Three Minutes ‘til Midnight
In 1945 a Russian-born biophysicist named Eugene Rabinowitch, together with fellow Manhattan Project alumnus Hyman Goldsmith, created a newsletter called the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Its purpose, according to the founders, “was to awaken the public to full understanding of the horrendous reality of nuclear weapons and of their far-reaching implications for the future of mankind; to warn of the inevitability of other nations acquiring nuclear weapons within a few years, and of the futility of relying on America’s possession of the ‘secret’ of the bomb.” In 1947 the Bulletin, recognizing that their efforts to halt the atomic arms race was failing, developed a symbol of the legacy of nuclear weapons known as the “Doomsday Clock.” Originally set at seven minutes to midnight, the Doomsday Clock has tracked the progress of humankind’s efforts to contain nuclear weapons’ menace since 1947, with its time being changed when circumstances warranted.1
In 1953, as a result of the Soviet Union’s continued testing of nuclear weapons, the Doomsday Clock was set at two minutes to midnight, the closest to the end it ever reached in its history to date. After a period of fluctuation, in 1972 the clock was set at twelve minutes to midnight as a result of détente and the signing of the SALT accords. This setting matched the best result up until that time, achieved when President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Khrushchev signed the limited test ban treaty in 1963. The testing of a nuclear device by India in 1974, followed by the demise of the SALT II treaty in 1980, combined to put the clock back to its original setting, seven minutes to midnight. This was the clock’s reading when President James Earl Carter entered the fourth year of his presidency.2
On January 23, 1980, President Carter delivered his State of the Union address to the American people with an eye on defining his response to the ongoing situations in Iran and Afghanistan. Carter addressed the hostage crisis in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as the two major problems facing the United States, before outlining the history of U.S. efforts to contain Soviet power since the end of the Second World War. The president noted that the United States had, throughout this period,
maintained two commitments: to be ready to meet any challenge by Soviet military power, and to develop ways to resolve disputes and to keep the peace. Preventing nuclear war is the foremost responsibility of the two superpowers. That’s why we’ve negotiated the strategic arms limitation treaties—SALT I and SALT II. Especially now, in a time of great tension, observing the mutual constraints imposed by the terms of these treaties will be in the best interest of both countries and will help to preserve world peace. I will consult very closely with the Congress on this matter as we strive to control nuclear weapons. That effort to control nuclear weapons will not be abandoned.3
It was an election year, and the issues of arms control took second seat to matters that resonated in a more serious fashion on the domestic front. When the Iranian militants had originally taken over the U.S. embassy in Teheran, President Carter had seen his popularity rise among an American public who tended to rally around the flag, so to speak, in times of military crisis. However, as time moved on and Carter had demonstrated no effort to break the impasse that had become the Iran hostage crisis, his popularity began to plummet. Such negative poll results carried considerable political weight, especially in an election year.
Under pressure to be seen as doing something, Carter authorized the U.S. military to implement a bold rescue mission to free the hostages. On April 24, 1980, the mission was aborted after a fiery crash involving rescue aircraft, and the next day President Carter made a televised address to the American people in which he informed them about the rescue attempt and its failure. The “Desert One” fiasco, as the rescue became known, further damaged Carter’s political fortunes. Carter’s image wasn’t helped when his secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, resigned in protest of Carter’s decision to go forward with the rescue attempt.
While Carter wrestled with the issues of Iran and Afghanistan, he also focused on the difficult problem of strategic nuclear deterrence and deciding what form American nuclear war plans would take. The decisions he ultimately made ended up being some of the least understood, and yet most controversial, of his administration, culminating in his signing Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59), “United States Nuclear Weapons Targeting Policy.” PD-59 grew out of the Nuclear Targeting Policy Review (NTPR), ordered as a result of PRM-10, the president’s initial guidance for strategic forces. The person responsible for putting the NTPR together was Leon Sloss, a veteran State Department bureaucrat who had previously served as the deputy director of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (from 1973 to 1975) and as the assistant director of ACDA from 1976 to 1978. It was in this latter capacity that he was assigned the task of preparing the NTPR.4
The NTPR, also known as the “Sloss Panel Report,” was conducted in two parts, the first dealing with nuclear targeting and the second with a strategic reserve force. The first part of the study was completed in December 1978. Sloss and his fellow planners stopped evaluating the Soviets from the mindset of Americans when it came to establishing deterrence criteria. Rather, they focused on what American nuclear targeting would concern the Soviets most, and planned accordingly. In doing so, Sloss considered political targets that, if struck, could lead to the unraveling of Soviet power in non-Russian republics, and thus the dismantling of the Soviet Union itself. Such sites, known as “counter-control” targets, were also referred to as “ethnic targets,” given their focus on non-Russian nationalities.5
At the heart of the targeting philosophy contained in the NTPR was the concept that the best way to deter the Soviet Union from engaging in a nuclear war was not only to demonstrate an American will to retaliate if attacked but also to put the Soviets on notice that any American nuclear response would be designed not simply to punish the Soviet Union but rather to defeat the Soviet Union by ensuring that the chaos and disruption that would ensue from a nuclear strike would destroy the Soviet system of government and compel the Soviet Union to surrender. Originally the targeting of the Soviet political machinery was labeled as Counterforce targeting. However, in order to differentiate between the targeting of Soviet missiles and the Soviet political apparatus, a new term was coined: Countervailing.
The key to a Countervailing strategy was the notion that if the Soviets chose to start a nuclear war, not only would they lose, but the United States would win. This represented a key departure from the Assured Destruction philosophy that had governed U.S. nuclear deterrence up until that time. According to the drafters of the NTPR, the Soviets believed that nuclear war could be waged in a protracted fashion and that military targets, not civilian or industrial, would be the first targets of any such war. The Soviets also sought to wage nuclear war in a manner that guaranteed the survival of the Soviet regime and produced a Soviet victory. In order to be effective, U.S. deterrence capability had to be able not only to counter the Soviet model of nuclear warfare but also to prevail, for only by knowing that they would fail in the event of a nuclear war would the Soviets be truly deterred from engaging in a nuclear conflict. The “Sloss Panel Report” and its Countervailing strategy were initially supported only by Zbigniew Brzezinski, but eventually Harold Brown and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were brought on board (the State Department was kept out of the deliberations over the Sloss report). Brzezinski had a Presidential Directive drafted, and on July 25, 1980, President Carter signed PD-59, America’s new nuclear war strategy.6
Carter’s embrace of the MX missile, and a new advanced-technology strategic bomber that made the cancelled B-1 bomber moot, as well as his support for the Trident II missile and submarine program, when combined with his approval of PD-59, pointed to a hardline position on defense that had not been seen since the 1960s. But the public thought otherwise. Some 60 percent of Americans believed that the United States needed to be spending even more on defense, despite the fact that Carter had increased defense spending by a substantial amount. The combined effects of a terrible economy and ongoing hostage crisis with Iran proved to be Carter’s undoing. On November 4, 1980, Ronald Reagan defeated Jimmy Carter in a landslide, winning 489 electoral votes to Carter’s 49 and beating Carter by almost 10 percentage points of the popular vote.
