Figure 1.1. A conceptual framework of operational psychology
In the present perilous situation, it is obviously desirable that the psychologists of the country act unitedly in the interests of defense. Our knowledge and our methods are of importance to the military service of our country, and it is our duty to cooperate to the fullest extent and immediately toward the increased efficiency of our Army and Navy.
—Robert Yerkes (1917)
Operational psychology traces its origins back to the profession’s involvement in World Wars I and II. During that period in U.S. history, psychologists were relied on to help assess, select, and place military service members based on their suitability for various positions in national security and defense (Brandon, 2011; Mangelsdorff, 2006). It was the former American Psychological Association (APA) president (Robert Yerkes) who, over 100 years ago, after witnessing the application of various hard sciences to the military in World War I, commissioned several committees to examine the potential role of psychology in the nation’s defense.
Between 1917 and 1919, two million military inductees were psychologically screened for the Department of Defense (DoD) using intelligence and aptitude tests. Psychologists found a rich trove of applied research in the intersection of operational problems, national defense, and national security requirements. Applied psychological research flourished in the areas of war fighter personality, performance, and selection (Henmon, 1919; Paton, MacLake, & Hamilton, 1918; Rippon & Manuel, 1918) while a parallel process was occurring in the application of psychological principles in the post–Industrial Revolution workforce of America. The psychological study of industrial and vocational activities expanded rapidly. Intelligence testing, occupational interest, and job analysis methodology were developed and employed throughout the workforce.
Within the defense and security sectors, the operational application of behavioral science was levied against three broad problem sets: (1) performance factors associated with individual differences used in the study of personnel selection, pilot performance, human factors, and ergonomics; (2) attempts to measure intelligence and aptitude, applied to personnel suitability screening using traditional test batteries such as the Army Alpha and Beta; and (3) a focus on personality differences, employing tests measuring psychological fitness and adaptation (Staal & Stephenson, 2013).
While much can be said about World War I as a catalyst for applied psychology, most operational psychologists identify World War II and the establishment of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) as the birthplace of the specialty (Banks, 2006; OSS, 1948). It is well beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the activities of the OSS in full detail; however, a brief overview of its history and employment of psychologists is instructive. Most contemporary operational practitioners identify the work of OSS psychologists as the modern progenitor for operational psychology.
Following World War I, the German Wehrmacht (defense forces) established a unique approach to assessing and selecting their officers. Known later as an assessment center, the Germans conducted a three-day period of assessment during which time officer candidates were provided psychological testing and naturalistic exercises to assess their aptitude and abilities. A multidisciplinary board of evaluators (e.g., psychologists, physicians, and military officers) rated each candidate. Members of the British military observed Wehrmacht psychologists using observational techniques and situational tests in German officer selection. The British combined these German observational methods with the psychometric approach of American psychology and called it an “assessment” to describe their process. Following their observations, the British War Office Selection Boards (WOSBs) began to use assessment centers for military officer selection. During these assessments, British officer candidates were subjected to psychiatric interviews, psychological testing, and a series of realistic group and individual simulations. In 1945, the British Civil Service Commission used the assessment center technique for the first time in a nonmilitary context. This technique was mirrored in the United States by the American Telegraph & Telephone Company (AT&T) following World War II.
The Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI), which would later become the Office of Strategic Services, was established in 1942 under the direction of Major General William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan. The COI’s charter was to develop strategic intelligence and carry out unconventional warfare, specifically, espionage, sabotage, information operations (propaganda), and guerrilla warfare. After its first year in operation, the COI office was renamed the OSS. While reviewing its operational successes, OSS leadership became concerned with reports from the field regarding OSS agents’ inability to adapt to the challenging environments faced overseas. In response, it was recommended that a program of psychological and psychiatric assessment like that conducted in the British WOSBs should be employed. By November 1943, a physical facility had been established, and OSS psychologists were put to work assessing candidates for clandestine operations overseas.
