CHAPTER 16

Failure to Launch

Prague, the Czech Republic, April 5, 2009

Dressed in a dark suit, white shirt and a subdued blue tie (a departure from the “power red” ties that were the mark of his predecessor) with an American flag pin—the symbol of the nation for which he served as chief executive—mounted on the left lapel of his jacket, Barack Hussein Obama, the 44th President of the United States, climbed onto the stage. He was accompanied by his wife, stylishly outfitted in a sleek black dress. Although her husband had been in the office less than three months, her sense of fashion had already caught the attention of the media in both the United States and around the world.

A clear sense of excitement filled the huge crowd that had gathered in Hradcany Square, in the center of Prague, the Czech Republic’s capital. Barack Obama was about to deliver an address that was, by design, intended to capture the imagination of not just the audience in attendance but the entire world. After eight years of the previous conservative administration marked by arrogance and unilateralism, Barack Obama’s presence seemed to usher in a more liberal, open approach reminiscent of a different era, when people spoke of Camelot.

The president was well aware of the comparisons that were being made, and he exploited them in humorous fashion. As his wife left his side in preparation for the start of his address, he told the adoring crowd that he was “proud to be the man who brought Michelle Obama to Prague.”1 This was a clear reference to the famous statement by John F. Kennedy during his May 1961 visit to Paris, when he told a similarly adoring crowd, “I do not think it altogether inappropriate to introduce myself…I am the man who accompanied Jaqueline Kennedy to Paris.”²

The historic visit of the newly elected President Kennedy to Europe that Obama alluded to, a visit in which he toured Paris with his beautiful wife, had also involved business. During that visit, in which Kennedy had a tense summit meeting in Vienna, Austria with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev—where the two leaders discussed the comprehensive nuclear test ban and the Soviet-NATO standoff over Berlin—had occurred months before America’s forty-fourth president was even born. That such a comparison could be relevant in the context of Obama’s visit to Prague underscored the reality that although nearly a half century separated the two visits, the attendant circumstances remained similar.

The parallels between the Kennedy and Obama presidencies were more than simply historical. The two presidents had to deal with a nearly identical adversary (Kennedy and the Soviets, Obama and the Russians). They both had to do so under similar conditions: a deteriorating arms control environment (for Kennedy, the comprehensive test ban treaty [CTBT] negotiations, while Obama faced the looming expiration of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, which served as the foundation of the arms control verification agreements in place between the United States and Russia). These conditions were affected by serious disagreement over events taking place within the NATO sphere (Kennedy had the Berlin crisis; Obama faced the fallout over the short war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008, which continued to sour U.S.-Russian relations). The unifying factor that linked both situations, even though they were separated by nearly forty-eight years, was the reality that both sides possessed nuclear weapons that were capable of unleashing atomic Armageddon not only on themselves but also on the entire world.

While in Prague, Barack Obama was facing his own upcoming summit with the leader of Russia, scheduled for early July 2009, just three months away at that time. The START treaty, signed in July 1991, was due to expire in December 2009. Obama’s predecessor had failed to establish a replacement framework of arms control or disarmament between the United States and Russia. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, or SORT, signed by President Bush and President Vladimir Putin in May 2002 and entered into force in June 2003, contained no verification mechanism or agreed-upon benchmark for implementation. If START expired, there was real concern in both Moscow and Washington that the level of tension and mistrust that existed between Russia and the United States could trigger a new arms race.

President Obama had inherited the planning for a missile defense shield in Europe (to be deployed on two bases, one in Poland, housing missile interceptors, and the other in the Czech Republic, housing the associated radar), to both of which Russia profoundly objected. Already Russia was hinting that it would deploy a new generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) once START expired. Facing a massive budget deficit and an economy in crisis, the last thing President Obama wanted to embark on was a new and expensive arms race with the Russians.

Even before he was elected, Barack Obama had made the decision that he would try to redefine U.S.-Russian relations away from the Cold War-like adversarial atmosphere he had inherited toward one more reflective of the kind of cooperation that many had hoped for in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. To help craft this new approach, Obama turned to Michael McFaul, a professor in political science at Stanford University who had studied and worked in Russia during the 1990s. In October 2006 Michael McFaul was approached by people close to Barack Obama to join a circle of experts who were advising the Illinois Senator on foreign policy issues in preparation for an anticipated presidential bid in 2008. McFaul agreed, and quickly became Obama’s go-to expert on Russian issues. Following the 2008 U.S. presidential election, Obama picked McFaul as the special assistant to the president and senior director of Russia and Eurasian affairs at the National Security Council.3

One of McFaul’s first tasks was to formulate and implement a “reset” in U.S.-Russian relations. There was widespread acknowledgement among Russia observers that, as of 2008, relations between Washington, DC and Moscow were at an all-time post–Cold War low. The goal of a “reset,” McFaul believed, was to “find cooperation with Russia on common interests” and “develop a multi-dimensional relationship with Russia” inclusive of “societal contacts” that would be pursued through a policy of “active engagement.”⁴

For McFaul, however, the Russian “reset” wasn’t about U.S.-Russian relations per se as much as it was about building strong ties between the Obama administration and Dmitry Medvedev, the former prime minister who had assumed the Russian presidency in 2008 from Vladimir Putin. Putin, the hand-picked successor to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, had taken over in 2000, and had just finished out his second term (the Russian Constitution forbade a president from serving more than two successive terms). Now Putin had become the prime minister, effectively trading places with Medvedev.

Obama’s newly confirmed secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, was scheduled to meet with her Russian counterpart, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, in Geneva in March 2009. McFaul advised that it would be a good idea to publicly draw attention to the “reset,” and a State Department staffer came up with the idea of presenting a symbolic “button” that would be symbolic of the occasion. The staffer approached McFaul who, as the resident Russian expert in the NSC, provided what he believed to be the translation for the word “reset” (peregruzka) and the correct spelling.5 When Clinton presented the “reset button” to Lavrov, however, he pointed out that peregruzka did not mean “reset,” but rather “overload,” referring to putting too much power through an electrical system, leading to blown fuses, or even a fire (the actual word for “reset” was perezagruzka).⁶

While harmless, the linguistic gaffe was symbolic of the rushed nature of Obama’s Russian reset. In Prague, Obama planned to demonstrate that his administration would not operate in a “business as usual” mode when it came to the issue of nuclear weapons and disarmament. Rather, the new president wanted to usher in a similarly new beginning regarding not only U.S.-Russian relations but indeed the entire world when it came to the issue of nuclear weapons.

Indeed, in the days prior to his Prague speech, Obama had met with Russian President Medvedev in London on the sidelines of the G-20 meeting. There the two leaders, following talks at the U.S. Embassy residence, issued a joint statement that sought to set both the tone and agenda of this new “reset.” “Reaffirming that the era when our countries viewed each other as enemies is long over, and recognizing our many common interests,” the joint statement began, “we today established a substantive agenda for Russia and the United States to be developed over the coming months and years.”

We also discussed nuclear arms control and reduction. As leaders of the two largest nuclear weapons states, we agreed to work together to fulfill our obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and demonstrate leadership in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world. We committed our two countries to achieving a nuclear free world, while recognizing that this long-term goal will require a new emphasis on arms control and conflict resolution measures, and their full implementation by all concerned nations. We agreed to pursue new and verifiable reductions in our strategic offensive arsenals in a step-by-step process, beginning by replacing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with a new, legally-binding treaty. We are instructing our negotiators to start talks immediately on this new treaty and to report on results achieved in working out the new agreement by July.7

In addition to negotiating a new arms control treaty, the joint statement injected new energy and relevance into what had, over the course of the previous administration of George W. Bush, become a moribund, almost irrelevant process—the NPT review conference. In a year’s time, in May 2010, the nonproliferation treaty (NPT) review conference would convene. Obama was hoping to ally with Russia in order to use this occasion to push for a renewal and reinvigoration of the NPT, building on all three pillars of the treaty—disarmament, nonproliferation and nuclear power—to strengthen the treaty and improve its implementation.⁸

But the joint statement also addressed what amounted to a poison pill—missile defense.