One issue that the new president would not have to address was that of the Americans held hostage in Iran. The combined impact of the death of the shah of Iran from cancer while in exile, on July 27, 1980, and the Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980, helped push Iran toward being receptive to ending the crisis. President Carter desperately wanted to have the hostages released while he was still in office. Finally, through the use of an Algerian diplomat as an intermediary, the United States and Iran were able to enter into what was known as the Algerian Accords, which called for the release of the U.S. hostages in exchange for the United States to unfreeze some $8 billion in Iranian assets. In a parting insult to President Carter, the Iranians delayed the release of the hostages until right after Ronald Reagan was sworn in as president. Former President Carter was able to meet the hostages when they landed in Rhein-Main Air Base in West Germany.
In his inaugural address, President Reagan did not mention the Soviet Union once. He spoke about the strength of American democracy, and the importance of his vision of governance, one in which the government served the people and not the other way around. He spoke about the symbols of American democracy and the price paid by those who died defending it. It was an uplifting, optimistic speech, full of dignity and hope but with little substance. One of the criticisms leveled against Ronald Reagan during the 1980 presidential election was that he was very much a lightweight when it came to the details of governance. His first inaugural address set forth a broad vision, but it would be up to him and his team of advisors to turn that vision into reality.7
Reagan had selected as his vice president George H. W. Bush, a man seasoned in foreign policy, national security, and the inner workings of Washington in every way that Reagan was not. Bush and Reagan had been bitter political rivals, and it was almost a foregone conclusion that Vice President Bush would not be a major player in the formulation and implementation of policy in the Reagan White House. While a weak vice president was nothing new in Washington, the concept of a weak national security advisor was, especially given the past practices of the three previous administrations. Reagan picked Richard Allen, a longtime Washington insider and former Nixon administration official (Allen had served on the National Security Council), to serve in the diminished role of national security “counsellor,” a position that lacked direct access to the president and required Allen to report to Ed Meese, the White House general counsel.8
Allen, like Reagan, was a member of the Committee for the Present Danger (CPD). Such membership appeared to play a major role in determining the makeup of the Reagan administration national security team. All in all thirty-two members of the CPD were given appointments in the Reagan administration. One of the cofounders of the CPD, Eugene Rostow, was appointed to head ACDA. Paul Nitze, the entrenched foe of arms control, became the chief negotiator for Theater Nuclear Forces (INF) in Europe. William Casey took over the CIA. Jeane Kirkpatrick, a lifelong, albeit hawkish, Democrat, was picked as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. Richard Pipes moved to the NSC, where he served as the leading Soviet specialist, and Richard Perle became the assistant secretary of defense for international security policy. The elevation of so many CPD members to positions of responsibility resulted in an immediate change in the tone emerging from within the Reagan administration concerning the Soviet Union. Reagan may not have mentioned the Soviet Union in his inaugural address, but within days Washington was awash in CPD-driven rhetoric, which repudiated détente, denigrated arms control, and called for a massive increase in defense spending.9
The man who would oversee the defense budget, as well as the entire American defense bureaucracy, as secretary of defense under Reagan was Caspar “Cap” Weinberger. Weinberger had served in the Nixon administration as director of the Office of Management and Budget, and as secretary of health, education and welfare. His tenure as OMB director earned him the nickname of “Cap the Knife,” for his efforts to cut government spending. What Weinberger lacked in defense experience was, in Reagan’s mind, more than adequately compensated by both his management skills and his dedicated anticommunist stance. Picking up on the mantra of the CPD, shortly after assuming his post as secretary of defense, Weinberger quickly began advocating for a dramatic increase in defense spending. By March 1981, President Reagan—with Weinberger’s input and approval—submitted a $228 billion defense budget for fiscal year 1983, a $33.8 billion increase. Reagan also proposed a 7 percent increase in defense spending per year through 1985, totaling almost a trillion dollars. Weinberger’s nickname was changed in some circles to “Cap the Shovel,” in reference to these, and later, other increases in military spending. Reagan’s pick for secretary of state, Alexander Haig, possessed impressive credentials, including working in the White House under presidents Nixon and Ford. Ronald Reagan selected Haig to lead the State Department in January 1981 and gave Haig every assurance that he would play a pivotal role in formulating and implementing foreign policy.10
On January 29, 1981, President Reagan gave his first press conference, in which the issue of arms control featured. Reagan told the reporters that he was in favor of a negotiated agreement that achieved “an actual reduction in the numbers of nuclear weapons,” if this was verifiable. Arms control could not be conducted in a vacuum, however, and the president noted that his administration would work based on “linkage,” which took into account “other things that are going on.” Détente, Reagan said, had so far been “a one-way street that the Soviet Union has used to pursue its own aims,” which were, according to Reagan, “the promotion of world revolution and a one-world Socialist or Communist state” that reserved “unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat, in order to attain that,” something the United States had to keep in mind when seeking to do business with the Soviets.11
This was harsh talk, which was well received by the CPD-dominated members of the Reagan administration. But before the new administration could organize itself effectively with regard to a unified approach toward arms control, President Reagan was shot, on March 30, 1981, by would-be assassin John Hinckley. In addition to producing a made-for-television moment when the president joked with his wife about “forgetting to duck,” Reagan’s brush with mortality also led to his reflecting on the state of U.S.-Soviet relations and in particular about the consequences of a nuclear war between the two nuclear powers. While in the hospital, he reflected that God may have spared his life in order for him to “reduce the threat of nuclear war.” Reagan then proceeded to write a letter to Brezhnev in which he called for renewed efforts at disarmament and elimination of nuclear weapons. While Reagan’s inner circle was able to rewrite specific passages of the letter calling for a reduction in nuclear weapons before sending the letter to Brezhnev, there could be no doubt that the president’s position on the issue of nuclear weapons became heavily influenced by his near-death experience. While many of Reagan’s closest advisors were shocked by the tone and content of the letter, there was nothing they could do to alter this newfound passion for a world free of nuclear weapons.12
The president’s new view of arms control had no policy outlet. Haig would continue to articulate publicly about arms control with the Soviet Union, noting in April 1981 that any future arms control effort would be linked with Soviet behavior, declaring that it served “no useful purpose” to negotiate with the Soviets while they engaged in “imperialist policies.”13 Later, in July 1981, Haig appeared on ABC News’ “Issues and Answers,” where he said that “arms control is no longer the centerpiece of U.S.-Soviet relations. The centerpiece must be what contributes to the security of the American people, to international peace and stability.”14 But other players were emerging from within the Reagan administration that would have a say in what direction U.S. policy would take vis-à-vis arms control, and lacking the ability to control the issue via a supreme bureaucratic position, Haig saw the issue slip further and further from his grasp.