OSS selection psychologists recognized that there was an absence of sufficient job analyses due to the specialized nature of the OSS agents’ duties. As a result, the team of OSS evaluators concluded that rather than specific knowledge, skills, and abilities, their target would be based instead on a “whole-person concept.” OSS leadership found such value in their psychologists’ consultation that only agents who received a positive recommendation could be sent abroad.
OSS agent candidates were assessed for their aptitude and acumen across many different variables: (1) motivation, (2) practical intelligence, (3) emotional stability, (4) social relations, (5) leadership, (6) physical ability, (7) observation and reporting, (8) propaganda skills, and (9) and ability to maintain cover. Each variable was rated on a six-point Likert scale. To validate the selection program, OSS psychologists collected information from four sources, performance appraisals from overseas staff, an evaluation of each agent by their theater commander, feedback from subsequent evaluations whenever possible, and appraisals by returning personnel (peer evaluations). Wiggins (1973) conducted an analysis of OSS psychological assessments, finding an increase in predictive accuracy for selection decisions of between 14 percent and 18 percent. Readers who are interested in a more detailed description of the OSS and its cadre of distinguished psychologists are referred to several sources (Banks, 2006; Handler, 2001; OSS, 1948; Picano, Williams, & Roland, 2006).
The OSS was disbanded by an executive order following World War II, and its functions were split between the Department of State (DoS) and the Department of War (DoW). The OSS’s research and analysis branch was subsumed under the DoS (later to form the Interim Research and Intelligence Service). The DoW received the OSS’s clandestine branch that formed the Strategic Services Unit. Shortly after this time, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the military’s Special Forces were created. There seems little doubt that critical remnants of the OSS were used in the formation of both organizations. In the absence of the OSS, operationally minded psychologists continued to provide support to national security and defense elements. Their activities included special operations personnel selection; influence and information operations consultation; indirect behavioral assessments; Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training support; and interrogation and debriefing support (Banks, 2006; Williams et al., 2006).
In addition to the areas of intelligence and defense, psychological science and its practitioners were employed in several other operational arenas during the second half of the last century. For example, police, public safety, and other law enforcement agencies witnessed widespread growth and development in their operational use of psychologists and behavioral science. Applications included personnel suitability screening, fitness-for-duty evaluations, consultation to investigations, and hostage negotiations. A discussion of these developments is beyond the scope of this chapter; however, readers are referred to the substantial literature in this area (Corey, 2012; Kitaeff, 2011; Reese & Horn, 1988).
The attacks against the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, were a watershed moment for psychologists supporting national security, defense, law enforcement, and public safety. The military and intelligence apparatus for the United States was anxious to find answers and to prevent a future attack. Law enforcement and homeland security were equally alert to potential risks and, alongside military and intelligence counterparts, pressed their psychologists into service at an accelerated rate. The number of psychologists trained to support interrogations and debriefings was increased. This expansion facilitated the development of formal training programs to prepare non-operationally trained psychologists to support these activities (Dunivin, Banks, Staal, & Stephenson, 2010; Greene & Banks, 2009). Unfortunately, this infusion was accompanied by controversy regarding the roles psychologists played as operational enablers. Widespread misperception that operational psychologists were engaged in torture and unethical practices arose (Kalbeitzer, 2009; Lifton, 2004; Marks, 2005; Mayer, 2005).
In response, the community of operational practitioners stepped up their engagement to dispel such myths surrounding operational psychology. As interest in this emerging specialty increased, so too did the ranks of its practitioners, and scholarship and research in the area followed. The Society for Military Psychology (Division 19 of the American Psychological Association) published a special issue in the journal Military Psychology, devoted to operational psychology (Williams & Johnson, 2006). This was the first time a journal in psychology devoted an entire issue to the topic, and the result was a series of operational psychology papers flooding the literature (Hoyt, 2006; Kennedy & Zillmer, 2006; Reger & Moore, 2006; Saus et al., 2006; Shumate & Borum, 2006; Staal & Stephenson, 2006; Stephenson & Staal, 2007). Prior to this time, only a handful of articles had been written about psychologists working in operational positions. Holland and Curtis (1998) are credited with the first use of the term “operational psychology,” relating the work of psychologists in support of human space flight. Two other early references to operational psychology include a description of human factors consultation and personnel selection by the U.S. Navy, and the work of Russian operational psychologists working in the arenas of antiterrorism, counterintelligence, training, and personnel selection (Staal & Stephenson, 2013).