While acknowledging that differences remain over the purposes of deployment of missile defense assets in Europe, we discussed new possibilities for mutual international cooperation in the field of missile defense, taking into account joint assessments of missile challenges and threats, aimed at enhancing the security of our countries, and that of our allies and partners. The relationship between offensive and defensive arms will be discussed by the two governments.⁹

The cooperation hoped for in that last sentence would not be born out over time.

Prague was an awkward, yet ideal, location for President Obama to begin his journey of global nuclear disarmament. The Czech Republic retained deep mistrust of Russia that recalled the era of the Soviet Union. Obama alluded to this reality early on in his speech, declaring, “When I was born, the world was divided, and our nations were faced with very different circumstances…few would have imagined that the Czech Republic would become a free nation, a member of NATO, a leader of a united Europe. Those ideas would have been dismissed as dreams.”¹⁰

Obama spoke of the Velvet Revolution of 1989, which brought down the communist government in what was then Czechoslovakia. He also mentioned the Prague Spring, when from February to August 1968 the people of Prague, and indeed all of Czechoslovakia, sought to distance themselves from the oppressive nature of Soviet-style communism. The Prague Spring came to a crashing end in August 1968 when hundreds of tanks from the Soviet Union crushed the Czechoslovakian effort to effect democratic-based political reform under their treads. The defeat of the Prague Spring movement also destroyed any hope of implementing the sweeping nuclear arms reduction measures being planned at the time by President Lyndon Johnson.11

Moving to calm any fears among the Czechs that his administration might sacrifice the young republic in the name of improved relations with Russia, Obama hammered home the fact that the bond between the United States and the Czech Republic, cemented through the institutions of NATO, was unbreakable: an attack against one was an attack against all. There were new threats facing NATO, Obama said, and contingencies needed to be put in place. But as the United States, the Czech Republic and NATO worked to confront these new threats, it was essential that they also ensure that the remnants of threats derived from the time of the Cold War, namely nuclear weapons, did not come back to haunt them.

“The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War,” the president told the people assembled before him. “No nuclear war was fought between the United States and the Soviet Union, but generations lived with the knowledge that their world could be erased in a single flash of light. Cities like Prague that existed for centuries, that embodied the beauty and the talent of so much of humanity, would have ceased to exist.”¹²

The weapons of the Cold War remained, Obama said, even if the Cold War did not. The president rejected the fatalism of those who viewed the proliferation of nuclear weapons as inevitable; to embrace such a fallacy, Obama noted, was to admit that “the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.” Obama rejected this notion. “As the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon,” he declared, “the United States has a moral responsibility to act.”

So today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. I’m not naïve. This goal will not be reached quickly—perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change. We have to insist, “Yes, we can.”13

These were dramatic words announcing a bold vision—perhaps too bold. From Obama’s Prague speech, three main pillars of policy emerged. The first, dealing with nuclear disarmament on the part of the nuclear-weapon states (the United States, France, the United Kingdom, China and Russia) as envisioned by Article VI of the NPT (in which all parties undertake to pursue good-faith negotiations of effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament), had three major components—a new arms control treaty between the U.S. and Russia, getting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ratified in Congress and brought into force, and the passage of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty at the United Nations which would freeze the size of the existing nuclear arsenals of nuclear-weapons states, and make it more difficult for other nations to join the nuclear club. Each of these components was a major undertaking.

The second pillar, nuclear nonproliferation, revolved around the strengthening of the NPT, as well as bolstering the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify compliance with the NPT. In terms of the latter, the Obama administration would push for the UN Security Council to reach consensus on its obligations to act in cases of noncompliance, embodied by the ongoing standoff between Iran and the IAEA over its nuclear program (which, by 2007, had been determined to be of a peaceful nature by the CIA). Obama also wanted to empower the Security Council with the ability to address the issue of states, such as North Korea, that had withdrawn from the NPT and were acquiring nuclear weapons capability free of any constraint. The Obama administration was silent on the issue of those nations, such as Israel, India and Pakistan, who possessed nuclear weapons and refused to sign the NPT.

The third pillar of Obama’s nuclear strategy was the encouragement of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a safe manner, inclusive of controls over sensitive nuclear materials and technology. Taken in their totality, this vision represented a welcome departure from the lethargy and indifference exhibited by the previous administration of George W. Bush when it came to matters of nuclear nonproliferation. Whether Obama and his new team of nuclear arms control acolytes would be able to turn theory into reality was another question altogether.¹⁴

In addition to Michael McFaul, who was more academic than arms control specialist, Obama brought into his inner circle two persons who were to prove to be critical in trying to bring his nonproliferation vision to fruition. In recognition of the priority that was being placed on arms control, Obama had created the position of White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The incumbent would serve “as the principal advisor to the President on all matters relating to arms control and the prevention of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and WMD terrorism, and coordinated United States government activities, initiatives, and programs to prevent proliferation and WMD terrorism and promote international arms control efforts.” To fill this position, Obama tapped Gary Samore, a Harvardeducated non-proliferation expert whose previous experience included stints at RAND, Lawrence Livermore, the State Department, the Clinton administration National Security Council (where he served as the Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export controls), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, and with the Council on Foreign Relations, in New York.15

Samore was to be the arms control policy Czar. The task of turning policy into reality, however, especially on the linchpin of the entire Obama nuclear policy framework—a new strategic arms control treaty with Russia—fell to Rose Gottemoeller, who was sworn in as the Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation on April 6, 2009—one day after Obama’s Prague speech. Like Samore, Ms. Gottemoeller had done stints with both RAND, the Council on Foreign Relations, and IISS, as well as service in the Clinton White House as a member of the NSC, and as a nuclear non-proliferation expert with the Department of Energy. She had also worked with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in both their Washington, DC and Moscow offices. Gottemoeller had a firm grasp of the issues, and she knew and understood the Russians. All her skills would be put to the test in the months to come.¹⁶

One of the most pressing realities facing McFaul, Samore and Gottemoeller was that of time. The START treaty, which provided the framework for verifiable strategic nuclear arms control, was due to expire on December 5, 2009. For her part, Gottemoeller wasted no time getting to work. On April 24 she and her team of negotiators met in Rome with their Russian counterparts, led by the veteran Russia diplomat, Anatoly Antonov, and began the process of drafting an agreed treaty framework that would be available for their respective leaders by early July, when a Summit was planned to take place in Moscow.17

Gottemoeller’s task was complicated by the reality of competing agendas. The goal of reducing the strategic nuclear stockpiles of Russia and the U.S. from the 1,700-2,200 deployed warheads permitted under the Bush-era SORT agreement to a verifiable 1,500 was the easiest part of the negotiations. Resolving disagreements over verification was more complicated—the U.S. wanted more on-site inspections, the Russians fewer. Likewise, the U.S. was pushing for new accountability procedures, which included assigning a unique identifier to each accountable item, something the Russians opposed. And, under pressure from Congressional Republicans, the U.S. was pushing for the continuation of stringent exchanges of telemetry related to the flight testing of missiles. The Russians had long resisted this measure, and the U.S. negotiators viewed it as redundant, given the new on-site inspection provisions which allowed for the physical inspection of warheads and missiles.¹⁸