One of the other players was Eugene Rostow, nominated to head ACDA. During his Senate confirmation hearings in June 1981, Rostow belittled the very cause he was supposed to be championing, declaring that “arms control thinking drives out sound thinking.”15 Unlike his predecessors, who seemed to understand that the role of ACDA was to help prevent nuclear war, Rostow took an opposite point of view, telling the Senate that the United States could fight and win a nuclear war with the Soviet Union, and even flourish in the aftermath of a global conflict that killed between 10 million and 100 million people, citing the “resilience” of the human race. Rostow staffed ACDA with like-minded persons who believed that the United States could fight and win a nuclear war if it were prepared to fight one. Arms control, in their collective opinion, was the antithesis of war preparation.16
The lack of a central bureaucratic framework for arms control policy would play havoc with the Reagan administration’s early efforts to organize in a cohesive manner. Rostow’s ACDA ostensibly operated under the aegis of Haig’s State Department but in fact possessed a great deal of independence. Nonetheless, where in the past ACDA had exercised control over the process of negotiating arms control agreements (through either the director himself or his deputy), under Reagan the job of negotiating with the Soviets was given to independent negotiators, who reported directly to the White House. The job of negotiating strategic arms reductions was given to retired Lieutenant General Ed Rowney, who had resigned his position on the SALT II negotiation team in December 1979 and had spent most of 1980 testifying against the SALT II treaty. With strategic arms reduction talks in limbo, the selection of Rowney as the man to head them up on behalf of the United States was a clear sign that the Reagan administration was in no hurry to jumpstart the process, as Carter had been back in 1977.
The Reagan administration had inherited the “dual-track” policy concerning theater nuclear forces. This policy had the United States promising to seek to negotiate with the Soviets about reducing or eliminating INF in Europe, while at the same time preparing to deploy a new generation of theater nuclear weapons, the Pershing II and GLCM, as counters to the Soviet SS-20. The individual chosen to head up the INF talks was Paul Nitze, the founding father of America’s Cold War policy of containing the Soviet Union and, like Rowney, a vociferous opponent of the SALT II treaty and arms control in general. The selection of these two men to head up the respective negotiations was an ominous beginning for a process on which so many hopes were based.17
Before the Reagan administration could embark on a fresh approach toward negotiating any arms control agreement with the Soviets, there needed to be an understanding about what the strategic nuclear posture of the United States would be in terms of nuclear weapons employment and the related nuclear weapons delivery systems. Much of this work had been recently done by the Sloss Panel in preparing the NTPR for President Carter, which led to the promulgation of PD-59. Rather than subject the national security mechanisms of the United States to a new top-to-bottom study, the Reagan administration convened a panel for the purpose of refining PD-59. This work was done over the summer of 1981 and had the input of many who would be involved in formulating the arms control policies of the Reagan administration, including Rowney, Nitze, Rostow, and others. The end result of this effort was the issuing of NSDD-13 on October 19, 1981, the “Nuclear Weapons Employment Plan of the United States.” Unlike the massive PD-59 that preceded it, NSDD-13 was a slim document that set forth some basic guidelines, further amplifying the work of PD-59. First, the United States would no longer operate under a Countervailing policy, but rather a Prevailing policy: Nuclear war would be waged with the goal from the outset being American victory in any protracted nuclear exchange lasting up to 180 days in duration.18
NSDD-13 represented the final philosophical victory for nuclear strategist Albert Wohlstetter. Not only did he advise on its creation, but his adherents, including Andrew Marshall, were central contributors to its content. Wohlstetter had long viewed the concept of Assured Destruction as immoral, given its focus on destruction inflicted on civilian populations. The paralysis created by Assured Destruction, or its corollary, Mutually Assured Destruction, was also ineffective, since it neutralized a nuclear arsenal that cost so much to build. Wohlstetter proposed a concept of Graduated Nuclear Deterrence, which accepted the reality of a limited nuclear war, utilizing precision nuclear weapons to destroy an enemy’s military and command capability. As such, Wohlstetter was adamantly opposed to arms control, which he viewed as self-constraining, since it limited the technological advantage enjoyed by the United States. Instead, he advocated the creation of highly accurate weapons, nuclear and nonnuclear alike, whose mere existence would suffice to deter any potential enemy because, if needed, they would in fact be used, as opposed to the massive city-killers of the past, which no prudent leader would ever seek to unleash. NSDD-13 represented a full embrace by the United States of Wohlstetter’s theories, capping a long and distinguished (if controversial) career. (Wohlstetter retired from the University of Chicago in 1980.)19
President Reagan had campaigned vigorously on the concept of America’s “window of vulnerability” vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. He had promised to close this window if elected, and now that he was commander in Chief, he faced the political problem of being seen as fulfilling one of the cornerstone objectives of his administration. The rhetoric regarding the scope of the threat faced by the Soviet Union existed, thanks to Wohlstetter and Pipe’s pronouncements. Now what was needed was substance. NSDD-13 directed that the United States be able to wage and persevere in a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union lasting up to 180 days in length. The arsenal necessary to accomplish this, however, did not exist. The Trident II submarine (and its D-5 missile) was years away from being deployed; so, too, was the advanced technology “stealth” bomber. The B-1 bomber had been cancelled by President Carter, and the MX missile, while ready for production, lacked a coherent basing strategy.