This landmark series in Military Psychology was followed by a second special issue, specific to operational psychologists’ working in the national security and intelligence sectors. This series was published by the Society of Consulting Psychology (Division 13 of the APA) in its journal Consulting Psychology (Civiello, 2009). Division 13’s complementary series provided a number of unique perspectives on operational psychology’s support of national security activities. As a capstone to the literature in this area, the APA published a book on the ethics of operational psychology (Kennedy & Williams, 2010). This text was instrumental in drawing together national security, defense and law enforcement operational psychologists. The publication of this volume, under the banner of the APA, established the legitimacy of the specialty and addressed lingering concerns about its ethical applications across the spectrum of practice domains. Subsequent volumes have been published adding to the building literature in this new specialty.
On one hand, much of the work of operational psychologists is not new. As mentioned previously, elements of operational psychology and operationally minded psychologists have supported national security and defense-related activities for over 100 years. On the other hand, as a codified area of specialization, operational psychology is new. Since its earliest inception, operational psychology has evolved. During this maturation, different authors and practitioners have posited different definitions of the field to define its practice parameters (Dean, 2012; Kennedy & Williams, 2010; Staal & Stephenson, 2006; Williams & Johnson, 2006; Williams, Picano, Roland, & Banks, 2006). Some authors have asserted operational psychology in a manner that ties it to national defense, while others have argued for its exclusive connection to national security. Others have levied criticism against both groups for limiting its contextual scope of practice (Gravitz, 2009). A descriptive review of these proposed definitions has already been provided (Staal & Stephenson, 2013).
To find common ground and draw communities of operational practitioners together, Staal and Stephenson (2013) merged the definitions proposed by multiple operational psychologists. While this approach may be unsatisfactory for some, it may be necessary for unity among the operational psychology community. Consensus allows for the operational practice community to move forward in important developmental pathways as it grows as a recognized psychological specialty, pathways that may not be available without a common operating foundation. In their examination of different operational psychology definitions, these authors identified several foundational truths: (1) operational psychologists apply psychology and behavioral science to real-world problems; (2) their work often occurs within third-party consultative relationships; (3) their clients are often individual decision makers or organizations, and not necessarily the direct recipients of their services; (4) the purpose of their consultation may be to assist individuals or organizations in developing, targeting, and influencing others; (5) the focus of this development and influence often occurs across tactical, operational, and strategic levels; and (6) the operating context for operational psychology typically falls within the national security, defense, law enforcement, and public safety sectors.
In practice, operational psychologists provide a broad spectrum of services. Operational consultation may include: (1) advising counterterrorist elements on the behavior of a terrorist cell or violent extremist network, (2) providing training to intelligence analysts and interrogators on ways to build rapport when working with detained subjects who don’t share similar cultural or ideological experiences, (3) helping draft strategic communications for leaders in response to an opposing political regime, (4) assisting in the design of personnel screening programs for various occupational specialties, (5) facilitating intelligence debriefings and analysis, (6) enhancing small-team performance, or (7) consulting with pilots on the human factors associated with distributed decision making, common in unmanned aerial vehicle operations.
The following definition focuses on core foundational elements common to operational psychology practices. We submit the following as an increasingly accepted definition of operational psychology, “a specialty within the field of psychology that applies psychological science to the operational activities of national security, defense, and public safety.” These services typically occur through a consultative relationship that enables individuals to more effectively understand, develop, and influence an individual, group, or organization to accomplish tactical, operational, or strategic objectives (see Figure 1.1).