Rose Gottemoeller also faced constraints from competing bureaucratic realities, the most critical of which was the Department of Defense’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The purpose of the NPR was to establish U.S. nuclear deterrence policy, strategy and posture—in short, to define the foundation upon which any follow-on agreement to START would be based. From an arms control perspective, this was no “chicken or egg” exercise, but rather a process which began with the NPR establishing the doctrinal parameters within which Gottemoeller and her negotiators would be operating. In short, one had to first understand the circumstances under which the U.S. intended to use nuclear weapons before one could come to an agreement on how many nuclear weapons were needed, and of what type. Disarmament could not take place in a vacuum. As such, when she sat down with Antonov in Rome, Gottemoeller had no point of reference when it came to what the NPR would be proposing as policy. She was, as it is said, negotiating with one hand tied behind her back, compelled to repeatedly coordinate with the National Security Council staff to ensure any agreements reached were compatible with the doctrinal requirements anticipated to be spelled out in the NPR, which was being drafted in parallel with Gottemoeller’s negotiations.¹⁹

Despite the many obstacles in their way, Obama’s disarmament team was able to prepare an agreed “joint understanding for the START follow on treaty” together with their Russian counterparts that was signed with great fanfare by President Obama and President Medvedev during a much-hyped summit held in Moscow from July 6-9, 2009. According to this agreement, the limits on strategic delivery vehicles, such as missiles and bombers, would be in the range of 500-1100, and in the range of 1500-1675 for their associated warheads. Specific provisions on definitions, data exchanges, notifications, eliminations, inspections and verification procedures, as well as confidence building and transparency measures, would become an integral part of any future treaty, along with a provision to the effect that each Party will determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms—in short, Russia and the U.S. would be able to define for themselves what mix of their own bombers, missiles and submarines would be contained within an overall cap on delivery vehicles.20

The agreement on a joint understanding, however, papered over the very real differences between Russia and the U.S. over missile defense. The day before Obama was scheduled to arrive in Moscow, Russian President Medvedev gave an interview in which he declared that the U.S. must compromise on plans for a missile-defense system in Europe if it wanted any agreement regarding a reduction in nuclear warheads. These issues, Medvedev said, “are interconnected.” Medvedev urged the U.S. to “show restraint and show an ability to compromise,” after which the two sides could “agree on the basis of a new deal on START and at the same time can agree on the question of how we move forward on anti-missile defense.”²¹ The joint understanding agreement contained a single sentence calling for “a provision on the interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms.”²² While this proved enough to salvage the Moscow Summit, there were real concerns that missile defense could end up sinking a START follow-on treaty.

With the Moscow Summit in the books, the Obama administration turned to the next major calendar date on his nuclear agenda—the speech before the United Nations General Assembly, where President Obama would seek to tie in his bilateral disarmament efforts with Russia to his global vision for multilateral nuclear nonproliferation. In this regard, Obama had two looming deadlines—the expiration of the START treaty in December 2009, and the convening of the NPT Review Conference in May 2010. For Obama’s vision of global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, as expressed in his Prague speech, to have any chance of success, he needed to be seen as being as committed to the latter, arms control and reduction, as to nonproliferation. This commitment was doubly important given the ongoing diplomatic friction between Iran and the IAEA over its nuclear program; in order for the U.S. to have credibility on the issue of Iran, it had to be seen as being committed to the larger principles of nuclear disarmament, including its own.

Further complicating an already complex policy problem, missile defense once again intruded into the narrative—needless to say. Since taking office, President Obama and his national security team had been wrestling with the decision previously taken by the Bush administration regarding the deployment of ten modified ground-based interceptor (GBI) missiles in Poland, along with a corresponding radar site in the Czech Republic. The Polish GBI was a two-stage version of the existing three-stage GBI that was already deployed in Alaska and California. But the modified GBI was still just a concept—no missiles had been built as of September 2009, and the first missiles weren’t scheduled to be flight tested until sometime in 2010. Moreover, the anticipated footprint of the Poland GBI (i.e., the area it could protect) excluded much of NATO, including Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania from any missiles launched from Iran, the ostensible purpose behind the deployment to begin with. Moreover, both Poland and the Czech Republic were emphasizing the importance of the modified GBI and radar deployment in terms of the signal it would send to Russia, despite the fact that the U.S. had been telling the Russians that the Polish GBI was not intended to target Russian missiles. This was the last message Washington, DC wanted to be sent.23

Based upon the recommendation of his advisors, President Obama announced, in a speech delivered on September 17, that the Polish GBI was being scrapped in favor of a more capable missile defense system built around the U.S. Navy’s Aegis air defense system, equipped with advanced SM-3 surface-to-air missiles. This shield would be serviced initially by U.S. Navy ships deployed in both the Black and Mediterranean Seas. Later, so-called “Aegis Ashore” units would be installed at sites in eastern Europe, configured to shoot down any missiles launched against Europe from Iran.²⁴

“[O]ur new missile defense architecture in Europe,” Obama declared, “will provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and America’s allies. It is more comprehensive than the previous program; it deploys capabilities that are proven and cost-effective; and it sustains and builds upon our commitment to protect the U.S. homeland against long-range ballistic missile threats; and it ensures and enhances the protection of all our NATO allies.”25

Obama went out of his way to assure the Russians that any concerns they had about this new missile defense program were “entirely unfounded,” noting that “[o]ur clear and consistent focus has been the threat posed by Iran’s ballistic missile program, and that continues to be our focus and the basis of the program that we’re announcing today.”²⁶

The Russian response was warm. Prime Minister Putin, a long-time opponent of the U.S. plans to deploy missile defenses in Europe, called Obama’s decision “correct and brave,” while President Medvedev made it clear that Russia would respond favorably to any American initiative that replaced the Poland GBI with systems deemed to be less threatening to Russia.²⁷

Obama hoped to be able to convert the Russian goodwill into concrete support for a tougher stance on what was, from the American perspective, one of the foremost nuclear proliferation problems of the day—Iran. The U.S. had been at loggerheads with Iran over the scope, scale and intent of its nuclear program. From the perspective of Washington, DC, the Iranian efforts to enrich uranium were little more than a cover for a military program the purpose of which was to enable Iran to produce a nuclear weapon. While a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) published in 2007 assessed that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons activities sometime in 2003, and that Iran was not currently pursuing a nuclear weapon, the U.S. policy continued to be one premised on the starting point that Iran could not be trusted to have an indigenous uranium enrichment program, despite the fact that, as a signatory to the nonproliferation treaty, Iran had every right to do so under Article IV of the NPT. Getting international consensus for increasing the pressure on Iran to cease enrichment was a challenge; having Russian support for such an effort was deemed critical.²⁸

President Obama sought to use the platform provided by the annual General Debate of United Nations General Assembly, which afforded the heads of states of the various member nations the opportunity to address the world body on matters of import. For Obama and the U.S., the 2009 General Debate was seen as the ideal venue for garnering international support for the bold nuclear disarmament vision that had been outlined in Prague earlier that year. When President Obama took to the dais in the main conference hall of the General Assembly on September 23, he was reading from a speech that had been carefully scripted by his national security team to accomplish that very objective.

“[W]e must stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and seek the goal of a world without them,” the President declared, clearly defining his agenda. “This institution was founded at the dawn of the atomic age, in part because man’s capacity to kill had to be contained. For decades, we averted disaster, even under the shadow of a superpower stand-off. But today, the threat of proliferation is growing in scope and complexity. If we fail to act, we will invite nuclear arms races in every region, and the prospect of wars and acts of terror on a scale that we can hardly imagine.”

A fragile consensus stands in the way of this frightening outcome—the basic bargain that shapes the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. It says that all nations have the right to peaceful nuclear energy; that nations with nuclear weapons have the responsibility to move toward disarmament; and those without them have the responsibility to forsake them. The next twelve months could be pivotal in determining whether this compact will be strengthened or will slowly dissolve.

America will keep our end of the bargain. We will pursue a new agreement with Russia to substantially reduce our strategic warheads and launchers. We will move forward with ratification of the test ban treaty, and work with others to bring the Treaty into force so that nuclear testing is permanently prohibited. We will complete a nuclear posture review that opens the door to deeper cuts and reduces the role of nuclear weapons. And we will call upon countries to begin negotiations in January on a treaty to end the production of fissile material for weapons.

