This speech – which was to the Society of Editors – was the first public speech ever made by a serving chief of MI6.
Laura Roberts, MI6 Chief Sir John Sawers Says Secrecy is Vital to Keep UK Safe, The Telegraph, 28 October 2010
Dearlove took over as Head of MI6 from 1999 to 2004.
Referring to restrictions on access to information.
This also occurred at the inquest: real names of MI6 witnesses were provided to the coroner, but not to the jury investigating the deaths: 20 Feb 08: 1.7 and 26 Feb 08: 3.3.
Referring to a document related to the Milosevic assassination plot – this is covered later.
Keen is addressing Baker here, then Dearlove answers.
The role of A and H will be addressed later.
It will later be shown that Mr 6 is Richard Spearman.
Referring to a letter from the British Embassy to the French investigation into the crash.
Stephen Dorril, MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations, 2001, page 611
This is supported by Mr 6: “I do not accept that that means deniability in the context of internally, ie that you can deny things to one another”. There is an apparent conflict here with the principle of information – internally – supplied on a “need to know” basis (see earlier). I am suggesting that if a fellow MI6 colleague was asking about something he or she did not “need to know”, then that could lead to deniability being used within the MI6 organisation.
I suggest this is also common sense.
See Parts 1 to 3.
Asia Needs To Act On Road Crashes, Press Release, International Transport Forum, 22 September 2009. Jack Short, Secretary General of the International Transport Forum, said: “In Asia over 2,000 people die on the road every day, accounting for 60% of casualties at [a] global level.”
This figure is based on an IRTAD (International Road Traffic and Accident Database) estimate from 2009 (see endnote) – the figure in 1997 would have been substantially higher than this. In 2008 there were 4,275 road deaths in France, whereas the equivalent toll in 2000 was 8,079. – and in 1990 there were 11,215 killed on French roads. Source: IRTAD Database, OECD Long-Term Trends, June 2010, www.internationaltransportforum.org/irtad
There is a possibility – although it did not come up at the inquest – that the higher profile a target might be, the stronger the need to be able to deny MI6 involvement. This would fit with car crash being the chosen method to eliminate Diana.
Former MI5 officer, Annie Machon, said in her 2005 book: “Vehicle ‘accidents’ are used as a way of assassination precisely because they are such a common cause of death.”: Annie Machon, Spies, Lies and Whistleblowers: MI5, MI6 and the Shayler Affair, p215.
Mr 6 supported this when he confirmed to Mansfield that deniability “would embrace denying it to a foreign Government”.
In his book, Spycatcher, Peter Wright indicated that MI6 will deny any operation not carried out by someone under the cover of the local British Embassy. In describing work done by his father, Maurice Wright, in Norway during WWI: “The MI6 station in the [British] Embassy [in Oslo] supplied him with communications and spare parts, but it was dangerous work…. He was not part of the diplomatic staff and would be denied if discovered.”: Spycatcher, p9.
Intelligence Services Act.
Tomlinson outlines similar evidence on the MI6 Chief’s lack of accountability in his book The Big Breach, pages 199 to 201.
Interview with Richard Tomlinson conducted by Paul Sparks at Arles, France on 5 April 2009.
Interview with Richard Tomlinson conducted by Paul Sparks at Arles, France on 5 April 2009.
The inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the death of Ministry of Defence employee, David Kelly, on 18 July 2003.
Peter Heap, The Truth Behind the MI6 Facade, The Guardian, 2 October 2003
Duncan Gardham, MI6 Boss Admits Differences in Values With US Over Torture, The Telegraph, 11 August 2009
Peter Wright was told in MI5 training in the 1950s: MI5’s “work very often involves transgressing propriety or the law”.: Spycatcher, p31.
Tomlinson, Heap, Scarlett.
And also later in this volume.
The transcript reads “was in”, but it probably should read: “was not in”.
MO5 ran the “Special Section” of the War Office.: Christopher Andrew, Secret Service, p88.
Richard Tomlinson, The Big Breach, 2001, page 58
This account in Tomlinson’s book – that organised British intelligence was set up as a result of lies and fiction – is supported in Christopher Andrew’s book Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community, pp88-102 and Andrew Green’s book Writing the Great War: Sir James Edmonds and the Official Histories, 1915-1948 (Military History and Policy), pp31-33.