On October 3, 1981, President Reagan stood side by side with Defense Secretary Weinberger and announced that not only was he bringing the B-1 bomber back into production, but he was also going ahead with the production of a hundred MX missiles. There was a catch, however: Reagan was scrapping the “racetrack” concept that had been the cornerstone of the MX employment concept under President Carter. Instead, he proposed placing thirty-six MX missiles into “super hardened” Titan II missile silos and exploring other options for the remaining sixty-four missiles, including deploying them on large aircraft, protecting them with a new ABM system, or burying them in extra-deep silos dug deep into the sides of mountains. The window of vulnerability was closed, Reagan said, although his actions to accomplish this closure represented more of an illusion than substance. The Reagan-Weinberger MX plan did nothing to alter the underlying assessment that U.S. silo-based missiles were vulnerable to a Soviet first strike, and on November 5, 1981, Caspar Weinberger himself testified before Congress that the B-1 bomber’s ability to penetrate Soviet air defenses past 1988 was assessed as limited. A week later he reversed himself in a letter written jointly with CIA Director Bill Casey: The two men stated that the B-1 was viable as a penetration bomber well past 1990. Congress, focusing on the MX missile issue, failed to muster enough votes to override the president’s stated desires, and the B-1 bomber program became official.20
With a strategic nuclear posture cobbled together, however haphazardly, the Reagan administration was positioned to set in motion its arms control strategy. Having labeled SALT II as being “fatally flawed,” Reagan had, since before the 1980 election, promised to enter a new round of negotiations for a SALT III treaty, promising reductions in nuclear arms, not just limitations. But the rhetoric of the Reagan team often took on the tenor of nuclear machismo, which seemed to represent the antithesis of arms reductions, focusing instead on arms employment. Weinberger announced publicly that the United States would be seeking to build and deploy enhanced radiation weapons (the “neutron bomb”), only to be contradicted by Secretary of State Haig, who stated that no decision had been made to deploy the weapon. Reversing course, Haig touted a NATO contingency plan to detonate a tactical nuclear “shot across the bow” of any Soviet conventional assault on Europe, only to be contradicted by Weinberger, who expressed ignorance of any such policy.21
The rift between the State Department and the Defense Department extended into the field of arms control policy, with Foggy Bottom advocating an immediate push for Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) talks in order to placate a growing antinuclear movement in Europe, while the Pentagon pushed for the continued deployment of the Pershing II and GLCM weapons systems, void of any arms control constraints. The negative political fallout from the Carter-era decision to deploy new INF weapons into Europe had, by the time Ronald Reagan took office, expanded into a full-blown peace movement of considerable political clout. The heavy-handed rhetoric of the Reagan national security team only made matters worse. Far from seeing the deployment of the Pershing II and GLCM missiles as a means of countering the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles, many Europeans viewed the new missiles as representing targets for the Soviet weapons, targets that were located in their own backyard. Hundreds of thousands of protesters took to the streets to protest the deployment of weapons systems that represented, in the eyes of the antinuclear movement and much of the general European population, the ultimate taboo: the mass annihilation of civilians in an avoidable nuclear holocaust.22
The structure of the INF policy debate was twofold. On the side of the State Department was the newly appointed head of the Bureau of European Affairs, Richard Burt. A former reporter for the New York Times, Burt was on record commenting, shortly before Reagan took office, that “there are strong reasons for believing that arms control is unlikely to possess much utility in the coming decade.”23 On assuming his office, however, Burt was confronted with the reality of the European antinuclear movement and its opposition to the deployment of the Pershing II and GLCM missiles. This opposition was especially strong in West Germany and the Netherlands, two nations slated to receive the new U.S. weapons systems. Burt carried out a series of meetings with European leaders, including several with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, whose appeal to President Carter for an American response to the Soviet SS-20 deployment was responsible for initiating this entire crisis. Burt soon found himself articulating strongly in favor of an early initiation of INF talks between the United States and the Soviet Union with the goal of significantly reducing the numbers of INF systems to be deployed by either side. In addition to appreciating the European perspective, Burt recognized the dangerous linkage between the planned deployment of INF weapons and the threat of all-out general nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union, noting that “the emplacement of long-range U.S. cruise and ballistic missiles in Europe makes escalation of any nuclear war to involve an intercontinental exchange more likely, not less.”24
Burt’s concerns were brushed aside by his counterpart within the Defense Department, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, who represented the other half of the INF policy debate. Perle had assumed his post straight from his position on Senator Scoop Jackson’s staff, where he had become a vociferous foe of both the Soviet Union and arms control. An adherent of Wohlstetter’s philosophy on nuclear deterrence, Perle believed that only by linking NATO’s nuclear capability with the strategic nuclear forces of the United States could one truly deter a Soviet military assault on Europe, either conventional or nuclear. The numbers of planned U.S. INF forces, and their ability to disperse to remote deployment areas, meant that the Soviets would have to expend a considerable percentage of their nuclear arsenal in any decapitation strike against NATO-affiliated INF, knowing that scores of U.S. weapons would survive to strike back against targets inside Soviet territory. Once U.S. nuclear weapons detonated inside the Soviet Union, there would be nothing to stop a general Soviet attack against the United States. NSDD-13 anticipated this, with its commitment to “controlled escalation” and the ability to wage a protracted nuclear conflict. Of course, the intention was not to promote nuclear warfare but rather to deter it by demonstrating a genuine willingness to use nuclear weapons and prevail, if Soviet actions warranted it. Perle was opposed to any effort to engage the Soviets directly on INF. It was his belief that any effort to reduce U.S.-Soviet differences to a system of treaty-imposed constraints that would then need to be complied with represented a fundamentally flawed point of view. Perle was joined in his opposition to any INF negotiations by National Security Counsellor Allen, who viewed such talks as little more than “blackmail.” Defense Secretary Weinberger and Secretary of State Haig both supported the INF deployments at the earliest possible time.25
Haig was confronted with the reality of the scope and breadth of European opposition, and as such he was cognizant of the need to hold INF talks, if for no other reason than to be seen as being sympathetic to the concerns of America’s NATO allies. Under pressure from Burt, the State Department began aggressively pushing for the initiation of INF talks at the earliest possible moment. Following a visit by Helmut Schmidt to Washington in May 1981, President Reagan agreed to fully prosecute the dual-track policies of the December 1979 INF agreement, giving equal weighting to both the deployment of INF weapons and the conduct of arms control talks designed to reduce their numbers. Confronted with this reality, Richard Perle executed a brilliant political maneuver, proposing what became known as the “Zero Option”: the removal of all Soviet SS-20 missiles from Europe and Asia, in exchange for U.S. agreement not to deploy the Pershing II and GLCM missiles. Both Burt and Haig rejected Perle’s initiative as unworkable in terms of selling it to the Soviets and its impact on the overall U.S. military buildup, creating as it would the suspicion that American efforts were an exercise in propaganda, easily dismissed as merely a negotiating ploy.26
Perle’s boss, Caspar Weinberger, was initially skeptical, fearful that the Soviets might accept the offer. But it became more and more clear that the Zero Option was, from an anti–arms control point of view, perfect: There was no chance the Soviets would accept the elimination of one of their most effective weapons systems in Europe and Asia, a weapon that was actually deployed, in exchange for the United States not deploying weapons that had yet to be built, let alone deployed. The Zero Option, by playing into European demands for a reduction of nuclear weapons, virtually guaranteed that the Pershing II and GLCM missiles would be deployed into Europe on schedule on the strength of the anticipated Soviet rejection.27
On December 18, 1981, Ronald Reagan officially unveiled the Zero Option INF proposal in remarks made before the National Press Club in Washington, DC. Calling his proposal a “simple, straightforward yet historic message,” Reagan sought to assuage European leaders’ concerns over American intentions toward the Soviet Union, which Reagan maintained were purely peaceful, while maintaining pressure on the Soviet Union for some sort of meaningful arms control. Declaring the scheduled deployment of Pershing II and GLCM missiles as a “reaction” to ongoing Soviet INF buildup, Reagan touted the Zero Option as the ideal solution to European peace and stability. Any INF agreement, Reagan underscored, would have to be fully verifiable based on the precepts of “openness and creativity rather than the secrecy and suspicion which have undermined confidence in arms control in the past.”28
Reagan’s presentation got exactly the reaction that was hoped for in Europe. While several leaders were skeptical of the real policy objectives of the Reagan administration, the Zero Option proposal created an environment of hope not only for meaningful INF talks but also for a resumption of strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviets. Brezhnev was in West Germany when Reagan delivered his speech, immediately putting the Soviets on the defensive at a time when, because of the antinuclear peace efforts in Europe, Moscow felt it had the upper hand diplomatically. Some in Europe recognized that the Zero Option was designed with failure in mind. However, short-term domestic political considerations trumped long-term strategic issues. Reagan’s appointee as the U.S. INF negotiator, Paul Nitze, was bringing a hardliner’s perspective to the table in Geneva. Reagan’s instructions to Nitze were simple: “Hang tough.”29
At a time when the Reagan administration needed stability in terms of its national security policy formulation, it instead was delivered a shattering blow when National Security Counsellor Allen was forced to resign his position in January 1982 after allegations surfaced about a $1,000 gratuity paid to Nancy Reagan by a Japanese magazine that ended up in Allen’s safe, unreported. An investigation also uncovered the existence of three expensive watches Allen had accepted as personal gifts from other Japanese associates. To replace Allen Ronald Reagan turned to a close friend, Deputy Secretary of State William Clark. Unlike Allen, who had to report to Reagan through Edwin Meese, Clark was given direct access to the president.