I will also host a summit next April that reaffirms each nation’s responsibility to secure nuclear material on its territory, and to help those who can’t—because we must never allow a single nuclear device to fall into the hands of a violent extremist. And we will work to strengthen the institutions and initiatives that combat nuclear smuggling and theft.

All of this must support efforts to strengthen the NPT. Those nations that refuse to live up to their obligations must face consequences. This is not about singling out individual nations—it is about standing up for the rights of all nations that do live up to their responsibilities. Because a world in which IAEA inspections are avoided and the United Nation’s demands are ignored will leave all people less safe, and all nations less secure.

But if the governments of Iran and North Korea choose to ignore international standards; if they put the pursuit of nuclear weapons ahead of regional stability and the security and opportunity of their own people; if they are oblivious to the dangers of escalating nuclear arms races in both East Asia and the Middle East—then they must be held accountable. The world must stand together to demonstrate that international law is not an empty promise, and that Treaties will be enforced. We must insist that the future not belong to fear.29

The speech was a tour de force of aggressive nuclear nonproliferation policy, one which matched longstanding American demands vis-àvis Iran and North Korea with a renewed commitment on the part of the U.S. to see its own nuclear arsenal reduced while embracing the ultimate goal of universal nuclear disarmament.

While it played well to the international audience, Obama was hopeful that Russian ears were likewise attuned to his message. At a meeting with Russian President Medvedev later that day, he had the opportunity to find out. Afterwards, both Obama and Medvedev took time to brief the press on the results of their get together. Obama started off by highlighting the progress that had been made with Russia over a new START treaty. “[B]oth of us,” Obama noted, “are confident that we can meet our self-imposed deadline to get an agreement that substantially reduces our nuclear missiles and launchers by the end of the year.”

The American president then declared that the U.S. was “committed to upholding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that strikes a bargain with all countries. That bargain says that countries are able to pursue peaceful nuclear technology; that they commit not to pursuing nuclear weapons; and those nations that have nuclear weapons make commitments to start reducing their stockpiles.”

Obama sought to identify common ground with his Russian counterpart.

As the two major nuclear superpowers, we have made a commitment that we will reduce our nuclear stockpiles and move forward on our part of the bargain. And many other countries are abiding by the international commitments and norms that have been established by the NPT.

He then hit his main point—holding Iran accountable.

Unfortunately, Iran has been violating too many of its international commitments. So what we’ve discussed is how we can move in a positive direction that resolves a potential crisis, not just in the Middle East but that can cause enormous problems to the non-proliferation regime worldwide. I believe that Russia and the United States shares the strategic objective that Iran can pursue peaceful energy sources but that it should not pursue nuclear weapons. I believe we also share the view that this should be resolved diplomatically, and I am on record as being committed to negotiating with Iran in a serious fashion to resolve this issue.30

President Obama made no mention of missile defense.

For his part, President Medvedev seconded much of what his American counterpart had said about Iran. “Our task,” Medvedev noted, “is to create such a system of incentives that would allow Iran to resolve its fissile nuclear program, but at the same time prevent it from obtaining nuclear weapons.” As to the issue of sanctions, Medvedev was less than enthusiastic. “Russia’s belief is very simple, and I stated it recently: sanctions rarely lead to productive results.”

Instead of closing there, however, Medvedev brought up missile defense. He stated that he believed that the decision to halt the Polandbased GBI “was reasonable,” and that it took “into consideration our concerns on the missile defense which is needed for Europe and for the world. And we are ready to continue this work with our U.S. colleagues in this direction, as well as with our European colleagues, of course.”

Medvedev closed on an optimistic note. “Most importantly, we’ve learned to listen to each other once again. And that is of great importance both to the future of relations of the two countries and the two peoples.”³¹

Two days later, on September 25, Obama was once again in front of television cameras, discussing Iran. He was in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, which at the time was playing host to the G-20 Conference. This time, however, the subject was not generic policy proclamations, but rather the recent disclosure by Iran of a previously undeclared nuclear facility located in Fordow, near the Iranian holy city of Qom. While Iran claimed, with some justification, that it had complied with the letter of the law when it came to notifications involving the Fordow plant, Obama took the opposite line.

Iran’s decision to build yet another nuclear facility without notifying the IAEA represents a direct challenge to the basic compact at the center of the non-proliferation regime…[t]his site deepens a growing concern that Iran is refusing to live up to those international responsibilities, including specifically revealing all nuclear-related activities.

“[T]his is not,” Obama reminded his audience,

the first time that Iran has concealed information about its nuclear program. Iran has a right to peaceful nuclear power that meets the energy needs of its people. But the size and configuration of this facility is inconsistent with a peaceful program. Iran is breaking rules that all nations must follow—endangering the global non-proliferation regime, denying its own people access to the opportunity they deserve, and threatening the stability and security of the region and the world.32

The Fordow crisis could not have come at a worse time for the Obama administration. Iran’s uranium enrichment program was geared toward the production of nuclear fuel enriched to a level of approximately 3.5%. This amount was far below that required for a viable nuclear weapon—for that the uranium would need to be enriched in excess of 90%. However, Iran was experiencing a fuel shortage for a research reactor which operated using uranium fuel enriched to approximately 20%. The U.S. already had concerns over the accumulation by Iran of uranium stocks enriched to 3.5%. According to calculations conducted by the Obama administration, Iran was in possession of some 1,300 pounds of uranium enriched to 3.5%. This was enough for Iran to produce a single nuclear device. If Iran were to accumulate a similar amount of uranium enriched to 20%, it would be that much closer to producing a nuclear weapon.

The solution, according to the Obama administration, was simple—rather than having Iran continue to produce enriched uranium, Iran would instead transfer its stock of enriched uranium to a third party, who would then replace the Iranian uranium with an equivalent amount of enriched uranium that had already been processed into nuclear fuel, and as such was unusable in a nuclear weapon. Negotiations were already underway with Russia to see if Moscow would accede to the fuel swap concept. The revelation of the existence of the Fordow facility, however, put these plans in a flux. The Fordow situation also complicated U.S. preparations for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, where issues such as Iran’s right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes were certain to be a key topic of discussion. Anything that could be interpreted as representing an unrealistic U.S. restriction of Iran’s rights under the NPT would not sit well with the bulk of the member states whose support the U.S. would need if it were to push forward its ambitious agenda of NPT reforms.

The NPT Review Conference was scheduled for May 2010. In the meantime, the Obama administration was in a race against time regarding a new START treaty. The December deadline was fast approaching, and it was becoming increasingly apparent that there would not be a ratified treaty in place to replace START once it expired. The best the Obama administration could hope for would be to have a finalized treaty draft that each side would adhere to pending ratification and entry into force.

The failure to produce a new START treaty was becoming a political issue, as well. President Obama would need the support of the Republicans in the Senate if his vision for nuclear nonproliferation were to have any chance of reaching fruition. This included having the Senate ratify whatever new START treaty that might be negotiated, as well as a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Fissile Material Cutoff treaty. But there was already grumbling within the Senate over the delay regarding START. Senator Richard Lugar, the influential ranking member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, had published an OpEd in the Washington Times where he observed that “the current U.S.-Russian relationship is complicated enough without introducing more elements of uncertainty. Failure to preserve the START Treaty would increase the potential for distrust between the two sides.”33 Another critical Republican Senator, Senator Jon Kyl, the Senate Minority Whip, was on record about his concerns over the loss of verification capability once START expired, noting in November 2009 that “the U.S. will lose a significant source of information that has allowed it to have confidence in its ability to understand Russian strategic nuclear forces; likewise, the Russian Federation will lose information about the U.S. nuclear forces.”34

The message being sent by the Republican Senators was clear—so long as the U.S. had confidence in its understanding of the composition and capability of the Russian strategic nuclear force, arms control and its attendant treaties was a worthwhile endeavor. However, once uncertainty creeps in, restoring this confidence might prove to be an impossible task. The U.S. needed a new START treaty sooner, not later.