Few events associated with operational psychology have been as explosive as operational practitioner support of interrogation and detention operations. Disinformation, lack of critical thinking, and unbridled innuendo have combined to confuse and distort the truth. We take this moment to set the record straight. A more detailed history and discussion can be found in Chapter 11 of this text.
As best as anyone can ascertain, two contracted CIA psychologists provided support in designing and implementing a program of harsh interrogation in the early days following 9/11. Furthermore, between 2002 and 2003, two military psychologists (both clinicians) were pressed into service as consultants to interrogations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Neither of the clinicians had prior training, and both received limited supervision in their new roles. To make matters worse, the Department of Defense (DoD) had yet to develop any training program or draft any instructions providing guidance on their roles or responsibilities. In the clarity of hindsight, they were heavily criticized by vocal opponents of psychologists supporting interrogation and detention activities. As allegations of possible abuse surfaced, the public became aware of the presence of psychologists in detention facilities, and naturally their activities were questioned. Over the course of the next several years, numerous investigations were conducted by the DoD and other agencies (DoA, 2004a, 2004b, 2005; Schlesinger, 2004). In no case was wrongdoing identified on the part of psychologists or Behavioral Science Consultation Teams (BSCTs). In fact, just the opposite was the conclusion of these investigations. The following excerpt comes from the 2005 report commissioned by the surgeon general of the army, “There is no indication that any medical personnel participated in abusive interrogation practices; in fact, there is clear evidence that BSCT personnel took appropriate action and reported any questionable activities when questioned” (DoA, 2005, p. 106).
Others have also written commending the response of operational psychologists working in and around interrogation and detention facilities. For example, both Fallon (2017) and Lauritzen (2013) chronicle the acts of Dr. Michael Gelles, a Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) operational psychologist, who was present in the Guantanamo Bay detention facility in 2002. In their account, Dr. Gelles raised and reported concerns over potential abuse to NCIS leadership. As a former naval officer working for the DoD, Dr. Gelles was operating, as many operational psychologists do, in a third-party consultative role. He has been credited for his moral courage and independent action in preventing potential human rights violations, something he could not have done, had he not been an experienced operational practitioner at Guantanamo Bay.
In the light of these events, the Department of the Army (DoA) developed a formal training program for BSCTs (DoA, 2006) and published formal guidance on BSCT roles and responsibilities (DoD, 2006). The APA also responded, launching a presidential task force to examine ethical issues associated with psychologists operating in the national security sector (APA PENS TF, 2005). Following the release of the PENS TF Report, the APA’s Council of Representatives formed a resolution reasserting the organization’s absolute opposition to all forms of torture and abuse, linking the APA’s position to the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Convention.
Despite these actions, a vocal minority within APA continued to raise concerns about psychologists’ role in interrogation support, and, in response, the APA issued a re-affirmation of the organization’s position against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment (APA, 2008). The following year, the APA doubled-down on its position, issuing a moratorium prohibiting psychologists from planning, designing, assisting in, or participating in any activities that involve the use of torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Moreover, the APA passed a petition resolution stating that psychologists may not work in settings where persons are held outside of, or in violation of, either international law (e.g., the UN Convention against Torture and the Geneva Conventions) or the U.S. Constitution, unless they are working directly for the persons being detained or for an independent third party working to protect human rights. This petition was approved by a vote of the APA membership (8,792 voting in favor of the resolution; 6,157 voting against the resolution). Per the Association’s rules and bylaws, the resolution became an official APA policy in 2009. In June 2010, the APA formally amended its ethics code to reflect its recent policy changes (APA, 2010) and, under continued pressure, in 2013 the APA’s Council of Representatives adopted a resolution to rescind the PENS TF report.
