campaign of political assassinations in the 26 counties.195
“With the loss of two key agents, the British opted to sacrifice the Littlejohns in exchange for Wyman and Crinnion.”196
Gordon Thomas, Intelligence Author: 2010 Book Inside British Intelligence: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“Kenneth Littlejohn … claimed, ‘[John Wyman] said he would like us to carry out political assassinations of IRA leaders. He gave me a list that included Seamus Costello and Joe McCann.’ 197
“It was agreed McCann would be the first target. Before the Littlejohns could assassinate the IRA man, however, he was shot dead by a British patrol in Belfast.”198
Stephen Dorril, Intelligence Consultant and Author: 2000 Book MI6: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“The explosion of two bombs in Dublin on 1 December 1972 aided the passage of an anti-terrorism bill…. The Irish Gardai Special Branch presented fragmentary evidence that the bombers had been … aided by British intelligence in planting the devices. On 19 December, the Irish rounded up an MI6 intelligence network. This included John Wyman, who had recruited an agent inside the Gardai199….”200
Richard Norton-Taylor, Intelligence Journalist: 1990 Book: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“[In 1988]201 four SAS men shot dead three unarmed IRA terrorists in Gibraltar….
“The Gibraltar operation was controlled by MI5, though the SAS would not have acted without the personal authority of [Margaret] Thatcher202.
“Two years after the incident203 … questions remain unanswered. If, as the Spanish Government and police maintain, the three terrorists – Danny McCann, Sean Savage, and Mairead Farrell – were followed up to the Gibraltar frontier, why were they not arrested?… Spanish police sources … [said] that the three were unarmed and had crossed the border without explosives. Why then did the MI5 officers tell the SAS soldiers … that the three were most certain to be armed … [and] were also likely to have on them a remote-control detonator enabling them to trigger a bomb they had left, primed, down-town?…
“The SAS soldiers were heavily briefed by MI5 officers who told them they were following highly dangerous terrorists who could be expected to be ruthless and deadly…. Anonymous MI5 officers, shielded from view, gave evidence at the inquest. But the jury was prevented from hearing crucial evidence about the MI5 operation and MI5’s state of knowledge by public interest immunity certificates signed by government ministers. The MI5 officer in charge of the operation, the man who briefed the SAS soldiers, did not give evidence at all.”204
British agents were involved in the assassination of Patrick Finucane205 in Northern Ireland.
John Stevens, MPS Commissioner: 17 Apr 03 Stevens Enquiry Report on Northern Ireland: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“Patrick Finucane was murdered in front of his wife and three children in his home on Sunday 12th February 1989. He was 39 years old….
“By November 1989 the murder remained unsolved and the investigation had effectively ceased. However in 1990 a journalist, Mr Neil Mulholland, provided new information about the Finucane murder from a man claiming to be both a quartermaster for the Ulster Defence Association and an agent of the RUC206 Special Branch. This man was William Stobie….
“Stobie was recruited as an agent by the RUC Special Branch in November 1987 following his arrest for the murder of Brian Adam Lambert for which he was released without charge. He was tasked by Special Branch until 1990 when as a result of Mulholland’s information he was arrested by the RUC for the Finucane and Lambert murders…. His activities, whilst an agent, clearly indicate his central role in the commission of serious offences from at least July 1988 onwards.
“It has now been established that before the murder of Patrick Finucane, Stobie supplied information of a murder being planned. He also provided significant information to his Special Branch handlers in the days after the murder. This principally concerned the collection of a firearm. However this vital information did not reach the original murder enquiry team and remains a significant issue under investigation by my Enquiry team….
“My Enquiry team … reviewed William Stobie’s and Brian Nelson’s roles in the murder of Patrick Finucane. Nelson, an Army agent, had been identified as a suspect during my first Enquiry. He was charged with thirty-five serious terrorist offences and later convicted. He was imprisoned for ten years….
“Nelson was aware and contributed materially to the intended attack on Finucane. It is not clear whether his role in the murder extended beyond passing a photograph, which showed Finucane and another person, to one of the other suspects….
“Brian Nelson’s role also raised a number of issues arising from the work of the Force Research Unit (FRU), the Army’s agent-handling unit in Northern Ireland….”207208
Martin Ingram & Greg Harkin, 2004 Book Stakeknife: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“The FRU provided [agent Brian] Nelson with photographs and detailed maps of Finucane’s home…. [FRU] handlers were also involved in reconnaissance missions at the Finucane family home. There was at least one occasion when a FRU officer drove Brian Nelson to Fortwilliam Drive to see the Finucane’s house. Another time, a FRU officer posed as a window cleaner with Nelson and they offered their ‘services’ to a neighbour of the Finucanes so they could check out the rear of their target’s home….
“[Tommy] Lyttle209 told me210 that … all the UDA members involved in the [Finucane] killing attended a ‘celebration’ party held in [Lyttle’s] house after the murder. FRU informer Brian Nelson, Special Branch informer Jim Spence and Ken Barrett211 were among the guests at this macabre gathering.”212
Owen Bowcott, Journalist: 26 Jun 07 Guardian Article: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“No policemen or soldiers are to be charged in connection with the loyalist murder of the solicitor Pat Finucane, the prosecution service said yesterday.
“The decision to take no action against senior officers in military intelligence and the Royal Ulster Constabulary effectively marks the end of an 18-year investigation to prove in court that there was organised collusion between the security forces and loyalist paramilitaries….
“The latest evidence reviewed by the Public Prosecution Service of Northern Ireland came out of the third inquiry conducted by the former Metropolitan police commissioner Lord Stevens into agent-handling in Northern Ireland during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
“In a statement the prosecution service said there was insufficient evidence to bring cases to trial. It cited problems with missing records, witnesses who have died and the difficulties of ascertaining ‘the role and responsibilities that individuals played in specific events’. It also had to take account of potential abuse of process arguments by the defence that any trial at this stage would be unfair.
“The main thrust of what was known as Stevens III was the role of the army’s surveillance operations in Northern Ireland, in particular the Force Research Unit (FRU). Nine former members of the unit, including its former head, Brigadier Gordon Kerr, were questioned, as well as seven police officers and a civilian. The prosecution service said: ‘There was insufficient evidence to establish that any member of FRU had agreed with Brian Nelson [an agent run by FRU] or any other person that Patrick Finucane should be murdered or had knowledge at the relevant time that the murder was to take place.’
“It added: ‘Lord Stevens … stated that he believed there had been collusion between loyalist paramilitaries and elements of the security forces. While an investigator may properly reach general conclusions on collusion, the prosecutor’s role is different.’…213214
“Alex Maskey, a Sinn Féin assembly member who was also targeted by Nelson, said yesterday: ‘It has to be remembered that the DPP [prosecution service] is simply another level in the policy of collusion and the policy of concealment and cover-up.’
“The Police Service of Northern Ireland issued a statement on Lord Stevens‘s behalf, saying: ‘[He] notes the statement made by the public prosecution service. It is a matter for them.’
“British-Irish Rights Watch, the organisation whose report triggered the Stevens III inquiry, said it was ‘disappointed but not surprised’ at the decision.
“The MoD215 said: ‘We welcome the decision. Soldiers have been criticised for long enough and should be left to get on with their lives. The MoD has cooperated fully with the Stevens inquiries.’
“The government has said it is committed to holding a public inquiry into the Finucane murder but, it is believed, has been unable to find a judge to chair it….
“In 1987 Gordon Kerr, a lieutenant-colonel and veteran of army intelligence, now retired, was appointed head of the Force Research Unit. He oversaw the recruitment of Brian Nelson and his infiltration of the Ulster Defence Association. Nelson took up a key position as a gatherer of intelligence on potential republican targets. At Nelson‘s trial in 1992 Col Kerr defended his former agent’s role, declaring: ‘There were several occasions when targets for assassination were brought to our notice by Nelson.’ Col Kerr has insisted his operation saved lives and that Nelson never told the FRU that Finucane was going to be killed.”216
Comment: The main point here is that Finucane was not the sole assassination. The Northern Ireland Ombudsman’s report – see below – established that there were 20 separate assassination plots between 1991 and 2000, and the anonymous evidence (see above footnote regarding the 2000 Sunday Herald article) indicates at least 12 others between 1987 and 1991.
Why has the Ombudsman’s report been ignored?
Why did John Stevens217 focus his investigation on one assassination – Finucane – when other evidence indicates there were up to 32 others?
Why have no members of British intelligence been charged for assassinations they have been shown – by Nuala O’Loan’s report (below), by the Stevens report – to have been involved in?
An investigation by the Northern Ireland Police Ombudsman into the 9 November 1997218 assassination of Raymond McCord Junior219 uncovered widespread involvement by Special Branch agents in 20 assassination plots. The investigation also revealed a culture of collusion and cover-up of the plots by Special Branch officers.
Nuala O’Loan, Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland: 22 Jan 07 Investigative Report: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“Intelligence reports and other documents within the RUC220 and the PSNI221 … linked informants, and in particular one man who was a police informant (referred to in this report as Informant 1) to the following ten murders:
• Mr Peter McTasney who died on 24 February 1991;
• Ms Sharon McKenna who died on 17 January 1993;
• Mr Sean McParland who was attacked on 17 February 1994, and died on 25 February 1994;
• Mr Gary Convie who died on 17 May 1994;
• Mr Eamon Fox who died on 17 May 1994, in the same attack as Mr Gary Convie;
• Mr Gerald Brady who died on 17 June 1994;
• Mr Thomas Sheppard who died on 21 March 1996;
• Mr John Harbinson who died on 18 May 1997;
• Mr Raymond McCord Junior who died on 09 November 1997
• Mr Thomas English who died on 31 October 2000
“Intelligence was also found linking police informants, and in particular Informant 1, to ten attempted murders between 1989 and 2002.”222
“Whilst undoubtedly Special Branch officers were effective in preventing bombings and shootings and other attacks, some informants were able to continue to engage in terrorist activities including murders without the Criminal Investigation Department having the ability to deal with them for some of those offences.
“On occasions this also resulted in crimes being committed by informants with the prior knowledge of Special Branch officers. Informants engaged in such crimes were not subject to any of the controls inherent in the system…. On occasion … [Special Branch] police … watched as serious terrorist crimes were committed by their informants….
“The evidence clearly shows that Informant 1’s behaviour, including alleged murder, was not challenged by Special Branch, and the activities of those who sought to bring him to justice were blocked repeatedly. Records were minimized, exaggerated, fabricated and must also have been destroyed. Informant 1 would have been well aware of the level of protection which he was afforded.
“It is also the case that whilst he was engaged in drug dealing and other money making activities, Informant 1 was not only protected by Special Branch but he was also given large sums of public money in return for such services as he provided…. The total amount estimated to have been paid to Informant 1 over 12 years is in excess of £79,000.
“This investigation demonstrates graphically the dangers of a separated and effectively unaccountable specialist intelligence department with extensive and largely uncontrolled powers….
“In many … crimes described in this report there were witnesses, who either drew police attention to a crime or volunteered to give evidence, some of it quite specific…. The Police Ombudsman has found that on a number of occasions the police did not use these opportunities to further their investigations. This had two consequences: firstly the investigation did not proceed, and secondly [this] failure by police to use evidence tendered by witnesses … must have given rise to a lack of confidence among the people that there was any point in assisting the police when such crimes were committed….”223
Dermot Ahern, Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs: 22 Jan 07 Press Release: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“The Police Ombudsman’s Report is a deeply disturbing and shocking exposé of the activities of loyalist paramilitaries and their relationship with the RUC Special Branch.
“The report’s findings are damning….
“The Ombudsman has found that RUC officers colluded in crimes by their failure to tackle the most serious activities of their informants – including murder. Clearly, elements of the RUC Special Branch had lost all moral compass at that time. I note that there are to be further investigations on foot of this report. Police officers implicated in these appalling acts must be held accountable for their actions.224
“These findings confirm what many observers feared about the conduct of RUC Special Branch.”225226
Ex-MI6 agent Richard Tomlinson has stated that he was shown evidence – by Nicholas Fishwick228 – of an MI6 plot to assassinate Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic. It was a two page document outlining the justification for and methods of execution of the plot. The third method involved a car crash in a tunnel and a strobe flash gun to disorientate the driver.
The evidence from the seven MI6 witnesses was that there was a documented proposal229, but the assassination target was someone other than Milosevic230 – someone whose identity can’t be revealed – and the idea was quashed early because such a proposal was outside the ethos of MI6.
According to MI6 witnesses the documentary evidence has since been destroyed.
James Risen, Los Angeles Times Journalist, USA: 15 Feb 98 Article: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“A … CIA covert action program, designed to attract and recruit Iraqi officers to foment a military coup, was … destroyed by [Saddam] Hussein, in June 1996.
“That CIA program, operated jointly with MI6, the British intelligence service, was based in Jordan, using a front group called the Iraqi National Accord….
“CIA sources now say this … covert program was thoroughly penetrated by Iraqi double agents, who betrayed the Iraqi military officers who dared to sign up to work with the CIA and MI6.
“Hussein executed at least 100 military officers and others who had cooperated with the Americans and the British.”231
Patrick Cockburn, The Independent Journalist, UK: 17 Feb 98 Article: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“MI6 in Plot to Kill Saddam
“A plot by MI6, Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service, to topple President Saddam Hussein collapsed in ignominy, triggering one of the worst defeats in its history.
“The coup, organised by intelligence officers in Amman, Jordan, was crushed by the Iraqi leader, who executed as many as 80 conspirators and arrested hundreds more.
“The revelation will be widely seen as contradicting British and American claims that they are not planning to topple the leadership in Baghdad. They have claimed repeatedly that the only issue at stake is the entry of UN weapons inspectors. Yet 18 months ago MI6 and the CIA joined in trying to foment a military coup against President Saddam in Iraq….
“CIA agents, angry that the White House stopped them from backing an attempt to assassinate President Saddam or mount a military attack on him, have confirmed for the first time to the Los Angeles Times that the attempted coup was a joint operation by MI6 and the CIA.
“The two intelligence agencies chose a group called the Iraqi National Accord, recruited from Iraqi army, party and intelligence officers, as the instrument through which to organise a military coup in Baghdad….
“Other sources say that the London station of the CIA along with MI6 played a key role in choosing the Accord to overthrow the Iraqi government. With money from the intelligence agencies it moved its headquarters to Jordan in early 1996 and tried to recruit serving Iraqi officers to act against President Saddam….
“Starting in late June and early July 1996, there was a wave of arrests and executions of senior officers in an elite formation. The number of those killed is not known but may be as high as eighty.
“The CIA‘s attempt to overthrow President Saddam has received some publicity in the US, but the role of MI6 in the failed coup has hitherto been kept secret.”232
Stephen Dorril, Intelligence Consultant and Author: 2000 Book MI6: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“In 1996, MI6 cooperated with the CIA’s station chief in London, Thomas Tweeten, in a botched operation in northern Iraq…. A meeting in January 1996 of CIA and MI6 officers and intelligence officers from Jordan and Saudi Arabia agreed to back the INA233 as the vehicle to overthrow Saddam. The CIA and MI6 invested millions of dollars in the London-based INA … which ran the operation from lavish offices in Amman. The conspirators were supplied with weapons and explosives, and were provided with a powerful radio transmitter taken from Croatia. Unfortunately for MI6, the INA was riddled with informers and double agents.
“During late June and July there were a spate of arrests of senior army officers, including a number from the élite Special Republican Guard which protects the Iraqi leader, who were said to be party to a plot to start a mutiny. It is not known how deeply implicated MI6 officers were, but a number of CIA officers were deemed to be ‘out of control’. Organising the opposition from Kurdistan, they planned without authorisation the assassination of Saddam…. On 31 August Saddam sent his tanks … into Kurdistan, crushing the opposition and destroying the headquarters of the Iraqi National Congress.”234
Coroner: 26 Feb 08: 152.1:
“This is not an issue in these inquests. We are not looking into newspaper reports into what might or might not be going to happen to Colonel Gaddafi.”
In early 1996 a roadside bomb exploded underneath a vehicle in a motorcade carrying Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the leader of Libya. Several people died as a result of the blast, but Gaddafi survived – he was severely shaken but not injured.
There is evidence indicating that on that day Gaddafi was the target of an attempted assassination and there is conflicting evidence over the degree of MI6’s involvement in the operation.
Richard Dearlove, MI6 Director of Operations, 1994 to 1999, UK: 20 Feb 08: 64.8:
Burnett: Q. Now, there is a very well-known allegation of planned assassination that I wish to ask you about. It has been suggested widely and publicly that, in February 1996, SIS conspired with one of its Libyan agents to assassinate Colonel Gaddafi. Now, first of all, just to locate that in time, you were head of operations at the time.
A. I was indeed head of operations at the time.
Q. Were you the chief of the service when that allegation emerged publicly?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. Is it true?
A. No, it is not true, and I think one should add that – this is an allegation that was made by a former Security Service officer, David Shayler. It was fully investigated by the Metropolitan Police, who sent a team into SIS. They were given full access, full cooperation, and it was shown as a result of their investigation that Shayler‘s allegations were without substance.
Q. Now, Shayler, you say, was a former Security Service officer; that is MI5 –
A. MI5.
Q. – not MI6, as it happens.
A. Not MI6.
Q. So investigated by the Metropolitan Police?
A. An independent police investigation, which was ordered by the Crown Prosecution Service.
Q. You have said what its conclusions were. Did you obviously, as chief, take a close interest in that?
A. I took an exceptionally close interest.
Q. Do you have any doubts about the correctness of that conclusion?
A. I have no doubts whatsoever, nor did I from the start of the investigation.
Miss X, MI6 Administrator, UK: 26 Feb 08: 151.8:
Keen: Q. An alleged plot to assassinate Colonel Gaddafi…. If there was a P file236 for that individual and a proposal for an assassination, presumably the P file would contain a record of that proposal?
A. If something like that had ever existed, yes, it would be on that file.
Q. So, again, that would be a simple way of checking whether or not, in fact, at the relevant time, the Secret Intelligence Service did advance such proposals beyond the wild imaginings of Mr A?
Coroner: This is not an issue in these inquests. We are not looking into newspaper reports into what might or might not be going to happen to Colonel Gaddafi, and we also have Sir Richard’s evidence on this.
Q. With respect, sir, Sir Richard’s evidence was that, as a matter of principle, the Secret Intelligence Service would never contemplate such an action or operation, and that was challenged by my learned friend, Mr Mansfield, and the issue that arises is whether there is in fact evidence to show that that in fact is the case and that there have been occasions where such operations have been contemplated by the Secret Intelligence Service.
Burnett: Maybe I shall waste time – I am sorry if I do – but my recollection of Sir Richard’s evidence237, which I do not have up in front of me at the moment, was that he explained to the jury that following those public allegations made in newspapers – and I think he attributed them to a former MI5 officer, there was a police investigation –
Coroner: I think we know who he was.
Burnett: I am sure he named him.
Coroner: Yes.
Burnett: – there was a police investigation, and the police then consulted the CPS and the conclusions were negative. I have a fairly vivid recollection of Sir Richard indicating that he always knew that they would be because he was the head of operations at the time alleged and he knew there was nothing in it. So it may well be that this witness cannot add anything to that.
A. I cannot add anything to what you have already said there.
Burnett: It is at Day 73238, pages 64 and 65.
Q. Given that there was an investigation of that alleged conspiracy to murder, have you any explanation as to why there wasn’t a similar investigation in respect of Mr A‘s proposal?
A. Only that Mr A’s proposal, I do not think, ever really got beyond being just an idea.
Q. Is an idea not sufficient?
A. An idea that does not become in any way substantive is not recorded formally anywhere or anything like that and is quashed right from the word go, no.