One of the first crises faced by newly appointed National Security Advisor (a change in status from Allen, who had been called “counselor”) Clark was, not surprisingly, related to the issue of INF. In February 1982 the Soviets, as expected, rejected the Zero Option, incredulous that the United States would seriously seek such a major deviation from the existing SALT accords, which had left the Soviet INF systems untouched. Now the Americans were attempting to have the Soviets do away with all of their INF systems, proposing in exchange not to deploy a new family of weapons still under development, while leaving intact the “forward based systems” (FBS) comprised of the large number of nuclear-capable U.S. military aircraft based in Europe and on U.S. aircraft carriers. Richard Perle had been correct: The Zero Option was an offer the Soviets simply could not accept. In March 1982 the Soviets responded with a counterproposal, calling for a phased reduction in NATO and Warsaw Pact medium-range missiles and nuclear-armed aircraft to six hundred systems by 1985 and three hundred by 1990. Leonid I. Brezhnev, to appease the concerns over the deployments of the SS-20, announced a moratorium on the deployment of any additional SS-20s in Europe. April and May came and went, with the stalemate in Geneva over INF talks in place.30
In early May 1982 President Reagan attempted to break the deadlock in strategic arms talks by announcing a major new arms control initiative that sought not simply limitations on strategic nuclear forces but actual reductions. Such talks had been envisioned since the Carter administration, under the guise of SALT III. Reagan viewed the SALT title as political poison, however, and instead unveiled a new name to accompany his new proposal: strategic arms reductions treaty or START. In a speech delivered on the campus of his alma mater, Eureka College, the president stated that he would like to begin the new START talks as early as June 1982 and that he was open to having a meeting with Brezhnev when the Soviet leader visited the United Nations, also in June. Reagan had to strike a fine balance in his speech between alleviating the political pressure being brought to bear by the European antinuclear protests and acknowledging the disdain among his core supporters for anything associated with arms control. He proposed a two-phased approach toward disarmament, the first phase reducing the strategic arms of both sides by 33 percent, and even deeper cuts—some 50 percent—by the end of the second phase. The START proposal represented dramatic cuts and was designed to have each side possessing the same numbers of nuclear weapon delivery systems. But the proposed cuts were also designed to cut the heavy ICBMs, which represented the core strength of the Soviet strategic arsenal.31
As was the case with the Zero Option INF proposal, Reagan’s START initiative was very much one-sided, calling for the Soviet Union to make significant cuts in its ICBM force while leaving untouched two of the three major components of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal, submarines and heavy bombers. Likewise, the United States was asking the Soviets to make cuts in forces that actually existed, while promising not to deploy new weapons systems, like the MX missile. The START proposal was, it seemed, designed to fail. But in fact Reagan and his advisors were serious about making START work. Despite his criticism of the SALT II treaty, Reagan reluctantly agreed to observe the treaty, although it had not been ratified by the U.S. Senate, as well as to adhere to the 1972 SALT interim agreement, so long as the Soviets did the same. A major concern, especially among members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was that if the SALT accords broke down, then the Soviets would be in a prime position to build up their missile forces more rapidly than the United States could make other plans for. Reagan viewed START as a legitimate exercise in arms control. The question was whether the Soviets would share this same view.32
Even as the Reagan administration put together its combined strategic nuclear strategy and arms control policy, the policy team itself underwent a dramatic transformation in July 1982 with the resignation of Secretary of State Haig. Haig had been under fire from the beginning of his tenure. His inability to establish firm control of American foreign and national security policy had led to numerous bureaucratic clashes with Defense Secretary Weinberger and his further alienation from Reagan’s inner circle. The departure of Allen as the “national security counselor,” and his replacement with Clark, who took over an upgraded National Security Advisor position that further diluted Haig’s influence, only exacerbated matters. Haig submitted his resignation in early July 1982. Reagan accepted it and replaced Haig with George P. Shultz, the former Treasury secretary under Richard Nixon and, until his appointment as secretary of state, an executive at Bechtel, a leading international engineering and construction firm. Shultz was also a member of the CPD, and his appointment brought the State Department, on paper at least, into ideological alignment with the rest of the CPD-dominated Reagan administration.33
The vacuum caused by the shuffle of leadership at the State Department created a window of opportunity for the most unlikely of initiatives from the most unlikely source. Paul Nitze, the INF chief negotiator, had grown increasingly frustrated by the lack of progress in the INF talks, caused largely by the Zero Option policy and his inability to deviate from its strictures in his dealings with the Soviets. He was joined in his frustration by his Soviet counterpart, Yuli Kvitsinsky. Kvitsinsky had indicated to Nitze that the Soviets were undergoing a major review of their whole approach to INF, and unless the deadlock in negotiations was broken soon, this review would happen in a manner detrimental to the goals and objectives of the INF process. The United States was on the verge of beginning its controversial deployment of Pershing II and GLCM missiles into Europe, and the Soviets were threatening to walk out of the talks if this occurred. In a moment of brilliant improvisation, Nitze and Kvitsinsky went on what has become famously known as “the walk in the woods,” where the two negotiators, on their own and without instructions, sought to create a proposal that could serve as the foundation of a Reagan-Brezhnev summit meeting. Recognizing that both sides needed to make concessions in order for their gambit to succeed, Nitze and Kvitsinsky came up with a proposal that would have the Soviets agree to reduce the number of SS-20 missiles deployed against Europe to seventy-five and the United States in turn forgo the deployment of the Pershing II missile, which worried the Soviets greatly, given its ability to strike targets in the western Soviet Union, and limit its deployment of GLCMs into Europe to seventy-five.34
When Nitze brought the proposal to Reagan and his inner circle, it was initially met with approval and excitement. Kvitsinsky had told Nitze that he would communicate the Soviet response to the proposal via the Soviet embassy in Washington, DC. But while Washington waited for Moscow, Moscow was likewise waiting for a sign from Washington that the “walk in the woods” proposal was acceptable to the Americans. Kvitsinsky was a direct representative of Andrei Gromyko, the foreign minister, and as such spoke with his authority. Gromyko had decided to go out on a limb. With Brezhnev’s mental health deteriorating, and Aleksei Kosygin and Mikhail Suslov already dead, Gromyko had permitted Kvitsinsky to go forward without a formal blessing from the central authorities. Yuri Andropov, the head of the KGB, was making a political move to replace Brezhnev, and Gromyko had filled the vacuum by freelancing on INF. For the initiative to succeed, however, it would require the Americans to be seen making the first move.35