But the Senate, which had its own views on arms control separate from the Obama administration, had also made it clear that it viewed certain verification provisions contained in the soon to be expired START treaty as essential to any follow-on agreement, thereby complicating negotiations where the Russians (and the Americans) were keen on eliminating outdated compliance measures, such as the exchange of telemetry. (Advances in technical intelligence collection made moot the need for such an exchange, since all of the requisite data, and more, was being collected regardless.) Likewise, Senate Republicans linked any disarmament effort with a parallel modernization of the U.S. nuclear enterprise, something that required a completed Nuclear Posture Review to be on hand. Finally, the Senate was adamant—there would be no linkage between a new START treaty and missile defense.

Thus hobbled, the American negotiators continued to pound away at their thankless task. Progress was measured in small steps—by November 15, during the Asia-Pacific Summit held in Singapore, President’s Obama and Medvedev were able to agree to undertaking a “bridge” agreement which would uphold the principles of a new START agreement pending final ratification (Obama was also able to get Russian agreement on a fuel swap plan for Iran).³⁵

Later that month Michael McFaul and Gary Samore accompanied Obama’s National Security Advisor, Jim Jones, to Moscow where the final details concerning warheads and delivery vehicle numbers were being hashed out with the Russians. Building on the success of this meeting, President Obama prepared for the finalization of a treaty to be had with President Medvedev during the Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, on December 10. The START treaty had expired by this time, and both sides were keen on formalizing an agreed upon “bridging mechanism.” Such an outcome, however, was not to be. Important progress was made, but no deal was able to be finalized. This was the reality that confronted the Obama administration as 2009 came to a close.36

Negotiations continued in January 2010 with a marathon session conducted in Moscow where significant progress was made, only to dramatically backslide on February 24 during a much-anticipated telephone conversation between Obama and Medvedev. A Russian misunderstanding about the U.S. position on missile defense led Medvedev to broach the issue with Obama, who was taken aback by any notion of the U.S. yielding on the issue. As far as Obama was concerned, the U.S. position had not changed—the U.S. was going forward with missile defense in Europe. How this would proceed could be discussed with the Russians, but it was going to happen. After a terse exchange, culminating in Medvedev insisting the U.S. address missile defense as part of a new START agreement, and Obama threatening to terminate negotiations altogether rather than yield on that point, the two parties hung up.³⁷

A compromise was eventually reached where noncommittal language regarding missile defense would be inserted in the treaty text, thereby satisfying Russian demands to remain engaged in the process without violating U.S. red lines. By March 26, 2010, Presidents Obama and Medvedev were able to make a joint announcement that a final agreement had been made regarding a New START treaty,³⁸ and that there would be a treaty signing ceremony held on April 8, 2010, in Prague, bringing the matter full circle from when President Obama first raised it during his fateful speech delivered almost a year ago to the day.

In announcing the completion of the treaty, the Obama administration noted that “the Treaty has a verification regime that combines the appropriate elements of the 1991 START Treaty with new elements tailored to the limitations of the Treaty,” adding that “the inspections and other verification procedures in this Treaty will be simpler and less costly to implement than the old START treaty.” Treaty verification procedures, the White House stated, will include “on-site inspections and exhibitions, data exchanges and notifications related to strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the Treaty, and provisions to facilitate the use of national technical means for treaty monitoring.”³⁹

The completion of the New START treaty coincided with the finalization of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) process by the Department of Defense. The 2010 NPR represented the doctrinal foundation upon which the U.S. negotiation position vis-à-vis New START was founded, as well as the totality of President Obama’s nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament philosophy. On April 6, 2010—two days before President Obama was to fly to Prague and sign the New START treaty with Russian President Medvedev—Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (a holdover from the administration of George W. Bush who was asked to stay on by President Obama as a symbol of bipartisanship and to provide much needed continuity), together with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Michael Mullen, gave a press conference where the 2010 NPR was publicly unveiled.40

“The NPR,” Gates announced, “provides a road map for implementing President Obama’s agenda for reducing nuclear risks to the United States, our allies and partners and the international community. This review describes how the United States will reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons with a long-term goal of a nuclear-free world.”

As Gates explained, the NPR focused on five key objectives: preventing nuclear proliferation and terrorism, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. national security strategy, maintaining strategic deterrence and stability while reducing nuclear force levels, strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners, and sustaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal.

“To these ends,” Gates declared, “the NPR includes significant changes to the U.S. nuclear posture. New declaratory policies remove some of the calculated ambiguity in previous U.S. declaratory policy. If a non-nuclear-weapons state is in compliance with the nonproliferation treaty and its obligations, the U.S. pledges not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against it. If any state eligible for this assurance were to use chemical or biological weapons against the United States or its allies or partners, it would face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response.”

Gates did not hide the intended targets of this new policy. “So there is a message for Iran and North Korea here, it is that, if you’re going to play by the rules, if you’re going to join the international community, then we will undertake certain obligations to you, and that’s covered in the NPR. But if you’re not going to play by the rules, if you’re going to be a proliferator, then all options are on the table in terms of how we deal with you.”

Gates spoke of the direct correlation between the NPR, the New START treaty, and the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal. “The NPR concluded,” Gates noted, “that stable deterrence can be maintained while reducing U.S. strategic nuclear vehicles by approximately 50 percent from START I levels, a finding that drove negotiations for the new START treaty with Russia.” Moreover, Gates underscored the fact that the U.S. would not develop any new nuclear warheads. “Programs to extend the lives of warheads will use only nuclear components based on previously tested designs and will not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities.”

As much as the 2010 NPR represented fundamental changes in U.S. declaratory nuclear policy, it also underscored the reality that, from a structural standpoint, U.S. nuclear posture remained unchanged. “[W]e will maintain the nuclear triad of ICBMs, nuclear-capable aircraft and ballistic-missile submarines,” Gates noted. “[W]e will continue to develop and improve non-nuclear capabilities, including regional missile defenses, to strengthen deterrence and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our overall defense posture. And finally, the United States will continue abiding by its pledge not to conduct nuclear testing.”41

Gates’ final comments underscored the reality that the United States, even with a progressive-minded president at the helm, was a nation where the reality of nuclear weapons dominated every aspect of U.S. defense policy. It consumed a significant portion of the defense budget, and underpinned military planning across the broad spectrum of contingency preparations, from confronting non-state terrorism to potential major power confrontation. President Obama had, speaking in Prague in April 2009, appeared to offer a vision of a world free from nuclear weapons. The American nuclear enterprise was in many ways a product of its own massive inertia, almost impossible to stop, and only capable of small changes in course direction at a time. The best Obama could hope for was to lock in a series of incremental changes which, in their totality, combined to affect the kind of overarching change he sought. The NPR allowed the possibility of a modicum of change; the New START treaty reflected that meagre possibility, a first small step in what would hopefully be a series of changes that might ultimately bring with them meaningful movement in the direction of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Nonetheless, the ceremony celebrating it echoed the kind of pomp that once marked similar arms control agreements reached between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Set in a rococo ballroom in the gilded interior of the grand Prague Castle, gold leaf offsetting dramatic friezes, with large elegant chandeliers looming over the inlaid wooden desk where the leaders of the world’s two largest nuclear powers sat, the signing ceremony for the New START treaty represented a fitting culmination of nearly a year of non-stop negotiations designed to continue the Cold War-era policy rack of nuclear arms reductions toward a goal of eventual nuclear disarmament. Both Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev appeared pleased when they affixed their respective signatures to the treaty documents, before exchanging the instruments and shaking hands. Afterwards, the two leaders addressed the assembled world media.