Q. And Tippexed out of the record?
A. That was a normal way of treating correspondence.
Annie Machon239, Ex-MI5 Officer: 2005 Book Spies, Lies & Whistleblowers: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“In summer 1995 … David [Shayler] was first briefed on the plot. David Watson [code PT16/B], David’s counterpart in MI6, asked to meet to discuss an unusual case which he could not mention over the phone. At the subsequent meeting PT16/B told David that:
“In exchange for MI6’s support, the Libyan offered to hand over the two Lockerbie suspects after the coup….
“In the following weeks, PT16/B told David that the Libyan was codenamed Tunworth. At some point in the following weeks David briefly saw the printout of MI6’s record of him. It contained around two or three separate mentions. They supported his claim to be a senior member of Libyan military intelligence….
“David takes up the story: ‘Throughout this process, I briefed my line manager, G9A/1 – Jerry Mahoney until December 1995, Paul Slim after that – about these developments….
“‘It is inconceivable that G9A/1 did not think an MI6-funded plot to engineer a coup in Libya was worthy of mentioning to his line manager, G9/0, Paul Mitchell. In turn, it is unthinkable that Mitchell did not raise the matter with his line management who would have informed his boss until the DG240 herself [Stella Rimington] had been made aware….’
“In December 1995 … R/ME/C at MI6, circulated CX95/ 53452 report241 to Whitehall and other addressees, warning of a potential coup in Libya…. The report clearly demonstrated that Watson knew that Tunworth was planning terrorism and his group had already been involved in attempts on Gaddafi’s life….
“David remembers another MI6 CX report being issued about the plot in early 1996. It was a shopping list of the group’s requirements to carry out the coup, including the supply of weapons and basics like jeeps and tents.
“Around the same time, Christmas 1995, Watson told David that he had met Tunworth, in Geneva and paid him $40,000. Jackie Barker, who had replaced Jane Thomas as G9A/15, told him that Watson had told her the same information ‘in confidence’. During routine G9/PT16 meetings around this time, officers occasionally mentioned the plot. Watson then met Tunworth on two further occasions early in 1996 in Geneva…. Watson mentioned [to David] that he had paid ’similar sums’ to Tunworth on each occasion. Although PT16/B never specifically mentioned it, it was tacitly understood that Watson was working with the approval of his direct line manager, PT16, Richard Bartlett.
“At some point … Watson mentioned that the submission – MI6 jargon for the letter requesting permission from the Foreign Office for otherwise illegal operations – was going to go ‘all the way to the top’. In about January 1996, Watson told him that the submission had been successful, indicating that the Foreign Secretary himself had signed the document permitting the operation….
“Then, in either February or March 1996, David read two, possibly three intelligence reports quoting independent sources – the Egyptian and Moroccan intelligence services. They all stated that an attack had been made on Colonel Gaddafi in Sirte, Libya. Two of the reports indicated that the attackers had tried to assassinate Gaddafi when he was part of a motorcade but had failed as they had targeted the wrong car. As a result of the explosion and the ensuing chaos in which shots were fired, civilians and security police were maimed and killed.
“‘At a meeting shortly after, Watson ventured to me242 in a note of triumph that Tunworth had been responsible for the attack. “Yes that was our man. We did it,” was how he put it. He regarded it, curiously, as a triumph even though the objective of the operation had not been met, and reporting indicated there had been civilian casualties….’”243
Paget Report, p811: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“[David Shayler’s] assessment that the SIS was involved in the crash in the Alma underpass was based largely on his knowledge of a plot involving a bomb or grenade being placed under a car in a cavalcade in Libya in order to kill Colonel Gadaffi – i.e. it involved attacking a car in a foreign country using what he described as ‘surrogates’ (cut-outs) to do the killing.
“By David Shayler’s account this was an overt attack involving no apparent attempt at disguise. He stated that an SIS officer briefed him on this and he saw corroboration of the plot in GCHQ material in terms of timings, intent etc. He claimed that the attack took place on the wrong car and that innocent people were killed.
“There was an independent investigation by the MPS into the ‘Gadaffi allegation’. Operation Paget enquiries have shown there is no evidence to support [Shayler’s] assessment that there is any link to this investigation.”
Note: The following items of evidence, media reports, interviews and comment pertaining to the Gaddafi plot are shown in chronological order.244
Mail on Sunday, 31 Aug 97 Article: Jury Didn’t Hear:245
“Gaddafi Plot Credible, Says US
“David Shayler’s revelations that MI6 tried to blow up Colonel Gaddafi were given strong credence by US intelligence sources yesterday.
“They insisted that, despite claims to the contrary, the British secret service was financing the group behind the attempt on the Libyan leader’s life in February 1996.
“A bomb was planted under Gaddafi’s motorcade as he travelled 210 miles south-east of the capital, Tripoli. Several people were killed but Gaddafi survived, although he is reported to have been so badly shaken that he needed hospital treatment.
“Shayler, who was working on the Libya desk at the time of the attack, gave a detailed account of British involvement in the affair to the Mail on Sunday and the BBC’s Panorama.246
“British government officials have since declared that the assassination story is false. But the American sources, speaking on the understanding that they are not identified, claimed there could be at least some truth in what Shayler says.
“In 1990, they said, the US, Britain and others staged a joint intelligence effort that closed down a Libyan chemical weapons plant in Rabta. But by the end of 1992, drawing on satellite photos and reports from spies – some through British intelligence – the CIA had constructed a computer model of a second nerve gas plant Gaddafi was building.
“A secret conference at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia – to which British intelligence representatives were invited – decided to wage a covert battle to prevent Gadaffi from finishing his new factory.
“The intelligence community agreed, as a preliminary step, to bog down construction by stopping the delivery of machinery needed for the building. Congressional forces say that in 1995, and again in 1996, the CIA provided classified briefings on Libya during which it was said that Gadaffi was vulnerable on the home front with religious unrest spreading into the armed forces.
“The CIA was financing at least one tribal group and encouraging it to revolt. But according to a Washington-based Middle East expert: ‘The CIA is notoriously weak in recruiting humint (human intelligence) assets, especially in the Middle East.’
“This is not true of MI6 and, say the Americans, the British service turned to the Fighting Islamic Group (FIG) and its leader, Abu Abdullah Sadeq, who was living in London. It was this group that was behind the failed assassination attempt.
“Last week a former senior analyst with American intelligence said: ‘I’m sure that British intelligence has all the plausible deniability that it needs. Certainly there were contacts between MI6 and FIG.’
“Another source in Washington said that he understood MI6 had ‘provided various kinds of support’ to FIG, including financial help.”247
Mark Hollingsworth & Nick Fielding, 1999 Book Defending the Realm: Jury Didn’t Hear:
On 2 August 1998 “hints of a story about Gaddafi surfaced in the Sunday Times. It was clear that the story was beginning to leak out, but with the government injunction in force it would not appear in Britain. Lord Williams, the Home Office minister, appeared on BBC Radio 4 to deny that there had been an ‘official plot’ to kill Colonel Gaddafi. His comments only fuelled speculation that there had been an unofficial plot. The Foreign Office would say only that ‘the central claim that there was an official plot to kill Gaddafi is untrue’.
“The following week … the New York Times published a version of the story…. [It] was brief but accurate.”248
Sarah Lyall, New York Times Journalist, USA: 5 Aug 98 Article: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“Are Britain’s Covert Operatives Messing Up? Don’t Even Ask
“Did the British Government try to assassinate Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, the Libyan leader, in February 1996 by planting a bomb under his motorcade?…
“A sweeping injunction has barred [UK] newspapers and television news programs from publishing the embarrassing allegations about the inner workings of Britain’s security services, brought up by a disgruntled former officer [David Shayler]….
“‘I’ve known these things for something like 16 months, and I am not allowed to publish any of it,’ said Jonathan Holborow, editor of The Mail on Sunday….
“The Labor Government has taken the harshest possible stand against the news media. ‘The thinking behind the injunction is that because of the nature of [Shayler’s] work, it’s possible that national security can be damaged’, said a spokeswoman for the Home Office who spoke on condition that her name not be used.
“Strangely enough, the Government told the press earlier this week that it could report the allegation about the Qadaffi assassination plot in the vaguest possible terms because, the Home Office spokeswoman said, ‘it is untrue.’
“But it forbade reporting of related details, like the allegations that the agent in charge had ties to a shady right-wing fundamentalist group in Libya, and that he was paid $160,000….
“‘As a journalist in a free democracy,’ said Mr. Holborow, of The Mail on Sunday, this censorship ‘makes me feel pretty sick.
“‘We haven’t had this sort of thing since the war,’ he said.”249
BBC Panorama, 7 Aug 98250 Documentary: Jury Didn’t Hear:
David Shayler: The Libyan section [of MI6 and MI5] … had regular three- month meetings….
Mark Urban, BBC Diplomatic Editor: At one of the joint meetings251 Shayler learnt of the existence of an Arab agent, who was given the very English code name, Tunworth. That informer and his SIS case officer are the key figures in Shayler’s allegations…. MI5 and SIS252 each sent two or three officers to the meetings. The MI5 ones, who Panorama has established were present, were G9A/1, Shayler himself, two others using the MI5 internal acronym, G9A/15.253 The SIS ones were called, in their service jargon, PT16, PT16 ops B and the man meeting and running Tunworth, PT16/B. At one of these meetings Shayler discovered that PT16/B’s new agent was much more than a simple supplier of information.
Shayler: PT16/B, who was my kind of opposite number in SIS … we’d talk about how [Tunworth] was involved … in trying to plan an assassination attempt on Gaddafi, using a Libyan Islamic extremist group254. Basically … this was what [Tunworth] was coming up with, with SIS. I mean that was the reason for the initial walk-in255 and so on. He was: “I’ve got a plan, I’ve got people behind me. What I also need is the money to buy the things I need.”
Urban: Tunworth’s intelligence was, we’re told, shared with a small number of key officials. These reports are known in the secret jargon of Whitehall as CX. Shayler says a special CX report of Tunworth’s information was put out. It contained details of what was brought together for the plan to kill Gaddafi. As is normal procedure the CX report was sanitised – it didn’t explicitly spell out that PT16/B’s agent was himself a part of the conspiracy to kill Gaddafi.
Shayler: When I first heard this story I thought this was Boy’s Own, James Bond, SIS stuff, and we’ll probably hear about it for a month, then it will disappear and we’ll never hear anything about it again…. They were actually put out as a CX report to Whitehall, probably to the Foreign Office, and certainly obviously to us, probably to GCHQ, may not be to GCHQ.
Urban: So they’re obviously very excited about this.
Shayler: Very excited about it, well, but even then my thinking still was, ok, I mean, they’ve put this out, they’re obviously not saying they’re involved at the moment, because what they’re saying is they’ve got a source reporting on somebody else doing it, which is one of the ways of hiding the source of your intelligence. My thinking even then was this is still Boy’s Own stuff. And I don’t think this is going to happen. It’s like so many things they’ve told me – it’s not going to happen.
Urban: As the plan to kill Gaddafi took shape inside Libya, the SIS officer PT16/B met his agent Tunworth again. As SIS’ relationship with Tunworth deepened a substantial sum of money was changing hands.
Shayler: So we’re talking about sort of like a hundred thousand pounds256257 to fund the assassination attempt against Gaddafi, which of course will come from the British taxpayer.
Urban: Britain’s agent Tunworth was a part of a conspiracy. He became SIS’ link with a militant Islamic group, a hardline organisation headed by Abdullah Al Sadiq. In the past several Arab countries have said that Britain is harbouring Islamic militants…. Libya has publicly accused Britain of giving refuge to the leader of [this] militant Islamic group. In response to our enquiries the Foreign Office remarkably says it doesn’t know if Abdullah Al Sadiq is in this country.
Late in February 1996 the militant Islamic group went into action. They had learnt that Colonel Gaddafi’s car was going to pass on a road near the city of Sirte. The terrorists had put a bomb under the road and waited. They set it off. Several bodyguards are thought to have died. In the gun battle which followed three members of the militant Islamic group were also reportedly killed. Shortly after the attack failed, intelligence reports were received and sent back to London where they ended up on David Shayler’s desk.
Shayler: [The reports were] … saying an attempt had been made on Gaddafi’s life, that in fact a bomb had been put under a car in a cavalcade. Gaddafi was travelling in the cavalcade, but in a different car, so the explosion’s gone off and there’d been various casualties and fatalities, but in fact they’d got the wrong people.258 Now even then I was still thinking this could be the result of Islamic extremists … in Libya in general…. There was another intelligence report which wasn’t quite as detailed, but this again was supporting the fact that the thing had happened.
Urban: A few days later, at the offices of an Arabic newspaper in London a fax arrived at the desk of Camille Tawil. In it the militant Islamic group claimed responsibility for the attack. They also identified the members of its team who they said had been martyred in a bid to kill Gaddafi.
Camille Tawil, Journalist, Al-Hayat: I remember receiving a statement by fax from this group, Islamic Fighting Group, saying that they are responsible for an assassination attempt on the life of Gaddafi. I read the statement. It contained several names. The statement claimed that they were involved in the assassination attempt. I felt it was credible information given to me, but I wanted to verify the story. I contacted other Libyan groups and they gave me a similar account of what had happened. This is why I decided to publish the story.
Urban: Shayler didn’t realise the full implications of the intelligence report until the next meeting of the joint group. It was MI5’s turn to host. Officers filed into Room 470 at Thames House. Once again PT16/B, the MI6 man who ran Tunworth was there.
Shayler: It was only when I met PT16/B, discussing other matters with him, that he mentioned this thing in a kind of note of triumph saying, “Yes you know, we’ve done it…. We are the kind of intelligence service that people think we are, almost.” My reaction was one of total shock. I mean, this was kind of really against … what I thought I was doing in the intelligence services and against … what I’d been telling people. In my job at MI5 I knew quite a few journalists, because I used to be a journalist. From time to time in conversations it would come up about work with the intelligence services and so on. I would say these stories are rubbish or, you know, somebody’s completely misunderstood what’s going on. Yeah, the intelligence services don’t get up to the things that were reported…. I [was] very determined to tell these people this sort of thing didn’t go on, but this was a refutation of that. Suddenly this sort of thing does go on. I was absolutely astounded when I heard this was the case. Because as I say my thinking on the SIS was that they were involved in a Boy’s Own comic. This was very real. Suddenly we’re talking about tens of thousands of pounds of taxpayer’s money being used to attempt to assassinate a foreign head of state.
Urban: So, is that shocking claim about what went on in the key meeting here [at MI5 HQ] true? In the course of investigating Shayler’s allegations, I have corroborated many of the key facts. There were indeed a series of meetings involving Shayler and the SIS officer PT16/B. Britain did have advance knowledge of the attempt on Colonel Gaddafi’s life. And British intelligence was using its Arab agent Tunworth as a cut-out or go-between with Islamic militant groups in Libya.
All of this begs the question: Just exactly who knew what SIS was up to? SIS’ foreign operations are governed both by law and Whitehall convention. A sensitive foreign operation requires the intelligence agency to draw up a submission. This is sent across the Thames to the Foreign Office where officials may alter it. It then goes to the desk either of a junior minister or the Foreign Secretary himself.
Shayler: In this case obviously because you are giving money to a group to assassinate a foreign head of state they actually said to me, we’re going to submit, but we think it’s going all the way to the top.
Urban: And it did?
Shayler: Yes … that’s what he was saying. I mean the law, obviously not at the same time, but later on they said it had gone to the top and they got authority from the top.
Urban: But did they get authority from their political masters here at the Foreign Office? Well, two well-placed people have told me that the Tory ministers running this department at the time gave no such authorisation. This is open to several possibilities. The SIS man, PT16/B was lying at those crucial meetings, perhaps to try and impress his MI5 colleagues. Or that an assassination operation went ahead without any kind of political approval. In short, Britain’s intelligence service was operating completely out of control.
There are precedents for SIS using Arab assassination groups. In the 50s they organised a group of Egyptians for an attempt to kill President Nasser. It wasn’t authorised by ministers259 – it was discovered by Nasser, and after this scandal the current procedures were put in place. More recently there’s considerable evidence that Britain cooperated with the CIA in an attempt to overthrow Saddam Hussein. In this case though, the plots were authorised by ministers….
For Shayler, there’s little doubt that SIS masterminded the Gaddafi operation and that he’s morally justified in revealing it.
Shayler: Essentially you’re paying, like in the region of a hundred thousand pounds … to carry out the murder of a foreign head of state….
Urban: It is true of course that Shayler’s knowledge of this affair depends entirely on what the SIS man, PT16/B, told him at their meetings. But certain pieces of this Libyan jigsaw cannot easily be argued away by SIS.
There was an assassination attempt. Numerous Libyan sources confirm it. Britain did have a relationship with Tunworth. Any inquiry into David Shayler’s allegation will be able to find the key CX report which detailed the plot against Gaddafi, so showing Tunworth’s inside knowledge.
Shayler: Obviously [the CX report] wasn’t saying we have an agent who was going to go and assassinate Gaddafi – what [it] was saying is there is an agent reporting that there is a group who have … taken certain steps towards the assassination of Gaddafi. But … it was much longer than the sort of stuff you normally got from SIS. Whereas the actual report would normally be a sheet of A4, two sheets of A4 at the most and this was 3 or 4 sides of A4.260
Urban: Somewhere in Whitehall then there should be copies of that secret memo, detailing SIS’ advance knowledge of the plot and proximity to it. As for MI5’s copy, Shayler tells me he remembers the file number….
This week the government has denied the suggestion that there was any authorised – and they stress the “authorised” – operation to kill Colonel Gaddafi.
MI6, or SIS’, defence against these serious allegations may well involve some sort of play with words. Their man, PT16/B, could well argue that he was just paying his Arab agent for information – the sort of routine intelligence work which does not require specific ministerial approval. So when the government says, as it has during recent days, that no authorisation was given to a plot to kill Colonel Gaddafi, they may well be right.
But only a thorough-going inquiry would stand a chance of getting to the bottom of whether some intelligence officers played fast and loose with the rules. David Shayler has provided Panorama with other details about the Libyan operation and the people connected with it. Combined with our own information, it suggests that SIS have a very serious case to answer. Only somebody [with the] power to delve into their most secret archives could stand a real chance of getting to the bottom of what exactly they thought they were buying when they handed over £100,000 to agent Tunworth.
BBC News, 8 Aug 98 Article: BBC Screens Shayler Interview: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“The BBC has broadcast an interview with the former MI5 officer David Shayler in which he spoke about an alleged plot by the UK’s Secret Intelligence Service to kill Libyan leader Colonel Gaddafi.
“The interview [was] with Panorama…. In it, he told how a £100,000 payment to an agent ‘Tunworth’ funded a militant plot to murder Gaddafi.
“The film was not broadcast until Friday because the government has an injunction designed, it says, to protect national security. The BBC decided to go ahead with the transmission after parts of the script were submitted to government solicitors, who gave authority to proceed….
“Mr Shayler joined MI5 in 1994, as part of the G9 section dealing with Libya. At a joint meeting on Libya with the SIS he heard of an agent known as Tunworth. Also at the meeting was PT16/B, who controlled Tunworth and detailed Tunworth’s collaboration with an extremist group in Libya trying to kill Colonel Gaddafi.
“However the CX Report, circulated to officials, GCHQ and the Foreign Office, did not say that Tunworth was actively involved in the plot.
“Mr Shayler later learned that as the assassination plot gathered pace, about £100,000 was given to Tunworth.
“In February 1996 a bomb was planted under Gaddafi‘s motorcade, but it exploded under the wrong car. Several bodyguards were killed and in the ensuing gun battle three extremists were reportedly killed….
“Mr Urban obtained evidence that meetings did take place with PT16/B, that Britain had advance knowledge of the attempt on Gaddafi‘s life and that Tunworth was a go-between with Islamic militant groups in Libya.
“However, Foreign Office ministers at the time of the affair said they had not given any authorisation for a murder attempt.
“Mr Urban concluded that one answer was that security services had acted without any political authority.