In Washington, as reports of Nitze’s bold proposal began circulating among the national security apparatus, a wave of protest began to swell against the compromises Nitze and Kvitsinsky had crafted. Richard Perle and his allies were aghast at any deviation from the Zero Option stance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff rightfully concluded from the compromise that the Soviets were fearful of the Pershing II missile, and as such they were loath to voluntarily surrender such a weapon. Secretary of Defense Weinberger wanted to use the Pershing II missiles to pressure the Soviets into eliminating the SS-20 missiles deployed against Asia, on the grounds that these systems could be rapidly transferred to the European theater in a time of crisis, making the proposed cuts in European-based systems meaningless. But ultimately the proposal was shot down by the new secretary of state, George Shultz, who criticized Nitze for unauthorized “freelancing.” Once it became clear that Nitze had not been speaking with the authority of the secretary of state, Gromyko had no choice but to reject the “walk in the woods” proposal, which he did formally in September 1982. Gromyko chastised Kvitsinsky, noting that in the future all back-channel dealings with Nitze needed to have the backing of Secretary of State Shultz prior to any discussion taking place.36
While the INF talks stalled, the newly named START talks sputtered. Led by chief negotiator Ed Rowney, the U.S. negotiating team seemed to place a premium on making it clear to their Soviet counterparts that these talks were not to be a repeat of the SALT process, but rather something quite different. Rowney did not have much leeway when it came to negotiating any aspect of a START agreement. The foundation of the U.S. position on START was spelled out in May 1982, stating that the U.S. goal in START was to achieve significant reductions in strategic arms yet retain viable deterrence. The focus would be placed on missiles, with the goal of eliminating Soviet advantage in heavy throw-weight systems. The Reagan administration wanted to shift both sides away from ballistic missiles as the key delivery system and rather embrace what it viewed as the less-destabilizing cruise missile, which the United States viewed more as a second-strike system. Additional guidance, released in a document that same month, directed that the United States would comply with the SALT II treaty—and in doing so take no action that would undercut existing arms control agreements with the Soviet Union—and made it clear that SALT II was not an adequate foundation for arms control and that any action the United States might take to ensure the survivability of its existing strategic weapons was justified. Likewise, this document declared that the United States would take no position on the issue of mobile missiles, thereby retaining flexibility when it came to basing concepts for the MX missile.37
The actual START talks began in June 1982. The first specific guidance Rowney and his team received for START established equal caps of 850 total ballistic missiles per side, with a sub-limit of 210 medium to heavy missiles, of which 110 could be heavy missiles. There would be a ban on any new heavy missiles in order to make moot the Soviet advantage in throw-weight capability, a proposed limit on the weight of any new re-entry vehicles of two hundred kilograms, and a limit on the number of MIRVs per ICBM to 10, and 14 for SLBMs. A new issue the U.S. START delegation was authorized to discuss was that of nondeployed missiles and their use in any potential “break out” scenario. Nondeployed missiles were those missiles—spares or reserve stock—that were not deployed with front-line units. With cuts scheduled to take place in both the Soviet and U.S. arsenals, there was a concern that the missiles removed from operational status might be held in reserve, only to be rapidly brought back into service in times of crisis, creating a strategic advantage. The U.S. negotiation position, although based on a singular entity, was divided into two distinct phases. Phase 1 had the United States seeking equality through the reduction of actual missiles; phase 2 would focus on the issue of achieving equality in terms of throw weight.38
In mid-August the Soviets made a surprise move, providing a comprehensive counterproposal that offered to reduce U.S. and Soviet strategic forces to 1,800 long-range missile and bombers each. The Soviet proposal was very similar to that put forward by President Carter in March 1977. The Soviets also asked for curbs on new classes of ballistic missile submarines (the Ohio for the Americans and the Typhoon for the Soviets) and a ban on cruise missiles. The fact that the Soviets did not reject the U.S. START position out of hand, but rather responded in the traditional manner of putting forward a counteroffer, indicated that despite the animosity created by the Reagan administration’s harsh anti-Soviet rhetoric, the Soviets remained committed to conducting serious arms control negotiations. That commitment notwithstanding, there was a massive gulf between the U.S. opening proposal and the Soviet counterproposal, derived as they were from fundamentally different approaches toward what would constitute a fair agreement based on the notion of equality.39
In September 1982 Rowney received a new negotiating guidance that addressed the issue of verification and underscored the need for onsite inspection, both in terms of an active and a passive presence, in any such verification arrangement. This on-site presence was sought not only at specific sites related to treaty activity but also in the areas around ICBM complexes to make sure there were no nondeployed missiles present; there was a provision for challenge inspections of other areas as well. The Soviets viewed the American numbers concerning missiles as a useful starting point for discussion, even if they were by and of themselves unacceptable (the Soviets specifically noted that the U.S. position was not “comprehensive” in nature, refusing, for instance, to discuss the matter of heavy bombers). The demands for on-site inspection, as always, were rejected out of hand.40
“I intend to search for peace along two parallel paths—deterrence and arms reductions.”41 These were the words of President Reagan as he introduced his basing plan for the MX missile in a speech on November 22, 1982. The Reagan approach was simple: In order to get the Soviets to agree to sweeping arms reductions, America had first to rearm itself so that it no longer operated from a position of strategic inferiority, perceived or otherwise. This, the president argued, was the only way to generate fair and equitable force reductions through any arms control effort. The Reagan administration had already initiated its arms control agenda, via the INF and START talks. Now he tackled the issue of deterrence through the vehicle of rearmament by announcing his decision to deploy 100 advanced MX missiles, deployed in what he termed the “Dense Pack” configuration: The missiles were to be deployed in a line 14 miles long and 1.5 miles wide, buried in super hardened silos spaced 1,800 feet apart, so not only would a single Soviet warhead be able to take out only one missile, but also the explosion of the Soviet warhead would destroy any additional incoming Soviet warheads without degrading the surviving MX missiles’ ability to launch. This theory of “fratricide” was untested. If it were viable, more than half of the deployed MX missiles would survive a surprise Soviet attack. If it weren’t, then Reagan was putting all of his strategic eggs in one basket, not exactly the model of strategic survivability called for in the U.S. deterrence strategy.42