Intelligence Officer’s New Entry Course – the six month training program.: The Big Breach, p44.
That had carried the MI6 trainees to the location.
Richard Tomlinson, The Big Breach, 2001, pages 53-56
MI6 lawyer, Robin Tam.
This should be Richard Dearlove.
This is addressed later.
Tomlinson.
Oxford definition.
Mr 6 – see later.
See Witness list at beginning of Part 1. The evidence of these witnesses is addressed in this chapter.
This could be a conflict with the claim that Paget was provided “full access” – see below.
Interview with Richard Tomlinson conducted by Paul Sparks at Arles, France on 5 April 2009
MPS actions are addressed in Part 6. The 2007 book Cover-Up of a Royal Murder: Hundreds of Errors in the Paget Report has revealed that the MPS did not carry out an honest investigation into the crash.
The involvement of Prince Philip was actually one of the central themes of Mohamed’s inquest testimony.
Mansfield is talking to Baker.
Despite preventing the jury from hearing any evidence from Philip, Baker told them, in his Summing Up: “There is no evidence that the Duke of Edinburgh ordered Diana’s execution”. Baker never explained how it was possible to know this, without hearing any evidence from the suspect – Prince Philip.
This issue is readdressed in the chapter on The Royals.
Soon after being designated coroner of the case, Baker removed the link to the Paget Report from the official inquest website.
From January 2004 to December 2006.
This is in conflict with Baker’s false assertion – see above – that the inquest was provided “evidence about [the] inner workings” of MI6.
During Tomlinson’s inquest evidence Michael Mansfield read out the contents of a September 1998 letter (attached to a letter to his solicitor, John Wadham) from Tomlinson, that was in the possession of the MPS – see transcripts for 13 Feb 08: 83.16 to 92.25. The contents of that letter are similar to what is in Tomlinson’s affidavit, except that the names of the recipients of A’s proposal were not read out (due to MI6 secrecy at the inquest).
The MI6 treatment of Tomlinson is addressed in a later footnote.
“Without a definite shape or form” – Oxford.
There is further discussion between Mansfield and Baker on this point – it starts on the inquest website at 25.19.
31 Mar 08: 67.17
29 Feb 08: 27.3
This is looked at again in the later section on Independent Operations.
1 Apr 08: 83.17
In his Summing Up Baker also said: “It has been suggested to a number of witnesses that perhaps the intention was to do no more than frighten the occupants of the car.” 31 Mar 08: 53.12. The use of the term “a number” can mean different things to different people, but Mansfield only canvassed the “frighten” possibility with two witnesses, E (see above) and Tomlinson (13 Feb 08: 94.16).
Duncan Gardham, MI6 Boss Admits Differences in Values With US Over Torture, The Telegraph, 11 August 2009
This is not about the rights or wrongs of murder. In some cases it can be argued that a targeted assassination of a wayward dictator – e.g. Adolph Hitler, Robert Mugabe – could be a desirable outcome for society. The issue here is whether British intelligence has been involved in targeted assassination plots. At the inquest – see below – the general MI6 witness evidence was that they never entertained thoughts of assassination.
In his book Tomlinson describes just nine trainees (including himself) present at his training sessions, which started in late 1991.: The Big Breach, pp44, 53.
Obfuscate means “make something hard to understand” – Oxford.
This was the title of an early draft of Tomlinson’s book, which was later published as The Big Breach – see Bibliography.
Intelligence Officer’s New Entry Course.
Directing Staff.
Jonathan Ball, who was the principal teacher during Tomlinson’s training.: The Big Breach, p45.