“He said that the BBC had obtained other evidence of SIS activities, but these were withheld for security reasons.”261
Robin Cook, UK Foreign Secretary, 1997 to 2001: 9 Aug 98: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“The tale about the MI6 plot to assassinate Gaddafi is fantasy…. I have pursued these allegations. I am absolutely satisfied that the previous Foreign Secretary did not authorise any such assassination attempt. I’m perfectly satisfied that MI6 never put forward any such proposal for an assassination attempt. Nor have I seen anything in the 15 months I have been in the job which would suggest that MI6 has any interest, any role or any experience over the recent decade of any such escapade. There was no Government-inspired plan to assassinate Gaddafi. It is pure fantasy.
“I have already made my own enquiries. I have satisfied my mind. I see no basis for the reports in today’s papers about any forthcoming enquiry. There was no SIS proposal to do it, and I’m fairly clear there has never been any SIS involvement. I do wish people would recognise that somebody who has left another service – not the Secret Intelligence Service MI6, he was never in MI6 – is making allegations, no doubt for his own reasons….
“I’m perfectly clear that these allegations have no basis in fact. And secondly, I am quite clear that the SIS operations I have authorised have nothing remotely to do with the kind of fantasy that has been produced over the last two days.”262263
Nicholas Rufford, Sunday Times Journalist, UK: 13 Feb 00 Article: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“Revealed: Cook Misled Public Over Libya Plot
“A top-secret report264 linking MI6 with a failed attempt to assassinate Colonel Gadaffi appeared on an American internet site yesterday, refuting Robin Cook‘s claim that British intelligence was not involved.
“The document, marked ‘UK Eyes Alpha’, details contacts between MI6 and a group of Middle Eastern plotters who tried unsuccessfully to blow up Gadaffi’s motorcade.
“It reveals that British intelligence knew of the 1996 assassination attempt at least two months in advance. A member of the rebel group gave detailed intelligence to his MI6 handler in anticipation of help from Britain.
“The foreign secretary, who said 18 months ago that MI6 had ‘no interest’ in any such plot, faced calls for a parliamentary inquiry.
“The report, coded CX95/ 53452, was passed to senior Foreign Office officials. It revealed when and where the assassination attempt was due and said that at least 250 British-made weapons were distributed among the plotters.
“Allegations of a plot to kill Gadaffi, said to involve MI6, emerged 18 months ago. British newspapers were prevented from publishing the claims, but details later appeared in The New York Times.
“Arab newspapers reported that the Libyan leader had only narrowly survived. A number of his bodyguards and would-be assassins died….
“There will be speculation, that the intelligence services were out of control, or that Cook was not told the full facts by Foreign Office staff….
“Francis Maude, the shadow foreign secretary, called for an immediate investigation: ‘Did Cook conceal the truth? Was it kept from him, or did he ignore it?’ he said….
“A Foreign Office spokesman defended Cook‘s conduct. ‘The foreign secretary did not mislead the public,’ he said. ‘At the time of the Frost interview he was not asked if MI6 knew about the plot. He was asked whether MI6 instigated it or was involved in it. Those were the allegations around at the time.’…
“The four-page CX document, published on the Yahoo! website, carries a coded header sheet that appears to confirm its authenticity…. It reveals that in November 1995 links were established between a plotter and ‘HMG’ – Her Majesty’s government….
“The text published on the web is blanked out at one point and the words ‘removed to protect Tunworth‘s identity’ inserted. Tunworth is the code-name assigned to the source….
“The report was passed to Sir John Coles, then the most senior civil servant in the Foreign Office, as well as to GCHQ, the government listening station, MI5 and the Ministry of Defence. It was also relayed to British stations in Tunis, Cairo and Washington….
“The claim that MI6 was involved in trying to kill Gadaffi was first made in August 1998 by David Shayler….
“Accounts published in Arab newspapers confirmed that an assassination attempt had taken place. Al-Hayat, the London- based Arab newspaper, reported that rebels had attacked Gadaffi’s motorcade near the city of Sirte in February 1996. Several bystanders were said to have been killed….
“The leaking of the CX report raises wider questions about the control of secret government material which finds its way onto the internet….
“The Sunday Times has complied with a request by Rear-Admiral Nick Wilkinson, secretary of the government’s defence, press and broadcasting advisory committee, not to print the address of the website on which the CX report is published….”265
Martin Hickman, The Independent, UK: 13 Feb 00 Article: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“An intelligence report placed on the world wide web has reportedly disclosed that British intelligence knew at least two months in advance that there would be an attempt to blow up Gaddafi….
“CX reports reportedly summarise MI6’s key intelligence findings and are circulated to the Prime Minister, the Cabinet Office and the Joint Intelligence Committee.
“Whitehall sources confirmed to The Sunday Times that the four page report – which carried a coded header sheet – was genuine….
“In a statement, the Foreign Office declined to state that the intelligence report was a fake. And it conceded that the British Government had known of plots against Gaddafi.
“The statement read: ‘In August 1998, interviewed on Breakfast With Frost, the Foreign Secretary said: “… I am absolutely satisfied that the previous Foreign Secretary did not authorise any such assassination attempt … nor have I seen anything which would suggest that SIS has any interest, any role, or any experience over the recent decade of any such escapade.”
“‘The Foreign Secretary went on: “… there was no Government-inspired plot to assassinate Gaddafi, there was no SIS proposal to do it”.’
“The statement added: ‘Nothing in the alleged intelligence report posted on the Internet invalidates what the Foreign Secretary said. Nor have we ever denied that we knew of plots against Gaddafi.’
“However, a storm is likely to engulf the Foreign Secretary over the disclosure that British intelligence apparently knew about the plot in advance.”266
BBC News, 15 Feb 00 Article: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“Robin Cook has denied misleading the public following the publication of a document on the internet alleging British involvement [in a plot to assassinate Gaddafi]. He said he was ‘satisfied’ that the intelligence services had no involvement in an ‘escapade’ to kill the Colonel.
“Mr Cook also denied two years ago that British security services had been involved in a bombing which narrowly failed to kill Colonel Gaddafi and overthrow his regime….
“The document published on the internet and marked ‘UK eyes alpha’ alleges that MI6 had been told of the plot two months before it was said to have taken place in February 1996.
“But Mr Cook told the BBC: ‘I accept absolutely nothing in the way of having misled the British public. What I said two years ago was that I was absolutely satisfied that the previous foreign secretary did not authorise an assassination attempt, that the SIS never put forward such a proposal and in my time in office I have never seen any evidence that the SIS had any interest in such escapades.
“‘There is absolutely nothing in this supposed intelligence document which would suggest otherwise. Indeed this document ends with the contact telling the SIS that the other plotters are unhappy about him even telling SIS, which rather proves that SIS were not manipulating this coup attempt.’
“Mr Cook refused to confirm whether the document was genuine or a forgery. But despite this, Rear Admiral Nick Wilkinson, secretary of the D notice committee which operates an agreed self-censorship system with the media on matters of national security, asked journalists not to publish the document’s website address….
“Shadow foreign secretary Francis Maude said that the documents raised ‘serious questions’ over Mr Cook‘s previous comments and demanded an immediate inquiry.
“And the Liberal Democrat’s foreign affairs spokesman Menzies Campbell said: ‘Knowing that there were plots against Gaddafi is one thing, but being involved in them is something entirely different.’
“The Libyan government has summoned Britain’s ambassador to ask to take part in any investigations over the plot.”267
Nick Cohen, Observer Journalist, UK: 12 Mar 00 Article: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“The ‘friends of Robin Cook‘, as we polite journalists call the Foreign Secretary when we want to be discreet, are apprehensive. He’s ‘very edgy about Shayler,’ they/he are whispering. ‘He knows he hasn’t been told the whole truth by MI6’….
“David Shayler alleged in 1998 that MI6, the Secret Intelligence Service, had been involved in an attempted coup against Gadaffi…. Cook‘s response was firm and suspiciously fast. MI6 had investigated the disillusioned spook’s Libyan accusations in the space of a few hours. He could assure the nation that they were nothing more than ‘pure fantasy‘.
“Earlier this year, an MI6 report headed ‘UK Eyes Alpha‘, was placed on the Internet. It said MI6 was indeed told by a ‘delicate source’ about a plot to kill the Libyan leader two months before a bungled coup took place in February 1996….
“It is possible that Robin Cook was fibbing when he said that Shayler was a fantasist, but not, in my view, likely. Cook‘s ‘friends‘ say that MI6 told him the allegations were nonsense, and he thus backed the Foreign Office‘s covert wing in good faith. What else was he meant to do? Malcolm Rifkind, the Foreign Secretary in 1996, was equally gullible. When the Libyan document was leaked in February, he was dismissive. Even MI6 has not tried to pretend it is anything but genuine, but Rifkind said: ‘SIS has never put forward such a proposal for an assassination attempt and in my time in office I have never seen any evidence that SIS is interested in such an escapade.’ Richard Norton-Taylor of the Guardian, who knows more about the espionage bureaucracies than most, discovered with ease the service’s contempt for mere elected politicians. A ‘well-placed source’ told him Rifkind would have been kept in ignorance. ‘It was up to MI6 to judge what to tell Ministers about their activities,’ the spy smugged.”268
Mark Hollingsworth, Guardian Journalist and Author, UK: 17 Mar 00 Article: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“We were sitting in a secluded office. ‘Do you have any documents to back up what you are saying?’ I asked David Shayler, the since-famous MI5 whistleblower. It was Wednesday, August 20 1997…. To my astonishment, he admitted there were indeed some papers.
“The next day a package of 28 documents arrived. Most were photocopies, although at least one was an original with a circulation sheet still attached. They were mainly internal MI5 reports, marked ‘Top Secret UK Eyes Alpha Umbra Gamma’ … ‘UK-US Eyes Only’ … ‘Confidential’, and so on. These included papers about Libyan dissidents by Shayler himself; a report entitled ‘Investigation of Subversive Organisations’; and details of meetings between foreign office and Libyan officials in Cairo….
“Shayler had been careful … not to take any ‘raw’ intelligence reports that might identify agents or informers. His exercise was purely to demonstrate his credibility….
“One important document, however, was absent from that dossier: the intelligence report which specifically links MI6 with the attempt to assassinate Colonel Gadafy. The recent leak of this document, on an American internet site, was devastating because it showed that British intelligence knew of the murder plot two months in advance, although the foreign secretary, Robin Cook, had described Shayler‘s original allegation as ‘pure fantasy’. An Arab dissident was passing detailed information to his MI6 handler in anticipation of British assistance….
“Clearly, MI5 and MI6 are now terrified about more humiliating leaks. But the really interesting question is: who leaked that MI6 document?
“Shayler himself did not have this report in his own dossier in 1997. (If he had hidden it from us all at the time, he would certainly have distributed it 18 months ago when the foreign secretary first denounced him as a fantasist.) The logical conclusion is that the MI6 document may have been separately leaked from within the intelligence community or the foreign office. This has frightening implications for those bodies. It suggests there is another mole and that Shayler has more support in Whitehall than has been realised.
“And it corroborates my own information that there are other MI5 and MI6 officers who agree with Shayler‘s analysis. (The fact that half of the 1991 intake of MI5 officers had resigned by 1996 shows that Shayler was hardly a lone voice.)”269
Replica of an MI6 document that appeared anonymously on a US internet site on 14 February 2000. The issue of authenticity is discussed in the next Comment section. Ex-MI5 officer, David Shayler, has stated that the document is one that he received a copy of in December 1995 during his time in charge of the MI5 Libya desk. A listing of explanations of codes and abbreviations appears below.270 271
Explanation of codes and abbreviations found in the above MI6 document:272
GG6 = MI5 agent running the counter Mid-East terrorism section
GG9 = MI5’s counter Mid-East terrorism section
NDO = MI5 Night Duty Officer
041807Z DEC 95 = Time the telegram arrived: 1807 or 6.07 p.m. on 4 December 1995; Z = Zulu time or GMT (Greenwich Mean Time)
FM London = From London – the London station of MI6 HQ at Vauxhall Cross
TO PUSD = To Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department in the FCO273
185 = 185th telegram in 1995 from London to PUSD274
Research Dept = Research Department of the FCO
MOD = Ministry of Defence
Security Service = MI5
Immediate = 2nd level of urgency – the 4 levels are: Flash, Immediate, Priority, Routine
UK Secret = UK only – not to be shared with agencies in other countries
Delicate Source = A sensitively placed human source is involved
UK Eyes Alpha = Limited to certain departments within the UK
2LIAPX01 = Joint Intelligence Committee requirement code
DICTD = Drugs, International Crime and Terrorism Department in the FCO
NENAD = North-East and North Africa Department in the FCO
RAD – ME = Research and Analysis Department – Middle East
DI = Defence Intelligence within the Ministry of Defence
JIC = Joint Intelligence Committee
GCHQ = Government Communications Headquarters
G9A5275 = David Shayler – Head of Libyan desk
G6A5 and G6A3 = MI5 handlers of Libyan agents
CX276 = Intelligence Report
95/53452 = Unique reference number for the report277
R/ME/C = Libyan requirements officer in MI6 – the person who writes up and sends the report
GTN = Government Telephone Network
Comment:Scott Baker said that the Gaddafi plot “is not an issue in these inquests”.
When Baker made the decisions on what material the inquest would cover, one of the key issues he had to confront was the possible involvement of MI6 in the 1997 Paris crash. In fact, in his Opening Remarks to the jury, Baker laid down eight questions that he said the inquest must address – one of these was: “Whether the British Security Services or any other country’s security services had any involvement in the collision”.278
Allegations had been made:
Given that MI6 is such a secretive organisation – see earlier – it is logical that if they assassinated Princess Diana and Dodi Fayed, they are hardly going to put their hand up and announce that to the inquest.
In this situation, circumstantial evidence becomes very significant – as does the answer to the question: Is there any evidence that could link MI6 to other assassinations in a similar time frame to the Paris crash?
Prior to the inquest there were three publicly known allegations of MI6 involvement in assassination plots in the 1990s:
In the months leading up to the 2007 inquest the judge, Scott Baker, had to make a decision about how this issue of MI6 assassination plots would be handled in the evidence the jury would hear.
Baker had several choices – he could ignore the issue of alleged assassination plots altogether; he could address one or two of the cases (Milosevic, Saddam or Gaddafi); or he could have addressed all three cases.
If Baker had ignored all of these plots, he would have opened himself up to criticism that he had failed to deal with one of the most important aspects of the Diana case: possible evidence of high-level assassination plots in a similar time-frame by the prime suspect (MI6) named in the allegations (see above).
The decision Baker made was to deal with the Milosevic case, but ignore the Gaddafi and Saddam plot evidence. Baker was very determined in this – as we have seen, when the issue of MI6 involvement in the Gaddafi plot came up, Baker was quick to close it down: “This is not an issue in these inquests.”
Instead Baker used up three or four inquest days281 addressing the evidence relating to the Milosevic plot.
The question is: Why did Baker choose to address the Milosevic plot and ignore the Gaddafi and Saddam plots?
There are critical differences between the three plots:
The Saddam plot didn’t reach the execution stage, but was very advanced – a base had been set up in Jordan and up to 80 people were executed after Saddam found out about it.
The Milosevic plot was a single proposal document which appeared to get no further than that and according to MI6 it was destroyed.
There is no evidence of UK-based prior knowledge of the Milosevic or Saddam plots outside of MI6.
There is a likelihood that MI6 would have been more comfortable dealing with the Milosevic plot, rather than the Gaddafi or Saddam plots, at the inquest.
The Paget report addressed the MI6 response to the Milosevic allegation285, but when it came to addressing the Gaddafi plot, it says: “There was an independent investigation by the MPS into the ‘Gadaffi allegation’. Operation Paget enquiries have shown there is no evidence to support [Shayler’s] assessment that there is any link to this investigation.”
Paget stated their assessment that “there is no evidence … [of] any link to this [Diana] investigation”. Paget does not indicate that there is nothing to the Gaddafi allegations – just that they believe there is no link between that plot and the Paris crash.
Paget completely ignored the existence of the plot to assassinate Saddam Hussein.
In December 2000, just 10 months after the CX report was placed on the internet, the British police interviewed David Shayler. The MPS’ final report was completed 9 months later, in September 2001.
The police wrote to Shayler on 9 November 2001: “As you know, the Metropolitan Police Service undertook an assessment of the available material and submitted two reports to the Crown Prosecution Service, an interim report in February 2001 and a final report in September 2001. The police enquiry has been extremely thorough, examining all relevant material…. Final advice from the Crown Prosecution Service has now been received, saying that the material does not substantiate the allegation made by David Shayler.”286
It is significant that although the MPS inquiry took 9 months – from December 2000 to September 2001 – no detail from it has ever been made public.
The following table compares the strength, clarity and relevance of evidence in the Milosevic, Gaddafi and Saddam plots.
When the three plots are compared – as in the above table – it becomes obvious that the stronger and clearest case indicating MI6 involvement in an advanced assassination plot is the 1996 Gaddafi plot, then the Saddam plot – not so much the Milosevic plot.287
The main argument supporting the relevance of the Milosevic plot is the similarities in methodology to the Paris crash – a crash in a tunnel using a strobe flash light to disorientate the driver. This indicates that the Milosevic plot should have been addressed at the inquest, but certainly not at the exclusion of either the Gaddafi or Saddam plots. Given that MI6 were prime suspects in the Paris crash, the evidence regarding all three plots should have been dealt with in front of the jury.
That did not occur.
This was the situation Scott Baker was confronted with in 2007, whilst deciding which evidence to cover at the upcoming inquest. The fact that Baker chose not to address the evidence relating to the Gaddafi or Saddam plots is a further indication that Baker is a corrupt judge.
This evidence also raises the possibility of collusion between Baker and MI6.
The inquest spent around three days dealing with the Milosevic plot.288 There was no existing documentary evidence – it was simply the word of ex-MI6 agent Richard Tomlinson against a stream of former and current MI6 officers: Dearlove, Miss X, Mr A, Mr H, Ms F, Mr E and Mr I.
The jury heard Tomlinson give evidence on 13 February 2008, then over the next two to three weeks – finishing on February 29 – they heard a succession of seven MI6 witnesses disputing his account.
The jury would probably have come away believing the MI6 accounts, but when one considers the earlier and later evidence on the honesty of MI6 officers, serious questions are raised about whether their evidence can be relied on.
Richard Keen’s cross-examination of X regarding the Gaddafi plot could be significant. Keen suggested to X that a search of the MI6 P file relating to Muammar Gaddafi “would be a simple way of checking whether or not … the Secret Intelligence Service did advance … proposals” for assassinations.
This is when – as earlier stated – Baker quickly tried to close this line of questioning down: “this is not an issue in these inquests”. Baker went on to say: “we also have Sir Richard [Dearlove]‘s evidence on this”.
Keen correctly replies by describing Dearlove’s evidence on the central issue here – whether MI6 assassinates people. Keen states that Dearlove said “the Secret Intelligence Service would never contemplate such an action or operation, and that was challenged by my learned friend, Mr Mansfield”. Keen explains that his intent is to establish whether “there have been occasions where [assassinations] have been contemplated by the Secret Intelligence Service”.
This argument by Keen appears to put Baker in a difficult spot289 – why wouldn’t the evidence regarding the Gaddafi plot be looked at, if we are interested in determining the MI6 approach towards assassinations?
This is when Ian Burnett, the inquest lawyer, chimes in to rescue Baker, by completely changing the subject – instead of dealing with the issue of Dearlove’s evidence regarding MI6’s approach to assassinations, Burnett starts fully relating Dearlove’s account of the handling of the Gaddafi plot by MI6 and the MPS investigation.
At the conclusion of Burnett’s recount of this, X – no doubt relieved that she too has been rescued from dealing with the Gaddafi plot – states: “I cannot add anything to what you have already said there”.