The Dense Pack concept was quickly criticized by many members of Congress as a $26 billion negotiating ploy. Less than a month after Reagan proposed Dense Pack, Congress killed it. Reagan, disappointed by the failure of Congress to give him the missile system he wanted, responded on January 3, 1983, by appointing a special panel, headed by former Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, to review U.S. strategic missile options, including options for the MX. It wasn’t just Congress that was troubled by Reagan’s MX plan. The Soviets were apoplectic. The day after Reagan’s speech the Soviet Union blasted the Dense Pack proposal as a “new dangerous step” toward an all-out arms race. Within a week the Soviets expanded on their concerns, calling Dense Pack a violation of the SALT II treaty, which banned the construction of additional fixed missile launchers. The START talks adjourned in early December 1982, with Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov warning ominously that the Soviets would respond to what they viewed as a violation of an existing arms control agreement by fielding a new missile of their own.43
Complicating the overall environment of U.S.-Soviet relations was the death of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev on November 10, 1982. Brezhnev was replaced by Yuri Andropov, the former head of the KGB. Andropov was immediately faced with the controversy created by Reagan’s Dense Pack speech and the need to be responding in an appropriate fashion, resulting in Ustinov’s strongly worded warning. But confrontation was not the path he desired. The new Soviet leader let it be known that Moscow favored a return to the time of détente. Andropov—who as head of the KGB was well acquainted with the reality of Soviet daily life beyond the gloss of Soviet propaganda—had a keen interest in reviving the moribund Soviet economy and understood better than most that a renewed arms race with the United States would have devastating consequences for his country. But the Soviet defense ministry, and in particular Defense Minister Ustinov, were increasingly alarmed by what they viewed as a relentless U.S. effort to achieve world supremacy.44
With the passing of Brezhnev, Andropov was interested in measures that would instill East-West stability and facilitate Soviet economic recovery. Avoiding an arms race with the United States was a large factor in this equation, and early in 1983 the new Soviet leader fielded his own arms control initiative, unilaterally reducing Soviet warhead levels in Europe to those of the French (ninety-eight weapons) and British (sixty-four weapons), thereby achieving the lowest level of nuclear weapons in Europe since 1978. This was real arms control, but Andropov’s effort went unrewarded by a Reagan administration caught in its own rhetorical insanity.45
For all his talk of the need for arms control, Ronald Reagan and his administration had no viable arms control policy. Right-wing ideology had crafted positions so rigid and one-sided as to make them virtually worthless. At ACDA, Eugene Rostow had become increasingly frustrated over the constraints being imposed on negotiations by anti–arms controllers, such as Richard Perle in the Defense Department, and started demanding that he be given more flexibility in crafting a workable arms control policy. This stance cost him his job, and in January 1983 President Reagan replaced Rostow with Kenneth Adelman, an archconservative neophyte on arms control. Rostow’s dismissal, and his replacement by Adelman, only reinforced the concern in Moscow that Reagan was utterly confused about how to approach the issue of restricting the arms race.46
If the dismissal of Rostow sent tremors of concern through Moscow, what Reagan did next had to register as the policy equivalent of an earthquake. On March 8, 1983, in a speech delivered before the National Association of Evangelicals, Ronald Reagan lashed out at a Soviet leadership he called the “focus of evil in the world,” and labeled the entire Soviet Union an “evil empire.” Clearly the Reagan administration was not positioning itself to build a sound relationship with Andropov in the aftermath of Brezhnev’s passing. Instead, building on the concept of mistrust, Reagan himself injected a new initiative that sought not only to undermine any residual goodwill that might exist beween the United States and the Soviet Union, but also to shred one of the foundational documents of the modern arms control experience: the ABM treaty.47
On March 23, 1983, President Reagan delivered a second speech, famously referred to as the “Star Wars” speech, in which he unveiled his administration’s intentions to deploy what was termed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). In a move directly challenging the foundation of conventional nuclear deterrence, Reagan announced the need for American defensive measures capable of rendering Soviet ballistic missiles obsolete. While Reagan claimed otherwise, the SDI initiative represented a direct attack on the ABM treaty and on the concept of equality when comparing U.S.-Soviet strategic power. Although purely theoretical at this stage, this initiative meant that the White House, through the release of NSDD-85, “Eliminating the Threat from Ballistic Missiles,” was committing the United States down a path of long-range research and development for a ballistic missile defense program.48
Reagan followed up his “Star Wars” speech with another primetime television appearance, this time to announce the findings of the Scowcroft Commission on ballistic missile options for the United States. Scowcroft, together with commission members such as Donald Rumsfeld, recommended that the United States deploy a hundred MX missiles, renamed Peacekeeper, to be deployed in existing Minuteman silos in Wyoming. This was seen as an interim measure until the United States could develop a more survivable basing mode for the Peacekeeper.49
The combined effects of the “Evil Empire” and “Star Wars” speeches served to convince the Soviet leadership that the Reagan administration was serious about only one thing: the total domination of the United States over the entire world, including the Soviet Union. Andropov called the Reagan policies “madness” and warned that Reagan was walking an “extremely dangerous path.” The Soviets were growing increasingly concerned about the stalled INF and START talks, and they feared that the Americans were using the talks as a vehicle to achieve a first-strike capability, concerns reinforced by Reagan’s pursuit of SDI. The new secretary of state, George Shultz, spent the summer of 1983 trying to repair U.S-Soviet relations, and there was some minor progress actually made in terms of increased grain shipments and talks on the opening of new consulates. All of this was undone on the night of August 31–September 1, 1983, when the Soviet Air Force shot down Korean Air Lines flight 007, a Boeing 747 aircraft that had strayed deep into Soviet air space, killing all 269 persons onboard. Immediately the Reagan administration reacted, not only condemning the act itself but also questioning the viability of dialogue with a nation capable of committing such an act. Information available today appears to defend the Soviet contention that they viewed KAL 007 as a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft, refuting the charges made by the Reagan administration that this was a deliberate act of murder. But Reagan himself kept upping the rhetoric, labeling the shoot-down as an act of “barbarism,” “savagery,” and “a crime against humanity.” When George Shultz met with Andrei Gromyko on September 8, 1983, in Madrid, Spain, what was supposed to be a time to celebrate a new direction for U.S.-Soviet relations quickly turned into a bitter exchange between the two senior diplomats.50