“One year ago this week,” Barack Obama began his celebratory comments, “I came here to Prague and gave a speech outlining America’s comprehensive commitment to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and seeking the ultimate goal of a world without them. I said then—and I will repeat now—that this is a long-term goal, one that may not even be achieved in my lifetime. But I believed then—as I do now—that the pursuit of that goal will move us further beyond the Cold War, strengthen the global nonproliferation regime and make the United States, and the world, safer and more secure. One of the steps that I called for last year was the realization of this treaty, so it’s very gratifying to be back in Prague today.”42

The signing of the New START treaty represented a culmination of the “reset” in relations Obama sought with Russia and, by doing so, redefined the two nuclear powers’ relationship with the rest of the world. “[T]his day demonstrates the determination of the United States and Russia—the two nations that hold over 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons—to pursue responsible global leadership. Together, we are keeping our commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which must be the foundation for global nonproliferation.”⁴³

Obama represented the new START as more than just a single agreement, but rather was “one step on a longer journey.” Missile defense, securing global stocks of nuclear material, and strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation treaty all represented additional steps on that same journey, he contended.⁴⁴

For his part, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev appeared equally ebullient. “This agreement,” he noted, referring to the newly signed treaty, “enhances strategic stability and, at the same time, enables us to rise to a higher level for cooperation between Russia and the United States.” Medvedev emphasized the treaty’s major achievements: “1,550 developed weapons, which is about one-third below the current level; 700 deployed ICBMs—intercontinental ballistic missile—and anti-ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, and this represents more than twofold reduction below the current levels; and 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers for such missiles—deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers, which again represents a twofold reduction below the level that existed prior to the signature on this treaty.”

But Medvedev’s praise came with a major caveat: “We believe—and this is our hope and position—we believe that the treaty can be viable and can operate only provided there is no qualitative or quantitative improvement in place in the capabilities, something that could, in the final analysis, jeopardize the strategic offensive weapons on the Russian side. This is the gist of the statement made by the Russian Federation in connection with the signature on this treaty.”

Medvedev was referring to the issue of missile defense. As one of the conditions for signing the New START treaty, Russia insisted on its right to issue what was known as a “unilateral statement” which declared that if there was a qualitative and quantitative improvement in the U.S. missile defense system, Russia would be justified in withdrawing from the New START treaty.

There was nothing new about such statements; every U.S.-Soviet arms control agreement dating back to the time of President Nixon contained one or more such statements, either signifying a political understanding between the two parties, or underscoring one party’s point of view or interpretation of an issue. The Russian “unilateral statement” was matched by a similar statement made by the U.S. which declared that it would continue to develop and deploy missile defense systems to defend itself and its allies.45

President Obama hoped to use the momentum from the signing of the New START treaty to help launch his ambitious Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), which convened in Washington, DC on April 12-13, 2010. Forty-seven national delegations participated in the summit, with 38 of those being represented at the head of state level. With this kind of international political firepower, the 2010 NSS seemed poised to put forward sweeping proposals which meaningfully addressed the issue of nuclear materials and international peace and security.

The NSS, however, was fundamentally flawed on several fronts. First and foremost, its principal target was nuclear terrorism—the acquisition and use by a non-state actor of a nuclear device. According to a communique issued by the White House at the conclusion of the NSS, “Nuclear terrorism is one of the most challenging threats to international security, and strong nuclear security measures are the most effective means to prevent terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear materials.”46 Such a scenario, however, was so far removed from reality that it actually diminished the impact of having so many world-leaders gathered in one location.

While all of the participants at the NSS committed to the principle of controlling the production and utilization of fissile material, singling out North Korea and Iran as potential sources of fissile material for terrorist entities while ignoring the contributions of nations like Japan (one of the world’s largest suppliers of plutonium) to the proliferation of nuclear material stood out. Likewise, the fact that Israel, a long-time nuclear power whose arsenal has been shielded from scrutiny by the United States, refused to participate in the conference at the head of state level, and both India and Pakistan—like Israel, non-NPT nations possessing nuclear weapons capability and whose respective efforts to build nuclear weapons was setting the stage for a dangerous nuclear arms race in south Asia—were treated with kid gloves by the Obama administration, further mooted the credibility of the summit when it came to genuine issues of nuclear non-proliferation. So, too, did the fact that the Obama administration did not invite either Syria, Iran or North Korea to the summit, an act of exclusion which served to paint the 2010 NSS as more of an extension of U.S. policy objectives than a multinational effort to curb nuclear proliferation.⁴⁷

By focusing almost exclusively on the issue of security in the face of the (unlikely) threat of nuclear terrorism, President Obama directly undermined his stated vision of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. The NSS made no mention about a fissile material cutoff treaty, largely because of Pakistani concerns that it needed to keep producing fissile material in order to produce enough nuclear weapons to keep pace with its nuclear-armed arch-nemesis, India. Likewise, the U.S. kept compliance with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines off the summit agenda out of concerns that the waivers granted by the U.S. to India, which was not a party to the NPT and who possessed nuclear weapons, would come under attack. And finally, the issue of Iran’s nuclear program loomed large at the summit but was only discussed on the sidelines given the wide gulf that separated the participants when it came to the issue of increased economic sanctions as a means of compelling Iranian compliance. In the end, the Obama administration sought, and gained, consensus among the summit’s many participants, but in doing so unveiled the harsh reality that most of the issues at the heart of any global effort at the elimination of nuclear weapons were too complicated and controversial to be addressed on a consensus basis by such a diverse gathering.48

The failure of the 2010 NSS to achieve any breakthrough in the fields of nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament was made even more apparent when juxtaposed with the results of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which was held at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from May 3-28. The stated goal for the U.S. at the NPT Review Conference was to reaffirm global support for the nonproliferation treaty through a balanced review of its three pillars: nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.⁴⁹

The U.S. delegation to the NPT Review Conference was led by a career civil servant, Ambassador Susan Burk. Ambassador Burk began her career in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where she helped shape nuclear negotiations policy. She then joined the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), where she was responsible for nonproliferation affairs. In 1999 Burk joined the State Department as the Director of Nonproliferation’s Office of Regional Affairs, and in 2004 was appointed the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Nonproliferation Bureau.⁵⁰ In 2009 President Obama appointed Ambassador Burk as the U.S. Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation.

For nearly a year prior to the convening of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Ambassador Burk and her staff had worked on getting consensus for a stronger stance on nuclear safeguards, NPT compliance, support for the International Atomic Energy Agency, and support for President Obama’s step-by-step plan for nuclear disarmament. Thanks in large part to the preparatory work conducted by Ambassador Burk and her staff, the 172 counties participating in the NPT Review Conference reaffirmed their commitment to the nonproliferation regime and agreed to concrete actions set forth in a consensus final document that included a 64-point action plan for disarmament, nonproliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and making progress toward a Middle East nuclear-weapons-free zone.⁵¹

From the U.S. perspective, when compared to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, which failed to produce any agreed action plan for addressing nuclear disarmament or proliferation, the 2010 iteration was a success, especially considering the difficulties of consensus-driven multilateral diplomacy. But one of the major goals of the U.S. at the conference was to isolate Iran in the eyes of the world over its continued refusal to yield to U.S. and UK demands regarding its nuclear program. Given that Iran was a participant in the NPT Review Conference, the U.S. had to tread lightly in order to prevent Iran from failing to sign on to a joint communique, and therefore deny the conference the consensus necessary to adopt any finding or resolution. Even there, the U.S. was prepared to forego consensus if it meant Iran was the only nation blocking consensus; if that were to happen, the U.S. believed, it would only highlight Iran’s isolation.