Although Keen has been forced – by Baker and Burnett acting together – to abandon his original line of cross-examination, he still manages to include the Gaddafi plot in his next question: “Given that there was an investigation of that alleged conspiracy to murder [Gaddafi], have you any explanation as to why there wasn’t a similar investigation in respect of Mr A‘s proposal?”
X’s answer is significant: “Only that Mr A‘s proposal, I do not think, ever really got beyond being just an idea.”
X appears to have inadvertently admitted that the Gaddafi plot was “beyond being just an idea” – otherwise there would not have been an MPS investigation.
In other words: the proposal of Mr A never “really got beyond being just an idea”, so there was no investigation. By implication though, in the case of the Gaddafi plot, there was an investigation, therefore it must have got beyond just being an idea.
At the inquest Baker went to great lengths to investigate the Milosevic plot, knowing that it revolved around a document that no longer existed – to this end, he arranged for the cross-examination of Tomlinson, Dearlove, X, A, E, H and I, and the reading of the statement of F.
Of more importance were the accounts of officers involved in the Gaddafi plot – a plot that led to a full-fledged attempt on the life of Muammar Gaddafi.
There are 15 people who could and should have been cross-examined. They were:
The point is that evidence indicating MI6 could have been involved in assassination attempts in the year prior to the Paris crash was of critical importance to this inquest. If Baker had been serious about finding out if MI6 had a role in the assassination of Princess Diana, he should have made it his business to establish whether Shayler’s claims were credible. Cross-examination of MI6 and MI5 officers could have helped in this.
None of this ever occurred – instead Baker said: “This is not an issue in these inquests.”
Why?
It could be significant that the British government has made immense efforts to suppress David Shayler’s evidence – this has included:
In early August 1998, when Cook refuted Shayler’s allegations he said:
All of Robin Cook’s statements were categorical – “the tale … is fantasy”; “absolutely satisfied”, “perfectly satisfied”, “nor have I seen anything”, “there was no”, “it is pure fantasy”, “I’m perfectly clear”, “I am quite clear” – except for one:
“I’m fairly clear there has never been any SIS involvement”.
Cook is categorically denying the receipt by the government of a proposal from MI6, but he appears to leave open the possibility of MI6 involvement without notifying the government of the day.
In 2000, Malcolm Rifkind – the 1996 Foreign Secretary – also denied knowledge of a proposal to government by MI6: “SIS has never put forward such a proposal for an assassination attempt and … I have never seen any evidence that SIS is interested in such an escapade.”
The issue of how high this proposal went is discussed later.
After the emergence of the CX document in February 2000, Cook was challenged on what he had said in 1998. Cook insisted that he hadn’t “misled the British public” and restated his 1998 position for the media: “What I said two years ago348 was that I was absolutely satisfied that the previous foreign secretary did not authorise an assassination attempt, that the SIS never put forward such a proposal and … I have never seen any evidence that the SIS had any interest in such escapades.”
In restating his 1998 position, Cook actually proceeded to mislead the public by missing out his most significant statements: “the tale about the MI6 plot to assassinate Gaddafi is fantasy”; “I’m perfectly clear that these allegations have no basis in fact” and “it is pure fantasy”.
When, in February 2000, the Foreign Office made its official statement outlining what Cook had said two years earlier, it also proceeded to mislead the public.349 The Foreign Office also chose to omit Cook’s most critical comments: “the tale about the MI6 plot to assassinate Gaddafi is fantasy”; “I’m perfectly clear that these allegations have no basis in fact” and “it is pure fantasy”.
Cook also said in 1998: “I do wish people would recognise that somebody who has left another service – not the Secret Intelligence Service MI6, he was never in MI6 – is making allegations, no doubt for his own reasons.”
Cook appears to be suggesting that because Shayler was not in MI6 – he was head of the Libyan subsection of MI5350 – he wouldn’t be privy to an MI6 operation.
Inquest lawyer Ian Burnett and Richard Dearlove also focused on this at the inquest:
Dearlove: “This is an allegation that was made by a former Security Service officer, David Shayler….”
Burnett: “Now, Shayler, you say, was a former Security Service officer; that is MI5.”
Dearlove: “MI5.”
Burnett: “Not MI6, as it happens.”
Dearlove: “Not MI6.”
In contrast, in Shayler’s Panorama interview he provided a detailed account of regular meetings between MI5 and MI6.351
Shayler’s evidence is supported by Stephen Dorril in his book MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations. Dorril describes changes made in January 1993 under the directorship of Colin McColl: “Changes included closer cooperation with [MI6’s] traditional rival, the Security Service (MI5), including the establishment of joint sections to cover the Middle East and Russia, particularly in the area of terrorism, and a shared research and development department….”352
So although Cook, Burnett and Dearlove353 imply that Shayler, as head of the MI5 Libyan subsection, would not be a reliable witness of an MI6 operation in Libya, Dorril shows that just three years earlier a decision had been made to create a “joint [MI6-MI5 section] to cover the Middle East”.
In the February 2000 declaration from the Foreign Office they said in reference to the CX document: “Nor have we ever denied that we knew of plots against Gaddafi.”
The issue here is that the CX document was raised on 4 December 1995 and the plot took place in February 1996 and since the document included FCO addressees, the issue of prior knowledge arises.
This statement appears to be an admission on the part of the FCO of prior knowledge of the plot to assassinate Gaddafi.
There appear to be only three possible positions the FCO could have in relation to the plot:
The sudden appearance of the CX document in early February 2000 appeared to eliminate the first possibility – the document indicates that the FCO was provided prior knowledge of the plot from MI6.
Is the CX 95/53452 document authentic?
The evidence is:
Shayler said, in the same program: “They were actually put out as a CX report to Whitehall, probably to the Foreign Office, and certainly obviously to us [MI5], probably to GCHQ, may not be to GCHQ.”
The CX report reads: “In late November 1995 [Tunworth] described plans, in which he was involved, to overthrow Colonel Qadahfi…. The coup plotters would launch a direct attack on Qadahfi and would either arrest him or kill him.”
It also states that the report was sent to Whitehall, the FCO, MI5 and GCHQ.
Urban stated that the CX report “didn’t explicitly spell out that PT16/B’s agent [Tunworth] was himself a part of the conspiracy to kill Gaddafi”, yet the report does say that Tunworth “described plans, in which he was involved, to overthrow Colonel Qadahfi”.
This is a direct conflict.
There are four main possibilities:
Before establishing which of these is correct, it is essential to view this issue in the context of the other evidence relating to the authenticity of the CX report:
This shows that instead of attempting to deny the authenticity of the CX document the FCO tried to address the issues the document raised.
This comment reveals that Cook addressed the CX document as though it was authentic.356
These points raise the following questions: If the CX document is not authentic then why was it addressed as though it was authentic by Cook and the FCO? And why hasn’t any one of the involved organisations or people – MI6, MI5, Cook, Rifkin, the FCO – disowned the document?
Returning now to the above conflict between the Panorama program and the CX document.
In 1998 Urban, presumably paraphrasing Shayler, said the CX document did not explicitly show Tunworth as “part of the conspiracy” but in 2000 the CX document said Tunworth “was involved”.
There are a couple of points:
This view is also supported in Shayler’s difficulty in recalling during the interview precisely who the CX document was addressed to – “probably to the Foreign Office … probably to GCHQ, may not be to GCHQ”.
In fact, the document was addressed to the FCO and GCHQ, among the other recipients.
Hollingsworth also pointed out362 that it was unlikely Shayler had possession of the CX document – and therefore he would not have been in a position to arrange its appearance on the worldwide web: “Shayler himself did not have this [CX] report in his own dossier in 1997. (If he had hidden it from us all at the time, he would certainly have distributed it 18 months ago when the foreign secretary first denounced him as a fantasist.)”
Regarding the four possibilities – listed above – explaining the conflict of evidence relating to Tunworth’s involvement, I suggest that the CX document did exist and the evidence points to it being authentic. I further suggest that either Shayler had an incorrect recall or Urban, on the program, has misstated Shayler’s position.
As shown above, after the unexpected release of the CX document, Cook said: “Indeed this document ends with the contact363 telling the SIS that the other plotters are unhappy about him even telling SIS, which rather proves that SIS were not manipulating this coup attempt.”
Is this true?
Is it true that the fact that “the other plotters are unhappy about [Tunworth] … telling SIS … proves that SIS were not manipulating this coup attempt”?
The truth is that there is no connection between the other plotters being unhappy with Tunworth telling MI6 and whether MI6 are involved or “manipulating” the assassination plot.
Cook’s statement on this is completely bereft of logic.
When one considers that these government statements on serious issues are presumably well thought through, this glaring lack of logic indicates the possibility that Cook panicked following the CX document release – possibly as a result of his earlier “no basis in fact” and “it is pure fantasy” comments.
In summary, Cook has made two very basic errors in his short 2000 statement – both of which could have misled the public:364
Was MI6 involved in the 1996 plot to assassinate Muammar Gaddafi?
The CX document reveals that Tunworth was supplying information to MI6.
The question is: Why?
Why would Tunworth supply information to MI6?
The CX report reads: “The officer was disclosing this information in the hope that if the coup was successful, the new government could enlist HMG365 support.”
Machon explains: “As a CX report going out to ministers, it could not detail the illegal payments” from MI6 to Tunworth.366367
The fact that Tunworth was supplying intelligence information to MI6, automatically makes him an MI6 agent and it is obvious that Tunworth would not have provided the intelligence in the CX report without receiving something in return.368
Whether MI6 provided material or monetary support for the assassination plot, or personal benefits to Tunworth, or both, the evidence – Shayler, Machon, the CX report – indicates that an MI6 agent, Tunworth, was involved in the February 1996 plot to assassinate Muammar Gaddafi.
Since Tunworth was involved and Tunworth was an MI6 agent, then that means MI6 was involved.
There are other factors – outside of the accounts from Shayler and Machon – that link MI6 to the Gaddafi assassination plot:
The above evidence – the implications of the information in the CX report, the US intelligence corroboration, the British suppression – indicates that David Shayler370 was telling the truth when he went to the media in 1997 with his allegations of MI6 involvement in the Gaddafi assassination plot.
There are key aspects of Shayler’s evidence that cannot easily be independently verified – e.g. the allegation that MI6 paid Tunworth $US120,000 in three instalments cannot be supported without witness evidence from key officers in MI6 and MI5, Tunworth or an independent review of the financial records of MI6.
But this failure to investigate does not render Shayler’s evidence false – in fact, it suggests the opposite. The indication is that the authorities have not allowed the evidence to become public knowledge because it is not in the interests of the British Establishment.
How high did the knowledge and authorisation of the Gaddafi assassination plot go – in MI6, MI5, the FCO and the Tory government?
Shayler stated: “Throughout this process, I briefed my line manager, G9A/1 – Jerry Mahoney until December 1995, Paul Slim after that – about these developments…. It is inconceivable that G9A/1 did not think an MI6-funded plot to engineer a coup in Libya was worthy of mentioning to his line manager, G9/0, Paul Mitchell. In turn, it is unthinkable that Mitchell did not raise the matter with his line management who would have informed his boss until the DG herself [Stella Rimington] had been made aware….”
Because there were no personnel from MI5 cross-examined or heard from during the inquest, it is impossible to verify Shayler’s account of this – except to say, it appears logical. It is logical that an issue of this significance – MI6 involvement in a plot to assassinate a foreign leader – would have gone to the top of MI5.
And if it didn’t, one could be justified in asking: “Why didn’t it?”
Annie Machon says in her book: “Although PT16/B never specifically mentioned it, it was tacitly understood371 that Watson372 was working with the approval of his direct line manager, PT16, Richard Bartlett.”
An MI6 operation of this nature – which included the payment of around $US120,000 – would have required the knowledge of the financial section of the organisation. I suggest that it would have been impossible for PT16/B to raise cheques or cash totalling $US120,000 without someone else in MI6 being aware of it – either ahead of time, at the time, or after the event.
I also suggest that, in a similar way to Shayler’s description of the upline contact in MI5, the knowledge of this operation would have gone all the way to the top – MI6 chief, David Spedding.373374375
Again, there is no easy way to confirm this because, although Baker allowed some MI6 officers to be cross-examined during the inquest, it was not regarding the Gaddafi plot, but instead the Milosevic plot – see earlier.
The evidence that David Watson was sharing this information on the Gaddafi plot with Shayler and also Jackie Barker376 in MI5 is another indication that he would have spoken to others in MI6 about it.
Added to this evidence is the clear existence of the CX report and Shayler’s recollection of a later CX report “shopping list”.
Did MI6 seek authorisation from the Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind?
Machon states: “At some point … Watson mentioned that the submission – MI6 jargon for the letter requesting permission from the Foreign Office for otherwise illegal operations – was going to go ‘all the way to the top’. In about January 1996, Watson told [Shayler] that the submission had been successful, indicating that the Foreign Secretary himself had signed the document permitting the operation.”
On Panorama Shayler said: “They actually said to me, ‘we’re going to submit, but we think it’s going all the way to the top’.” Urban then asked: “And it did?” Shayler: “Yes … that’s what he was saying…. Later on they said it had gone to the top and they got authority from the top.”
Machon referred to a second CX report: “David remembers another MI6 CX report being issued about the plot in early 1996. It was a shopping list of the group’s requirements to carry out the coup, including the supply of weapons and basics like jeeps and tents.”
This circulation of FIG’s shopping list for the coup is a possible further indication that FCO approval had been sought and granted.
In conflict with the above evidence, Mark Urban, the Panorama journalist stated: “Two well-placed people have told me that the Tory ministers running this department377 at the time gave no … authorisation” for the Gaddafi assassination plot.
Malcolm Rifkind, the Foreign Secretary in 1996, has said: “SIS has never put forward such a proposal for an assassination attempt”.
Rifkind’s successor, Robin Cook, supported this: “I’m perfectly satisfied that MI6 never put forward any such proposal for an assassination attempt”.378
But then, we have already seen that Cook misled the British public on at least three occasions: 1) in 1998, when he called MI6 involvement in the Gaddafi plot a “fantasy” three times in the one statement; 2) in 2000, when he misquoted his earlier 1998 statement, deliberately leaving out any mention of “fantasy”; 3) in 1998, by indicating that Shayler couldn’t have known about an MI6 operation, because he was an MI5 officer.
There is a possibility that both Cook and Rifkind have lied in their denials that MI6 sought authorisation for their involvement in the Gaddafi plot.
Urban has stated that “two well-placed people” told him that the Foreign Secretary “gave no … authorisation” for the plot.
Why have these two people remained anonymous? All they are doing is stating the government line, so why – if they are telling the truth – was it necessary for them to remain anonymous?
I suggest that if the Tory government did provide authorisation for this ill-fated plot, then it would be a very brave official indeed, who would confirm that to the media. In other words, I suggest that FCO officials could have to abide by a similar requirement to MI5 and MI6 officers – to speak in the national interest, even if that involves the telling of lies (see earlier).
In summary, Shayler’s 1997 account, based on his communications with MI6 officer, David Watson – made public in 2000 – essentially stacks up when it is compared to the documentary evidence from the CX report (this has been covered above).
I suggest there is no reason to disbelieve Shayler’s additional evidence – from the same source – that a) a sum of approximately $US120,000 was supplied to Tunworth, and b) that the Gaddafi assassination operation was approved by the Foreign Secretary of the day, Malcolm Rifkind.379
Conversely, I suggest that it is very plausible that the information from Cook, Rifkind and employees of the FCO is misinformation – designed to quell any potential public disquiet over the actions of the British government.
These people should have been subjected to cross-examination in a public forum – such as the Diana inquest – but that has never occurred.380381
The inquest heard that MI6 employs elements of the Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS) to carry out missions on its behalf.
Richard Tomlinson, Ex-MI6 Officer: 13 Feb 08: 51.4:
Mansfield: Q. Now MI6 or SIS, could it be described in this way in terms of its general role? Part of it was the acquisition and collation of information from a variety of sources. That is one role. The other role was to oversee objectives which might be carried out by others?
A. Yes, that is the case, yes….
Q…. In relation to the tasks that might be carried out by others, is that generally termed “the increment“?
A. Yes, okay – obviously I do not want to say too much on this subject, but I agree, yes.
Q. That covers – it may cover more – two of the organisations you have already mentioned, the SAS, Special Air Service – is that right?
A. That is correct, yes.
Q. – and SBS, Special Boat Service?382
A. Yes.
Q. Because MI6 itself does not contain operatives with the relevant skills to carry out particular practical tasks abroad?
A. That is exactly the case, yes.
At 91.2: Q. [Quoting from a September 1998 letter by Tomlinson] “The second method383 was to use the increment … a small cell of the SAS or SBS which is especially selected and trained to carry out operations exclusively for MI5/MI6 to infiltrate Serbia and attack Milosevic, either with a bomb or sniper ambush. [A] argued that this plan would be the most reliable, but would be undeniable if it went wrong.” Does it follow that if it went right, it would be deniable?
A. Well, if it went right anonymously, they would have got out of the country anonymously so there would never have been any question of them being caught and interrogated. But clearly, if it went wrong and they were caught and interrogated, it would be very difficult to deny them because no British Government would really leave their highly trained and very loyal soldiers to be imprisoned in that fashion, so the British Government would have to be involved if they were, for some reason, compromised and caught.
Richard Dearlove, MI6 Director of Operations, 1994 to 1999, UK: 20 Feb 08: 116.12:
Mansfield: Q. The SIS themselves, as it were, don’t dirty their own hands with tasks abroad. They employ an increment, do they not?
A. Can I cut to the quick, Mr Mansfield? I am not going to speculate on SIS’s various operational capabilities. They are many and they are different and the court does not need to know about them. What the court does need to know is that all of these capabilities, every single one of them, were under my personal control as the chief of operations and subject to class 7 authorisations under the Act. So there are not any little offshore liars here that somehow do not fit into this pattern; they do not exist. Anything that is referred to, whether you have heard of it before or whether you have not heard of it before, whether it has a strange name or whether it has not got a strange name, was under the control of the director of operations. Let’s be absolutely crystal clear about that and I think it is important that the jury understands that fact.
At 120.15: Q. What I wanted to put to you is deniability means this, doesn’t it: it means there will be a secret operation abroad, carried out by an increment, not SIS officers but SAS officers or SBS officers –
Coroner: But under the approval of SIS?
Q. Well, yes.
Coroner: The whole point is that this plan is not one officer on a frolic of his own going to carry it out on his own. It has been put up through the system for approval.
Q. Oh yes, this one is384, yes.
Coroner: So I do not really see why we are spending so long on this, on a matter which really must be speculation.
Q. Sir, it is not speculation because I submit that Tomlinson obviously regarded it – and I would submit to you and to the jury – that it was of some importance that what he remembered – obviously Sir Richard has his own views about it – but what he385 remembered bore a resemblance to what happened in Paris, which is why he went to the French juge….
Coroner: I think we need to focus on what happened in the tunnel, not on other ephemeral matters.
At 124.14: Mansfield: Q. [Quoting Tomlinson’s letter] “The second method386 was to use the increment, a small cell of SAS and SBS which is especially selected and trained to carry out operations exclusively for MI5 and MI6.” He is right about that, isn’t he?
A. I am not going to speculate or comment.
Q. If it is going to be suggested that this is a construct of some kind that he fabricated out of nowhere, I want to put to you very clearly that there was a small cell called the “increment” that was employed by the security services, SIS and SBS, abroad; correct?
A. Mr Mansfield, I have told –
Tam: I have been very –
Coroner: I think the witness is looking after himself at the moment, Mr Tam.
Tam: I do want to say that this is the point at which my learned friend is getting into operational details and methods which are sensitive and should not be asked about.