The attention of America was soon diverted by the deaths of 241 U.S. service members in Beirut, killed when a suicide bomber blew up a barracks housing U.S. Marines, and by the U.S. invasion of Grenada a few days later, ostensibly to free American medical students trapped on the island in the aftermath of a socialist coup d’état, but in fact intended to eliminate a secret Cuban military base alleged to be under construction there. Shortly after the Grenada operation, President Reagan spoke before the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, and unveiled a new policy direction for the Soviet Union, one that envisioned “rolling back” socialism around the world. The Grenada operation, although small in scale, clearly demonstrated in the eyes of the Soviet Union that the anti-Soviet stance taken by Reagan went beyond rhetoric and had assumed an actively militaristic posture. Andropov condemned the Reagan administration’s policies as representing a “serious threat to peace.” The Soviets, Andropov said, had given up on the possibility of serious negotiations with the United States so long as these anti-Soviet policies were in place.51
In November the Soviet Union submitted one last proposal at the INF talks in Geneva, offering to reduce the number of SS-20 missiles facing Europe to even lower numbers than they had agreed to under the moratorium. The U.S. delegation, still operating under the inflexibility of the Zero Option policy, rejected the Soviet offer, and shortly thereafter the United States began the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM missiles to Europe. The Soviets immediately withdrew from the INF talks. In an effort to keep the START talks alive, Brent Scowcroft drafted a proposal calling for both the Soviet Union and the United States to reduce their nuclear arsenals according to the concept of equivalence, based on the disparities between the strategic forces of each side. This represented a departure from the previous Reagan demand of strict equality. Ed Rowney, the START negotiator, was opposed to the new proposal, and misrepresented it to the Soviets in Geneva, reinforcing to his Soviet counterparts that the “basic position of this administration has not changed.” The Soviets in turn refused to deal with Rowney and walked out of the START talks when they concluded in December 1983 without setting a date for their resumption.52 U.S.-Soviet relations were frozen. Andropov, his health failing, condemned the U.S. actions in deploying INF to Europe, somewhat ominously warning about the “dangerous consequences of that course.” Later, in a December 1983 speech to Soviet war veterans, Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov accused the United States of breaking the military-strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, something he said the Soviet Union was “determined not to allow.”53
In January 1984, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists reset the Doomsday Clock to three minutes before midnight, citing the total collapse of arms control dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Cold War not only had grown colder but was in greater danger of becoming a “hot” war than any time since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.
ENDNOTES
1 Allan M. Winkler, Life Under a Cloud: American Anxiety About the Atom (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 39–41.
2 Steven Hayward, The Real Jimmy Carter: How Our Worst Ex-President Undermines American Foreign Policy, Coddles Dictators and Created the Party of Clinton and Kerry (Washington, DC: Regnery Press, 2004), 65.
3 Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Addresses of Jimmy Carter (Middlesex, UK: Echo Library, 2007), 22.
4 Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991) 384.
5 Eric Mlyn, The State, Society, and Limited Nuclear War (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995), 116.
6 Scott Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 49.
7 Robert Banis, Inaugural Addresses: Presidents of the United States from George Washington to 2008, (Science & Humanitarian Press, 2008), 331.
8 David Rothkopf, Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 215.
9 Jerry Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1983), 8.
10 Keith Shimko, Images and Arms Control: Perceptions of the Soviet Union in the Reagan Administration (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 64.
11 Raymond Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1984), 8.
12 Ronald Reagan, Ralph Weber, ed., Dear Americans: Letters from the Desk of President Ronald Reagan (New York: Doubleday, 2003), 12.
13 Beth Fisher, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000), 25.
14 Ibid., 27.
15 J. Peter Scoblic, U.S. Versus Them: How a Half Century of Conservatism Has Undermined America’s Security (New York: Viking, 2008), 119.
16 Ibid., 126.
17 April Carter, Success and Failure in Arms Control Negotiations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 197.
18 Scoblic, 127.
19 Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 61–62.
20 Peter L. Hays, Brenda J. Vallance, and Alan R. Van Tassel, eds., American Defense Policy, 7th ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 223.
21 James Nathan and James Oliver, United States Foreign Policy and World Order (Lebanon, IN: Pearson Scott Foresman, 1989), 396.
22 Steve Breyman, Why Movements Matter: The West German Peace Movement and U.S. Arms Control Policy (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2001), 257.
23 Scoblic, 119.
24 Ted Carpenter, Collective Defense or Strategic Independence? Alternative Strategies for the Future (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1989), 54.
25 Laurence Barrett, Gambling with History: Ronald Reagan in the White House (New York: Doubleday, 1983), 310.
26 Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate of Nuclear Arms Control (New York: Knopf, 1984), 70.
27 Ibid., 72.
28 Richard Shearer, On-Site Inspection for Arms Control: Breaking the Verification Barrier (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1984), 41.
29 Talbott, 157.
30 Michael Mandelbaum, The Other Side of the Table: The Soviet Approach to Arms Control (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1990), 91.
31 Paul Lettow, Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (New York: Random House, 2006), 71.
32 A. Carter, 184.
33 Lou Cannon, Reagan (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1982), 400.
34 Strobe Talbott and Paul Nitze, The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace (New York: Knopf, 1988), 174.
35 Mandelbaum, 110.
36 Talbott, 144.
37 Garthoff, 523.
38 Scoblic, 124.
39 Ian Bellany, Coit D. Blacker, and Joseph Gallacher, eds., The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (London: Cass, 1985), 63).
40 Ronald Powaski, March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1939 to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 207.
41 Philip L. Cantelon, Richard G. Hewlett, and Robert C. Williams, eds., The American Atom: A Documentary History of Nuclear Policies from the Discovery of Fission to the Present, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), 218.
42 Lettow, 84.
43 Ronald Powaski, Return to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1981–1999 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 36.
44 Garthoff, 86.
45 Martin Ebon, The Andropov File: The Life and Ideas of Yuri V. Andropov, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983), 261.
46 Breyman, 135.
47 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 224.
48 Francis Fitzgerald, Way Out in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 147.
49 Lou Dubose and Jake Bernstein, Vice: Dick Cheney and the Hijacking of the American Presidency (New York: Random House, 2006), 51.
50 Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1991), 742.
51 Garthoff, 129.
52 Paul Bennett, Russian Negotiating Strategy: Analytic Case Studies from SALT to START (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 1997), 99.
53 Garthoff, 136.