Iran, however, surprised the U.S. by announcing midway through the NPT Review Conference that it had approved a controversial fuel swap initiative brokered by Turkey and Brazil. Iran operated a medical research nuclear reactor in Tehran that produced vital medical isotopes. This reactor used uranium fuel enriched to 20%, far above the 3.5% enrichment Iran had undertaken to produce fuel for its nuclear power plant at Bushehr. Iran had a pre-existing supply of fuel that scheduled to run out sometime in 2010. In 2009, Iran discreetly approached the IAEA to see if it would be possible to acquire a new supply of 20% fuel.

The U.S. became aware of Iran’s predicament, and immediately blocked the IAEA from providing any help. Instead, the Obama administration sought to leverage Iran’s need for 20% fuel into an arrangement which would have Iran transport the bulk of its stock of 3.5% enriched uranium to Russia, which in turn would transport it to France, which would enrich it to 20% and convert it into the metallic fuel plates used by the research reactor, before returning it to Iran. The goal for this “fuel swap” was to prevent Iran from accumulating enough low-enriched uranium to produce a nuclear weapon, once that stock had been enriched to 90% or more. Iran, distrustful of the U.S. keeping its commitments once the Iranian uranium stocks left Iranian control, balked at the arrangement. The Obama administration, seeing a political opportunity, continued to press Iran to accede to the fuel swap and to transform any Iranian refusal into talking points that could be used against Iran at the NPT Review Conference.52

Midway through the conference, however, Iran announced, together with Turkey and Brazil, that it has agreed to a fuel swap arrangement which would see Iran transfer half of its low-enriched uranium (LEU) stockpile to Turkey in return for fuel for a medical research reactor. While the terms of the Turkish-Brazilian-Iranian fuel swap were virtually identical to the proposal being floated by the U.S., there was one critical difference: the deal brokered by Turkey and Brazil was designed to succeed, while that put forward by the U.S. was intended to fail. Almost immediately, the Iranian announcement came under attack from the U.S. and U.K., and a concerted diplomatic effort was launched to kill the Turkish-Brazilian deal. But the damage to the U.S. effort had been done—rather than rally the world against Iran, Iran emerged from the NPT Review Conference with several member states voicing support for the Iranian actions, and questioning the motives of the U.S.53

The Obama administration regrouped following this stumble, and pushed through a package of economic sanctions through the United Nations designed to both punish Iran and compel it to abandon its enrichment program. Instead, Iran redoubled its commitment to produce 20% enriched fuel. Moreover, Iran began preparations to install centrifuge cascades at the Fordow site which would be dedicated to the production of 20% enriched uranium.⁵⁴

There was one last task remaining for the Obama administration in 2010—getting the New START Treaty ratified in the Senate. No sooner had the ink dried from the signatures affixed to the treaty documents, than Ambassador Gottemoeller found herself engaged in a constant stream of hearings and briefings, where she advocated on behalf of the treaty she negotiated before Senators and their staffs, many of whom were supportive, many of whom were skeptics, and a handful—including John Kyl, who were both skeptical and opportunistic. President Obama needed 67 votes for ratification, and it was touch and go as to whether he would be able to garner sufficient support. Contrary to the START provisions, the 2011 Defense Budget had already allocated some $80 billion for nuclear weapons modernization; at Senator Kyl’s insistence, Obama allocated an additional $10 billion. But even this was not enough; Kyl withdrew his support for the treaty in November, blindsiding the President and his staff. Only a last-minute push, which included the President providing additional commitments regarding the deployment of ballistic missile defense in Europe, enabled Obama to secure the votes necessary for ratification; in short, Obama was able to secure ratification of a treaty which purported to lessen the threat posed by nuclear weapons by embracing policies which actually accelerated the potential for nuclear conflict. The New START Treaty was passed on December 22, 2010, with 71 Senators voting in favor.55

The New START Treaty was supposed to be the foundation upon which the U.S.-Russia reset was to be built, and yet it wasn’t until nearly two years into his presidency that Obama was able to get American ratification. Even before treaty ratification, however, the reset faltered. The concept behind the reset was for the U.S. to engage in actions together with Russia that were designed to bolster the credibility of Dmitry Medvedev as the Russian head of state, perhaps enabling him to serve a second term if then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin consented to allow him to seek reelection in elections scheduled for March 2012. While the New START treaty lingered in Congress, however, new opportunities emerged to demonstrate U.S.-Russian accord emerged.

The first of these opportunities was to improve economic ties between the two nations. Russia was keen on joining the World Trade Organization (WTO). During President Medvedev’s visit to Washington, DC on June 25, President Obama pledged U.S. support for Russia’s membership. The U.S. also brought up the possibility of lifting economic sanctions imposed on Rosoboronexport, the Russian state arms export corporation. But the reality of Congressional involvement slowed down the process of approval—the sanctions were eventually lifted, and Russia—with U.S. support—became the 156th member of the WTO in August 2012.⁵⁶

A more contentious issue hung over the burgeoning U.S.-Russian reset like a Sword of Damocles—missile defense. In November 2010, the NATO membership convened in Lisbon, Portugal for the annual NATO Summit. For the first time, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) would be convened at the head of state level. One of the major items on the agenda was missile defense. President Medvedev arrived at the summit with a detailed proposal which would incorporate Russian missile defense components into the NATO architecture. While this proposal made operational sense, President Obama rejected it on the grounds that NATO could not be relying upon Russian capabilities for its collective defense, if for no other reason than NATO’s raison d’etre was built around containing Russia. Nonetheless, both leaders agreed to continue their dialogue on missile defense, and to come up with a more concrete proposal by June 2011.⁵⁷

Obama and Medvedev were scheduled for another face-to-face meeting during the G-8 summit, held in Deauville, France in May 2011. The advisors for both presidents worked together to craft common language for a joint statement on U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defense. Medvedev expended considerable political capital getting a skeptical Vladimir Putin to agree to the language and arrived at the G-8 meeting fully expecting the statement to be issued as planned. However, the U.S. ended up balking at the last minute, prompting President Obama to back off issuing the agreed-upon statement. Medvedev was furious, as he was made to look weak and ineffectual on the eve of Russia deciding who its next President would be. That decision rested with one person—Vladimir Putin. Medvedev’s failure to deliver on missile defense would prove to be a factor in Putin’s eventual decision.58

The end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011 saw the onset of a series of popular uprisings against established autocratic authority in North Africa and the Middle East that became known as “the Arab Spring.” By the spring of 2011, this unrest had spread to Libya and Syria, two longtime Russian client states with a history of cooperation with Moscow dating back to the time of the Soviet Union. As the unrest spread in Libya, concerns began to be raised in Europe and the United States about a potential humanitarian disaster unfolding inside Libya as forces loyal to Libya’s long-time leader, Muammar Ghaddafi, cracked down on the rebels. While these accusations turned out to be vastly exaggerated, at the time there was considerable pressure for the United Nations Security Council to impose a “no-fly zone” over Libya which, enforced by U.S. and European air power flying under the auspices of NATO, was ostensibly to curtail any human rights abuses.⁵⁹

Key to any such resolution being passed was getting both Russia and China to either vote in favor of the resolution or, at a minimum, abstain. The use of a veto by either country would effectively kill the resolution. Insofar as the U.S. expected China to follow the Russian lead, U.S. pressure focused on Russia and its President to go along with the so-called humanitarian intervention. Much to the surprise of the U.S. diplomatic community, Medvedev agreed not to use a Russian veto. The resulting Security Council-backed intervention by NATO prompted a very public split between Medvedev and Putin, with Medvedev issuing a rare public rebuttal of Putin’s objections. By May 2011 it became apparent to Medvedev that he had been played for a fool by the U.S. and NATO, with the humanitarian intervention merely a smoke screen for a wider program of regime change. Medvedev expressed his frustrations to Obama during the G-8 summit in Deauville, France.60

The one-two punch delivered by the failure to secure a commitment by the U.S. for cooperation on missile defense, combined with the embarrassment over the Libya debacle, proved too much for Medvedev’s survival. On September 24, 2011, on the occasion of the meeting of the congress of United Russia (the ruling political party in which both Medvedev and Putin were members), Dmitry Medvedev proposed that his predecessor, Vladimir Putin, stand for the presidency in 2012. Putin readily accepted. The fix was in—Putin immediately proposed that Medvedev run on the United Russia ticket in the parliamentary elections in December 2011, thereby succeeding Putin as Prime Minister. Medvedev’s tenure as Russia’s head of state was finished, with the reins of power being, once again, placed in Putin’s hands.