A. I am happy to comment as I commented before, Mr Mansfield. There are a number of capabilities that SIS has, but what I am going to say – and I am going to repeat this because I do find your line of questioning on this rather tedious – that there is no part of SIS, whether it is deniable or not, which does not come under the terms of the Official Secrets Act which is not fully under the control of the operational director of SIS. There is not a bit of SIS that acts independently or goes off and does its own thing. This does not exist, whatever it may be called, however it is composed, however it is trained, wherever it is found in the world. I do not know how many times I am going to have to emphasise this – I have said it four or five times already387 – so I would be grateful if we moved on to a different line of questioning because it is unproductive to go on banging on about this point.
Q. Well, I am sorry to be tedious and ask you questions about policy and also observations about the capability because one of the points that the jury will have to consider is whether members of SIS, acting without authority, would be aware of the capability. Can I just explain the context? Mohamed Al Fayed believes … that there was a conspiracy to cause this crash. One of the questions that Lord Stevens had to consider is motive, opportunity and capability. These are the features that this jury will have to look at. Are you following me?
A. I am.
Q. So, therefore, capability is important. Do you understand that?
A. The service’s capability is the service’s capability, but I do not think that has anything to do with this inquest into the death of Princess Diana.
Q. Well, I am not going to persist if that is your answer, that “the service’s capability is the service’s capability”. I will leave the jury to decide what that means and I am going to ask you about another topic.
Mr A, MI6 Head of Balkan Target Team: 26 Feb 08: 210.25:
Mansfield: Q. You were certainly made aware during the training courses of what has been called the increment or the use of military agents, whether they be SAS or SBS. You were made aware of that, were you not?
A. I was made aware of a variety of capabilities.
Richard Tomlinson, Ex-MI6 Officer: 2001 Book: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“The army provides a detachment from the SAS regiment, called Revolutionary Warfare Wing388 in Hereford, and the navy provides a small detachment from their Special Boat Service in Poole. Both have similar roles as far as MI6 is concerned and are known collectively within the service as the ‘increment’. To qualify for the increment, SAS and SBS personnel must have served for at least five years and have reached the rank of sergeant. They are security vetted by MI6 and given a short induction course into the function and objectives of the service…. They learn how to use improvised explosives and sabotage techniques….”389
Stephen Dorril, Intelligence Consultant and Author: 2000 Book MI6: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“As Chief of MI6, [Maurice Oldfield390] ‘insisted that if an intelligence service was to be respected, it should never confuse the collection of information with sabotage and assassinations’. ‘Disruptive actions’ were continued, but more at arm’s length under the umbrella of a ‘General Support Branch’ which liaised closely with the SAS. A Defence Intelligence Staff officer as part of … the MoD stationed at Century House391 arranged the employment and deployment of members of the SAS and Special Boat Squadron392 (SBS) as ‘contract labourers’.”393
Jonathan Bloch & Patrick Fitzgerald, Intelligence Writers: 1983 Book: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“Covert operations of a military nature … are not carried out by MI6, but by the Special Air Service (SAS), three army regiments with … an inherently political function beyond that of the British armed forces as a whole….
“Close cooperation is required between MI6 and the SAS before and during overseas campaigns and SAS squadrons receive briefings from MI6 before departure….
“The SAS have been extensively deployed in Northern Ireland…. Persistent reports of SAS assassinations are invariably dismissed because they come from republican sources…. Simultaneously their justifiable reputation for ruthlessness – one former British soldier who worked with [the SAS] in the Middle East described them as ‘the coolest and most frightening body of professional killers I have ever seen’ – is believed by the army to be a powerful … deterrent to some forms of IRA activity.”394
Richard Norton-Taylor, Intelligence Journalist: 1990 Book: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“The Special Air Service (SAS) is … now firmly established as a highly-trained, armed unit permanently available to the security services and the prime minister.
“The SAS has become the armed military wing of the security and intelligence services.”395396
Comment: The evidence on the role of SAS and SBS in fulfilling MI6 objectives is:
It must be realised that this is a subject about which there is little publicly known knowledge, primarily because the authorities withhold information on it – witness Dearlove’s contribution, discussed below. Even Tomlinson was reticent to speak on it – he told Mansfield: “obviously I do not want to say too much on this subject”.
The evidence that is available – primarily from books by intelligence analysts or writers – essentially supports Tomlinson’s account.398
Tomlinson’s basic assertion is that MI6 uses people from within the SAS and SBS “to carry out operations” which may involve the use of “improvised explosives and sabotage techniques”. This is “because MI6 itself does not contain operatives with the relevant skills to carry out particular practical tasks abroad”.
In other words, MI6 uses the SAS and SBS to do its dirty work.
There are two key aspects to this: a) the nature of the work done; and, b) the work is done on behalf of MI6 by the SAS or SBS.399
Dorril refers to “disruptive actions”; Bloch & Fitzgerald: “covert operations of a military nature”; Norton-Taylor: “the armed military wing”.
All of these descriptions fit with Tomlinson’s, the use of “improvised explosives and sabotage techniques”.
Dorril’s context is MI6400 and he states that the officer involved in organising the SAS and SBS deployments was based at Century House – MI6 headquarters during the period he is referring to.
Bloch and Fitzgerald don’t spell this out so clearly, but their context is the roles of MI6 and SAS and they also refer to the requirement for “close cooperation … between MI6 and the SAS”. They mention the SAS involvement in Northern Ireland – other evidence earlier in this book shows that the SAS activities in Northern Ireland were controlled by MI6 up to 1973, when MI5 took over.
Norton-Taylor confirms that the SAS worked on behalf of “the security and intelligence services” – this indicates both MI5 and MI6.
Tomlinson describes the SAS and SBS operatives used by MI6 as “the increment”. This is not a term that has been used by the other sources, but Tomlinson does specify in his book that the increment is the name they are known by “within the service”. The other sources do not have experience from within MI6.401
Michael Mansfield asked Richard Dearlove – who has a great deal of inside MI6 experience402 – about the increment, on four occasions.
It may be significant that Dearlove initially reacted very strongly, on the second occasion Baker intervened, on the third Dearlove simply refused to comment and on the fourth Tam intervened:
1st instance: Dearlove: “can I cut to the quick, Mr Mansfield? I am not going to speculate on SIS’s various operational capabilities….”
2nd instance: Baker: “I do not really see why we are spending so long on … a matter which really must be speculation”
3rd instance: Dearlove: “I am not going to speculate or comment”
4th instance: Tam: “my learned friend is getting into operational details and methods which are sensitive and should not be asked about” followed by Dearlove: “the service’s capability is the service’s capability”.
There are several serious concerns about what occurred during this critical period of cross-examination:403
Dearlove’s initial reaction, when Mansfield suggested that MI6 “employ an increment” for “tasks abroad”, was “I am not going to speculate on SIS’s various operational capabilities”.
Baker later supported that: “I do not really see why we are spending so long on this, on a matter which really must be speculation”.
Just in case we didn’t get it, Dearlove repeated it: “I am not going to speculate”.404
Speculation405 – the point here is that Richard Dearlove is on the stand. Dearlove: 38 years experience in MI6, Director of Operations for 5 years and MI6 Chief for another 5 years, 11 years on the MI6 board.406
Dearlove is being questioned on a key aspect of MI6 operations – critical to the current case407 – so it is ridiculous to suggest that any answer on this from him would be speculative. Yet we have both Dearlove and Baker suggesting just that – “I am not going to speculate”; “a matter which really must be speculation”.
Dearlove states that “the court does not need to know about … [the] SIS’s various operational capabilities”. And later: “I am not going to confirm or deny whether the [capabilities] you are mentioning are part of the service’s capabilities”.
Dearlove finished up by stating: “the service’s capability is the service’s capability”.
The inquest jury were investigating the circumstances of the Paris crash. MI6 had been named as a prime suspect for having orchestrated it. Yet Dearlove is trying to tell the jury they are not entitled to be told about MI6’s “operational capabilities”.
This type of evidence tends to make a sham out of even having MI6 witnesses cross-examined at this inquest. If the jury aren’t allowed to know about the capabilities of a prime suspect in the investigation408, then how can they be expected to reach an informed verdict on the circumstances of the crash?409 If there were concerns that national security was threatened by revealing this information, then why wasn’t it told to the jury in a closed court?
Dearlove strongly states on three occasions that the jury needed to know that he was in control:
Dearlove appears to be suggesting that everyone should rest easy because in 1997 – at the time of the deaths of Princess Diana and Dodi Fayed – the operational capabilities of MI6, whatever they may be, were under Dearlove’s personal control.
What Dearlove, or anyone else, fails to tell the jury is that in the previous year, 1996, under Dearlove’s watch as Director of Operations, MI6 had been deeply involved in two high-level assassination plots – Gaddafi and Saddam.411
What this means is that the knowledge that Dearlove was in control at the time of the Paris crash is not a cause for comfort, but instead a cause for concern.412
It raises the inevitable question: If Dearlove – and Chief Spedding413 – presided over the assassination plots of Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein, did these same men also preside over the assassination of Princess Diana?
On the second occasion that Mansfield mentioned the increment, Baker interrupted him midstream, pointing out that even if the increment was used an operation would still be “under the approval of SIS” and then continued: “the whole point is that this [Milosevic] plan is not one officer on a frolic of his own going to carry it out on his own. It has been put up through the system for approval.”
If we go back to Mansfield’s question, we can see that it has nothing to do with what Baker is suggesting: “What I wanted to put to you is deniability means this, doesn’t it: it means there will be a secret operation abroad, carried out by an increment, not SIS officers but SAS officers or SBS officers – ”414, at which point Mansfield was cut off by Baker.
Mansfield’s question focuses on the issue of deniability and he mentions just before this – see previous footnote – “I am asking … whether in 1993 there were discussions which involved the concept of deniability”. He then puts it to Dearlove that deniability “means there will be a secret operation abroad, carried out by … SAS officers or SBS officers”.
This is where Baker cuts Mansfield off and changes the subject to the issue of: “one officer on a frolic of his own”.
Mansfield was not suggesting anything like that – he was describing a “secret operation abroad, carried out by an increment” on behalf of MI6, which could later though, if necessary, be denied by MI6: the issue of deniability.
Mansfield was effectively describing a possible scenario for the way the Paris crash could have been organised, had MI6 done it – a deniable operation.
Yet we next find Baker saying: “I think we need to focus on what happened in the tunnel, not on other ephemeral matters.”415
In doing this, Baker was able to deftly – but dishonestly – shut down Mansfield’s line of questioning and he was forced to move on to the next subject.416
Later, when Mansfield brings up the increment for the fourth time, Dearlove then emphasises his argument by appearing to copy a similar line from Baker: “There is not a bit of SIS that acts independently or goes off and does its own thing. This does not exist….”
The point is that no one has ever suggested that the increment – the use of the SAS or SBS to conduct operations for MI6 – was ever acting independently. In all the mentions of this in the literature, including Tomlinson, the actions of the SAS and SBS – when operating on behalf of MI6 – are under the control of MI6.
If the SAS conducts an operation for MI6, then the fact that MI6 is not directly carrying it out makes it easier for them to deny involvement. That does not however mean that MI6 is not in control of the conduct of that operation.
Both Baker and Dearlove suggested that the issue of the increment had nothing to do with the current case – the deaths of Princess Diana and Dodi Fayed:
As has been mentioned, MI6 was alleged to be one of the prime suspects for the orchestration and conduct of the Paris crash. Therefore, if the jury were to be allowed to do a proper job of determining the cause of the deaths of Diana and Dodi, it would be imperative for them to understand the capabilities – including use of the increment – of MI6.418
Baker, who was in control of the inquest, appeared very determined – with the help of Tam and Dearlove – to ensure that his own jury were not privy to such information.
Why is this?
Despite the refusal by Baker, Dearlove and Tam to divulge this to the jury, other evidence, mostly not heard at the inquest – Tomlinson, Dorril, Bloch and Fitzgerald, Norton-Taylor – reveals that the SAS and SBS are used to conduct operations on behalf of MI6.
The earlier question was: What happens regarding assassination out in the field?
Does MI6 involve itself in assassination plots?
As usual, the evidence is conflicting:
Table: Known Specific British Intelligence Assassination Plots422
434
The above table includes a few of the assassination plots that were considered or executed during the second world war, but more importantly, it shows that the British intelligence appetite for assassinations did not dissipate at the conclusion of hostilities in 1945. If anything, it appears to have grown.
There were at least two targets in the 1950s – Nasser and Grivas – then an upsurge through the 1970s435, 80s436 and 90s, culminating in three high profile world leaders in the 1990s – Milosevic, Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein.
So in the five year period leading up to the death of Princess Diana, there were three known top-level assassination plots involving MI6 – Milosevic, Gaddafi and Saddam.437
The table does indicate that British intelligence is not particularly good at carrying high profile assassinations through to completion – none of the three known proposed top-level assassinations in the 1990s were successfully executed.
One could argue that this high failure rate would indicate that MI6 were unlikely to have been involved in the assassination of Princess Diana, which was a highly complex, yet successful operation.438 This issue is addressed later in this book.
What quickly becomes clear, in assessing the earlier witness evidence on MI6 and assassination, is that at the inquest the MI6 witnesses – Dearlove, X, A, H, E, I – presented a united front. To the last man, or woman, they swore on oath that, as employees of MI6, they had not seen any evidence of MI6 involvement in any assassination plots:
All this is despite the admission from these same people that A had drawn up a proposal for the assassination of a Balkan identity.
John Scarlett, speaking in 2009 in his role as MI6 chief, supported the inquest accounts: “we do not have license to kill”439 – but he is a lonely voice.
When we look outside of the inquest evidence, to ex-intelligence officers or intelligence experts and historians – none of which was heard by the jury – there is a major divergence from the inquest line.
That evidence is:
So a huge contrast in the evidence: at the inquest “MI6 assassination” is an oxymoron, but outside of the inquest a considerable amount of evidence indicates that MI6 does involve itself in assassination plots.
This latter view is then strongly supported by the evidence already looked at showing MI6 involvement in various assassination plots – some WWII identities, Nasser, Milosevic, Gaddafi and Saddam.
The Intelligence Services Act states that if the Foreign Secretary authorises an illegal action outside the UK then that act is legal. In other words, an assassination440 sanctioned by the Foreign Secretary is legal under British law.
Although that is a 1994 law, the accounts included in Peter Wright’s book – he was an MI5 officer from 1955 to 1976 – indicate that it was also a requirement to run illegal operations past the Foreign Office, well before 1994. Wright’s book includes evidence of that rule being flouted: on page 310, referring to an event in the mid-1960s: “the plan was put up to F.J.441, who gave his consent, although the operation442 was kept secret from the Foreign Office, on the grounds that they would very likely veto it”443444
Wright’s account raises a serious concern: the possibility that there was a culture of hiding a planned operation from the FCO, if MI5 felt it would be rejected. This appears to defeat the purpose of FCO oversight – the FCO are only shown operations which MI5 think will be authorised.
If MI5 were doing this, it is possible that MI6 were too.
There were two major assassination plots in the 18 months leading up to the Paris crash – Saddam and Gaddafi.
The Gaddafi evidence – see earlier – indicates that FCO authorisation was sought and obtained, but in the case of the Saddam assassination plot, it is not possible, from the available evidence, to ascertain if this occurred.
The Wright evidence certainly indicates the possibility of an earlier culture of ignoring the FCO on “difficult” operations.445446
The 1994 Intelligence Services Act indicates that MI6 officers or agents are not liable if the illegal act has the Foreign Secretary’s authorisation. But, if MI6 is found later to have acted illegally without that authorisation, what then is the penalty?447 And, would there anyway be any will within government circles to punish perpetrators working for MI6?
It could be significant that in 1998 – the year following the Diana crash – the Criminal Justice Act was passed. It appears to extend the rights of MI6 officers: there is no criminal liability for offences committed outside the UK, if the person is “acting on behalf of, or holding office under, the Crown”.
No mention there of a requirement for the Foreign Secretary’s authorisation.
This evidence suggests that if MI6 were involved in the Paris crash, it may or may not have had the authorisation of the FCO – in other words, it is possible, regardless of the legislation, for MI6 to conduct an illegal operation without government approval.
So the evidence the jury heard – mostly witness evidence from inside the organisation – strongly supported the view that MI6 does not contemplate assassinations – outside of A’s proposal.
The evidence the jury didn’t hear – witnesses from outside of MI6, ex-officers, the evidence of various specific plots, including the published CX report – just as strongly supports the view that MI6 does involve itself in assassination plots.
I suggest that on balance, to any unbiased observer, the evidence shown in the earlier pages is overwhelming in indicating that MI6 has been involved in assassination plots.
Does this mean that the MI6 witnesses all lied on this point at the inquest?
Not necessarily – it depends on:
That could be careful questioning: Dearlove wasn’t asked if he knew of any plots – only if he knew of any successful assassinations.450
As pointed out earlier, the table shows that MI6 are not particularly successful at converting known plots into actual assassinations.
Ostensibly the jury were there to determine if Princess Diana and Dodi Fayed were assassinated451, so even if MI6 had done it, Dearlove – who was Director of Operations at the time – would be most unlikely to put his hand up for it during questioning.
Effectively, Dearlove may have told the truth, if MI6 weren’t involved in Diana’s assassination. If they were involved, then he has lied under oath.
X joined MI6 in 1982452 and in 2008453 – when cross-examined – confirmed that she had “started … there as a … personal assistant, but … some time ago” had risen to “middle management”. X is evidently a trusted employee, because during the Paget investigation she was provided with “God’s access” – unrestricted access to all MI6 files (see earlier454).
It is significant that X appears to speak with authority on this subject. She says: “it has never happened in my time” – not qualifying it with “from my experience” or “to the best of my knowledge”.
This indicates then that X has lied when she says an assassination proposal – other than A’s – “has never happened in my time”.
H was A’s line manager in 1992, and at that time A was Head of the Balkan Target Team456. H’s immediate boss was E, Controller of Central and Eastern Europe. According to Tomlinson’s affidavit,457 H was the Head of Balkan Operations. That was a senior position, but it is impossible to know how high H had been promoted in the organisation by 2008 – or even if he was still at MI6 – when he was cross-examined.
It is then not possible to know what access H would have had to information – and therefore whether he was lying – when he confirmed to the inquest he had never “seen or heard of any … proposal that involved assassination” other than A’s.
E’s position in 1992 was Controller of Central and Eastern Europe.
Mansfield correctly pointed out that when E said in his Paget statement that he had “never seen any proposal relating to any targeted assassination”, that could not be true – other evidence at the inquest had shown E had seen A’s assassination proposal.
E gave a muddled response: “Yes, but I have – I still have never seen – this was in relation to the time of the [Paget] inquiry and I have not seen anything put in front of me related to flashing lights and everything of that nature.”
E gave two defences:
The issue though was that E had categorically stated: “I have never seen any proposal relating to any targeted assassination”. Whether the statement was made to the Paget inquiry or included flashing lights is actually irrelevant.
Burnett had earlier asked E: “Are you aware of … any proposal that there be an assassination?”460 There is no qualification here – Burnett does not say “any proposal other than A’s”.
One of E’s defences to Mansfield was that his statement was made at “the time of the [Paget] inquiry”. E admitted to Burnett: “When I gave the statement to Lord Stevens‘ police inquiry, I did not recall the incident…. Of course, subsequently, all these different pieces of testimony have arrived, which puts in doubt the calibre of my memory….”
If E was unaware that he had seen this proposal at the time of Paget, E’s awareness of “all these different pieces of testimony”461 reveals that he must have been aware that evidence indicated he had seen the proposal, by the time he was asked this question by Burnett. Yet E responds: “Categorically no.”
I suggest that when E responded with “Categorically no”, to “Are you aware of … any proposal that there be an assassination?” E has either misunderstood the question, or has lied.
When this is viewed in the light of his muddled or evasive answer – introducing flashing lights and the timing462 – to a straightforward question from Mansfield, it raises the possibility that E has lied to Burnett.
In Tomlinson’s affidavit – shown earlier – he included Mr I465 on the circulation list for A’s proposal. Mr I has stated: “I have no memory of having seen or heard of such a proposal.”466 The general evidence the inquest heard was that A’s assassination proposal document was destroyed before it reached Mr I.