Richard Tomlinson, The Big Breach, 2001, page 141
Hilliard said that he was quoting from a draft of Tomlinson’s book, but there is no reason to suggest that it would differ substantially from the final version, shown here. There appears to be key information in the book account that Hilliard may have deliberately neglected to remind Tomlinson of, during this period of cross-examination: a) Tomlinson says in his book that the question was asked “after several pints of beer”; b) Tomlinson wrote that Ball – the person he questioned – “had already proved himself a convincing liar”; c) Tomlinson wrote: “if an assassination were plotted, only a tiny handful of officers would know about it”; d) Tomlinson wrote: “Ball … would not make a lowly … student privy to such sensitive information”. None of these four points were included in Hilliard’s account of Tomlinson’s book and they all detract from the credibility of the answer – “Absolutely not, never” – that Tomlinson received from Ball.
There is an apparent conflict in Richard Tomlinson’s evidence: at the inquest he said he remembered “another trainee specifically asked a question … about whether MI6 do … kill people … in one of the training talks that we were given”. Yet it his 2001 book, Tomlinson said: ““Has MI6 ever assassinated a peacetime target?… Nobody quite dared to ask one of the DS in class. It was a taboo subject, left unsaid by the DS and unasked by the students”. There are a couple of differences – the question in the book is very specific about assassinating a peacetime target, whereas at the inquest the topic described by Tomlinson was more general: “whether MI6 do break the law or do kill people”; in the book Tomlinson specifically says the students didn’t dare to ask the DS, the directing staff, but at the inquest the question was asked of someone who was not DS: “not one of the teaching staff – we had visiting officers from the head office”. Tomlinson was not asked to clarify this conflict, but I suggest it is possible that students could be afraid to ask teachers about assassinating peacetime targets, but still feel able to ask a more general question about killing people.
Referring to assassination.
This probably should read: “When you did”.
“This” being the Milosevic plot.
Referring to the other person MI6 claim was the target – i.e. not Milosevic.
Known as Mr A during the inquest but named in Richard Tomlinson’s affidavit to the French investigation.
The Milosevic proposal.
Mr A later stated: “The training staff had different manuals….. So there were not, as far as I remember, manuals that were given to us. I have never been a training officer, but the training officers may have had manuals that they referred to.”: 26 Feb 08: 210.13. This clarification may have been a result of A becoming aware that his evidence conflicted with others – Mansfield appeared to imply a conflict when he told A: “you say there were not any manuals anyway” (see below).
The Milosevic proposal.
Known as Mr H during the inquest but named in Richard Tomlinson’s affidavit to the French investigation.
Known as Mr E during the inquest but named in Richard Tomlinson’s affidavit to the French investigation.
Known as Mr I during the inquest but named in Richard Tomlinson’s affidavit to the French investigation.
Dorril describes Petty as McColl’s assistant: MI6, p759.
This is the target that at the inquest, and in his earlier affidavit, Tomlinson said was Milosevic.
Interview with Richard Tomlinson conducted by Paul Sparks at Arles, France on 5 April 2009
John Stevens, Stevens Enquiry: Overview & Recommendations, 17 April 2003, p16. This was also quoted in the Paget Report, p810
Gordon Thomas, Inside British Intelligence: 100 Years of MI5 and MI6, 2010, page 174
The CIA assassination manual is addressed in the later section on CIA involvement.
Cornwell worked for British intelligence from 1950 (MI5 from 1952) and specifically for MI6 from 1960, retiring to pen novels in 1964. He writes spy thrillers under the pseudonym John le Carré.
Olga Craig, John Le Carré, Sydney Morning Herald: Spectrum Magazine, 18 September 2010, page 39; Olga Craig, John Le Carré: “We Carried Out Assassinations During the Cold War”, The Telegraph, 28 August 2010
Pseudonym.
This is in conflict with Richard Tomlinson who, discussing his dismissal from MI6, in a 2009 interview, said: “I was absolutely devastated when they ended my – well, they didn’t end my contract, because I didn’t even have a contract, we didn’t have contracts”. This may be because Tomlinson was employed in the 1990s – it is possible that MI6 did have a contract when Anderson commenced employment in 1973, but had dispensed with it by the early 1990s. Anderson appears to have provided a direct quote from within the employment contract. Source: Interview with Richard Tomlinson conducted by Paul Sparks at Arles, France on 5 April 2009.
Nicholas Anderson, NOC: Non-Officer Cover: British Secret Operations, 2009, ppiii-v
Daphne Park died on 24 March 2010, aged 88. She worked for British intelligence during WWII and at the conclusion of the war, took up employment with MI6, staying with them for 34 years, retiring in 1979.