The first act of the theater that was the Putin-Medvedev exchange of power took place in early December 2011, during parliamentary elections which saw the size of United Russia’s parliamentary majority reduced considerably. In the end, Russia United emerged victorious, and Dmitry Medvedev’s role as Russia’s future Prime Minister was secured. But there were widespread reports of voter irregularities which had many in the Russian opposition crying foul, prompting large-scale demonstrations in the streets of Moscow, which were forcefully put down by Russian authorities.

At this juncture, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton issued a statement that would dramatically alter the substance and tenor of U.S.-Russian relations going forward. Speaking at a gathering of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Vilnius, Lithuania, Clinton declared that “When authorities fail to prosecute those who attack people for exercising their rights or exposing abuses, they subvert justice and undermine the people’s confidence in their governments.” Clinton continued, noting that “As we have seen in many places, and most recently in the Duma elections in Russia, elections that are neither free nor fair have the same effect.”⁶¹

For his part, President Putin condemned Clinton’s remarks as an act of blatant interference in the Russian election process. “[Opposition leaders] heard the signal and with the support of the U.S. state department began active work,” Putin said during a meeting in preparation for the upcoming presidential election, scheduled for March 4, 2012. “We are all grownups here. We all understand the organizers are acting according to a well-known scenario and in their own mercenary political interests.”62

On March 4, 2012, the Russian people went to the polls to complete the last act in the power transition drama involving Putin and Medvedev; Putin emerged victorious, winning nearly 60% of the vote.

“I promised you we would win,” a tearful Putin proclaimed to a crowd of supporters. “We have won. Glory to Russia!” Putin went on to denounce Hillary Clinton’s earlier criticism of Russia’s elections, labeling it as an attempt to “destroy Russia’s statehood and usurp power. The Russian people have shown today that such scenarios will not succeed in our land,” he declared. “They shall not pass!”⁶³

The U.S.-Russian reset was dead, and with it Barack Obama’s vision, such as it was, of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. The failure of this vision, articulated so forcefully during his Prague speech in April 2009, to launch was doomed by American hubris, linked to a nuclear weapons enterprise that resisted any and all efforts to rein it in. Barack Obama had one chance to pull back from the precipice of a world dominated by nuclear weapons.

He failed.

ENDNOTES

1 White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, the Czech Republic,” press release, April 5, 2009.

2 Jan Potter, Janet and Jackie: The Story of a Mother and Her Daughter, Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis (New York: Mac Millan, 2002), 184.

3 Uriel Epshtein, “An Interview with Michael McFaul, U.S. Ambassador to Russia,” The Politic.org, August 19, 2013 (https://thepolitic.org/an-interviewwith-michael-mcfaul-u-s-ambassador-to-russia/).

4 Ibid.

5 Jim Geraghty, “The Infamous ‘Reset’ Button: Stolen From a Hotel Pool or Jacuzzi,” National Review, March 3, 2014 (https://www.nationalreview.com/the-campaign-spot/infamous-reset-button-stolen-hotel-pool-or-jacuzzi-jimgeraghty/).

6 https://sputniknews.com/world/201903061073007622-clinton-lavrovreset-anniversary/.

7 https://www.politico.com/story/2009/04/obama-medvedev-release-jointstatement-020756.

8 Arms Control Today staff, “Taking Stock of the NPT: An Interview with U.S. Special Representative Susan Burk,” Arms Control Today, March 2010. (https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010-03/taking-stock-npt-interview-usspecial-representative-susan-burk).

9 Ibid.

10 “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” op. cit.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/press-briefinggary-samore-ambassador-alex-wolff-and-mike-mcfaul.

15 http://nis2016.org/agenda/speaker-bios/gary-samore/.

16 https://web.archive.org/web/20090417061214/http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/121630.htm.

17 https://www.nti.org/gsn/article/start-negotiators-voice-optimism-afterfirst-meeting/.

18 Michael McFaul, From Cold War to Hot Peace (Mariner Books: New York, 2019), 142–143.

19 Ibid., 140.

20 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/jointunderstanding-start-follow-treaty.

21 https://www.rferl.org/a/Russia_Calls_On_US_To_Compromise_On_Missile_Defense/1769610.html.

22 White House, “Joint Understanding…,” op. cit.

23 https://armscontrolcenter.org/boom-goes-the-dynamite-on-the-bushthird-site/.

24 Ibid.

25 https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/us/politics/18shield.text.html.

26 Ibid.

27 Clifford J. Levy and Peter Baker, “Russia’s Reaction on Missile Plan Leaves Iran Issue Hanging,” The New York Times, September 18, 2009.

28 https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/20071203_release.pdf.

29 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/23/barack-obama-unspeech.

30 https://traceyricksfoster.wordpress.com/2009/09/24/remarks-bypresident-obama-and-president-medvedev-of-russia/.

31 Ibid.

32 Hanna Ingber Win, “Obama Iran Nuclear Speech At G-20 (TEXT),” Huffington Post, November 25, 2009.

33 Senator Richard Lugar. “Trust Still Needs Verification,” The Washington Times, July 18, 2008, p. 24.

34 Senator Jon Kyl, “NSWG Travel,” Remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition. November 21, 2009. p. S11969.

35 https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2009/11/15/Medvedev-Obamamet-in-Singapore/94871258294050/.

36 McFaul, op. cit., 147–148.

37 Ibid., 150.

38 Ibid., 153.

39 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Key Facts About the New START Treaty, Washington, D.C., March 26, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/key-facts-about-new-start-treaty.

40 https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/04/139929.htm.

41 Ibid.

42 https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/text-of-obama-andmedvedev-remarks/.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2010/04/07/a-new-start.

46 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/communiquwashington-nuclear-security-summit.

47 https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/april-2010-nuclear-securitysummit/.

48 Ibid.

49 https://carnegieendowment.org/2010/06/17/2010-npt-reviewconference-what-happened-and-what-next-event-2939.

50 https://2001-2009.state.gov/outofdate/bios/b/34496.htm.

51 Carnegie Endowment, 2010 NPT Review Conference, op. cit.

52 Scott Ritter, Dealbreaker: Donald Trump and the Unmaking of the Iran Nuclear Agreement (Atlanta: Clarity Press, 2018), 129–132.

53 Peter Crail, “Brazil, Turkey Broker Fuel Swap with Iran,” Arms Control Today (June 2010) (https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010-06/brazil-turkeybroker-fuel-swap-iran).

54 Ritter, Dealbreaker, op. cit. 133–135.

55 McFaul, op. cit., 153–156.

56 Ibid., 172–173.

57 Ibid., 189–190.

58 Ibid., 190–192.

59 Ibid., 224–225.

60 Ibid., 226–227.

61 Arshad Mohammed and Nerijus Adomaitis, “Clinton criticizes Russia vote, Germany urges improvement,” Reuters, December 6, 2011 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-election-usa/clinton-criticizes-russia-vote-germany-urges-improvement-idUSTRE7B50IE20111206).

62 Miriam Elder, “Vladimir Putin accuses Hillary Clinton of encouraging Russian protests,” The Guardian, December 8, 2011 (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/08/vladimir-putin-hillary-clinton-russia).

63 Timothy Heritage, “Putin Claims Victory in Election,” The Fiscal Times, March 4, 2012 (http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2012/03/04/Putin-Claims-Victory-in-Election).