Would Mr I have seen the evidence of other MI6 assassination attempts, such as the 1996 Gaddafi and Saddam plots?
Mr I confirmed to Burnett that he was in “a position which oversaw a number or all aspects of the work of SIS in 1992 and 1993 because … [he was] on the central staff … [and was] also secretary to the board of directors”.467 Mr I also told Mansfield: “I had left SIS by 1998”.
One can’t know for sure whether Mr I was still working for MI6 in 1996.
Burnett’s questioning appears to be careful – he only asks Mr I if he has “seen a proposal” – not whether he knew of one. Then Burnett asks if he had “knowledge” of any actual assassination. As we know from earlier, there is a big difference between an assassination proposal and a successful assassination – MI6 do not have a high conversion rate.
So Burnett has limited Mr I’s questioning – a significant witness because of his central position – to the sighting of a proposal document. It is possible that Mr I could have heard of an assassination proposal without actually seeing the document.
There is another serious flaw in Burnett’s methods of questioning the MI6 witnesses on this issue – knowledge of assassination proposals or assassinations. In some cases Burnett has failed to ascertain the precise periods that the MI6 employees worked for the organisation. This is significant because the jury were expected to decide on the alleged assassinations of Princess Diana and Dodi Fayed, which occurred in August 1997. Burnett asked the MI6 witnesses questions about what they knew or saw about assassination plots, but then neglected to establish whether these people were even at MI6 in August 1997.
Even then, the jury are not that much wiser, as Mr I has not told precisely when he left – just that he was gone by 1998. The jury heard only that Mr I worked for MI6 from 1975 to 1993471, but he could have left the organisation in any year from 1994 to 1997.
The inquest jury also couldn’t have known whether Mr I was still working in MI6 during the 1996 Gaddafi and Saddam plots.472 But then, they wouldn’t have even been asking the question – the inquest heard nothing about the Saddam plot and then was told by Baker that the Gaddafi plot was “not an issue in these inquests”.
The jury could not then ascertain whether Mr I was present at MI6 during the Saddam, Gaddafi or Diana assassination plots.
So again, Burnett goes on to ask questions of E about his knowledge of assassinations and plots, but deliberately failing to establish what time period E is able to witness about. We know from the general evidence that E was still at MI6 in 1992. There is also evidence of an MI6 document signed by E in January 1994.473
It wasn’t until the following day, when E was asked by Mansfield about an event in 1998, that E then volunteered: “[That] was just before I retired”.474 Whether the jury realised the significance of this passing comment could be a matter of debate, but what it meant was E was a senior member of MI6, present during the assassination plots of Gaddafi, Saddam and Princess Diana.475
This evidence appears to add weight to the possibility – raised above – that E could have lied when he answered with “Categorically no”, to Burnett’s “Are you aware of … any proposal that there be an assassination?”
Again Burnett fails to even attempt to establish how long H was at MI6. As with E, the general evidence shows that H was at MI6 in 1992. And again, there is also evidence of an MI6 document signed by H in January 1994.476
Burnett asked H about the 1998 event, but there is no indication from H about whether he was still at MI6 at that stage.477
On the available evidence, it is not possible to know if H is still in MI6, or if and when he left (see preceding footnote).
Effectively the Diana inquest jury were not given enough information to know whether Mr I or Mr H478 were present at MI6 in 1996 and 1997, when three critical assassination plots took place – Gaddafi, Saddam and Diana and Dodi.
Richard Tomlinson, Ex-MI6 Officer: 2001 Book: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“[My] thoughts were interrupted by the PAX479 ringing on my desk. ‘Hello Richard … I’m afraid that CX of yours has been spiked. And H/SECT480 wants to see you about it – go up and see him right now.’ I dropped the phone and urgently made for the lift to take me up to the 18th floor….
“[Alan] Judd [H/SECT] addressed me … ‘That CX report you wrote about Tory party481 funding482…. I’m afraid we can’t possibly issue it. If it leaked out, it could bring down the government…. The [MI6] Chief483 has decided to issue it as a “hot potato”, meaning that it will go only to the Prime Minister484. I want that CX report destroyed.’ Judd handed over the paperwork that I was required to sign to have the report officially struck off the records. There was no choice but to sign, though I knew it was wrong. ‘And you are to talk to nobody about this report or this incident,’ Judd threatened ominously as I was getting up to leave.”485
Peter Wright, ex-MI5 Officer: 1987 Book Spycatcher: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“Years later, when I was coming up for retirement, I tried to find the details of this operation in the MI6 files. I arranged with Sir Maurice Oldfield, the then Chief of MI6 to spend the day in their Registry looking for the papers. But I could find nothing; the MI6 weeders had routinely destroyed all the records years before.”486
Comment:There are two major obstacles when it comes to the seeking of evidence regarding the activities of MI6.
First, MI6 witnesses have an allegiance to the Queen and to the national interest that supersedes any legal requirement to tell the truth under oath in a court of law.
Second, there are MI6 “weeders” who have gone through the files long before any outside investigators – the MPS487 – are allowed to have access.488
On the one hand we have Richard Dearlove assuring the inquest jury that the MPS “were given full access489490, full cooperation” during their investigation into the Gaddafi plot, while Peter Wright – who the jury didn’t hear – tells us “the MI6 weeders had routinely destroyed all the records” of an operation he knew had taken place.491
X alluded to a culture of removal of information when Richard Keen, representing the Pauls, asked if ideas were sometimes “tippexed out of the record”. In a possibly inadvertent response, X replied that tippexing out of the record “was a normal way of treating correspondence”.492
Richard Tomlinson also confirms that in certain circumstances MI6 documents are “destroyed” and “struck off the records”.493
Mr I – private secretary to the MI6 Chief – was asked by Michael Mansfield: “Do you remember any occasions when documents were shredded?” Mr I replied: “Oh, well, documents are very frequently shredded if they are ephemeral.”494495
The question is: What is the point in giving the police full access if the records have been removed?
This superficial openness creates a false facade of “nothing to hide”.
These problems in obtaining MI6 evidence – dishonest witness testimony and destruction of records – means that we are forced to look elsewhere for the evidence. This is a key reason why the bulk of the evidence presented in this chapter has been derived from the testimonies of former MI6 and MI5 officers, the works of intelligence experts and media reports at the time of the events – mostly not heard by the inquest jury.496
Richard Tomlinson’s evidence was that a proposal was put forward by A to assassinate Slobodan Milosevic. Other MI6 witnesses – primarily A and H497 – have stated that the named target on the proposal was not Milosevic.
At the inquest Richard Keen asked X: “Has that other person since been assassinated, Miss X?” X refused to answer this: “I think that is probably edging closer to the area –” and MI6 lawyer, Robin Tam, broke in: “Sir, I have thought about that for a moment because the ‘neither confirm nor deny’ principle would apply there as well…. The name itself is sensitive. I think everyone here recognises that. If questions are asked about what has happened to that individual since, it could tend to identify him.”
When seen in the light of the general MI6 evidence that they never contemplate assassinations, this question from Keen would seem rather innocuous.
So why then did MI6 – both X and Tam – immediately refuse to answer it?
There would appear to be just three possible reasons:
If either of options 1 or 2 are correct, then MI6 comes out looking bad – option 1 would show that they had lied repeatedly under oath in declaring that Milosevic was not the target; option 2 would automatically lead to an assumption that MI6 may have been involved in the assassination, when they have consistently stated that is not something they would consider.
That leaves option 3 – that the person, who is not Milosevic, has not been assassinated.
That is the only option that leaves MI6 untarnished – so if option 3 was true, why didn’t Tam let X answer the question?
Tam stated that if X was allowed to say “what has happened to that individual since, it could tend to identify him”.
Yet in 1998 – about three years after the conclusion of the Yugoslav war498 – A wrote: “It seems to me … that [Tomlinson] is being mischievous as there is far more mileage in an SIS plot to kill a president499 than in a possible contingency plan to kill someone who might become more powerful but in 1993 was, and remains, unknown to the public at large.”500501
The plot to assassinate this person – either Milosevic or someone else – was contrived in the context of the Yugoslav war. According to A, after the war had long concluded, this unnamed person was still “unknown to the public at large”.
This evidence appears to indicate that if X had stated at the inquest that the unnamed person had not since been assassinated – option 3 above – then it would be most unlikely that the figure, who after the war was still “unknown to the public”, could have been identified from that information.
An earlier footnote indicates that MI6 may have changed their description of this assassination target – between 1998 (six years after the proposal) and the inquest (another ten years later). In 1998 the person was described as “unknown to the public at large”, but by 2008 the same witness, A from MI6, has confirmed that the target was an “extreme nationalist politician”502503
This latter description – the account put forward to the inquest – fits more comfortably with X and Tam’s refusal to answer Keen’s question. But the 1998 account – someone “unknown to the public at large” – does not.504
This evidence appears to raise questions about the validity of the MI6 evidence on the Milosevic assassination plot.505
There are serious inconsistencies in Miss X’s inquest evidence on her search in the MI6 database regarding the Milosevic assassination plot:
Mansfield asked X: “When you typed in ‘Milosevic’ and you got a fair amount of material, did any of the material relate to assassination?” X replied: “I honestly – I hope this is not a difficult answer here – I honestly don’t remember.”
Five minutes later, Mansfield tried again: “Did you look, within the material headed ‘Milosevic’, for anything that could be associated with the word ‘assassination’?” This time X answered: “I do not believe I did, no.”
Initially X cannot remember if anything related to assassination, then five minutes later she admits she didn’t actually look for the word “assassination” – this is despite the fact that the issue X was dealing with was an alleged assassination plot against Milosevic.
Then Baker asks X: “Did you look at the material that was thrown up by the request ‘Milosevic’?” X: “I looked at it as far as the carding of the name went and any hits that brought up, but I did not … carry out a file search, sir.”
So we then find out that X did not actually “carry out a file search” on Milosevic.
Next, Baker: “What were you actually looking for?” X: “In that instance, yes, I was looking for anything which might associate Milosevic with assassination”.
So, to Mansfield: “I do not believe I did, no” to: “Did you look, within the material headed ‘Milosevic’, for anything that could be associated with the word ‘assassination’?”
Then to Baker: “I was looking for anything which might associate Milosevic with assassination”.
These are completely opposite responses: “I do not believe I did” look for Milosevic and assassination. Then: “I was looking for … Milosevic [and] assassination”.
Mansfield, who by now appears to be understandably confused, seeks clarification of X’s position – X: “the papers related to the card that I searched, they had no reference to assassination.”
There are two issues here: 1) What was X looking for? Did she look for Milosevic and assassination? and 2) What did X find? Did she find anything on assassination under Milosevic?
X’s first answer on this was: “I do not believe I did” look for “anything … associated with … ‘assassination’”
Her second answer was: “I was looking for anything which might associate Milosevic with assassination”.
As stated before, these are opposite answers – only one could be right.
X’s first answer on this was: “I honestly don’t remember” if “any of the material [related] to assassination”.
Her second answer was: “the papers … had no reference to assassination”.
So again a major conflict: “I honestly don’t remember” to a definite statement: “no reference to assassination”.
On both issues X has provided conflicting evidence under oath.
If X’s initial response – “I do not believe I did” look for “anything … associated with … ‘assassination’” was true, then her later account – “the papers … had no reference to assassination” – must be a lie.506
What is the significance of this?
Miss X was relied on at the inquest to provide critical evidence on MI6’s systems of records, particularly in connection with the Milosevic plot.
The above issues raise serious questions over the veracity of X’s evidence under cross-examination – she appears to have lied under oath. This should be viewed in the light of earlier evidence that X lied about her knowledge of MI6 assassination proposals.507
As has been stated, the Milosevic plot has not been addressed in detail, but the analysis of areas that have cropped up during this investigation has cast serious doubts on the veracity of the MI6 evidence – in turn, this indicates that Richard Tomlinson’s account has substance.508
The general evidence from the MI6 witnesses was that MI6 did not contemplate assassinating people – it was not part of the organisation’s ethos.
This appears to be a lie – there is a huge amount of evidence pointing to MI6 involvement in assassination plots. It could be argued that assassination is a part of MI6’s ethos.
Is it possible that Princess Diana and Dodi Fayed were assassinated by an independent group of MI6 officers acting without the service’s approval?
Richard Tomlinson, Ex-MI6 Officer: 13 Feb 08: 22.8:
Hilliard: Q. What you said to the French magistrate, Mr Tomlinson, August of 1998…. You are recorded as having said this: “I have never heard any mention, either during or subsequent to my service, of any plan to assassinate a member of the Al Fayed family, Princess Diana or anyone else for that matter, other than President Milosevic. It is impossible, given the structure of MI6, for an assassination plot of this type to have been hatched by the department. It could have been done independently by members of MI6, but not by the service itself. This is only my assessment, however, as I have never heard any mention of such a plot.” Was that accurate at that time?
A. Yes, I believe so. I certainly never saw any plan to assassinate the subject of this inquisition – this inquest. As I said there, at the time it would be institutionally quite – very difficult to carry out an assassination. It is not completely impossible, I do not believe, but it would be institutionally quite difficult.
Q. I do not want to split hairs, Mr Tomlinson. We have here, “It is impossible, given the structure of MI6, for an assassination plot of this type to have been hatched by the department”. Are you happy about that or not?
A. Well, you know, nothing is impossible, but it would be very difficult, I would say. You know, to get the necessary – it would depend who the – it would depend also who the subject of the assassination was to quite a substantial degree. Certainly to assassinate someone who was universally very unpopular around the world and amongst MI6 officers themselves would be easier, institutionally, to carry out than it would be to assassinate someone who was not unpopular. So, for example, if MI6 had wanted at some point to assassinate Saddam Hussein, institutionally I think that would have been feasible and possible, and I have subsequently heard, since leaving MI6, that there is a credible account that they did actually plot to assassinate Muammar Gaddafi of Libya –
Q. That is after you have left the service, is it?
A. I read that in the newspapers after I left the service.
Q. I am trying to stick, do you follow, because if we go into – not just you, but what other people have read in newspapers and so on, you appreciate we will be here a long time.
A. Yes. What I was saying is it would be very, very difficult for MI6 to assassinate a – the popularity of the subject would make a difference. So a target who was very, very unpopular would be easier to assassinate within MI6 than someone who was not.
At 93.10: Mansfield: Q. What did you mean when you said … that it510 could be done independently?
A. I think nowadays that would not be the case, but I think in the olden days … the intelligence services were not as tightly controlled as I have no doubt they are nowadays. I think that that has been controlled a lot more deeply…. There was, at the time of the Harold Wilson Government – I think it was quite well established now – there was a cabal of MI5 officers who were interested in – or were talking loosely about a plot511 and there have been other incidences where MI5 and MI6 officers have done things independently well outside of the control of the organisation. I don’t think it is something that happens regularly and I don’t think it could ever happen nowadays.
Q. In relation to those days – and we are talking about the 1990s as opposed to since 2000 – if an MI5 officer – and if there is an objection, please say – if a MI5 officer or an MI6 officer felt that what was happening in the United Kingdom or elsewhere was in the interests of the United Kingdom and was subversive, undermining the state or the Monarchy, that might generate discussion about what to do about it, mightn’t it, then?
A. I think that is possibly the case, yes. I think that is the case, yes.
Q. Once again it might range across a number of options. It might not be a car crash in order to murder; it could be a car crash in order to frighten. That is another possibility, another option, isn’t it?
A. Well, I think that we are getting into speculation. It is a possibility but, you know, it is speculation. At the time in MI6 I think there was not as strict control over their activities as there is now and that is all I can really say on that matter.
Richard Dearlove, MI6 Director of Operations, 1994 to 1999, UK: 20 Feb 08: 31.13:
Burnett: Q. What would your comment be to a suggestion that rogue elements within SIS, if such existed, could mount an operation of any sort without authority, let alone an assassination…?
A. I would have regarded that as an impossibility.
At 36.7: Q. Are your stations authorised to act independently of head office in London?
A. No, they are not. In any significant matter, they are controlled from London.
At 57.25: Q. What about a suggestion that the Paris station or perhaps someone in the Paris station was freelancing at the end of August 1997?
A. Out of the question. It is just not conceivable within the structures that I have described, and I should add that any and every part of the service was under my control in terms of operations.
At 119.9: Mansfield: This is what [Tomlinson] said in relation to being carried out independently and not by the service as a whole…. “I think nowadays”, would you please listen to the answer if you haven’t heard it, “that would not be the case … but I think in the olden days … the intelligence services were not as tightly controlled…. I don’t think [an independent operation] is something that happens regularly and I don’t think it could ever happen nowadays.”512 Now, that is what he said last week. Do you disagree with that?
A. I fundamentally disagree with that.
Mr 6 aka Richard Spearman, MI6 Officer. British Embassy, Paris: 29 Feb 08: 63.2:
Mansfield: Q. I want to ask you about people who would not necessarily be working, as it were, according to the rule book. Was that possible in this period in the 1990s, that there might be people not working to the rule book?
A. I can only speak to my experience. My experience is that we work very hard – and of course, we are always improving our processes, but my experience, including during that period, was that our processes were broad, were deep and were adhered to. In that context, I cannot imagine circumstances in which someone within the organisation would be working beyond the rule book, no.
At 81.24: Q. [Tomlinson] was aware – you don’t agree with it – that officers did operate independently from time to time….
A. That is not my experience. It is not the way we work.
Coroner: Summing Up: 31 Mar 08: 70.13:
“Freelancing was inconceivable. Tomlinson‘s was a mischievous and fanciful allegation.”
Coroner: Summing Up: 31 Mar 08: 71.9:
“It is only after the allegation against the Duke of Edinburgh was shown to be fanciful that the claim shifted to a rogue element within SIS being responsible.”
Comment:There are problems with Baker’s Summing Up comments to the jury:
It was never used by Richard Tomlinson or Mohamed Al Fayed, or anyone else.
Burnett was the first person to bring in “rogue elements” during his cross-examination of Richard Dearlove. Burnett is not quoting anyone – he asks: “What would your comment be to a suggestion that rogue elements within SIS….?” Burnett calls it “a suggestion”, but the only person making the suggestion is himself.
That then is the only mention during the entire six months of the inquest, until Baker latches onto it on the first day of his Summing Up: “the claim shifted to a rogue element within SIS being responsible”.514
Baker calls it “the claim”. Who is making the claim? Baker must be referring to Burnett, but he fails to tell the jury that.
Tomlinson made a claim: “it could have been done independently by members of MI6”.
Tomlinson consistently uses the term “independent”. Burnett and Baker use the term “rogue”.515
There is a big difference:
Inquest lawyer, Nicholas Hilliard, was the first person to introduce into the inquest Richard Tomlinson’s allegation: “It [the crash] could have been done independently by members of MI6” – that was on 12 February 2008. As Hilliard pointed out, he was quoting from Tomlinson’s evidence “to the French magistrate … [in] August of 1998”.
Mohamed Al Fayed was the main witness making the allegation that “my son and Princess Diana were murdered … on the orders of Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh” – see below. Mohamed was cross-examined on 18 February 2008 – six days after Tomlinson’s allegation was heard by the jury.
This then means that Baker has lied in his Summing Up – not only was “the allegation against the Duke of Edinburgh” not “shown to be fanciful” (see point 1 above) but the chief proponent of it, Mohamed, was not heard from until well after the Tomlinson allegation of an independent MI6 operation had been put forward and subjected to questioning from Hilliard and Mansfield.517
In his Summing Up Baker presented the jury a picture of a changing and faltering case being proposed: “It is only after the allegation against the Duke of Edinburgh was shown to be fanciful that the claim shifted to a rogue element within SIS being responsible.”
In doing this, Baker appears to have deliberately misled his own jury.
Four witnesses have claimed that MI6 could have been involved in the Paris crash.