Gordon Corera, MI6: A Century in the Shadows, BBC Radio 4 Documentary, 10 August 2009
Duncan Gardham, MI6 Boss Admits Differences in Values With US Over Torture, The Telegraph, 11 August 2009
This is supported by John Pearson in his 1966 book on the life of Ian Fleming. Fleming worked in the Admiralty, including several years in Naval Intelligence, throughout WWII. During this time Fleming conducted secret missions for British intelligence: “A … sophisticated little weapon that … appealed to Fleming was a fountain pen which could eject a sizeable cloud of tear gas when you pressed the clip. He sometimes carried one with him. ‘Of course, ‘ he explained to another member of NID [Naval Intelligence Division] ‘you’re not confined to tear gas. It will take a cyanide cartridge too, but naturally you don’t fit one of those except on really dangerous missions.’ The pen was kept loaded with tear gas on the off-chance of his meeting an enemy agent face to face…. His routine contacts with the undercover society of Special Operations made him an ex-officio member of the cloak-and-dagger world, where all this was rather taken for granted.
“Fleming … seems to have become very much involved in spirit with the ‘black’ world of the Special Operations Executive. His brother Peter had … been recruited by the SOE for special work in the Middle East….
“According to Fleming’s close friend, Ivar Bryce, who was … working for Sir William Stephenson [Head of SOE] ‘Ian wrote out the charter for the American COI [Coordination of Information, forerunner of today’s CIA] at General William Donovan’s [Head of COI] request. He wrote it in long-hand in a room in the British Embassy and it took him just over two days.
“On leaving NID in December 1942 [Admiral] Godfrey acknowledged that Fleming ‘had contributed very largely to the development and organisation of the Naval Intelligence Division during the war’.” John Pearson, The Life of Ian Fleming, pp106,114-5,127,136.
The COI started in 1941, the following year it became the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) which was replaced by the Central Intelligence Group in 1946 and finally became the CIA in 1947.
Head of the BSC – British Security Coordination.
British Security Coordination – a branch of MI6 set up in New York in 1940 to handle covert operations in North America during WWII.
Special Operations Executive – an organisation established in 1940 to conduct operations involving sabotage and resistance. After WWII it became the “Special Operations Branch” of MI6.
World War 2 – 1945.
Displaced Person.
Stephen Dorril, MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations, 2001, pages 610-612
John Pearson, The Life of Ian Fleming, 1966, pages 129 to 130
Annie Machon, Spies, Lies and Whistleblowers: MI5, MI6 and the Shayler Affair, 2005, page 167
Foreign Secretary.
This is intimated by H to Mansfield – see above and below.
Dearlove’s background was covered on 20 Feb 08: 4.4 to 5.15.
At the time of the inquest.
26 Feb 08: 3.10
X was involved in showing MI6 files to Operation Paget and at that time was given “God’s access” to all files – see earlier.
In her evidence, X said “there were always discussions about that” – as though she could have had experience of training sessions over a period, as a result of her role in administration.
The year of A’s assassination proposition – see later.
“I was there [at the training sessions] on a couple of occasions, in 1987 I think it was”.
The presumption is that Dearlove and X should have been trying to present a true overall picture to the court.
One could argue that Mansfield should have included that one, but it did occur in the bar, and in Tomlinson’s book – not heard by the jury – he said that it was “after several pints of beer” and that the officer who told him was “a convincing liar”.
“Obfuscate” means “to make something hard to understand”: Oxford.
“That is not precisely accurate of what [Tomlinson’s] evidence was”.
The actual word used by Tomlinson was “obfuscated”.
The LiveNote was the inquest transcripts, which the judge and lawyers had in front of them on computer screens during the inquest sessions.
19 Feb 08: 1.4
Earlier evidence indicated that A’s training could have been around 1983.
William Stevenson – the author – has written about events involving William Stephenson – the head of SOE. The two men are separate people and their surnames are spelt differently.
British Security Coordination.
William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid: The Secret War 1939-1945, 1977, pp364-380
MI6 Chief from 1939 to 1952.