In 2014, the APA’s board of directors contracted the Sidley Austin law firm to assist in settling lingering accusations of impropriety, claims echoed in James Risen’s book, Pay Any Price. It had been alleged that key leaders within the APA had been working in secret with the DoD and military psychologists to draft ethics guidelines and policies that would allow them to continue to support interrogations without imposing additional limitations on their work. This allegation was fueled by the belief that psychologists had been complicit in torturing detainees for the government.
David Hoffman, an accomplished prosecutor, led a team of seven lawyers. In selecting a law firm to conduct the investigation, the APA board of directors demonstrated their unwillingness to trust psychologists to examine these issues independently and provide an objective report. That decision set in motion a series of conditions that would ultimately result in a failure to critically evaluate and analyze the data they collected (Kilburg, 2018). Psychologists, unlike lawyers, investigate issues employing a process of critical analysis that starts with a logic statement, a null hypothesis. This approach guarantees a comparative analysis of facts and assumptions. In contrast, attorneys employ a different methodology, with different levels of proof and analytic practices. Typically, one lawyer makes an argument satisfying his client’s goals, while the opposing lawyer counters with her own argument refuting those claims. The arguments are presented before a judge or jury who ultimately decides the truth claims of each. This approach falls well short of the scientific method employed by psychologists. Because these two methods hold different standards for data collection and analysis, they easily lead to different conclusions. Mr. Hoffman’s Report failed to meet our profession’s standard when it comes to methods of investigation, and the result was a series of faulty assumptions and conclusions.
After studying how the DoD and APA collaborated in drafting policies and guidelines for psychologists’ support of interrogation and detention operations, Hoffman’s team of attorneys concluded that there was “collusion” between the DoD and APA. How collaboration or coordination was dubbed “collusion” by Hoffman and his team is unclear. However, once characterized in this manner, it was judged as irrefutable evidence in the court of public opinion, and it emboldened the vocal minority opinion within APA. Ironically, Hoffman’s Report states that his investigation never found any evidence that the APA’s coordination with the DoD resulted in any torture or inhumane treatment of detainees, a fact often ignored by those opposing operational psychology.
Even though no psychologist has been censured by the APA, none has had their membership revoked, and none has been criminally prosecuted, claims of unethical conduct remain, and Mr. Hoffman’s Report is considered “proof” of wrongdoing. In the wake of Hoffman’s Report, senior APA staff were removed, and senior military psychologists were slandered. Immediately following the release of the report, the APA’s Council of Representatives took the unprecedented step of prohibiting psychologists from providing support to any national security interrogations. This was the first time, perhaps in the history of the field, that a setting or location (national security interrogations) was deemed unethical as opposed to a behavior (interrogation or detention support). In taking such steps, the APA revealed that its decision was the result of political pressure and not the result of a scientific investigation of the facts.
Operational psychologists often work in public safety, defense, security, and intelligence where clients may be third-party decision makers or organizations as opposed to individuals receiving personal services. They often focus on organizational effectiveness as opposed to personal effectiveness. Operational psychologists do many things: (1) they help assess, select, and train resiliency in military members; (2) they enhance communication, team cohesion, and leader decision making in high-stakes situations; (3) they advise interrogators and intelligence analysts on the best ways to build rapport, operational accord, and cultural sensitivity when working with detainees; (4) they train pilots to reduce cognitive load, enabling them to better accomplish their missions; and (5) they consult with organizational leaders on morale, personnel, and policy. In some instances, their work is sensitive, with limits placed on external access. When acting as embedded consultants, dual agency considerations are common.
Our history is rich and diverse and spans over 100 years of application to national security and defense operations. Despite our proud heritage, operational psychologists have faced adversity and opposition. Our specialty has continued to mature and develop despite these distractions, and it is currently on trajectory to becoming a formally recognized specialization within the branch of applied psychology (Staal, 2018).
Operational psychologists have taken hold of a unique niche within national security, defense, and public safety sectors. The following chapters will describe consultative support to intelligence activities, counterterrorism, insider threat, counterintelligence, specialized assessment and selection, operational training, and human performance.
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