Mohamed Al Fayed, Dodi’s Father, UK: 18 Feb 08: 55.23:
Burnett: Q. I think it is clear already that you would adhere to this view [from 5 July 2005 statement]: “I am in no doubt whatsoever that my son and Princess Diana were murdered by the British security services on the orders of Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh.” That remains your view and you have expanded upon it.
A. Definitely.
At 43.5: Q. What you say is that Prince Philip and Prince Charles, both at Balmoral, organised an assassination using MI6 in Paris?
A. Yes, definitely.
At 127.12: Horwell: Q. A letter that you wrote to the Right Honourable Paul Murphy of the Intelligence and Security Committee. It is dated 14th February 2006. You mention that the security services were acting on the orders of the Royal Family and these are your words “the Prime Minister and his senior henchmen”, and you went on to say this: “There is equally no doubt in my mind that such a momentous and horrific action would have been directly sanctioned by the Prime Minister.” …. Mr Al Fayed, the list of conspirators; those who are involved in … this murderous plot…. We can add Tony Blair to that list, can we?
A. You can, because I am sure he knows what they are going to do, definitely.
Q. And you say in that letter: “Not only is Tony Blair involved, but also his senior henchmen.” Now, who did you mean by “his senior henchmen”?
A. Maybe his chief of staff.
….Q. And the Foreign Secretary of the day, Robin Cook, he must have been involved?
A. It is a possibility.
Mohamed Al Fayed: 15 Feb 06 Letter to John Stevens518: Jury Heard Part Only:
“There is no doubt that Messrs Langman, Spearman and Spedding have all been directly implicated, acting, I am sure, directly to the orders of the Royal Family, the Prime Minister and his senior henchmen.”519
John Macnamara, Al Fayed Director of Security: 14 Feb 08: 134.6:
Horwell: Q. You go on to say in this statement520 that: “I have become convinced that [Diana and Dodi] were murdered and that the British and French security services were complicit in their deaths.”
A. Yes.
Q. Yet another assumption that you are prepared to put into a witness statement?
A. That was my belief, yes.
Q. Without any evidence?521
A. Well, there was evidence of people like Richard Tomlinson, for example.
David Shayler, Ex-MI5 Officer: Quoted in 2005 book: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“Having looked at the available evidence I am personally inclined to think that MI6 paid to have Diana and Dodi involved in an accident, in the same way they paid to have Gaddafi assassinated, using a ‘surrogate’.”522
Comment: There are four witnesses who have claimed the involvement of MI6 or British security services in the deaths of Princess Diana and Dodi Fayed – Richard Tomlinson, David Shayler, Mohamed Al Fayed and John Macnamara.523
Outside of Tomlinson, four other MI6 employees – former and current –were cross-examined on this.
Richard Dearlove, MI6 Director of Operations, 1994 to 1999, UK: 20 Feb 08: 45.20:
Burnett: Q. Are you able to confirm from your own knowledge – it follows from what you have said – that no authorisation was sought in respect of any activities concerning Princess Diana?
A. I can absolutely confirm that.
Q. It would plainly have been outside the functions of SIS to do so?
A. Had it been done, it would have been outside the functions of the service.
At 174.2: Horwell: Q. A plan to murder a group of people because the Duke of Edinburgh did not like the man whom the Princess of Wales was having a relationship with, a relationship of four to five weeks’ standing, that plan goes all of the way to murder; a plan that was executed either within days or possibly within an hour, Sir Richard, on one analysis of the evidence…. Is it your evidence that it is impossible that [this proposal] could have been executed in the manner suggested?
A. It is quite impossible. It is completely fanciful.
….Q. The idea that the Duke of Edinburgh had a hotline to SIS to order murder, equally absurd?
A. Completely absurd.
Q. You have been asked about another potential motive, landmines, and you have been asked about a dossier. I believe there are only two people in the world that call these documents a “dossier“; one is Simone Simmons and the other is Mr Mansfield. The dossier, as those two people describe it, is a collection of documents and information that Diana compiled. No one knows from where, but Simone Simmons accepted the suggestions that it was likely to come from the British Landmines Trust and the Red Cross and they were kept in an envelope. There is no evidence that that evidence contained highly secret or confidential information. The suggestion appears to be that because Princess Diana was compiling information of that nature, that she would have been a target for assassination. Again I do not know why I am asking the question, but I will do so: what is your response, Sir Richard?
A. I am outraged that it should even be suggested. It is just again – “ridiculous” is the only word that I can use, and, you know, personally to me and to my senior staff in SIS, you know, really deeply offensive.
Miss X, MI6 Administrator, UK: 26 Feb 08: 60.9:
Burnett: Q. If, for the sake of argument, there had been any plan at all involving Diana, Princess of Wales, and Dodi Al Fayed, would that have been thrown up by your searches?
A. Yes, it would.
Q. Do you thus conclude that there was none?
A. There was absolutely no plan whatsoever.
…. Q. Had there been any MI6 interest in the relationship between Dodi and Diana, would that have shown up in the records?
A. Yes, it would.
Q. And there was nothing?
A. It is not that I am trying to be rude in any way, there was just no interest. It is not our sort of thing.
Q. Therefore, the records, do they or do they not confirm Sir Richard Dearlove‘s evidence that SIS simply had no interest whatsoever in Dodi or in Diana or in them jointly?
A. No, we had no interest whatsoever.
At 169.8: Tam: Q. Do you have any doubt yourself about whether there is information lurking in SIS’s systems that you have just overlooked despite the fact that you have done all of these searches?
A. I am sure I am able to say this: I am absolutely 100% certain that there is nothing, absolutely nothing.
Mr A, MI6 Head of Balkan Target Team: 26 Feb 08: 238.2:
Horwell: Q. What is suggested here is that, because the Duke of Edinburgh did not like the Princess of Wales‘ partner of some four to five weeks, the Duke ordered the assassination of the Princess and that order was put into operation almost instantly. In your 25 years of experience now of SIS and the way it operates, what in your opinion are the prospects of such a plan being put into operation?
A. It is absolutely unthinkable.
Mr E, MI6 Controller of Central and Eastern Europe: 29 Feb 08: 27.7:
Horwell: Q. The suggestion now is that the Duke of Edinburgh takes against the partner of the Princess of Wales, of just some four or five weeks standing, no more than that, and he orders that MI6 scares the occupants of a car in Paris that night and MI6 takes the order and carries it out within a very short period of time. What, in your opinion, are the prospects of MI6 getting involved in any such operation?
A. Nil.
Comment: The MPS lawyer, Richard Horwell, should have been asking Dearlove a simple question: What was his response to the suggestion that “Princess Diana was compiling information” about landmines and that made her “a target for assassination”?
But in Horwell’s build-up to the question he made several comments that raise serious concerns:
Yet just the previous month Paul Burrell had stated to the inquest: “I knew that the Princess did compile a dossier on every fact of the landmine mission. She took it very seriously.”524525
The closest Simone Simmons got to saying what Horwell is suggesting was during Horwell’s cross-examination of Simmons on January 10.
This is what was said:
Horwell: “[Diana] obviously had access to a number of people and organisations who would be able to give her relevant information?”
Simmons: “Information, yeah.”
Horwell: “And obviously one source of information on this topic would have been The Red Cross?”
Simmons: “Possibly, yes.”526
But Horwell didn’t remind the jury that on the same day Simmons had also said to Mansfield: “Most of [the dossier] was information that she had got from other sources. They were her notes as well and she always had her notes on the … top of it all.”527
The only mention of the British Landmines Trust in the entire inquest is this from Horwell. Neither Simmons, nor anyone else, has ever mentioned the British Landmines Trust in any of their evidence.
The reason for this is that there is no organisation called the British Landmines Trust – and there never has been. And no organisation with a name even like the British Landmines Trust.528
Horwell has made this up – he has told the inquest that Diana got her information from the British Landmines Trust, even though he knows that this organisation does not exist.
All Simmons did was confirm to Horwell that the Red Cross would possibly have been “one source of information on” landmines and Horwell has deliberately turned this into: “Simone Simmons accepted the suggestions that [the landmine dossier information] was likely to come from the British Landmines Trust and the Red Cross”.529
Although this is technically true, Horwell misleads the inquest by failing to state the size of the envelope. Simmons indicated at the inquest that the dossier was about five inches thick530 – so it is obvious the envelope would have been very large.531
The context of Horwell’s comments is the issue of whether Diana’s dossier on landmines could constitute a motive for assassination – he asks Dearlove to respond to the suggestion “that because Princess Diana was compiling information of that nature” she was assassinated. Horwell indicates this suggestion is so ridiculous that he states: “I do not know why I am asking the question, but I will do so”.
So Horwell’s point appears to be that there is no evidence that the dossier contained anything that could have provided a motive for Diana’s assassination.
Is that true? What is the evidence?
There are several points that indicate there was sensitive material in the dossier: 532
The above seven points reveal that Horwell’s assertion to Dearlove – “there is no evidence that … [the dossier] contained highly secret or confidential information” – is a lie.
In the previous question to Dearlove, Horwell addressed another alleged motive for the assassination of Princess Diana. In his build-up to this question – regarding the motive being Diana’s relationship with Dodi – Horwell again included misleading comments that should cause concern:
Part 2 has revealed that the evidence indicates the plan was primarily to murder Princess Diana. Trevor Rees-Jones survived the crash and there is no evidence of any plan to murder him, even though he was a central player in the events of that night – see Part 3.
Horwell appears to have deliberately put this at its lowest. Although there is evidence that Philip disliked Dodi, there are significant factors – omitted by Horwell – that could point to Philip’s involvement in the assassination.
Philip’s relationship with Diana may be more significant than his dislike of Dodi. There is also the impact of a potential pregnancy of Diana to Dodi.
Evidence in Part 2 shows that Diana feared Philip and made suggestions that Philip wanted to kill her long before her involvement with Dodi Fayed.
The evidence pointing to Philip’s possible involvement is addressed later in this book.
The evidence in the Prior Knowledge section of Part 1536 shows that the perpetrators of the assassination would have had at least a week to plan and organise the detail of the crash. For Horwell to suggest that it was “executed … possibly within an hour” is absurd, but also misleading.
In summary, Horwell appears to have deliberately made the two possible motives – the relationship with Dodi, the anti-landmine campaign – look as ridiculous and outrageous as possible, even lying to the inquest to achieve this.
In what comes across as a stage-managed production, Dearlove has responded on cue and to order – “it is quite impossible”, “it is completely fanciful”, “completely absurd”, “I am outraged”, “‘ridiculous’ is the only word that I can use”, “personally to me and to my senior staff in SIS, you know, really deeply offensive”.
Horwell has based the questions on such false and fictitious scenarios that I suggest Dearlove was able to honestly disown involvement.
Whether MI6 were involved in the assassinations though is a different matter to what Horwell has put – Horwell never straight out asked Dearlove if MI6 was involved.
By the time Horwell got to the cross-examination of Mr A, he had modified his questioning. This time landmines has not been addressed at all and Horwell states: “the Duke ordered the assassination of the Princess and that order was put into operation almost instantly”.
So “a plan that was executed either within days or possibly within an hour” has morphed into “that order was put into operation almost instantly”.
Not satisfied with “possibly within an hour”, we now have “almost instantly”.
A is confronted with a ridiculously impossible scenario – an order is given for an assassination and it is carried out by organising a complex, orchestrated car crash “almost instantly”.
Horwell gets the answer he wants: “it is absolutely unthinkable”.
I would answer the same, and what A has said is not a denial that Princess Diana could have been assassinated by MI6 as a result of an order from Prince Philip.
Three days later Horwell, cross-examining E, changed the scenario again – minus the landmines, and it becomes an order to scare, not assassinate.537 Horwell says: “the Duke of Edinburgh … orders that MI6 scares the occupants of a car in Paris that night and MI6 … carries it out within a very short period of time”.
This scenario appears to presume that Philip is somehow monitoring the movements of Diana and Dodi in real time and is aware that they are “the occupants of a car in Paris” on the night of 30-31 August 1997. MI6 then takes the order to scare the car’s occupants and “carries … out” the organisation of a complex, orchestrated car crash “within a very short period of time”.
So this time Horwell has illustrated a situation where Philip has determined the method to be used – he “orders that MI6 scares the occupants of a car” – whereas with the previous witnesses, Horwell has Philip making the order, but leaving the method up to MI6.
But again, Horwell has outlined an impossible scenario – a complex car crash organised in “a very short period of time” – and E confirms there is “nil … prospects of MI6 getting involved”.
Burnett asked Dearlove: “Are you able to confirm … that no authorisation was sought in respect of any activities concerning Princess Diana?” Dearlove: “I can absolutely confirm that.”
But, I suggest, if an order came from a senior royal or from within the UK government, then MI6 would not need to seek authorisation.538
Robin Tam, the MI6 lawyer, asked Miss X: “Do you have any doubt yourself about whether there is information lurking in SIS’s systems that you have just overlooked despite the fact that you have done all of these searches?” X confidently responded: “I am sure I am able to say this: I am absolutely 100% certain that there is nothing, absolutely nothing.”
The question is: What is the point of X saying this if prior to her searches the MI6 weeders – mentioned earlier by Wright and West – have cleared the records of any operation MI6 does not want to be seen to be associated with?
In summary at this point, there were several factors that would have prevented the inquest jury from arriving at an informed decision on the degree of MI6 involvement in the deaths of Princess Diana and Dodi Fayed:
Back to the four witnesses who have claimed MI6 involvement in the crash – Tomlinson, Shayler, Mohamed and Macnamara.
There is some conflict in their evidence:
If MI6 were involved in assassinating Princess Diana and Dodi Fayed, there are three main possibilities:
Mohamed has consistently described the first option – a government or royal authorised operation involving MI6.
Macnamara appears to describe the second option – “the British and French security services were complicit”. Macnamara has never suggested government or royal authorisation. At the inquest he was asked by Horwell if Philip was involved – his answer: “Not to my knowledge. I have never mentioned the Duke of Edinburgh”.544
Shayler may also believe it is the second option – he makes no mention of anyone other than MI6, who he suggests “paid to have Diana and Dodi involved in an accident”.
Tomlinson supports the third option – “it could have been done independently by members of MI6, but not by the service itself”.
So from the four witnesses, we see all three options being canvassed.
There are several points from Tomlinson’s evidence to consider:
In 1998 Tomlinson had said: “It is impossible, given the structure of MI6, for an assassination plot of this type to have been hatched by the department”.
Ten years later, in 2008, he said: “It is not completely impossible … but it would be institutionally quite difficult”.
“Impossible” had been changed to “not completely impossible” and “quite difficult”.
Princess Diana was very, very popular – Tomlinson therefore appears to be suggesting she would be more difficult “to assassinate within MI6 than someone who was not”. I suggest that is common sense.
However countering this, Tomlinson did confirm to Al Fayed lawyer, Michael Mansfield: “if … an MI6 officer felt that what was happening in the United Kingdom or elsewhere … was subversive, undermining the state or the Monarchy, that might generate discussion about what to do about it”.
There is a critical missing aspect to this: what sort of “things” – were there any assassination plots?
Spearman is obviously a senior MI6 officer with ties to the Chief at the time, David Spedding. Tomlinson is suggesting it could be significant that Spearman was posted to Paris just before the crash.
This position would seem to conflict with Tomlinson’s “impossible … for an assassination plot of this type to have been hatched by the department” assessment, made just a year before.
Tomlinson’s general position is that “it would be institutionally quite difficult” for MI6 as an organisation to have carried out the Paris assassinations. But there are conflicts from that – “it is impossible … for an assassination plot of this type to have been hatched by the department” but then: “There may well be significance in the fact that Mr Spearman was posted to Paris in the month immediately before the deaths”.
There are several factors that raise serious questions over Tomlinson’s original assertion that “it is impossible, given the structure of MI6, for an assassination plot of this type to have been hatched by the department”:
In summary, the suggestion that the Paris crash operation could have been carried out by independent MI6 officers is not logical and does not stack up.
Why then has Tomlinson consistently suggested that it is more likely the Paris crash operation could have been independently conducted, rather than by the organisation?
I suggest that Richard Tomlinson, who is a highly educated person549, is possibly aware that the opposite is true – that it was more likely carried out by the MI6 organisation, rather than a group of independents.550
There is a real possibility that from the time of his original French statement in 1998, right through to the inquest and possibly beyond that, Tomlinson has felt under threat from MI6. Tomlinson’s 2001 book The Big Breach reveals that he has been subjected to massive mistreatment by the MI6 organisation, including several arrests and stints in jail, since his firing in April 1995.551
I suggest that the pressure Tomlinson has been put under over a sustained period has led to him feeling he needed to temper his evidence and not directly implicate his former employers, MI6, in the assassinations of Diana and Dodi – an allegation which he would be unable to prove, but which could potentially subject him to further harassment by MI6.
In short, there is an understandable possibility Tomlinson is intimidated by MI6’s power and ability to destroy his life.
Part 1 revealed that key witnesses saw a single powerful flash in the Alma Tunnel just prior to the crash.
The question here is: Is this something that could have been caused by equipment used by or on behalf of MI6?
Richard Tomlinson., Ex-MI6 Officer: 13 Feb 08: 52.3:
Mansfield: Q. A strobe or flashlight. Now, were you, during training, ever shown such an item?
A. I believe that I was when I went to Poole, to a visit to the SBS, and they had a number of special weapons which they used…. One piece of equipment there that I remember was a very bright – a piece of equipment that could give a very bright flashing light. I was told at the time that this was used for – in the case of if they wished to disorient, for example a helicopter pilot, on landing for example. Because clearly at night or suchlike, a helicopter pilot might have been landing with night vision goggles or even, at night, just using the naked eye and a very, very bright flashing light would lead to disorientation and being unable even to see outside references and to likely being unable to control the helicopter.
Q…. Can you describe the light in any way at all that you saw in your training, which would be obviously near the beginning of the period of your employment?
A. No, I cannot remember with any clarity that anymore. It was just a piece of equipment amongst several.
Q. But is there any doubt in your mind that you saw such a thing?
A. I am sure I saw it, yes.
Q…. Was it something that was portable?
A. Yes, I believe it was portable, yes. It was small enough – if it was not portable, I am sure I would remember that it was not portable. It must have been small enough to be carried quite easily.
Q. All right. This may be a bridge too far, but the sort of size, can you remember even that, now?
A. There was a large table and there were several items on it, so it must have been small enough to fit within a small portion of the table.
At 161.22: Tam: Q. The flashing light or the device for a flagging553 light that you say that you saw when you were training. Now, it is right, isn’t it, that as a piece of equipment – I think you gave this answer before – it would need to be portable and that in fact it should be really ideally small as well, should it not?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you now remember anything about this device that you were shown when you were training?
A. I remember being in a military hall, as it were. There was a large table at the end of the room, and on that they placed the whole series of gadgets which they used in their operations. There were several rather interesting, you know, hand-guns and hand-arms and underwater breathing apparatus, and I remember there being something along those lines. There was a corporal from the SBS who was explaining what each did, and he just went through and said, “This is what we use this for”, et cetera, and explained what they were all for. I do not particularly remember what it looked like, but I remember being explained that this is what various items did.
….Q. Can you remember what sort of size it was?
A. The size – no, I cannot remember specifically what size it was, but there were several items on the table and they were all portable – the sort of size of something that would be portable.
Q. Now, if you could just answer this question “yes” or “no”: were you told whether or not it had a name?
A. I cannot remember. Sorry.
Q. Do you think you would now recognise it if you saw it again?
A. No.
Richard Dearlove, MI6 Director of Operations, 1994 to 1999, UK: 20 Feb 08: 121.20:
Mansfield: Q. What do you know about strobe lights?