Irgun Zvai Leuni: a Jewish underground terrorist organisation.
Nigel West, The Friends: Britain’s Post-War Secret Intelligence Operations, 1990, pp41-2, 50
CIA Director, 1953 to 1961.
Gordon Thomas, Inside British Intelligence: 100 Years of MI5 and MI6, 2010, pages 175-6
That night the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri es-Said, was visiting 10 Downing St.
British Prime Minister.
At this time Eden was taking large doses of prescription drugs.
Information Research Department, a part of the Foreign Office.
Special Political Action.
Wilbur Eveland, CIA officer.
Deputy Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office.
Arab News Agency.
See Peter Wright’s account below. Dorril also includes the poison dart story which was described by Wright.
Stephen Dorril, MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations, 2001, pages 623 to 639
Richard Belfield states: “MI6 concocted a plan to assassinate [Nasser] by pumping cyanide gas through the U-bend of his toilet….”: The Secret History of Assassination, p254.
Porton Down, the UK government’s chemical and biological Weapons Research Establishment. Today it is home to the UK government’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory.
In this, Wright represented MI5.
Peter Wright, Spycatcher, 1987, pages 160-1
Peter Wright, Spycatcher, 1987, pages 156-8
Bill Magan, MI5 officer. Both Magan and K-G later became Directors on MI5’s board.: The Friends, p23.
MI6 officer who became Conservative MP for Mid-Bedfordshire in 1960.: The Friends, p102.
Nigel West, The Friends: Britain’s Post-War Secret Intelligence Operations, 1990, pp95, 102-3
Ian Black, Files Show UK Backed Murder Plot, The Guardian, 28 June 2001
Belfield’s account is sourced from the British National Archives, Reference FO371/146650. Belfield also said: “The Foreign Office was being encouraged to take action by their man in Leopoldville. MI6 was also being prodded into action by reports from their Congo station chief, Daphne Park, who argued that Lumumba was going to take the Congo into the Russian camp.”: The Secret History of Assassination, p24.
Belfield states: “The second option was to bring in a constitution taking power away from Patrice Lumumba as prime minister and giving it to the president.”: The Secret History of Assassination, p25.
Richard Belfield, The Secret History of Assassination: The Killers and Their Paymasters Revealed, 2008, pages 24 to 25
Patrice Lumumba was assassinated, but not by the British. Belfield wrote: “The CIA dispatched an agent to the Congo armed with a deadly virus with which to kill Lumumba, but it was the Belgians who got there first, shooting him dead after days of brutal and inhumane treatment.”: The Secret History of Assassination, p26.
In June 2003 this article – entitled Assassination and the License to Kill – was submitted as written evidence to the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons, by Dr Martha Mundy, Senior Lecturer in Anthropology (Specialist in the countries of the Arab East) London School of Economics.: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/
Leader of the Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA) assassinated in Dublin on 5 October 1977.
Member of the OIRA. He survived an attempted assassination on 1 March 1975.: Wikipedia under “Sean Garland”.
First chief-of-staff of the Provisional IRA. He died on 17 May 2001, aged 73.
This occurred on 15 April 1972.
Richard Bennett, Assassination and the License to Kill, Asia News, 13 June 2003
DS Patrick Crinnion, member of the Irish SB, recruited as an agent by John Wyman.
“26 counties” is a term used by the Irish to describe the Republic of Ireland, which comprises 26 counties.
An Phoblact, History: British Spies in the 26 Counties, Ireland’s Own, 27 December 2001
There is a conflict between Thomas’ and Bennett’s account. Bennett says that “Littlejohn passed on the name of Joe McCann” to Wyman. Thomas says that Wyman included McCann on the assassination list he gave to Littlejohn. Although the latter would seem most likely, the main issue here is that the overall evidence points to MI6 being involved in a proactive campaign of targeted assassinations in Ireland in the early 1970s.
Gordon Thomas, Inside British Intelligence: 100 Years of MI5 and MI6, 2010, pages 207 to 208
Irish National Police Service. Dorril is probably referring here to Patrick Crinnion.
Stephen Dorril, MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations, 2001, page 741