A. No more than the average, I believe.
Q. Training in MI6 – SIS at that time – was there training which involved them seeing and watching the use of strobe lights for disorientating –
A. I can say, I think with confidence, that no there were not. I was pretty familiar with the service’s training programmes and I think that that also is a Tomlinson construction. Under oath, I think I am very confident in saying that, although I am judging from my knowledge of the training. This is not part of SIS’s training.
Q. Yes. What I wanted to ask you is: have any inquiries that you are aware of been made in relation to those charged with training at that time? I can give you roughly the date and roughly the place where he says he was trained and saw something of this nature. Have any inquiries been made in relation to that?
A. I do not know the reply to that because I think, as I have said to you, it was believed in the services that it is not part of SIS’s training.
Q. Believed –
A. Mr Tomlinson made many, many allegations and statements. He used bits of knowledge on which he elaborated with a very clear intention, of causing mischief for the service and the greatest possible difficulty. I think that the strobe light allegation is, in my view, spurious. It does not apply to SIS.
Miss X, MI6 Administrator, UK: 26 Feb 08: 70.2:
Burnett: Q. You are aware, I am sure, that one of Mr Tomlinson‘s suggestions is that he saw a strobe light or bright light of some sort when he was undergoing SIS training.
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Were you able to identify when Mr Tomlinson did his training?….
A. That is a matter of record. His course ran from September to February.
Q. September 1991 to February 1992?
A. Yes.
Q. Was it then part of the training that those undergoing it would spend a day with the Special Boat Service?
A. They would have various briefings, yes.
Q. And that would be one of them?
A. That would be one of them, yes.
Q. You have checked the records and they don’t show anything more detailed of what occurred?
A. No, I am afraid they don’t, no.
Q. Had you undergone similar training or been involved in training at about that time or just before?
A. I have been involved in training, yes.
Q. When were you involved in training?
A. Sort of intermittently over the years.
Q. But were you involved in training at the end of the 1980s, so just before Mr Tomlinson joined the service?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. Did you work on that initial training course?
A. I was involved with that, yes.
Q. In that capacity, did you attend the SBS briefing?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. On how many occasions?
A. Over the next two or three years, probably about three or four times, something like that, at that stage, and then also on other occasions.
Q. What you say in your statement, if I can remind you, is that you went on two occasions in the late 1980s, which we will come on to a bit later. Were any strobe lights used or shown to you?
A. No, they were not.
Q. Was there anything of a bright flashing loud nature shown?
A. Yes, the only thing that I could recall, when trying to think “I wonder what Mr Tomlinson might have meant”, was that they do use sort of those pyrotechnic kind of – I only know them as “flash bangs”. You sort of chuck them in a room to disorientate people and so on. They are little fireworky things.
Q. You attended again later in the 1990s, did you?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And were you shown strobe lights or flashing lights?
A. No, I was not, no.
Mr A., MI6 Head of Balkan Target Team: 26 Feb 08: 172.11:
[In an undated MI6 document]: “For the record, I had never heard of blinding strobe lights until I saw some conspiracy theory television programme this year about the death of the Princess of Wales.”
At 195.20: Burnett: Q. You add for good measure there that you have never heard of blinding strobe lights “… until I saw some conspiracy theory television programme after the crash in Paris”.
A. That is correct, sir.
Q. Can we take it from that that during such training as you received for SIS, you were not trained in the use of strobe lights or blinding lights?
A. Absolutely not, sir.
Comment: Does MI6 use portable equipment that could have been used in the Alma Tunnel on 31 August 1997 to produce the huge, bright flash that was described by witnesses?554
As with everything else, the evidence is conflicting:
- Tomlinson: “I remember … a piece of equipment that could give a very bright flashing light … that … was used ,,, to disorient”
- Dearlove: “no there were not” to Mansfield’s: “was there training which involved them seeing and watching the use of strobe lights?”
- X: “no, they were not” to Burnett’s: “were any strobe lights used or shown to you?”
- A: “I had never heard of blinding strobe lights until … this year” – in an undated document written some time after the Paris crash
- A: “absolutely not” to Burnett’s: “you were not trained in the use of strobe lights or blinding lights?”
There are several points to note from Dearlove’s cross-examination:
X was evasive at times.
Burnett asked X: “Had you undergone similar training [to Tomlinson] or been involved in training at about that time [of Tomlinson] or just before?” X didn’t answer this – she said: “I have been involved in training,558 yes.” Burnett: “When were you involved in training?” X is again evasive: “Sort of intermittently over the years.”
X states she was “involved” – see previous footnote – with “that initial training course”559. Without finding out what “involved” means, Burnett then asks X: “In that capacity, did you attend the SBS briefing?”
What “capacity”?
The jury is hearing X’s answers without being privy to what her role was at the SBS briefings.560 For example, X may have had a role that wouldn’t have brought her in contact with a strobe light, whether such lights were there or not.
So when Burnett finally asks: “Were any strobe lights used or shown to you?” X is not evasive: “No, they were not.”
But the questions are: What was X’s role at the SBS briefings? Why did Burnett not even try to find out what her role was? Would X’s role have brought her in contact with strobe lights had any been there?
Mr A stated561: “I had never heard of blinding strobe lights until … this year562” – this is an interesting statement from an experienced MI6 officer, who was Head of the MI6 Balkan Target Team during the Yugoslav war. A gave the strongest denial563 evidence from any of the MI6 witnesses – he is not just saying that blinding strobe lights weren’t shown or heard about during training, but he is denying that he had ever heard of them in his life up to when he “saw some conspiracy theory television programme after the crash in Paris”.
This is particularly significant because Tomlinson stated in his affidavit: “Dr Fishwick564 suggested that one way to cause the crash might be to disorientate the chauffeur using a strobe flash gun….”
It may not be a coincidence that the MI6 officer who provides the strongest denial – complete ignorance of the existence of strobe lights – is the very one who is alleged to have put forward the proposal to use a strobe light in an assassination plot.
Tomlinson has never suggested that MI6 keeps stocks of strobe lights. His evidence is that SBS uses them, or something similar, in their work and he saw one during his training at an SBS display in Poole. By inference, the lights could be used on behalf of MI6 – see earlier evidence of MI6 using SBS and SAS to conduct field operations.565
The official SAS website includes a “Strobe Light Pouch MkIII566” in its list of equipment products.567568569 This appears to provide independent supporting evidence for Tomlinson’s sworn affidavit account – see earlier – that “a strobe flash gun [is] a device which is occasionally deployed by special forces570”.571
Tomlinson has provided a logical reason why the SBS had the “piece of equipment that could give a very bright flashing light” – it was: “this was used … to disorient … a helicopter pilot, on landing for example”.
One could argue that since strobe lights exist, and apparently they have since 1931572, why wouldn’t they be used by special forces and be known to intelligence agencies?
The question is: If the SAS and SBS do not use strobe lights in their line of work, then one could ask, why? Why wouldn’t SAS and SBS include strobe lights as part of their useful equipment?
I suggest that the attempts by MI6 to distance themselves from knowledge of or use of strobe lights would tend to arouse suspicion, rather than be seen as credible evidence.
The introduction of this issue struck a sensitive chord with MI6.
Richard Tomlinson., Ex-MI6 Officer: 13 Feb 08: 54.7:
Mansfield: Q. Were you at any time aware, whilst you were working in this period of the early to mid-1990s, of any SIS or MI6 involvement in the war that was being waged within Angola?
A. Yes, I can say – yes, there was –
Q. Don’t give me the detail for the moment –
A. Yes.
Q. – because there may be objection. I do not know.
A. That is what I am hesitating for, yes.
Q. I am not asking for the detail from you, but you remember.
A. Mm.
…. Coroner: Is the relevance of this landmines?
Q, It is….
Coroner: Is that going to get into the detail?
Q. Well, there is a risk of it….
Coroner: We will see what Mr Tam says about this.
Tam: Sir, I was listening to see what the next question was going to be, but if there is a risk of detail being given, then that detail may well be detail which should not be given.
Coroner: The trouble is, once the detail is given, it is then too late. That is the problem.
Tam: That is why I was listening to the question to see exactly sort of answer might be –
Coroner: Mr Mansfield is content to leave this until next week, anyway, so that may be the way out of this.
Q. I think there may be time today to consider how to deal with this because, obviously, as you have rightly pointed out, it bears absolutely on what Princess Diana was doing in 1997. I would want to ask this witness, so that everyone knows what the question is, what the role of MI6 was in Angola – when he was obviously part of MI6, what he learned to be that role. That is all.
Tam: Can we take instructions on that and return to it?
Coroner: Yes.
At 123.6: Q. This concerns the possibility of a role of MI6 in Angola, and you were about to say something and then stopped. Is your recollection in relation to this issue based on any document or conversation that you had while you were employed at MI6?
….A. Well, MI6 would have several roles in Angola. It would not just be one.
Tam: Stop, stop, stop. This is the road that I did not want the witness to be going down without some care being taken. My learned friend asked the question that he very kindly agreed to start with, which is simply to try to ascertain from the witness the basis for him talking about the subject matter. Only once that we have that established can we then go on to see what of that it is possible safely to talk about in future.
Coroner: Did you hear that, Mr Tomlinson?
A. Yes, I did. I am not sure I entirely understand how far I am allowed to go.
Q. Can I put the question again? The preparatory question is this: what is the basis for your recollection about any role that MI6 may have had in Angola in the 1990s? Can I illustrate it, so that it is very clear? Is it the result of a document you saw at the time or conversations or training? What is the source?
A. I think I can answer that. There was a possibility of a posting to Angola and I was interested in going myself because I thought it would be an interesting posting and challenging. I do not know whether that is still the case, but in the 1990s we had postings there.
Tam: Stop, stop. Sir, so that I am not beating about the bush, I understand that my learned friend wants to explore with this witness an allegation that has been made that SIS were in some way involved in the supply of landmines to factions in Angola and I have said that that is an aspect that he can properly ask questions about. Our sensitivities and proper sensitivities, as you will appreciate, lie in protecting the questions of whether there were any requirements from the Government for intelligence relating to Angola, that is to say whether or not there were; whether or not there were any intelligence operations in Angola, and if there were, how they were carried out. It is that area that we are seeking to protect for sensitivity.
Coroner: So you have no objection to the narrow question on landmines?
Tam574: The narrow question on landmines is fine. We have no wish to stand in the way of a proper question. What we are concerned about is that the witness does not stray into other areas which do not concern that, but which might adversely affect –
Coroner: He has been showing some signs of wanting to stray. Can you ask the narrow question on landmines?
Q. May I make it clear? The suggestion is not that MI6 supplied landmines because they would not do that. The question I want to explore with this witness is the role that MI6 played in the war between two factions and on which side were they playing it and, of course, the indirect connections that may then arise in relation to weaponry and landmines going into Angola.
Coroner: Unless that is public knowledge, which I suspect. it is not, I cannot see that that would be allowed.
Tam: Sir, that is all going into operational matters –
Coroner: Indeed.
Tam: – in great specificity.
A. If I can say something here please?
Coroner: Well, I think it is rather dangerous for you to say things without a question because you might be trespassing the wrong side of the line.
A. No, but what I do wish to say does not trespass on anything. I am being perfectly responsible. I do not actually know any of the answers to the potential questions on landmines that may be put to me. I just don’t know. So perhaps that will answer the question. I just don’t know what – except in broad terms, I do not know – what MI6 were potentially doing there, I don’t know. I can tell you on landmines, I do not know anything about it at all.
Richard Dearlove., MI6 Director of Operations, 1994 to 1999, UK: 20 Feb 08: 127.9:
Mansfield: Q. In 1997, in January, Princess Diana went to Angola. Did you know that?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Were there MI6 agents in Angola at the time?
A. I am not prepared to divulge details of SIS’s involvement or positioning in Angola, but what I can say, because we might as well push forward, is that SIS – and I state this categorically – was not involved in the supply of weapons to either side in the Angolan civil war in 1997 and had no involvement in specifically the supply of landmines to either side.
Coroner: I think what Mr Mansfield is ultimately getting at, if we can try to shorten this, is that Princess Diana expressed a very considerable interest in landmines and their elimination and the elimination of their supply. We know that the Government changed in May 1997, and the incoming Government’s policy, which I think may be part of the ethical foreign policy, if I remember rightly at the time, was different from the Conservative Party’s previous policy when they were in Government. Can you throw any light at all on the suggestion that the security services may have killed Diana and Dodi because of her interest in landmines?
A. None whatsoever. SIS had no involvement in the manufacturing or supply of landmines. I might also point out that the job of SIS is to support the Government policy. The Prime Minister announced the end of manufacture and use of landmines, as my Lord has mentioned –
Coroner: Then at some point we signed up to the Ottawa Convention, but I cannot remember the date –
A. In May 1997.575 I can make no attachment between these two issues whatsoever – none.
Q. Perhaps I can just prepare the ground so you can see what the suggested link is. There had been, in Angola, a civil war going on for a number of years.
A. Correct.
Q. The best part of 20 years by 1997.
A. Correct.
Q. Is it also right that the war basically was fought between two factions, UNITA and MPLA?
A. That is correct.
Q. And that MPLA was basically an organisation backed by the Soviet Russians at that point and UNITA was another organisation that was given support by the United States and the United Kingdom; correct?
A. You have to be very careful. You are throwing around dates here and I am not sure. I cannot recall now. I do not think the British Government were ever particularly supportive of UNITA.
Q. No, not officially, but unofficially.
A. Well, that is your statement.
Q. What is the answer?
A. I am not going to speculate on British policy towards UNITA of that period because, frankly, I just cannot remember.
Q. I can obviously just put the bold statement and I know the answer. I want, if I may, just to put the bricks in the wall to you. So you know why I am asking these questions, it is because there was some evidence that Diana was compiling a dossier and that the dossier was capable of exposing historically British involvement in Angola because of who manufactured the weaponry, how it was got in there. Please understand that there is no suggestion that the SIS themselves would manufacture anything or would themselves, as it were, take weaponry into Angola, but that MI6, along with parish576 companies and British mercenaries, were playing a role in that war. Can you answer that?
A. I do not recall, as I said, that the SIS was involved in the supply of weaponry to either side.
Q. Yes. That was not the suggestion, that MI6 was involved in the supply, but that British companies were involved.
…. Q. The reason I was asking you about Angola is, through one source or another, did you become aware that she was asking a lot of questions?
A. Frankly, we did not take any interest –
Q. Really.
A. – in what she was doing. It is not a national security issue. My job was to contribute to national security.
Q. But, of course, if it was thought that Diana was going to expose a great deal of what was going on and had been going on in Angola and was teaming up – I am going to put it so that it is clear – with a family577 who were certainly persona non grata in the plural and, worse than that, actually by some loathed, that might become an issue of security, mightn’t it?
A. That is your speculation. I do not think this was an issue of any security concern whatsoever. I think that is very – it is fanciful.
Q. You think it is fanciful?
A. Yes, it was entirely fanciful. It was of no concern to my service whatsoever.
…. Q. Going back to the Angolan situation for a moment – that is why I want to ask you this question or is it a question of deniability – MI6 had a role in Angola during the war between UNITA and MPLA, did they not?
A. We mentioned the JIC578 earlier. There would have been intelligence requirements on the situation in Angola.
Q. Did it go beyond that?
A. No.
Q. Nothing more –
A. Not that I can recall and I really don’t think it went beyond that.
Comment: MI6 was notably sensitive about their involvement in Angola:
Tam said: “The narrow question on landmines is fine.” This appears to be because MI6 – who had employed Tomlinson – must have known that he had no specific knowledge about their involvement with landmines in Angola. And Tomlinson confirms this with: “I do not actually know any of the answers to the potential questions on landmines that may be put to me.”
Mansfield clearly stated during the cross-examination of Tomlinson: “May I make it clear? The suggestion is not that MI6 supplied landmines because they would not do that.”579580
In spite of this, just a week later, Dearlove – the witness – avoided answering questions by focusing on exactly that subject:
Even after Mansfield directly told Dearlove: “Please understand that there is no suggestion that the SIS themselves would manufacture … or … take weaponry into Angola”, Dearlove immediately continues with his mantra: “I do not recall … that the SIS was involved in the supply of weaponry to either side”.582
Mansfield again had to state: “That was not the suggestion, that MI6 was involved in the supply” – then finally Dearlove shifted from that line.
Dearlove evaded answering most of Mansfield’s questions on Angola:583
In a courtroom situation it is normal for a lawyer to build up his cross-examination with a series of questions probing various aspects of an issue. Michael Mansfield had in the stand Richard Dearlove – the main MI6 witness on potential knowledge within the organisation regarding motives for the deaths.584585 It had been alleged that Diana’s anti-landmine campaign was a key possible motive.586
Mansfield got to ask just two questions on this critical subject – “Did you know that … Princess Diana went to Angola?”; “Were there MI6 agents in Angola at the time?” – before Baker intervened.
Mansfield hadn’t even used the word “landmines” – that was first used by Dearlove in his answer.587 Dearlove – who was supposed to be a witness in the stand answering questions – included in his “answer”, “we might as well push forward”. In other words, let’s finish with the “landmines” issue as soon as we can.
Baker then intervened, latching onto this, and apparently decided to attempt to completely circumvent Mansfield’s line of questioning: “I think what Mr Mansfield is ultimately getting at, if we can try to shorten this…. Can you throw any light at all on the suggestion that the security services may have killed Diana and Dodi because of her interest in landmines?” To which Dearlove included his earlier mantra: “SIS had no involvement in the manufacturing or supply of landmines.”
Mansfield managed to ignore this and continued with his original questioning:588 “There had been, in Angola, a civil war going on for a number of years?”
In the end, though, between Tam’s sensitivities589, Dearlove’s mantra and evasiveness and Baker’s attempted circumvention, Mansfield was able to gain very little understanding of MI6’s role in Angola.
The most climactic points appeared to be from Tomlinson before he was shut down each time590: “in the 1990s we had postings there [in Angola]” and “MI6 would have several roles in Angola”.591
Dearlove’s biggest admission was: “There would have been intelligence requirements on the situation in Angola.”
However, it may be that more relevant than the dearth of MI6 evidence was the reaction of the lawyer, Tam, the witness, Dearlove and the judge, Baker, when this subject of landmines was raised by Mansfield.
The question is: Why was there such a concerted effort by Baker, Dearlove and Tam to shut down the inquest evidence on the MI6 involvement with landmines?
The following excerpt from Tomlinson’s book highlights the level of MI6 interest in the arms industry.
Richard Tomlinson., Ex-MI6 Officer: 2001 Book: Jury Didn’t Hear:
“‘Battle’ was one of the arms dealers that MI6 had on its books. Arms dealers are useful sources of intelligence on international arms deals and can be influential in swinging the deals to British companies. ‘Battle’, a multi-millionaire Anglo-Iranian, earned a salary of around £100,000 per year from MI6.
“In late 1991, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) asked Battle to buy them a consignment of new [Russian-made] BMP-3 armoured personnel carriers…. The MOD592 heard rumours that [the BMP-3’s] performance was better than Western equivalents and asked MI6 for intelligence.
“Battle set to work on the deal, flying regularly between the BMP design bureau in Kurgan and Abu Dhabi, and he eventually sealed a deal for the Russians to sell a batch of the lower specification export variant BMP-3s to the Gulf state. He did not omit to see his MI6 handler every time he passed through London, however, and on one visit mentioned that he had been shown around the advanced variant of the BMP-3 on his last trip to Kurgan. MI6 persuaded him to try and acquire one. On his next trip, with a £500,000 backhander and forged end-user certificate provided by MI6, Battle persuaded his Russian contact to hide one of the advanced specification BMP-3s amongst the first batch of 20 export variants which were shipped to the UAE.
“The consignment of BMP-3s went by train from Kurgan to the Polish port of Gdansk. There the 20 UAE vehicles were offloaded into a container ship and sent on their way to Abu Dhabi. The remaining vehicle, under the cover of darkness and with the assistance of Polish liaison, was loaded into a specially chartered tramp steamer and shipped to the army port of Marchwood in Southampton.”593